Category: Magazine

Thirty-five Years Later, Somaliland Still Stands

Thirty-five Years Later, Somaliland Still Stands

There are certain anniversaries that, over time, become personal and cease to belong to history alone. They settle into the emotional memory of a people, carried in households, conversations, songs, and passed from one generation to the next. For Somalilanders, May 18 is one of those days.

Every year when this anniversary approaches, I find myself thinking more about the generation that endured war, displacement, and unimaginable uncertainty, yet still found within themselves the strength to rebuild. I think about those who buried loved ones and returned to cities reduced to rubble, only to begin again from almost nothing.

To understand the emotional significance of May 18, one must first understand the history that preceded it.

On June 26, 1960, the former British Somaliland Protectorate attained independence as the State of Somaliland. Days later, driven by the optimism of the era and the wider dream of Somali unity, Somaliland voluntarily entered into union with the Trust Territory of Somalia in pursuit of a greater Somali republic.

At the time, it was a sincere political vision. Across Africa, newly independent nations were emerging from colonial rule with enormous hope and ambition, imagining futures shaped by unity, self-determination, and shared identity. Somalilanders, too, believed they were contributing to something larger than themselves.

But history unfolded differently.

The years that followed gradually gave way to political marginalization, authoritarianism, violence, and ultimately the collapse of the Somali state itself. For Somaliland, particularly during the final years of the military regime, the consequences were devastating. Entire communities were displaced. Cities were heavily damaged. Families were fractured by war and loss. Much of the physical and institutional foundation of society was left in ruins.

And yet, even in the aftermath of such destruction, Somaliland’s story did not end there. This part of its history deeply moves me because Somaliland was not rebuilt under easy circumstances. It was rebuilt by people who had every reason to surrender to exhaustion and despair, yet chose not to. There was no certainty then that peace would endure. No certainty that the institutions being formed would survive. No certainty that the sacrifices being made would amount to anything lasting.

And still, they built.

They built through dialogue. Through reconciliation. Through communities willing to sit together after years of conflict and slowly attempt the difficult work of trusting one another again. Elders and ordinary citizens alike became part of a national conversation about coexistence, governance and survival.

What Somaliland achieved through locally led reconciliation remains one of the most important yet often overlooked chapters in modern African state-building.

Because rebuilding after conflict is not simply an infrastructural exercise, it is psychological. It requires people to trust again. To coexist again. To sit across from one another again after years in which fear and violence had shaped everyday life.

Over the course of my first year serving as Ambassador of the Republic of Somaliland to Kenya, I have found myself reflecting on this history much more deeply than ever before. Representing Somaliland has reminded me that behind every national story are ordinary people whose resilience carried history forward. And perhaps nowhere is that resilience more visible than within Somaliland’s diaspora communities, with whom I have the honor of interacting.

Thirty-five years later, this past year has, in many ways, felt like a moment in which the outside world has begun paying closer attention to a reality Somalilanders have long known and sustained for themselves.

Conversations surrounding Somaliland have gradually shifted toward discussions of partnership, stability, trade, regional security, and its growing role within the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea corridor.

That shift became particularly noticeable following the State of Israel’s formal recognition of Somaliland in December 2025, a development that marked an important diplomatic moment in Somaliland’s modern history. Yet even then, it did not feel like the beginning of Somaliland’s story. If anything, it felt like a long-overdue acknowledgement of a reality that Somalilanders themselves had never abandoned.

Thirty five years later, Somaliland’s story remains, above all else, a human one. A story carried by memory, sacrifice and reconciliation. It is to that generation that I pay tribute today.

By Dr. Mohamed Abdillahi Omar, Ambassador of the Republic of Somaliland to the Republic of Kenya

Israel’s Deputy Ambassador to Ethiopia Praises Somaliland

Israel’s Deputy Ambassador to Ethiopia Praises Somaliland

Israel is seeking to deepen ties with Somaliland following its recognition of the territory as an independent state in December 2025, with Israeli officials pointing to potential cooperation in agriculture, logistics, and infrastructure as part of a broader push tied to its highly controversial move to become the first country to recognize Somaliland.

Speaking to The Reporter Ethiopia, Israel’s deputy ambassador to Ethiopia, Tomer Bar-Lavi, said recent high-level talks between Israeli and Somaliland business leaders in Addis Ababa had produced positive initial engagement and could pave the way for future investment discussions.

“There were some initial meetings and they were very positive,” Bar-Lavi said. “We saw that the sentiment is there, and it’s very positive on both sides.”

He said Israeli companies were prepared to support Somaliland in sectors including agriculture, logistics, infrastructure, and medicine, though any future projects would depend on commercial demand.

“Our businesses are demand-driven,” he said. “They can provide whatever the other side needs regarding agriculture, logistics, infrastructure, medicine, and beyond.”

Israel’s recognition of Somaliland has attracted attention across the Horn of Africa and the wider international community. Somaliland, which declared independence from Somalia in 1991 following the collapse of the Somali central government, has since maintained de facto autonomy with its own government, security forces, currency, and domestic institutions.

Despite functioning as a self-governing territory for more than three decades, Somaliland has struggled to gain formal international recognition. Israel’s decision to recognize Somaliland therefore marked a historic diplomatic breakthrough for Hargeisa, making Israel the first country to officially acknowledge Somaliland as a “sovereign state.” The move has sparked diplomatic backlash from Somalia, which continues to regard Somaliland as part of its territory, as well as from several of Somalia’s allies and many Muslim-majority countries that have criticized Israel’s decision and condemned the recognition as a violation of Somalia’s territorial integrity.

Since the recognition announcement, relations between Tel Aviv and Hargeisa have expanded. Last month, Israel announced the appointment of a non-resident ambassador to Somaliland. In addition, officials from both governments have exchanged diplomatic correspondence concerning potential trade opportunities, investment projects, and broader economic partnerships.

Bar-Lavi told The Reporter that Israel viewed the move as recognition of “a reality which has existed on the ground” and described Somaliland as “a stable new partner in the Horn of Africa.”

Asked whether the decision could complicate Israel’s ties with Ethiopia or other African states, Bar-Lavi said each country pursued its own strategic interests and argued that Somaliland’s inclusion in regional diplomacy should be viewed positively.

“In our view, we are recognizing a reality which has existed,” he said. “This is a moderate country which has been de facto independent for decades, fighting terrorism.”

He added that Somaliland had expressed interest in joining international frameworks such as the Abraham Accords, which Israel sees as promoting regional cooperation.

“Israel has very good relations with the vast majority of Sub-Saharan African states and adding one more such state is, in our view, a very positive move that should be taken as an example by others,” Bar-Lavi said.

Though much of the relationship between Israel and Somaliland has remained opaque, developments in recent months have drawn increasing attention, particularly following the appointment of ambassadors representing Tel Aviv and Hargeisa. Israel has shown growing interest in expanding its security footprint in the Horn of Africa, a region that has become a battleground for competition among emerging Middle Eastern powers. The United Arab Emirates, which has long maintained significant influence in both Somaliland and Puntland, has also been linked to plans for a multi-country military network across the region, including in Somaliland.

According to a recent report by Le Monde, Berbera Airport is undergoing a major but low-profile military redevelopment involving several international actors. Drawing on satellite imagery and security sources, the newspaper reported that extensive construction took place between late 2025 and early 2026, coinciding with Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, including buried structures believed to be fortified fuel or ammunition storage sites, as well as elevated installations thought to support air defense systems similar to those seen in other Emirati-backed facilities in the region.

The report noted that the project is being led by the UAE under its defense partnership with Somaliland, while sources also allege that the development serves the strategic interests of both the United States and Israel. Le Monde also reported that Somaliland intelligence officials have quietly received training in Tel Aviv and that Israeli intelligence personnel have recently visited Berbera, reinforcing earlier reports of growing security cooperation between the two sides.

Although neither the UAE, Israel, nor Somaliland has officially acknowledged the existence of a military base in Berbera, Abu Dhabi already maintains extensive control over the port through a $400 million investment agreement signed with Somaliland authorities. The UAE has also been linked to a similar military facility in Puntland’s Bosaso, which has reportedly served as a transit hub for military logistics and mercenary operations connected to Abu Dhabi’s support for the RSF in Sudan. Somaliland officials, meanwhile, have not ruled out the possibility that military cooperation could become part of broader relations with Israel.

The remarks made by Bar-Lavi reflects the deepening ties between Hargeisa and Tel Aviv, despite widespread criticism from Somalia’s allies, the African Union, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and several members of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Somaliland’s president recently described Israel as a “reliable partner.” Previously, the president had praised Israel’s decisions and signaled his administration’s willingness to further strengthen and deepen relations between the two sides.

Israeli President to Receive Credentials of Somaliland Ambassador

Israeli President to Receive Credentials of Somaliland Ambassador

Israeli President Isaac Herzog will receive the diplomatic credentials of the first-ever ambassador of Somaliland, Mohamed Hagi, along with those of other new envoys on Monday, his office announced.

The ceremony comes on the heels of Israel approving the appointment of veteran diplomat Michael Lotem as ambassador to Somaliland in April.

Somaliland dissolved its union with Somalia and declared its independence in 1991. Israel is the first country to recognize Somaliland.

Situated in the Horn of Africa, Somaliland’s northern coast lies directly across the Gulf of Aden from Yemen, where the Houthis control territory. Israel is reportedly interested in establishing a base in Somaliland to counter Houthi and Iranian threats to Red Sea shipping. Officials in Hargeisa, Somaliland’s capital, are interested in cooperating in areas of energy, infrastructure and agriculture, among other things.

Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi has also expressed interest in joining the Abraham Accords.

Herzog will also receive the credentials of ambassadors from Australia, South Korea, Vietnam and the Vatican.

Somaliland Is Drawn Into a Perilous Middle East

Somaliland Is Drawn Into a Perilous Middle East

Israel’s recognition of Somaliland has given the nation long-sought visibility. It has also drawn it into the growing tensions reshaping the region.

Omar Ahmed and Ismail Bihaya are still a little dazed. In late March, the two hydrologists, both 32, were taking selfies on the esplanade of Jerusalem’s mosques, framed by the dazzling gold of the Dome of the Rock. The trip, the first of their lives, had long felt out of reach. Their country, the Republic of Somaliland, does not exist in the eyes of the world. “Our passport isn’t recognized anywhere. Except now, Israel,” Omar says with a grin, back in the lab where he and his colleague spend their days testing the water quality of Hargeisa, the capital of this breakaway region of Somalia.

Everything changed on December 26. That day, Israel became the first country to formally recognize Somaliland (formerly British Somaliland) as a sovereign state. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu appeared in a video call congratulating Somaliland’s president, Abdirahman Abdullahi.

The backlash was immediate. Somalia, the African Union, the Arab League, and even the UN Security Council condemned the move, accusing Israel of violating the principle of territorial integrity.

In Hargeisa, those reactions barely registered. That night, crowds flooded the streets in celebration. For several days, Israeli journalists covering the event were greeted with cheers as they moved through the city, an almost surreal scene in a Muslim-majority country, and all the more striking in the immediate aftermath of the war in Gaza.

Downtown Hargeisa, capital of Somaliland
Downtown Hargeisa, the capital of Somaliland

 

To understand that joy, one has to go back to the late 1980s. A former British protectorate, Somaliland had actually gained independence in 1960 before voluntarily uniting with the former Italian protectorate of Somalia. The union soon began to unravel. Amid growing clan tensions, the Somalia regime in Mogadishu launched a brutal campaign against the northern region, culminating in the near-total destruction of Hargeisa in 1988. The civil war left between 50,000 and 200,000 dead. “Hundreds of thousands more were driven into exile,” recalls a businessman who returned years later. “It was apocalyptic.” In 1991, as Somalia descended into chaos, Somaliland declared independence.More than three decades later, that independence remains unrecognized. Except, now, by Israel.

Omar Ahmed, chief engineer, Somaliland, Ministry of Water
Omar Ahmed, chief engineer at Somaliland’s Ministry of Water, was part of a delegation of 25 experts sent to Israel in March to train in modern irrigation techniques

Israel’s Intentions

To inaugurate their new partnership, Israeli authorities invited 25 Somaliland hydrologists for training in modern irrigation and water management. Omar and Ismail were among them. They came back impressed. “The scale of their desalination plants is staggering,” Omar says. “They are global leaders in water management. With infrastructure like that, we could completely transform our country.” Cooperation has accelerated quickly. Beyond training programs, Israel has announced investments in Somaliland’s infrastructure. The two governments exchanged ambassadors in April. Still, few here believe Israel’s intentions are purely developmental.

Tel Aviv is widely seen as eyeing Somaliland’s strategic location: roughly 500 miles of coastline along the Gulf of Aden, through which around 12 percent of global trade passes — an ideal vantage point from which to project military power. According to Bloomberg, Israeli officials have already identified a potential coastal site for a future base, a claim Somaliland has publicly denied.

Whether Israel actually intends to establish a military presence remains officially unconfirmed. Asked directly, a senior official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs dismissed the Bloomberg report as lacking “clarity,” without explicitly denying it.

 televised debate, MMTV, alliance, Somaliland, Israel
A televised debate on MMTV, Somaliland’s main television channel, about the alliance between Somaliland and Israel.

That ambiguity contrasts with what is said more privately. Several sources with close ties to the Somaliland authorities describe the project as an “open secret.” “Israelis want a base in Somaliland to monitor the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Houthis in Yemen. The government simply cannot confirm it yet, given the ongoing turmoil in the Middle East,” said a businessman with close ties to power.

In practice, no agreement has been announced and no infrastructure is visible on the ground. But the convergence of discreet diplomatic contacts, strategic logic, and local expectations has made the prospect of a base feel less like a distant possibility than a question of timing.

America’s Interests

Other countries are watching closely.

Aerial view, port of Berbera, Somaliland, DP World
Aerial view of the port of Berbera, in western Somaliland, developed by the Emirati company DP World. Photo credit: DP World

Ethiopia, landlocked and eager for access to the sea, nearly finalized a deal in 2024 to secure a 12-mile coastal strip of Somaliland along the Gulf of Aden before backing down under pressure from Mogadishu. The United Arab Emirates, which normalized relations with Israel under the Abraham Accords, has also taken a keen interest in the region. Starting in 2016, its port operator, DP World, has built a major terminal in the Gulf port of Berbera.

“We’ve invested $400 million,” says Maftouh Harir, a DP World executive, standing high above the docks on a towering quay crane. “The goal is to serve Ethiopia, which has no access to the sea.” Out on the horizon, a control tower rises above the sea spray. Nearby, Berbera’s airport, whose runway is among the longest in Africa, is no longer open to the public. Abu Dhabi is now converting it into a military base.

Ultimately, however, Somaliland’s hopes rest largely in Washington.

Within parts of Somaliland’s establishment, support for recognition has been building. As early as 2021, the Heritage Foundation published a policy paper urging the United States to recognize Somaliland as a way to counter China’s growing influence in nearby Djibouti, where Beijing has established its only overseas naval base just miles from a US installation.

Port of Berbera, Somaliland, Emirati company, DP World
Aerial view of the Berbera, developed by the Emirati company DP World. Photo credit: DP World

Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX), a close ally of Israel, has emerged as one of Hargeisa’s most vocal supporters. During a Senate hearing on April 23, he emphasized Somaliland’s “growing strategic relevance” and suggested that Donald Trump could formally recognize the territory before the end of his term.

At the same time, several members of the House of Representatives introduced legislation in March directing the Treasury Department to identify legal barriers preventing Somaliland from accessing the US financial system. The goal is to integrate Somaliland into the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication, or SWIFT network, a crucial step for dollar transactions. “Our banks cannot raise capital on international markets,” explains a Somaliland economist. “That forces them to charge prohibitively high interest rates. Access to SWIFT would be even more decisive than diplomatic recognition.”

For now, Somaliland’s government is trying to turn these diplomatic signals into economic gains. At the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Hargeisa, a delegation of Australian businessmen has come to explore opportunities in the mining sector. “What are your impressions of the country?” the minister asks, smiling broadly. “Very positive,” replies one of the visitors. “It was important for us to see things firsthand. We’ll be sending a positive message to our shareholders.”

“They can rest easy,” the minister says. “Somaliland is a haven of peace and stability. It’s the safest place in the Horn of Africa.”

‘A Functioning Democracy, the Most Advanced in the Region’

From the ground, Hargeisa bears the marks of a surprisingly dynamic African city. Cafés are filled with a stylish youth. Students snap selfies to celebrate the opening of a waffle shop. A new shopping mall of glass and steel is preparing to open its doors. Power outages are rare. The streets are clean. Markets are well stocked. And overlooking it all, the country’s first five-star hotel, which opened last August, glows at dusk.

market, Hargeisa, capital, Somaliland
A market in Hargeisa.

Despite lacking international recognition, Somaliland’s gross domestic product (GDP) per capita is about 50 percent higher than that of Somalia, and its poverty rate is roughly half. Even more striking is its political system.

“We are a functioning democracy, the most advanced in the region,” says Guleid Jama, a lawyer known for his work defending fundamental rights. “Since 1991, we’ve held six presidential elections, each followed by a peaceful transfer of power.” He is quick to add a caveat. “Our constitution, adopted in 2001, is relatively progressive. But our penal code still reflects the Mussolini-era legacy of Italian colonial law. Police frequently interfere with journalists and opposition figures.”

Marwo Sucaad, an opposition leader, confirms the mixed picture. “Our governments are elected democratically. There’s no doubt about that,” she says. “The 2024 campaign was vibrant, turnout was high. But corruption exists, and women remain largely excluded from power. No democracy is perfect, though.”

Marwo Sucaad, leading opposition figure, KAAH party, Hargeisa
The politician Marwo Sucaad, a leading opposition figure, at the headquarters of her Kaah party in Hargeisa.

Yet Somaliland’s stability rests on a delicate political balance. Power is largely concentrated in the hands of the central clan, which dominates the country demographically and territorially, particularly around Hargeisa. Other major groups in the west and the in the east, are integrated into the political system, but not without tension.

So far, this equilibrium has held. Since 1991, Somaliland has avoided the kind of fragmentation seen elsewhere in the region by maintaining a relatively cohesive state structure and repeated peaceful transfers of power. But that cohesion is not immutable. In the eastern regions, territorial disputes persist. In Las Anod, clashes that erupted in 2023 between Somaliland forces and local militias aligned with Somalia in the south left hundreds dead and displaced tens of thousands, exposing the fragility of the territory’s hold over its eastern fringes.

Israel’s arrival may now complicate that fragile balance.

‘Now That We Are Allied With Israel, Could This War Reach Us?’

Gulf of Aden, coast, Berbera, Somaliland, port
Berbera, Somaliland’s main port city, sits on the coast of the Gulf of Aden.

Barely two months after recognition, Tel Aviv became embroiled in a confrontation with Iran whose consequences could extend into the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. On the set of Somaliland’s main television channel, MMTV, the tone of debate has shifted.

“Now that we are allied with Israel, could this war reach us?” a journalist asked a political analyst in early April. “We have nothing to fear,” the analyst replied confidently. “Since the attacks of October 7, 2023, Israel has gained the upper hand over its enemies. It has become the dominant power in the Middle East. This alliance will allow us to develop, just as Saudi Arabia benefited from US protection after World War II.”

Others are less assured. In Yemen, the Houthi movement declared on December 28 that Berbera had become a “legitimate target.” Somaliland has limited means of deterrence. Its military is largely equipped with tanks and rocket launchers captured from Mogadishu at the end of the 1980s civil war and has no air-defense capabilities.

patrol, Somaliland, coast guard, port of Berbera
On patrol with Somaliland’s coast guard at the entrance to the port of Berbera. With limited resources, they monitor nearly 500 miles of coastline facing Yemen.

“Somaliland is preparing for this kind of scenario,” insists a senior official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Our generals are working day and night to ensure the country’s security.”

But for opposition figures, the greater risk lies elsewhere. “The eastern regions are still disputed,” worries Marwo Suad. “Somalia, backed by Turkey, China, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, could resume hostilities in response to Israel’s recognition. We are on the brink of another war.” Al-Shabaab, a powerful Somali insurgency group affiliated with al-Qaeda, has also vowed to fight any attempt by Israel to establish a presence in Somaliland.

“Only Washington can rein in Somalia’s backers,” says Marwo Suad. “That is the only protection that truly matters.” The government appears to share that view. In late February, it declared its readiness to grant the United States “exclusive access” to its mineral resources, as well as access to military bases. US military delegations visited Hargeisa and Berbera in June and November 2025. Still, there is little indication that Washington is eager to deploy troops, especially as the United States already maintains a base in Djibouti and cooperates with Mogadishu on counterterrorism.

On patrol, Somaliland, coast guard, Yemen
On patrol with Somaliland’s coast guard at the entrance to the port of Berbera. With limited resources, they monitor nearly 800 kilometers of coastline facing Yeme

For Somaliland’s leadership, however, recognition is only a means to a more immediate end: economic development. And here, the gap between expectations and reality remains stark.

Beneath Somaliland’s soil, geological surveys also suggest the presence of oil, gas, lithium, rare earth elements, and other minerals. Several foreign companies have already taken positions. The British firm Genel Energy has been exploring hydrocarbons since 2012. Taiwan’s Chang Development Company and Saudi Arabia’s Kilomass are looking into lithium. EAU Mining, the Australian company whose delegation visited Hargeisa, may soon follow. Yet beyond these early indicators, few deposits have been formally confirmed, and most projects are still at a preliminary stage.

Australian mining investors, foreign minister, Somaliland
A group of Australian mining investors meets with the foreign minister in Hargeisa

On the ground, investors are watching more than they are committing. The businessmen arriving in Hargeisa are not responding to a proven resource boom so much as to a political signal: the possibility that recognition could unlock access to international markets, financing, and legal protections that have long been out of reach.

Ahmed Osman Guelleh, a local industrialist, urges caution. “Mining is not how we will create the thousands of industrial jobs our youth need,” he says, standing in a warehouse stacked with crates of Coca-Cola bottled in his factory north of Hargeisa. “We need to focus on manufacturing, technology, and agriculture. Once we build that economic base, international recognition will follow naturally.”

For now, Somaliland faces structural constraints that recognition alone cannot resolve. Electricity is expensive, generated almost entirely from fuel oil. The workforce remains largely unskilled. Water is scarce in this arid climate. In the laboratory in Hargeisa, where he spends his days testing the city’s water, Omar Ahmed has been thinking about that gap ever since he returned from Israel.

“The scale of what we saw there… it’s billions of dollars,” he says. “Our entire Ministry of Water runs on about $1.8 million a year. Agriculture gets barely $2.8 million. Even with help from NGOs, we’re talking about a few million here and there. What we actually need is on a completely different scale.”

He pauses. “That’s the real gap. We come back with the knowledge, but we don’t have the money to do anything with it.” In a country that does not officially exist, recognition may open doors. But it will not, on its own, build a future.

Somalia & Somaliland: Battlegrounds as Turkey and Israel Seek the Control of the Red Sea

Somalia & Somaliland: Battlegrounds as Turkey and Israel Seek the Control of the Red Sea

Turkey and Israel are intensifying competition in the Horn of Africa, with Somalia and Somaliland emerging as key battlegrounds for oil, military influence and control of vital Red Sea trade routes.

Turkey has consolidated its position through formal agreements with Somalia’s federal government, securing major offshore and onshore oil and gas exploration rights alongside a strong military presence through its largest overseas training base. Israel, meanwhile, has moved closer to Somaliland after becoming the first country to formally recognize the territory as an independent state and is exploring plans for a military base near the Gulf of Aden to monitor Yemen’s Houthis and secure strategic access to the Red Sea corridor.

Earlier this year, Somalia confirmed it was ready to begin its first offshore oil drilling operations, with a Turkish government-owned drilling ship expected to arrive off its coast, according to BBC. The move followed the successful completion of seismic surveys last year by Turkey’s research vessel Oruç Reis, which collected 3D seismic data across key offshore blocks.

Somalia is estimated to hold at least 30 billion barrels of offshore oil potential and around 6 billion cubic meters of natural gas, though much of it remains unproven compared with established producers such as Libya and Nigeria.

Since 2011, Turkey has become one of Mogadishu’s closest allies, combining humanitarian support, military training and infrastructure investment. In December 2025, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said Ankara planned to establish a spaceport in Somalia.

Subsequent reports later confirmed that Turkey was exploring a broader aerospace facility, including a spaceport for satellite and possible missile launches, alongside plans for a naval base, while F-16 fighter jets were deployed inside Somalia in early 2026. In February 2026, Turkey also dispatched ageing U.S.-made M48 and M60 tanks through the streets of Mogadishu in a protected convoy after they were unloaded from a Turkish Navy landing ship.

According to reports, the tanks were deployed to secure Turkish facilities in the Warsheikh area, about 37 miles north of the capital, where Ankara is building the site for satellite launches and broader aerospace operations. Separately, Turkey recently reopened its $50 million military base in Mogadishu, reinforcing Ankara’s role in Somalia’s security sector and its support for the training of Somali National Army soldiers, including elite units involved in operations against Al-Shabaab.

Israel, meanwhile, has focused on Somaliland, whose coastline faces Yemen across the Gulf of Aden. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced in late 2025 that Israel had formally recognized Somaliland, describing the decision as being “in the spirit of the Abraham Accords.” The recognition triggered strong condemnation from Somalia and several Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia, Palestine, Egypt, Kuwait, Iraq, Jordan and Qatar, all of which rejected the decision as illegal and warned that it threatened regional stability and Somalia’s territorial unity.

Turkey also criticized the move, with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan calling Israel’s recognition of Somaliland “illegitimate and unacceptable” and later saying it “does not benefit” the region during a February visit to Ethiopia, one of Israel’s key allies in the Horn of Africa.

Despite the criticism, a Bloomberg report in March confirmed that Israel was exploring plans to build a military base in Somaliland to monitor and target Yemen’s Houthis, taking advantage of the region’s strategic location near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Defending the move, Shiri Fein-Grossman, chief executive of the Israel-Africa Relations Institute and a former member of Israel’s National Security Council, told Israeli outlet i24 News: “Everyone just looks at the map and understands what Israel is looking for here.”

“The recognition of Somaliland gives Israel a strategic location near the Houthis in Yemen and comes at a time that Israel needs as many friends as possible.”

Beyond Somalia and Somaliland, tensions between Turkey and Israel have deepened over Gaza, Syria and wider regional power projection, further exposing a growing geopolitical rivalry between the two military powers.

Middle East Eye reported that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has increasingly shifted his rhetoric towards Turkey as Ankara expands its influence across the eastern Mediterranean and Africa, particularly around Cyprus and Greece. In a post on X, Netanyahu accused President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of “massacring his own Kurdish citizens” and “accommodating Iran’s terror regime and its proxies”.

Turkey responded with sharp condemnation, with officials in Ankara describing Netanyahu as the “Hitler of the era”, citing Israel’s military actions in Gaza and across the region.

While Somalia and Somaliland remain central to their competition in the Horn of Africa, the broader dispute reflects a much wider struggle for influence stretching from the Red Sea to the Middle East, with both military powers seeking strategic bases in the two African territories to strengthen their regional reach.

Olamilekan Okebiorun is a business journalist covering markets, technology, and changing landscape of African economies for Business Insider Africa.

Somaliland: Children with Disabilities Still Face Barriers to Education

Rhima’s first step into school

Every morning, Rahima used to sit outside her home and listen. She listened to the laughter of children walking to school. She listened to their footsteps fading down the dusty road. And she imagined what it might feel like to walk beside them.

“I wished I could go with them,” she says quietly. But for years, school felt impossible.

When Rahima was nine years old, she was diagnosed with aggressive bone cancer. Her mother still remembers the moment clearly. “We did not know what tomorrow would look like,” she says. “We were very afraid.” The treatment saved Rahima’s life. But it came at a cost. Doctors had to amputate her right leg.

“I felt like my whole life had stopped,” Rahima recalls. After the surgery, she remained at home. Her parents worried she would face stigma from other children and the wider community. With limited income, they could not afford the support she needed to start school. As the years passed, Rahima watched other children leave for class each day while she stayed behind.

Opening doors for more children

Across Somaliland, many children with disabilities still face barriers to education.

Recent disability assessments conducted in twenty Education Cannot Wait (ECW)–supported schools identified 72 children with disabilities, many of whom had never accessed education due to stigma, limited support, or financial constraints. Through the ECW‑funded Multi‑Year Resilience Program (MYRP)—implemented by UNICEF in collaboration with the Ministry of Education and Science (MOES), Africa Educational Trust (AET) and local education partners—children with disabilities and out‑of‑school learners are being prioritized with scholarships and inclusive Accelerated Basic Education (ABE) pathways to restore their right to learn.

For families like Rahima’s, these changes are opening doors that once seemed permanently closed.

A future reimagined

Now settled into her learning journey, Rahima dreams of becoming a teacher.

“There are many girls like me still at home,” she says. “One day I want to help them learn too.”

Her story is a testament to the transformative power of inclusive education, made possible through the ECW‑funded MYRP, dedicated educators, and a community beginning to believe that every child deserves a place in school. For Rahima, the scholarship opened more than a school door. It gave her the chance to learn, to belong — and to dream again!

Impact beyond one child

The disability assessment in the ECW schools found significant numbers of children with:

  • Learning difficulties (32 cases)
  • Mobility impairment (13 cases)
  • Vision impairments (11 cases)
  • Hearing impairments (7 cases)
  • Behavioral challenges (7 cases)

These findings have strengthened inclusive practices, improved early identification of learning needs, and guided scholarship prioritisation to ensure children like Raxiima are not left behind.

Beyond the numbers, the assessments have also helped communities recognise that disability should not mean exclusion from education. By identifying barriers early and connecting families with schools and support programs, the ECW-supported initiative is helping more children with disabilities step into classrooms, rebuild confidence and begin their own learning journeys — just as Rahima has.

Somaliland’s Geopolitical Relevance Outpacing Its Institutional Preparedness

Somaliland’s geopolitical relevance is rising faster than its institutional preparedness
In an era of intensifying global competition along strategic maritime corridors, the Republic of Somaliland sits at a crossroads few policymakers can afford to ignore. Positioned along the Gulf of Aden, near the Bab el-Mandeb strait through which roughly around 12% of global trade passes, Somaliland occupies territory that is no longer peripheral to global strategy. It is central.
Yet Somaliland’s geopolitical relevance is rising faster than its institutional preparedness.
For over three decades, Somaliland has defied regional patterns. It has built a functioning political order, conducted competitive elections, and maintained relative internal stability without formal international recognition. These achievements are not accidental. They are the result of leadership.
From the early stewardship of Abdirahman Ahmed Ali (Tuur), who guided the fragile reassertion of sovereignty, to the state-building vision of Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal, Somaliland’s trajectory has been shaped by leaders capable of navigating crisis and compromise. Egal’s demobilization of militias and institutional consolidation remain foundational to Somaliland’s governance model.
This pattern of leadership continuity extended through Dahir Riyale Kahin, whose administration entrenched electoral legitimacy, and Ahmed Mohamed Mohamoud (Silanyo), whose economic diplomacy, particularly the Berbera Port agreement with DP World, signalled Somaliland’s entry into the geopolitical economy of the Red Sea corridor.
Under Muse Bihi Abdi, the state navigated rising internal political contestation and external pressure, while expanding its diplomatic outreach. Today, Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi (Iro) presides over a decisive phase, as Somaliland seeks to convert de facto statehood into formal international recognition, an aspiration first answered by the State of Israel in December 2025 after its PM announced a ‘full recognition’ of Somaliland’s sovereignty.
But here lies the paradox: as Somaliland’s strategic importance grows, the model that sustained its stability is becoming insufficient.
A Strategic Location in a Crowded Theatre
The Red Sea and Gulf of Aden are undergoing rapid geopolitical transformation. The region has become a theatre of overlapping interests:
  • ​Gulf states projecting economic and security influence
  • ​Global powers securing maritime routes and military access
  • ​Regional actors competing for ports, corridors, and alliances
Berbera Port, developed through the DP World concession, has emerged as a critical node in this competition. It offers an alternative logistics corridor to landlocked Ethiopia and a potential counterweight to congested or contested routes elsewhere in the region. But this opportunity comes with exposure.
Somaliland’s economy remains highly concentrated, dependent on Berbera port revenues, livestock exports, and remittances. Its lack of international recognition limits access to global financial systems, constraining its ability to scale infrastructure, diversify its economy, and absorb external shocks.
In short, Somaliland is strategically located, but structurally constrained.
The Leadership Constraint.
Historically, Somaliland has compensated for structural limitations through leadership. Its political stability has been personality-driven; anchored in individuals with legitimacy, experience, and consensus-building capacity.
Personality-Driven model is now reaching its limits
The emerging geopolitical environment demands a different type of leadership:
  • Leaders capable of navigating multi-alignment diplomacy without or with inadequate formal recognition.
  • Leaders able to negotiate complex economic partnerships without overexposure to external actors.
  • Leaders who can translate geopolitical opportunity into domestic development.
At present, Somaliland lacks a formalized system for producing such leadership. This creates a strategic vulnerability. Without a pipeline of capable leaders, Somaliland risks entering a period where geopolitical relevance outpaces governance capacity, a gap that external actors are quick to exploit.
Recognition Is Not a Strategy
Much of Somaliland’s external engagement has been framed around the pursuit of international recognition. While recognition remains a legitimate objective, it cannot substitute for internal capacity.
Recognition, even if achieved, will not resolve:
  1.  Economic concentration
  2. Institutional fragility
  3. Youth unemployment
  4. Women and minority groups’ representational equality
  5. Governance gaps
In fact, recognition without preparation could amplify these challenges by accelerating external engagement beyond the state’s ability to manage it. The more urgent priority is internal readiness.
Policy Imperatives in a Geopolitical Context
To navigate this new era, Somaliland must recalibrate its strategy along these axes:
Strategic Autonomy in Foreign Policy:
Somaliland must avoid overdependence on any single external partner. A diversified diplomatic approach: balancing Gulf, African, and Western engagements is essential to preserve autonomy.
Economic De-Risking:
Reducing reliance on Berbera Port revenues is critical. This requires investment in trade corridors, value-added exports, and emerging sectors such as digital services.
Leadership Institutionalization:
Political parties, civil society groups, and state institutions must collectively develop mechanisms for leadership cultivation. Governance cannot remain dependent on exceptional individuals.
Inclusive State-Building
The demographic reality where youth and women form the majority must be reflected in political representation. Exclusion is not only unjust; it is destabilizing.
Governance Before Recognition:
Somaliland’s comparative advantage has been its internal legitimacy. Preserving and deepening this must take precedence over external validation.
A Narrowing Window:
Somaliland’s current position is both an opportunity and a risk. Its stability makes it attractive. Its location makes it valuable. But without institutional depth, these same factors can render it vulnerable.
The next decade will not resemble the last. The geopolitical environment is less forgiving, more competitive, and far less tolerant of governance gaps.
Somaliland’s founding generation proved that leadership can create a state under conditions of collapse. The current generation faces a different test: whether it can transform that legacy into a system capable of sustaining the state under conditions of global competition.
Failure will not come as sudden collapse but as gradual erosion of autonomy, of policy space, and of strategic control. Success, however, would place Somaliland in a rare category not merely as a stable polity in a fragile region, but as a self-made state capable of navigating great power competition on its own terms. That is the real test ahead.
About the Author:
Salma Sheikh is a political analyst, a long time Somaliland recognition advocate, and Lead Advisor on Women Affairs at the House of Representatives of the Republic of Somaliland.

Dahabshiil iyo Telesom oo Batroolka Iran Iibsada

Dahabshiil iyo Telesom oo Batroolka Iran ka Iibsada Marakiibta Ciidanka Ilaalada Khumeyni oo Dawladda Mareykanku Xayiraad Saartey

Shirkadda Telesom, ee bixinta Adeega Internetka Somaliland gudaheeda ku keliyeysatey, ayaa dhawaan ka xidhay dadweynaha Reer Somaliland inay siyaartaan hoyga bogga loo yaqaan “Somaliland Chronicle” ee falanqeysa warar ku saabsan siyaasadda maamulka Qaranka Somaliland ee la xidhiidha dhinacyo kala duwan sida maareynta arrimaha dawladda, qandaraasyadda dawladda ee gacanta u gala maalqabeenka, iyo guud ahaan sida dhaqaalaha dalku u shaqeeyo ee saameyn weyn ku leh masiirka dalka iyo dadkaba.

Sidoo kale waxa uu boggu soo bandhigaa baadhitaano iyo dabagalo uu sameeyo oo salka ku haya xogo dhaba oo la xaqiijiyey jiritaankooda kuna saabsan dhacdooyin ka qabsoomay dalka oo ay hormood ka yihiin amba lug weyn ku leeyihiin xubno Golaha Wasiiradu amba Hogaanka Shirkada Waaweyn, oo sharciga dalka baalmarsan.

Bishan Maarso 10, 2026, ayuu boggu soo saaray qoraal si qoto dheer oo faahfaahsan uga hadlaya markab shidaal siday oo dekadda Berbera ku soo xidhay, una rarnaa labadda shirkadood ee kala ah : Shidaalka Geeska (Horn Petroleum) oo Kooxda Dahabshiil (Dahabshiil Group) leedahay iyo SomGas oo qayb ka ah shirkadda Hurmuud ee laga leeyahay dalka Somaliya.

Shidaalkan waxaa siday markab ku xidhan Ciidanka Ilaaladda Kacaanka Islamiga ee Iran loona yaqaan Qudus (CIKI-Q) sida ku sheegan maqaalka, isagoo ku soo xidhay dekedda Berbera bishii Feebarwari 2026 tiiyoo doonyaha dawladu gacansiiyeen xidhidhaankiisii.

Horn Petroleum iyo SomGas ayaa shidaalkaa labo qayb oo isleeg u kala qaatey, tiiyoo maamulka dekadda Berbera shixnadan shidaalka ah ku tilmaameen mida an hore loo arag baaxadeeda.

Isla markabkan ayaa bishii 9aad 17keedii ee 2025 isagoo ku xidhan deked Yeman ku taal oo Xuutiyiinta maamulaan loona yaqaan Ras Cisa ay Israa’il la beegsatey gantaal ka dhacay diyaarad daroon ah, isagoo gaas u sida Xuutiyiinta, mar ay qori caaraddii ku haysteen markabka iyo 27 qof oo saarnaa Xuutiyiintu, tiiyo mar dambe dadaal diblimaasiyadeed iyo dawladda Pakistan ku guuleysyeen soo daynta markabka iyo shaqaalihiisiiba.

Maraakiibka ayaa iska diiwaan geliya wadamo kale si ay mararka qaarkood u qariyaan cida leh si ay u khaldan macaamiisha, haddii xayiraadi saaran tahay ambaba rabaan in socdaalkooda badu u dhibyaraado.

Isla markabkan ayaa 5 bilood ka dib, tiiyoo magacii laga bedelay, calan kalena la saaray, loona sameeyey waraaqo ah in Ciraq laga leeyahay, ku soo xidhay dekedda Berbera lagana rogey shidaalkii uu siday tiiyoo loo qaybsadey sida kor ku xusan.

7 markab oo xayiraadi saaran tahay amba shake weyni dul hoganayo ayaa ku soo xidhay dekedda Berbera 30 kii cisho ee ku xigay dhacdadan iyada ah.

Saddex masuuliyiinta dekedda Berbera ayaa la xidhay maalmo yar ka dib markii markabkani ka ambabaxay dekedda, tiiyoon arrin aan la shaacin ilaa hadda wax dambi ahna lagu soo oogin masuuliyiintaas halka madaxdii shirkadaha shidaalka lahaana aan weli haba yaraatee wax ficil ah laga qaadin.

La macaamilka markabkan, warqadda ogolaansha ee la siiyey, iyo hawl fududenyta dekeddu u sameysey waxay ka hor imaneysaa qaraarkii madaxweynaha Maraykanku soo saaray tiiyoo Somaliland u keeni karta in la saaro cunaqabateyn xili la rabo in Aqoonsiga Somaliland laga iibiyo Maraykan iyo weliba Israa’iil oo aqoonsatey Somaliland in arrinkani shaki ku abuuro.

Agaasimaha Dekedda Berbera, Cabdi Diriye, oo madaxweynuhu magacaabo, ayaan ka soo jawaabin codsiyo loo diray oo arrintan khuseeya, qabanina dhawr telifoon oo loo diray, ka hor daabacaadda maqaalkan.

Suaasha imaneysaa waxaa weeye maxaa Telesom soo galiyey arrinkan ee ay xayirtay bogan soo bandhigay khiyaamadan qaranka halista ku ah. Telesom waa laan la mid ah shirkadda weyn Hurmuud fadhigeeduna yahay Muqdishu oo go’aamadda halkaas ayaa looga soo yeedhiyaa.

Djibouti at a Crossroads: The Presidential Transition Crisis Ahead of April 2026 Elections

Djibouti at a Crossroads: The Presidential Transition Crisis Ahead of April 2026 Elections

As Djibouti approaches its presidential elections, scheduled for April 2026, the contours of a complex political crisis are emerging within the ruling system. This crisis is rooted in chronic structural fragility, a tribal monopoly on power and deepening political uncertainty. The situation has been further exacerbated by President Ismail Omar Guelleh’s intention to amend the constitution to allow himself to run for a sixth term. Compounding this tension are growing divisions within the ruling elite over his possible successor.

These internal disagreements surfaced publicly in September following the resignation of Alexis Mohamed Gueldon, one of President Guelleh’s most prominent advisors and his official international spokesperson. Gueldon attributed his resignation to the country’s “democratic regression” and “nepotistic practices.” He also said that the president had “gone too far” – a clear reference to Guelleh’s intention to amend the constitution to remain in power.

Crisis of Power Transition in Djibouti

President Guelleh and his regime now face a twofold challenge. The first is constitutional; the 77-year-old president has exceeded the legal age limit for presidential candidacy (75). Despite his declining health, there are indications that he is seeking to replicate a previous amendment to the constitution to remove this limit. In an interview in May 2025, Guelleh left the door open to the possibility of running again – a move that has been met with internal resistance.

The second challenge concerns the identity of President Guelleh’s potential successor, an issue that could redefine the country’s political and social order. Guelleh’s options appear limited, and any move to designate a successor must be carefully calibrated to preserve regime cohesion and safeguard the influence of his family and clan, the Mamasan. In this context, the resignation of Gueldon, who belongs to the same clan, has fueled speculation that the president is grooming his stepson, Naguib Abdullah Kamil, who is affiliated with the Afar community, to succeed him.

Such a move risks intensifying ethnic polarization within the ruling coalition. The al-Issa tribe elite view Kamil as a threat to their historical dominance and privileges. This could prompt them to block his rise and prevent a transfer of leadership to the Afar, potentially through pressure to keep Guelleh at the top of the power pyramid or aligning with another candidate from within the clan, such as Gueldon, known for his extensive connections and political ambitions.

Consolidating Authoritarianism or a Potential Shift?

Given the current dynamics, three possible trajectories can be anticipated for the future of Djibouti’s ruling regime and the broader political landscape:

1. A Constitutional Amendment to Extend Guelleh’s Presidency

This scenario appears plausible, given President Guelleh’s extensive network of local, regional and international relationships, and his ability to navigate a political framework that enables him to balance and subordinate internal and external dynamics to his own objectives. Such a move would effectively extend the status quo and consolidate the regime’s de facto legitimacy and continuity, as well as preserve the interests of the elite without dismantling the tribal structure.

However, this path carries significant risks – including the erosion of the regime’s credibility, increased institutional fragility, growing public discontent and a strengthened opposition – which could ultimately destabilize the governance system in the medium term.

2. Engineering a Disciplined Transition of Power

This trajectory would require President Guelleh to recognize the need to lead an internal negotiated process to promote an agreed-upon successor. A likely successor could be his stepson, Kamil, who enjoys support from his influential mother and the Afar elite, or another figure from al-Issa/Mamasan clan. Such a managed transition could enhance the regime’s ability to reproduce itself while attracting regional and international endorsement, as it would offer a controlled and stable transfer of power. The key challenge, however, lies in forging internal consensus around the potential heir and reducing ethnic and factional rivalries within the ruling elite.

3. An Electoral Process Controlled by an Issa Candidate

The likelihood of this trajectory increases if al-Issa elite perceive a shift in power dynamics in favor of the Afar – particularly with the potential rise of Kamel. In response, they may push for elections, aiming to ensure victory for one of their prominent figures, thereby safeguarding their influence in the post-Guelleh era.

However this strategy risks deepening divisions and sparking elite-level confrontations, potentially drawing in the military and security forces – especially if the electoral process resembles previous ones marked by allegations of fraud and a lack of meaningful reforms to promote political inclusivity. Such conditions could lead to renewed opposition boycotts and further destabilize the political landscape.

Beyond Guelleh: Local and Regional Implications

Djibouti’s allies, with France at the forefront, are expected to play a leading role in facilitating a smooth transition of power

International and regional powers regard Djibouti as a strategic hub for expanding their influence in the wider region encompassing the Red Sea, East Africa, and the western Indian Ocean. These actors have long viewed President Guelleh and his regime as central to safeguarding their interests, relying on the political stability maintained throughout his tenure. As a result, they have often turned a blind eye to his authoritarian practices – such as fragmenting the local opposition and silencing dissent – which have enabled him to solidify his rule for over 25 years.

However, this stability appears tenuous and largely superficial. It does not stem from strong state institutions or effective governance, but rather from delicate tribal dynamics and the concentration of power in a few individuals who shape the country’s political landscape. With growing concerns surrounding succession and the ongoing discourse about the post-Guelleh era, there are genuine apprehensions of escalating tensions and conflict among Djibouti’s political and tribal elites. Such developments could undermine the governance system and weaken state institutions, pushing the small nation overlooking the Bab al-Mandab Strait into a period of turbulence, with significant implications for regional stability and the strategic interests of key regional and international players.

An uncontrolled succession crisis in Djibouti would have far-reaching consequences extending far beyond its domestic political sphere.  It would worsen regional instability and heighten geopolitical competition among the foreign powers maintaining military bases in the country. This would complicate their operational and strategic decision-making, potentially prompting a recalibration of their military strategies and presence. For example, the establishment of a Chinese military base in 2017 and Houthi attacks in the Red Sea have already weakened the US position in Djibouti. Restrictions imposed by Djibouti on US military activities have prompted Washington to explore alternative options, including expanding its presence in Kenya, making it its first non-NATO sub-Saharan African ally, as well as the growing US interest in Somaliland.

Conclusions

The months ahead will be pivotal in shaping the future of Djibouti. The choice between extending President Guelleh’s rule and initiating a political transition represents a delicate balancing act for the regime, which must demonstrate its ability to adapt to both domestic and external pressures for reform and democratic change. The decisions made by Djibouti’s leadership, particularly by Guelleh himself, could either pave the way for a new political era or maintain the status quo, with the risk of eventual regime collapse and national instability.

While international and regional partners prioritize sustainable stability and predictable transformation, external support for the ruling clan may no longer guarantee its endurance and political security. In this context, Djibouti’s allies –  especially France – are expected to play a leading role in diplomatic engagement and soft intervention. Their efforts may focus on  encouraging a peaceful transfer of power through internal consensus or a more transparent electoral process, rather than prolonging Guelleh’s grip on power

A Coalition with Diverse Agendas Team up for Opposing Somaliland Recognition in the Name of Somali Unity

A Coalition with Diverse Agendas Team up for Opposing Somaliland Recognition in the Name of Somali Unity

In late 2025, Israel officially announced its recognition of Somaliland, a self-declared independent region in northern Somalia that has asserted its sovereignty since 1991 but remains largely unrecognized by the international community. The decision marks a notable realignment in diplomatic relations across the Horn of Africa and the broader Middle East. In response, a coalition of 21 Arab, Islamic, and African states issued a joint statement condemning Israel’s move. They described it as a “grave violation of international law and the United Nations Charter,” reaffirmed their commitment to Somalia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, and explicitly rejected any suggestion that the recognition could be linked to efforts to displace the Palestinian people.

The sustained and coordinated efforts of geopolitically influential powers—including Egypt, Turkey, Djibouti, and Somalia—alongside a broader alliance of Arab and Muslim states such as Jordan, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Pakistan, and the Maldives, to prevent Somaliland from obtaining international recognition, illustrate a highly complex and multidimensional geopolitical phenomenon. This opposition has intensified in parallel with Somaliland’s increasing external engagements, particularly pragmatic contacts with Israel and other non-Arab actors.

This article argues that the region’s overwhelming opposition to Somaliland’s recognition cannot credibly be interpreted as a principled or neutral position grounded in international law, Islamic solidarity, or genuine concern for Somalia’s unity. Rather, through systematic analytical deconstruction, it demonstrates that this opposition stems from a convergence of narrow national interests, deep-seated geopolitical anxieties, and defensive reactions to the potential restructuring of the existing regional order.

On the surface, this stance is articulated through legalistic rhetoric—invoking sovereignty, territorial integrity, and moral symbolism, especially in relation to the Palestinian cause. Yet in practice, a persistent and fundamental paradox emerges between states’ declared principles and their actual conduct. The gap between discourse and action reveals that strategic calculations, rather than normative commitments, drive much of the regional response to Somaliland’s bid for statehood

Somaliland in Arab Politics: ‘File’ rather than ‘cause’

Complexity and agency, as well as the historical specificity of Somaliland, are being systematically denied within the political institutions, diplomatic circles, and strategic cultures of most Arab and Islamic capitals. It is hardly ever activated as an independent object of international politics or as an acceptable instance of self-determination based on a separate colonial and post-colonial experience. Rather, it is diminished to a bureaucratic abstraction, a file that needs to be handled but not a cause that needs to be comprehended.

It is a reduction that works in two paradigms that are overlapping and expedient politically. The former views Somaliland as a strictly sovereign entity, which is subordinated to Somalia. Somaliland, under this framing, falls under the category of internal administrative or constitutional issues of the internationally recognized state of Somalia. This division offers a pre-made rationale of the categorical denial of recognition or substantive international action, which is normally expressed in slogans like the preservation of the territorial integrity and the protection of the sovereignty of the central state. More importantly, this stance puts the symbolic sacredness of inherited boundaries above the material political facts. It consciously puts aside the institutional history, electioneering, and social contract of Somaliland for the sake of maintaining a formal cartographic wholeness, which, more often than not, exists on a piece of paper.

The second paradigm perceives Somaliland as an instrumentalized variable in a more comprehensive regional and world power policy. Within this framework, Somaliland emerges as a chess piece, as well as in the Israeli-Iranian game, the growing Turkish strategic presence in Africa, and the geostrategic struggle of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the maritime arteries of the Red Sea. In this logic, Somaliland does not possess a political actor or even a political interest of its own. Instead, it is diminished to a tactical area to be exploited, limited, or neutralized as per the strategic decisions of foreign powers.

The two paradigms are united in their deliberate ignorance of facts on the ground. Somaliland has a relatively long history of a stable and functional government, a period of over thirty years. It has also created effective electoral institutions, which have been able to handle competitive and peaceful transfers of power; internal security, which is starkly opposed to the chronic instability that plagues southern Somalia; economic and commercial infrastructure, including the development and operation of the Berbera port; and the ability to find responsible ways of dealing with external actors, including Ethiopia and Taiwan. This has been accompanied by a steady claim of disinterest and adherence to international standards.

Even with these facts that can be verified, Somaliland remains to be described as a state that is an exception—something that is inconvenient that poses a danger to the psychological and political underpinnings of the post-colonial Arab regional order. The order places a heavy burden on the sanctification of inherited borders, even though these boundaries may be supported by the use of coercion or without the truly popular consent. Another tactic employed by the capitals of Somaliland in the form of persistent political and media pressure, even when there is no hostile action or strategic provocation on the part of Hargeisa, highlights the existence of a deep-seated kind of hypocrisy.

The selective invocation of legal and religious rhetoric is not a kind of policy prescription but rather an act of performance of regional power management. It shows a crisis of credibility, where the interest in Somali unity is rhetorically magnified and the welfare, rights, and political will of the population of Somaliland are systematically discriminated against. Therefore, the Somaliland problem goes beyond the scope of a local conflict. It is a critical prism in which the incoherence and instability of regional strategic thought are revealed, as well as the way in which the emergent political realities are pushed into the background of the endless reproduction of established power accounts.

Somaliland faces rejection over precedent, not reality

The action taken by the various players to oppose the recognition of Somaliland is fueled by fears that go way beyond Somaliland itself. It is fundamentally fear, which is not about the existence of Somaliland but about the meaning of its success. The rejection is not aimed at the empirical reality on the ground as much as it is aimed at the political, legal, and ethical precedent on which recognition would be created.

The action taken by the various players to oppose the recognition of Somaliland is fueled by fears that go way beyond Somaliland itself.”

This fear has been expressed in three factors that are interlinked. The former is internal political contagion. The international acceptance of Somaliland on the basis of sound governance, historical particularism, and popular consent over a long period would serve as an influential example for marginalized or peripheral states in other Arab and African states. Such areas of the Sahel as Southern Syria, Iraqi Kurdistan, Southern Yemen, and other ethnically or politically distinct regions might use the example of Somaliland to justify the claim to autonomy or independence. To other regimes that routinely repress such claims, this possibility is a massive legitimacy problem, which compels awkward inquiries about how selectively they exercise sovereignty and self-determination.

The second dimension is associated with the holiness of colonial boundaries. The case of Somaliland proves that the boundaries that were established by the European colonialists are not fixed and even natural. It demonstrates that political order, institutional effectiveness, and social cohesion can be developed without—and even against—those borders. This ideological and practical threat is a danger to centralized states that are based on inherited territorial structures as the basis of authority. The recognition of Somaliland might become a legal and political precedent to challenge disputed borders in other countries and create turmoil in regional and international politics.

The third dimension deals with the symbolic justification of the model of the centralized state, despite its obvious failure. The aggressive politics of Somali unity are not always protecting Somali citizens but instead the abstract entity of the central state. Any acceptance of Somaliland would shed an ugly light on the difference between an ineffective federal government that is unable to provide security and services to its citizens and a breakaway state that has achieved some degree of effectiveness. This contrast disputes the belief that centralized authority is inherently better or more stable and thus throws the stability of regimes that have based their legitimacy on similar arguments into doubt.

In this regard, the attack against Somaliland is essentially defensive. It is not motivated by the signs of destabilization in the region or legal inconsistency, but by the fact that the recognition of successful alternative models of governance might undermine established political systems and restructure the standards of legitimacy in the region.

Egypt: Nile, Suez, and Red Sea in geopolitics

Egypt is the most strategically articulate of the opponents of the recognition of Somaliland. Though the official discourse in Cairo is greatly centered around the issue of separatism and solidarity among the Arabs, its stand is deeply embedded in the national security issues that go far beyond Somalia.

At the core of the Egyptian position is the existential question of the Nile and the pending conflict with Ethiopia on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). The Egyptian policymakers are worried that a stronger relationship between Somaliland and Ethiopia, especially with the involvement of a third party like Israel, would give Addis Ababa strategic depth and alternative maritime access through Berbera. This would decrease the dependence of Ethiopia on the avenues that can be influenced by Egypt, and this will undermine the bargaining power of Cairo in negotiations over the Nile.

Egypt is the most strategically articulate of the opponents of the recognition of Somaliland.

Intimately connected is the issue of the Suez Canal and Red Sea maritime routes, which cause anxiety on the part of Egypt. The Bab el-Mandeb Strait is a strategic bottleneck of the world economy, and any independent actor that has relations with the opponents of Egypt in the region is viewed as a possible strategic complication. Although both nations have formal diplomatic ties and have wide-ranging security cooperation with Israel, Egypt is still conscious of new alliances that may upset its well-calculated regional equilibrium.

Here lies a very dramatic rhetorical contradiction as the Palestinian cause is invoked. On the one hand, Egypt is a state that positions its role as a supporter of Palestinian rights, but on the other hand, it has strong relationships with Israel. The Palestinian story is therefore a contagious tool of diplomatic mobilization and not a stable ethical guide. In Egypt, the opposition is also influenced by fears that the successful succession of the separate identity and self-rule of Somaliland will be heard by the marginalized regions in Egypt, and the centralized Nile Valley model of governance will be threatened.

Combined with the other positions of Egypt, it represents a strategic calculation of resource security, maritime dominance, and regional influence, which is disguised in terms of legal and moral principles.

Turkey: Safeguarding influence, not Somali unity

The Turkish attitude towards Somaliland can be seen in terms of a strategic investment, protection, and consolidation of regional influence, and not in terms of a normative language of sovereignty and unity that pervades official Turkish rhetoric. In the last ten years, Ankara has remodeled Somalia into one of the most noticeable arenas of its extra-regional foreign policy into a mix of humanitarian diplomacy, infrastructure development, military involvement, and political favor of power. In that context, the acknowledgement of Somaliland or even its increased internationalization is a structural dilemma to the vested leverage of Turkey.

There is a great material presence of Turkey in Somalia. It operates the international airport and port of Mogadishu, has its largest foreign military base in the latter, and controls security training courses of the Somali troops. These are supplemented by soft power programs on health, education, and development aid, which have created a lot of goodwill among the people. All these interactions make Turkey more than a collaborator of the Somali state but a key agent of power and entry. The preservation of the territorial integrity of Somalia, in its turn, is consonant with the interest of Ankara in the existence of a single political interlocutor with the help of which its influence can be wielded.

The contradiction of the current position of Turkey is well traced when judged by its relations with Israel. In spite of occasional rhetoric battles, Ankara still has complete diplomatic, trade, and security ties with Tel Aviv. However, it strongly resists any Somaliland-Israel interaction. Such a contradiction highlights the fact that the Turkish objection is not based on principle against Israel but on one that is against the development of other forms of diplomatic and economic routes that circumvent Turkish-dominated nodes of influence. Given a known or actively involved Somaliland, it would ease independent trade networks, security alliances, and diplomatic adoptions, which would reduce the strategic dominance of Turkey in the Horn of Africa.

The appeal to Somali unity, therefore, is rather a non-normative assertion or a legitimizing discourse of strategic entrenchment. The example of Somaliland controlling its own matters without relying on any outside help questions this story, showing how legal and humanitarian arguments are manipulatively harnessed to serve the interests of power instead of supporting the principles of self-determination or good governance in their overall formulation.

Djibouti: Berbera as economic threat disguised by false security claims

Djibouti’s opposition to Somaliland is perhaps the most transparently driven by direct material interests, even as it is publicly articulated in the language of regional security. Djibouti’s political economy is fundamentally anchored in its role as a maritime gateway for the Horn of Africa, particularly for landlocked Ethiopia. The emergence of Berbera as a modernized, competitive port directly threatens this economic model.

A fully operational Berbera port, supported by international investment and efficient management, has the potential to divert substantial trade flows away from Djibouti. This would undermine Djibouti’s monopoly over port services, reduce state revenues, and diminish its geopolitical leverage over Ethiopia. To obscure these economic motivations, Djibouti frames Berbera’s development as a security risk, warning of foreign military presence and regional destabilization. Such claims are difficult to sustain, given that Djibouti itself hosts multiple foreign military bases and has long positioned itself as a hub for international naval operations.

Beyond economics, there is a political contrast that Djibouti’s leadership finds deeply unsettling. Somaliland’s relative stability and participatory governance stand in sharp relief against Djibouti’s entrenched authoritarian system. The implicit demonstration that stability can coexist with decentralization and electoral competition undermines the narrative that centralized, personalized rule is a prerequisite for order. Djibouti’s opposition thus reflects not only economic self-preservation but also an anxiety about normative comparison. Ultimately, Djibouti’s resistance to Somaliland’s recognition is an effort to protect a fragile commercial and political monopoly. Security discourse serves as a strategic façade, lending legitimacy to what is fundamentally a defensive economic posture.

Federal Somalia: Political legitimacy over popular interest

The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) occupies a unique position in this constellation of opposition, as its resistance to Somaliland’s recognition is existential. The FGS grounds its position in the inviolability of territorial unity, presenting secession as a threat to national survival. However, this stance is less about the welfare of Somali citizens and more about preserving the political legitimacy of federal institutions headquartered in Mogadishu.

The Somali leadership’s selective application of principle is evident in its external engagements. While adopting an uncompromising posture against any Somaliland-Israel interaction, Mogadishu has itself explored engagement with Israel when such engagement aligned with immediate diplomatic or security interests. This reveals that the core issue is not Israel, but authority—specifically, who possesses the right to represent Somali territory internationally.
Recognition of Somaliland would fundamentally undermine the FGS’s claim to sovereignty over the former Somali Republic, a claim that underpins its access to international aid, security assistance, and diplomatic recognition. Such recognition could also embolden other federal member states to renegotiate their relationship with the center, accelerating centrifugal pressures within Somalia itself. In this sense, opposition to Somaliland is a strategy of regime survival rather than a coherent vision for peace or reconciliation.

The resulting tension is stark: symbolic unity is prioritized over pragmatic solutions that could stabilize the region and respect the political will of Somaliland’s population. This disconnect illustrates how international legitimacy can become detached from domestic effectiveness, producing policies that preserve form while sacrificing substance.

Other Arab States: Media pressure, double standards

The behavior of other Arab and Muslim states—including Jordan, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Pakistan, and the Maldives—reveals a consistent pattern of selective principle and narrative management. These states maintain normalized and often expanding relations with Israel, encompassing trade, security cooperation, and diplomatic exchange. Yet they apply a markedly different standard to Somaliland.

Their primary mechanism is media-driven pressure. State-aligned outlets amplify narratives portraying Somaliland’s external engagements as threats to regional stability, Arab solidarity, and the Palestinian cause. This occurs despite the absence of any material interaction between Somaliland and these states, and despite Somaliland posing no conceivable threat to their national interests.

This double standard serves several functions. It reinforces established hierarchies within the regional order, affirms the authority of larger states to define permissible diplomatic behavior, and distracts domestic audiences from the contradictions inherent in their own governments’ foreign policies. Somaliland becomes a symbolic target through which conformity to an approved narrative is enforced. Such practices underscore the instrumentalization of ethical and legal discourse. Principles are not abandoned but selectively applied in ways that preserve power asymmetries and marginalize smaller political entities.

Marginalizing Reality: Palestine as rhetorical tool

The Palestinian cause occupies a central position in Arab political discourse, often functioning as a moral touchstone for regional legitimacy. In the case of Somaliland, however, it is frequently deployed as a rhetorical weapon divorced from contextual relevance. Somaliland, which has no historical involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict, is nonetheless portrayed as a vector of normalization simply for pursuing diplomatic engagement.

This strategy has extended to the circulation of demonstrably false narratives, including allegations that Somaliland would facilitate the resettlement of Palestinians from Gaza. Such claims lack evidentiary basis and are contradicted by Somaliland’s own public positions. Their purpose is not informational accuracy but emotional mobilization, creating a moral pretext for opposition that obscures underlying strategic motives.

The instrumentalization of Palestine in this manner undermines the integrity of the cause itself. By transforming a legitimate struggle into a tool of political convenience, regional actors dilute its moral force and marginalize the lived realities of Palestinians. Somaliland becomes collateral in a symbolic conflict that serves external interests rather than advancing justice.

Red Sea, Houthi threat

The Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb strait constitute one of the world’s most critical geopolitical corridors, facilitating global energy flows and commercial shipping. Somaliland’s coastline and the port of Berbera place it at the center of this strategic geography. As a result, regional responses to Somaliland are shaped less by normative considerations than by zero-sum calculations of control and access.

Any enhancement of Somaliland’s maritime infrastructure or international partnerships is interpreted as a redistribution of influence. Established powers respond defensively, seeking to constrain Somaliland’s options rather than engage constructively. This reaction highlights a broader pattern in regional politics, where geography consistently outweighs humanitarian or legal considerations.

The double standard is again evident. States that actively cooperate with Israel in the Red Sea basin condemn Somaliland for pursuing similar engagements. The issue is not the nature of the partnership, but the challenge it poses to entrenched hierarchies of permission and control.

In the context of the Yemeni conflict, Somaliland has been rhetorically linked to the Houthi threat as a means of justifying its isolation. Claims that Somaliland-Israel relations would provoke Houthi attacks or destabilize shipping lanes lack empirical grounding. Somaliland has consistently affirmed its neutrality and has every incentive to promote maritime security.
The invocation of the Houthi threat functions as an externalized justification for policies rooted in control rather than security. It allows opposing states to frame Somaliland’s independent engagements as inherently dangerous while obscuring their own selective alliances and security arrangements.

Conclusion: The problem is not Somaliland, but what it represents

The regional opposition to Somaliland’s recognition reveals a consistent pattern of strategic contradiction. Legal principles, moral narratives, and religious symbolism are mobilized selectively to obscure narrow national interests and preserve entrenched power structures. The widespread normalization of relations with Israel by Somaliland’s critics exposes the hollowness of arguments framed around moral absolutism.

At its core, Somaliland represents an unsettling alternative: a small political entity that has achieved relative stability, participatory governance, and institutional functionality through internal consensus rather than external imposition. This reality challenges inherited assumptions about sovereignty, legitimacy, and the inevitability of centralized authority.

Somaliland thus functions as a living litmus test. It tests whether regional actors genuinely value principles such as self-determination, effective governance, and popular will, or whether they prioritize the preservation of familiar geostrategic arrangements. The intensity and coordination of opposition suggest a clear answer. The resistance is not to instability or illegality, but to the transformative implications of acknowledging a successful alternative model of political order.


Author: Gulaid Yusuf Idaan is a senior lecturer and researcher specializing in diplomacy, politics, and international relations in the Horn of Africa. He can be contacted at Idaan54@gmail.com