Why is Egypt Involved in the Impasse Between Ethiopia and Somalia?
In early 2024, a major geopolitical event unfolded in the Horn of Africa with far-reaching consequences. Ethiopia and Somaliland signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on 01 January 2024 granting Ethiopia sea access through Somaliland’s ports in exchange for potential international recognition for Somaliland, marking a significant shift in the region’s political landscape.
The move was swiftly met with opposition from Somalia. The federal government in Mogadishu, despite having no authority over Somaliland since 1991, called the MoU illegal and accused Ethiopia of violating its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Tensions have mounted between the two countries since then. Somalia’s President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has sought to strengthen his country’s military and diplomatic alliances, culminating in a defense agreement with Egypt, formally approved by Somalia’s cabinet on 19 July 2024.
A month later, on 27 August 2024, two Egyptian military planes arrived at Mogadishu airport, according to Reuters, carrying weapons and ammunition. Egypt is reportedly preparing to send 10,000 troops to Somalia as part of a new peacekeeping mission slated for next year. This move has further escalated tensions with Ethiopia, raising fears of an emerging conflict. During a speech commemorating Ethiopia’s Day of Sovereignty on 08 September 2024, Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed issued a stern warning: “Anyone wishing to provoke Ethiopia should think carefully—ten times, not just once.”
Eyasu Hailemichael, a lecturer of International Relations specializing in the Horn of Africa, noted that while the risk of direct military confrontation remains low, a proxy conflict between Egypt-backed Somalia and Ethiopia is increasingly likely and carries significant geopolitical implications. According to Eyasu, the strategic importance of the Horn of Africa, particularly its proximity to the Red Sea—a vital maritime corridor for global trade—makes regional stability crucial, and the ongoing discord threatens to disrupt supply chains, hinder economic development, and destabilize an already fragile area.
Eyasu further emphasized that the involvement of external powers like the US, China, Russia, and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries complicates the situation, raising concerns about the Horn of Africa becoming a geopolitical battleground.
Egypt’s Involvement: Genuine support or strategic maneuver?
Asrat Birhanu, a hydropolitics researcher, argues that Egypt’s involvement is less about supporting Somalia and more about countering Ethiopia’s influence in the region. He suggests that Egypt is using its military cooperation with Somalia to create a geopolitical buffer against Ethiopia and gain leverage in the ongoing Nile River dispute.
Asrat highlights the disconnect between Egypt’s portrayal as a stabilizing force and its actions. He notes that the military agreement with Somalia appears to be a thinly veiled attempt to draw the country into Egypt’s sphere of influence. “Egypt’s strategy could undermine Somalia’s sovereignty and stability, exacerbating its internal fragmentation and further destabilizing the region,” he remarked.
Moustafa Ahmad, a researcher at the United States Institute of Peace, echoed this view, noting that Egypt’s primary interest is in isolating Ethiopia rather than playing a constructive role in Somali security. “The failure of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) negotiations and Ethiopia’s continued filling of the dam have placed significant domestic pressure on Cairo. Additionally, Egypt is unwilling to accept Ethiopia’s potential naval presence in the Red Sea,” he stated.
By aligning with Somalia, Moustafa argues, Egypt risks further destabilizing a region already grappling with internal challenges, such as the ongoing fight against Al-Shabaab militants. Somalia’s military cooperation with Egypt not only hardens Ethiopia’s stance on the MoU with Somaliland but also complicates Somalia’s internal political dynamics. Some Somali federal member states have expressed dissatisfaction with Egyptian involvement under the AU Support and Stabilization Mission, preferring the continued role of Ethiopian forces, which Mogadishu is seeking to phase out.
Federico Donelli, a professor of International Relations at the University of Trieste specializing in the Red Sea region, explained that Egypt’s involvement in Somalia is driven by both strategy and opportunity. Strategically, President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has been working to revive Egypt’s regional influence, particularly through diplomacy. Concurrently, Somalia’s request for Egyptian assistance provides an opportunity to deter Ethiopia amid growing rivalry between the two countries.
However, Federico warned of significant risks to Egypt’s strategy, including potential backlash from other regional powers and the challenge of navigating complex internal dynamics and challenging terrain in Somalia. “Egyptian troops may face more vulnerabilities than they anticipate,” he cautioned. Federico also noted that Egypt’s involvement has shifted the regional balance of power, with new alliances forming around Somalia’s position while others remain neutral. However, Somalia’s fragility persists, and Egyptian intervention could increase the country’s vulnerability, he stated.
Navigating a diplomatic solution
Turkey has actively attempted to mediate between Ethiopia and Somalia, hosting two rounds of talks in Ankara. Initially, these discussions offered a glimmer of hope for resolving the crisis, but the talks collapsed due to irreconcilable differences. Somalia demands that Ethiopia scrap the MoU, while Ethiopia insists on securing sea access in a “mutually agreeable manner.” A third round of talks is scheduled, though experts remain skeptical about the likelihood of success.
According to Federico Donelli, author of Turkey in Africa: Turkey’s Strategic Involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa, Turkey has made considerable efforts to mediate, but the underlying issues remain too complex. “It is hard to imagine Ethiopia giving up access to the Red Sea, and equally difficult for Somalia to accept the MoU with Somaliland,” he said. This deadlock suggests that only a significant compromise from one side could break the impasse, something neither nation appears willing to do.
Moustafa Ahmad concurs that Somaliland’s pursuit of international recognition is the core issue. “Somalia will continue to oppose any deals involving Somaliland’s independence, and the MoU has highlighted the need to address this issue,” he stated. He also suggested that Somalia’s strengthened military cooperation with Egypt may have emboldened Mogadishu, complicating Ethiopia’s diplomatic position and straining Turkey’s mediation efforts.
Eyasu Hailemichael added that deep-seated mistrust between Ethiopia and Somalia, stemming from historical tensions and diverging national priorities, makes finding common ground exceedingly difficult. This distrust has undermined mediation efforts so far, he stressed.
As tensions escalate, the urgency for a diplomatic resolution grows. Eyasu suggests a multifaceted approach that emphasizes promoting cooperative solutions. He noted that sustained regional dialogue, facilitated by neutral bodies such as the African Union or the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), could help ease tensions and ensure long-term stability in the region.
