Between Maritime Access and Recognition: Geopolitical Implications of Rapprochement Between Ethiopia and Somaliland

Recent statements by Somaliland’s foreign minister, Abdirahman Dahir Adam, also known as “Bakal” — affirming Ethiopia’s right to sea access and Hargeisa’s readiness to discuss this issue with the Ethiopian government — have reignited debate over Ethiopia-Somaliland relations. These remarks carry particular weight in the context of shifting power dynamics around the Red Sea, where intensifying global competition over maritime routes underscores the growing strategic importance of ports and logistical infrastructure. At the heart of this debate lies a structural geopolitical dilemma: Ethiopia’s landlocked geography on one side, and Somaliland’s uncertain status within the regional order on the other. The challenge extends beyond bilateral ties between Hargeisa and Addis Ababa, encompassing questions of sovereignty, recognition, and the balance of power in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea region.

The interview given by Somaliland’s foreign minister to the Ethiopian newspaper The Reporter on June 6, 2026, conveyed several key messages that reveal the implications and motives behind the revival of this maritime cooperation issue, the future of relations between Somaliland and Ethiopia, and the ongoing transformations in the Horn of Africa:

First, the statements emphasized the flexibility of the new administration in Hargeisa and its openness toward its Ethiopian neighbor. They suggest that Somaliland may not necessarily require formal Ethiopian recognition at this stage, but rather seeks to strengthen its partnerships with Addis Ababa and other regional and international actors. This approach is intended to bolster Somaliland’s de facto legitimacy and improve its negotiating position with Mogadishu, even in the absence of legal recognition. Despite growing expectations among Somaliland’s leadership and elite that friendly countries like Ethiopia and Kenya might follow Israel’s lead in recognizing Somaliland, Bakal clarified that his government respects Ethiopia’s policy and would never push Addis Ababa toward recognition. He expressed confidence, however, that Ethiopia will eventually view Somaliland as “a reliable and stable partner that it will eventually recognize.” This reflects a growing awareness in Hargeisa that the real value lies not only in potential recognition, but in positioning Somaliland as an indispensable partner in regional arrangements concerning ports, trade, and logistical corridors.

Second, the interview paved the way for a new negotiating track. When the Somaliland minister was asked how far his country’s new administration had changed its policy toward neighboring Ethiopia, which he described as Somaliland’s closest and most important ally in the Horn of Africa, and whether the administration wished to revive the controversial memorandum of understanding with Ethiopia, he did not provide a direct answer. Instead, he shifted the discussion away from the memorandum itself, which he said was “not the only thing” possible in the course of cooperation between the two sides, and emphasized the broader idea that Hargeisa understood Ethiopia’s maritime needs and was prepared to discuss them. He also noted that Ethiopia could make greater use of the port of Berbera, which, according to him, has not yet happened. This formulation does not necessarily indicate a formal return to the memorandum of understanding. Rather, it reflects an attempt to reproduce the strategic logic on which the memorandum was based, with a view to reintroducing it within a new negotiating framework that is less politically costly and more diplomatically acceptable. In other words, Hargeisa may be seeking to separate the strategic project from the legal and political framework that has raised regional and international objections, by presenting maritime cooperation with Ethiopia as a long-term economic and logistical project rather than a geopolitical maneuver conditional on recognition or one that infringes on questions of sovereignty.

Third, Hargeisa is seeking to capitalize on regional transformations that enhance Somaliland’s geostrategic value. This is especially true of developments related to the war with Iran and its proxies, and their repercussions for Red Sea security and global supply chains. These developments have led to a reassessment of the strategic importance of ports and vital coastal sites in the Horn of Africa, including the port of Berbera. The port is becoming increasingly attractive, especially for Ethiopia, as one of the potential alternatives for reducing its dependence on Djibouti. It is also gaining relevance as part of the broader restructuring of regional transport and trade networks, as well as emerging maritime security arrangements.

The prospects for reviving maritime cooperation and reaching new arrangements between Ethiopia and Somaliland appear stronger than before. Despite the uncertainty created by the “Ankara Declaration” signed between Ethiopia and Somalia in late 2024, several drivers continue to support — and even reinforce — the potential for a deeper partnership.

First, Internal Pressures: Domestic circumstances in both countries create incentives to break the deadlock, opening space for development and joint growth. Both governments increasingly recognize the feasibility of partnership, given the convergence of economic and strategic interests.

Second, Somaliland’s Growing Assertiveness: Somaliland’s recent success in consolidating power has emboldened Hargeisa to challenge Mogadishu more directly, strengthening its confidence in pursuing independent arrangements.

Third, Port Negotiations: Statements by Somaliland’s foreign minister did not rule out the possibility of granting Ethiopia a sovereign seaport. Rather, they suggested a willingness to negotiate better terms or wait for more favorable timing, signaling flexibility rather than outright rejection.

Fourth, Somalia’s Instability: The deteriorating situation in Somalia — marked by the federal government’s crisis of legitimacy and accumulated failures to establish a stable governance model in the south — creates further openings for Somaliland to advance alternative arrangements.

Fifth, Regional and International Context: Potential regional supporters for this type of arrangement, combined with growing international concern over Red Sea security and global supply chains, may help create an enabling environment for expanding logistical cooperation. While comprehensive political agreements remain unlikely in the near term, these dynamics could sustain incremental progress in maritime collaboration.

On the other hand, this path faces significant structural and political obstacles. Foremost among them is the legal status of Somaliland, which remains unrecognized internationally, and the firm position of Mogadishu, which enjoys broad support from the African Union and most international partners. In addition, the Ankara Declaration has created a new political reality that may make any Ethiopian return to unilateral arrangements with Hargeisa more politically and diplomatically costly. Such a move could be interpreted as a retreat from Ethiopia’s efforts to maintain calm with Somalia, especially given Addis Ababa’s ambitious demands — including a military base — and its declining reliance on Somalia, which is unable to offer a credible alternative for port access.

Beyond these bilateral challenges, the fragile balance of power in the Red Sea, overlapping interests of regional actors, and the sensitivity of port-related issues add further complications. The volatility of the regional security environment undermines the prospects for sovereign agreements and weakens the ability of both parties to commit to long-term arrangements that require durable political and security stability.

The resurgence of Ethiopia-Somaliland maritime cooperation reflects broader regional transformations. The revival of the idea of granting Ethiopia maritime access through Somaliland goes beyond economic and logistical considerations. It constitutes a critical test of sovereignty, recognition, and influence in the Horn of Africa, with far-reaching implications for relations between Mogadishu and Hargeisa, broader geopolitical balances in the region, and the interests of external powers.

1. Implications for Mogadishu-Hargeisa Relations 

For Mogadishu and Hargeisa, the issue is not merely about port facilities for Ethiopia — it sets a political precedent that directly touches on sovereignty and legitimacy. Any maritime arrangement between Ethiopia and Somaliland would deepen the divide between Somalia and Somaliland, exacerbating long-standing disputes, particularly against the backdrop of Somaliland’s normalization of relations with Israel.

While Somalia’s federal government asserts its full and exclusive authority over all Somali territory, including Hargeisa and Berbera, and threatens to use force to reintegrate Somaliland into the Somali federal state, the most dangerous aspect may not be the Somali response itself. Rather, it lies in the interplay of internal and external factors that continue to deepen the rift between the ruling elites in the south and north. The Somaliland issue is no longer merely an internal political matter that can be resolved through dialogue or gradual containment. It has become a distinct reality intertwined with regional and international calculations and interests that extend beyond the control of Somali and Somaliland leaders.

2. Implications for Regional Balances

The Ethiopia-Somaliland partnership exemplifies the intensifying geopolitical competition in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. In recent years, the region has undergone profound transformations, with the focus shifting from security issues, border disputes, and counterterrorism to ports, sea lanes, and logistics infrastructure.

Strengthening cooperation with Ethiopia would mark a qualitative leap for Somaliland, expanding its network of foreign relations and strengthening its position at the heart of the regional and geopolitical equation. It would also place Hargeisa on a clearer path toward broader international engagement as a de facto independent actor. In return, it would significantly advance Ethiopia’s strategic project to build maritime influence, including securing a permanent port and military base on the Red Sea coast. Such a development could redefine Ethiopia’s regional role and reshape the balance of power and maritime security equations in this vital corridor and the wider region.

The Future of the Ethiopia-Somaliland Partnership

Available evidence suggests that the partnership between Addis Ababa and Hargeisa will be shaped not only by internal dynamics and political will, but also by evolving regional balances across the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa. Expectations regarding maritime access and political recognition fluctuate between three possible scenarios.

Scenario 1:The Expansion of Functional Cooperation

This scenario builds on the existing trajectory of gradual cooperation, focusing on economic rather than political dimensions. It could involve greater use of the Port of Berbera, development of trade routes and infrastructure, and the creation of special economic zones. Crucially, it avoids sensitive political or sovereign arrangements that could be interpreted as implicit recognition of Somaliland or affecting its current legal status.

Grounded in pragmatism, this path allows both sides to achieve economic gains while minimizing political risks. It provides a practical and predictable framework with fewer risks, including those perceived by Somalilanders, southern Somali unionists, and their regional allies. This approach also aligns with the Ankara Declaration and with the preference of many international partners to promote economic integration while preserving the existing legal framework. It is therefore the most realistic and achievable scenario in the short and medium term, and it could evolve gradually through cumulative implementation steps rather than through a comprehensive political agreement.

Scenario 2: Negotiating a New Formula That Could Lead to Ethiopian Recognition of Somaliland

This scenario assumes that the governments of Abiy Ahmed and Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi, better known as “Irro”, will engage in serious discussions that could lead to reviving or improving the previous memorandum of understanding. This could result in a more comprehensive agreement granting Ethiopia long-term maritime privileges in exchange for political and economic gains for Somaliland. These gains could include formal recognition or steps that approach it in practice.

This scenario reflects Ethiopia’s growing maritime ambitions and Somaliland’s increasing confidence in its ability to expand its foreign policy options. However, its realization remains dependent on changes in the regional and international environment. First, Ethiopia would need to be convinced that the strategic gains outweigh the potential costs of deviating from the understandings established by the Ankara Declaration. This makes the scenario possible, though less likely, in the foreseeable future.

Scenario 3: Strategic Stagnation

In this scenario, political and diplomatic constraints prevent a breakthrough on the maritime access issue, leaving relations between the two parties uncertain. This scenario could gain strength if renewed momentum emerges in the reconciliation process between Ethiopia and Somalia. It could also become more likely if leadership priorities or political calculations change in Addis Ababa, Hargeisa, or Mogadishu. Additionally, Mogadishu’s ability to mobilize regional and international pressure could increase, leading to the containment or obstruction of any arrangements to which it is not a party. This would, in turn, reduce opportunities for maritime cooperation between Ethiopia and Somaliland.

However, such a stalemate would not address the root causes of the problem, including Ethiopia’s geographical constraints, Somaliland’s limited legal status, and increasing regional competition over sea lanes. These factors make this scenario less sustainable in the medium and long term.

Conclusions

Recent developments in relations between Ethiopia and Somaliland reveal that the issue of Ethiopian maritime access is re-emerging within new regional dynamics. Despite the constraints imposed by the Ankara Declaration and the sensitivity of the Somali sovereignty question, the motives driving both parties have become more urgent.

However, the future of this path will likely depend on the parties’ ability to reconcile the imperatives of economic geography with the requirements of political legitimacy. This makes the gradual expansion of functional economic and logistical cooperation the most likely scenario in the foreseeable future.

By contrast, the scenario of reviving the memorandum of understanding in a modified form that includes official recognition or sovereign arrangements remains contingent on deeper regional and international transformations, as well as shifting calculations among key actors. This makes the maritime access issue itself a central determinant of regional stability and a pivotal factor in reshaping the geopolitical order in the Horn of Africa in the coming years.

Source: Emirates Policy Center