Category: Blog

Thirty-five Years Later, Somaliland Still Stands

Thirty-five Years Later, Somaliland Still Stands

There are certain anniversaries that, over time, become personal and cease to belong to history alone. They settle into the emotional memory of a people, carried in households, conversations, songs, and passed from one generation to the next. For Somalilanders, May 18 is one of those days.

Every year when this anniversary approaches, I find myself thinking more about the generation that endured war, displacement, and unimaginable uncertainty, yet still found within themselves the strength to rebuild. I think about those who buried loved ones and returned to cities reduced to rubble, only to begin again from almost nothing.

To understand the emotional significance of May 18, one must first understand the history that preceded it.

On June 26, 1960, the former British Somaliland Protectorate attained independence as the State of Somaliland. Days later, driven by the optimism of the era and the wider dream of Somali unity, Somaliland voluntarily entered into union with the Trust Territory of Somalia in pursuit of a greater Somali republic.

At the time, it was a sincere political vision. Across Africa, newly independent nations were emerging from colonial rule with enormous hope and ambition, imagining futures shaped by unity, self-determination, and shared identity. Somalilanders, too, believed they were contributing to something larger than themselves.

But history unfolded differently.

The years that followed gradually gave way to political marginalization, authoritarianism, violence, and ultimately the collapse of the Somali state itself. For Somaliland, particularly during the final years of the military regime, the consequences were devastating. Entire communities were displaced. Cities were heavily damaged. Families were fractured by war and loss. Much of the physical and institutional foundation of society was left in ruins.

And yet, even in the aftermath of such destruction, Somaliland’s story did not end there. This part of its history deeply moves me because Somaliland was not rebuilt under easy circumstances. It was rebuilt by people who had every reason to surrender to exhaustion and despair, yet chose not to. There was no certainty then that peace would endure. No certainty that the institutions being formed would survive. No certainty that the sacrifices being made would amount to anything lasting.

And still, they built.

They built through dialogue. Through reconciliation. Through communities willing to sit together after years of conflict and slowly attempt the difficult work of trusting one another again. Elders and ordinary citizens alike became part of a national conversation about coexistence, governance and survival.

What Somaliland achieved through locally led reconciliation remains one of the most important yet often overlooked chapters in modern African state-building.

Because rebuilding after conflict is not simply an infrastructural exercise, it is psychological. It requires people to trust again. To coexist again. To sit across from one another again after years in which fear and violence had shaped everyday life.

Over the course of my first year serving as Ambassador of the Republic of Somaliland to Kenya, I have found myself reflecting on this history much more deeply than ever before. Representing Somaliland has reminded me that behind every national story are ordinary people whose resilience carried history forward. And perhaps nowhere is that resilience more visible than within Somaliland’s diaspora communities, with whom I have the honor of interacting.

Thirty-five years later, this past year has, in many ways, felt like a moment in which the outside world has begun paying closer attention to a reality Somalilanders have long known and sustained for themselves.

Conversations surrounding Somaliland have gradually shifted toward discussions of partnership, stability, trade, regional security, and its growing role within the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea corridor.

That shift became particularly noticeable following the State of Israel’s formal recognition of Somaliland in December 2025, a development that marked an important diplomatic moment in Somaliland’s modern history. Yet even then, it did not feel like the beginning of Somaliland’s story. If anything, it felt like a long-overdue acknowledgement of a reality that Somalilanders themselves had never abandoned.

Thirty five years later, Somaliland’s story remains, above all else, a human one. A story carried by memory, sacrifice and reconciliation. It is to that generation that I pay tribute today.

By Dr. Mohamed Abdillahi Omar, Ambassador of the Republic of Somaliland to the Republic of Kenya

Somalia & Somaliland: Battlegrounds as Turkey and Israel Seek the Control of the Red Sea

Somalia & Somaliland: Battlegrounds as Turkey and Israel Seek the Control of the Red Sea

Turkey and Israel are intensifying competition in the Horn of Africa, with Somalia and Somaliland emerging as key battlegrounds for oil, military influence and control of vital Red Sea trade routes.

Turkey has consolidated its position through formal agreements with Somalia’s federal government, securing major offshore and onshore oil and gas exploration rights alongside a strong military presence through its largest overseas training base. Israel, meanwhile, has moved closer to Somaliland after becoming the first country to formally recognize the territory as an independent state and is exploring plans for a military base near the Gulf of Aden to monitor Yemen’s Houthis and secure strategic access to the Red Sea corridor.

Earlier this year, Somalia confirmed it was ready to begin its first offshore oil drilling operations, with a Turkish government-owned drilling ship expected to arrive off its coast, according to BBC. The move followed the successful completion of seismic surveys last year by Turkey’s research vessel Oruç Reis, which collected 3D seismic data across key offshore blocks.

Somalia is estimated to hold at least 30 billion barrels of offshore oil potential and around 6 billion cubic meters of natural gas, though much of it remains unproven compared with established producers such as Libya and Nigeria.

Since 2011, Turkey has become one of Mogadishu’s closest allies, combining humanitarian support, military training and infrastructure investment. In December 2025, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said Ankara planned to establish a spaceport in Somalia.

Subsequent reports later confirmed that Turkey was exploring a broader aerospace facility, including a spaceport for satellite and possible missile launches, alongside plans for a naval base, while F-16 fighter jets were deployed inside Somalia in early 2026. In February 2026, Turkey also dispatched ageing U.S.-made M48 and M60 tanks through the streets of Mogadishu in a protected convoy after they were unloaded from a Turkish Navy landing ship.

According to reports, the tanks were deployed to secure Turkish facilities in the Warsheikh area, about 37 miles north of the capital, where Ankara is building the site for satellite launches and broader aerospace operations. Separately, Turkey recently reopened its $50 million military base in Mogadishu, reinforcing Ankara’s role in Somalia’s security sector and its support for the training of Somali National Army soldiers, including elite units involved in operations against Al-Shabaab.

Israel, meanwhile, has focused on Somaliland, whose coastline faces Yemen across the Gulf of Aden. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced in late 2025 that Israel had formally recognized Somaliland, describing the decision as being “in the spirit of the Abraham Accords.” The recognition triggered strong condemnation from Somalia and several Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia, Palestine, Egypt, Kuwait, Iraq, Jordan and Qatar, all of which rejected the decision as illegal and warned that it threatened regional stability and Somalia’s territorial unity.

Turkey also criticized the move, with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan calling Israel’s recognition of Somaliland “illegitimate and unacceptable” and later saying it “does not benefit” the region during a February visit to Ethiopia, one of Israel’s key allies in the Horn of Africa.

Despite the criticism, a Bloomberg report in March confirmed that Israel was exploring plans to build a military base in Somaliland to monitor and target Yemen’s Houthis, taking advantage of the region’s strategic location near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Defending the move, Shiri Fein-Grossman, chief executive of the Israel-Africa Relations Institute and a former member of Israel’s National Security Council, told Israeli outlet i24 News: “Everyone just looks at the map and understands what Israel is looking for here.”

“The recognition of Somaliland gives Israel a strategic location near the Houthis in Yemen and comes at a time that Israel needs as many friends as possible.”

Beyond Somalia and Somaliland, tensions between Turkey and Israel have deepened over Gaza, Syria and wider regional power projection, further exposing a growing geopolitical rivalry between the two military powers.

Middle East Eye reported that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has increasingly shifted his rhetoric towards Turkey as Ankara expands its influence across the eastern Mediterranean and Africa, particularly around Cyprus and Greece. In a post on X, Netanyahu accused President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of “massacring his own Kurdish citizens” and “accommodating Iran’s terror regime and its proxies”.

Turkey responded with sharp condemnation, with officials in Ankara describing Netanyahu as the “Hitler of the era”, citing Israel’s military actions in Gaza and across the region.

While Somalia and Somaliland remain central to their competition in the Horn of Africa, the broader dispute reflects a much wider struggle for influence stretching from the Red Sea to the Middle East, with both military powers seeking strategic bases in the two African territories to strengthen their regional reach.

Olamilekan Okebiorun is a business journalist covering markets, technology, and changing landscape of African economies for Business Insider Africa.

Somaliland’s Geopolitical Relevance Outpacing Its Institutional Preparedness

Somaliland’s geopolitical relevance is rising faster than its institutional preparedness
In an era of intensifying global competition along strategic maritime corridors, the Republic of Somaliland sits at a crossroads few policymakers can afford to ignore. Positioned along the Gulf of Aden, near the Bab el-Mandeb strait through which roughly around 12% of global trade passes, Somaliland occupies territory that is no longer peripheral to global strategy. It is central.
Yet Somaliland’s geopolitical relevance is rising faster than its institutional preparedness.
For over three decades, Somaliland has defied regional patterns. It has built a functioning political order, conducted competitive elections, and maintained relative internal stability without formal international recognition. These achievements are not accidental. They are the result of leadership.
From the early stewardship of Abdirahman Ahmed Ali (Tuur), who guided the fragile reassertion of sovereignty, to the state-building vision of Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal, Somaliland’s trajectory has been shaped by leaders capable of navigating crisis and compromise. Egal’s demobilization of militias and institutional consolidation remain foundational to Somaliland’s governance model.
This pattern of leadership continuity extended through Dahir Riyale Kahin, whose administration entrenched electoral legitimacy, and Ahmed Mohamed Mohamoud (Silanyo), whose economic diplomacy, particularly the Berbera Port agreement with DP World, signalled Somaliland’s entry into the geopolitical economy of the Red Sea corridor.
Under Muse Bihi Abdi, the state navigated rising internal political contestation and external pressure, while expanding its diplomatic outreach. Today, Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi (Iro) presides over a decisive phase, as Somaliland seeks to convert de facto statehood into formal international recognition, an aspiration first answered by the State of Israel in December 2025 after its PM announced a ‘full recognition’ of Somaliland’s sovereignty.
But here lies the paradox: as Somaliland’s strategic importance grows, the model that sustained its stability is becoming insufficient.
A Strategic Location in a Crowded Theatre
The Red Sea and Gulf of Aden are undergoing rapid geopolitical transformation. The region has become a theatre of overlapping interests:
  • ​Gulf states projecting economic and security influence
  • ​Global powers securing maritime routes and military access
  • ​Regional actors competing for ports, corridors, and alliances
Berbera Port, developed through the DP World concession, has emerged as a critical node in this competition. It offers an alternative logistics corridor to landlocked Ethiopia and a potential counterweight to congested or contested routes elsewhere in the region. But this opportunity comes with exposure.
Somaliland’s economy remains highly concentrated, dependent on Berbera port revenues, livestock exports, and remittances. Its lack of international recognition limits access to global financial systems, constraining its ability to scale infrastructure, diversify its economy, and absorb external shocks.
In short, Somaliland is strategically located, but structurally constrained.
The Leadership Constraint.
Historically, Somaliland has compensated for structural limitations through leadership. Its political stability has been personality-driven; anchored in individuals with legitimacy, experience, and consensus-building capacity.
Personality-Driven model is now reaching its limits
The emerging geopolitical environment demands a different type of leadership:
  • Leaders capable of navigating multi-alignment diplomacy without or with inadequate formal recognition.
  • Leaders able to negotiate complex economic partnerships without overexposure to external actors.
  • Leaders who can translate geopolitical opportunity into domestic development.
At present, Somaliland lacks a formalized system for producing such leadership. This creates a strategic vulnerability. Without a pipeline of capable leaders, Somaliland risks entering a period where geopolitical relevance outpaces governance capacity, a gap that external actors are quick to exploit.
Recognition Is Not a Strategy
Much of Somaliland’s external engagement has been framed around the pursuit of international recognition. While recognition remains a legitimate objective, it cannot substitute for internal capacity.
Recognition, even if achieved, will not resolve:
  1.  Economic concentration
  2. Institutional fragility
  3. Youth unemployment
  4. Women and minority groups’ representational equality
  5. Governance gaps
In fact, recognition without preparation could amplify these challenges by accelerating external engagement beyond the state’s ability to manage it. The more urgent priority is internal readiness.
Policy Imperatives in a Geopolitical Context
To navigate this new era, Somaliland must recalibrate its strategy along these axes:
Strategic Autonomy in Foreign Policy:
Somaliland must avoid overdependence on any single external partner. A diversified diplomatic approach: balancing Gulf, African, and Western engagements is essential to preserve autonomy.
Economic De-Risking:
Reducing reliance on Berbera Port revenues is critical. This requires investment in trade corridors, value-added exports, and emerging sectors such as digital services.
Leadership Institutionalization:
Political parties, civil society groups, and state institutions must collectively develop mechanisms for leadership cultivation. Governance cannot remain dependent on exceptional individuals.
Inclusive State-Building
The demographic reality where youth and women form the majority must be reflected in political representation. Exclusion is not only unjust; it is destabilizing.
Governance Before Recognition:
Somaliland’s comparative advantage has been its internal legitimacy. Preserving and deepening this must take precedence over external validation.
A Narrowing Window:
Somaliland’s current position is both an opportunity and a risk. Its stability makes it attractive. Its location makes it valuable. But without institutional depth, these same factors can render it vulnerable.
The next decade will not resemble the last. The geopolitical environment is less forgiving, more competitive, and far less tolerant of governance gaps.
Somaliland’s founding generation proved that leadership can create a state under conditions of collapse. The current generation faces a different test: whether it can transform that legacy into a system capable of sustaining the state under conditions of global competition.
Failure will not come as sudden collapse but as gradual erosion of autonomy, of policy space, and of strategic control. Success, however, would place Somaliland in a rare category not merely as a stable polity in a fragile region, but as a self-made state capable of navigating great power competition on its own terms. That is the real test ahead.
About the Author:
Salma Sheikh is a political analyst, a long time Somaliland recognition advocate, and Lead Advisor on Women Affairs at the House of Representatives of the Republic of Somaliland.

Dahabshiil iyo Telesom oo Batroolka Iran Iibsada

Dahabshiil iyo Telesom oo Batroolka Iran ka Iibsada Marakiibta Ciidanka Ilaalada Khumeyni oo Dawladda Mareykanku Xayiraad Saartey

Shirkadda Telesom, ee bixinta Adeega Internetka Somaliland gudaheeda ku keliyeysatey, ayaa dhawaan ka xidhay dadweynaha Reer Somaliland inay siyaartaan hoyga bogga loo yaqaan “Somaliland Chronicle” ee falanqeysa warar ku saabsan siyaasadda maamulka Qaranka Somaliland ee la xidhiidha dhinacyo kala duwan sida maareynta arrimaha dawladda, qandaraasyadda dawladda ee gacanta u gala maalqabeenka, iyo guud ahaan sida dhaqaalaha dalku u shaqeeyo ee saameyn weyn ku leh masiirka dalka iyo dadkaba.

Sidoo kale waxa uu boggu soo bandhigaa baadhitaano iyo dabagalo uu sameeyo oo salka ku haya xogo dhaba oo la xaqiijiyey jiritaankooda kuna saabsan dhacdooyin ka qabsoomay dalka oo ay hormood ka yihiin amba lug weyn ku leeyihiin xubno Golaha Wasiiradu amba Hogaanka Shirkada Waaweyn, oo sharciga dalka baalmarsan.

Bishan Maarso 10, 2026, ayuu boggu soo saaray qoraal si qoto dheer oo faahfaahsan uga hadlaya markab shidaal siday oo dekadda Berbera ku soo xidhay, una rarnaa labadda shirkadood ee kala ah : Shidaalka Geeska (Horn Petroleum) oo Kooxda Dahabshiil (Dahabshiil Group) leedahay iyo SomGas oo qayb ka ah shirkadda Hurmuud ee laga leeyahay dalka Somaliya.

Shidaalkan waxaa siday markab ku xidhan Ciidanka Ilaaladda Kacaanka Islamiga ee Iran loona yaqaan Qudus (CIKI-Q) sida ku sheegan maqaalka, isagoo ku soo xidhay dekedda Berbera bishii Feebarwari 2026 tiiyoo doonyaha dawladu gacansiiyeen xidhidhaankiisii.

Horn Petroleum iyo SomGas ayaa shidaalkaa labo qayb oo isleeg u kala qaatey, tiiyoo maamulka dekadda Berbera shixnadan shidaalka ah ku tilmaameen mida an hore loo arag baaxadeeda.

Isla markabkan ayaa bishii 9aad 17keedii ee 2025 isagoo ku xidhan deked Yeman ku taal oo Xuutiyiinta maamulaan loona yaqaan Ras Cisa ay Israa’il la beegsatey gantaal ka dhacay diyaarad daroon ah, isagoo gaas u sida Xuutiyiinta, mar ay qori caaraddii ku haysteen markabka iyo 27 qof oo saarnaa Xuutiyiintu, tiiyo mar dambe dadaal diblimaasiyadeed iyo dawladda Pakistan ku guuleysyeen soo daynta markabka iyo shaqaalihiisiiba.

Maraakiibka ayaa iska diiwaan geliya wadamo kale si ay mararka qaarkood u qariyaan cida leh si ay u khaldan macaamiisha, haddii xayiraadi saaran tahay ambaba rabaan in socdaalkooda badu u dhibyaraado.

Isla markabkan ayaa 5 bilood ka dib, tiiyoo magacii laga bedelay, calan kalena la saaray, loona sameeyey waraaqo ah in Ciraq laga leeyahay, ku soo xidhay dekedda Berbera lagana rogey shidaalkii uu siday tiiyoo loo qaybsadey sida kor ku xusan.

7 markab oo xayiraadi saaran tahay amba shake weyni dul hoganayo ayaa ku soo xidhay dekedda Berbera 30 kii cisho ee ku xigay dhacdadan iyada ah.

Saddex masuuliyiinta dekedda Berbera ayaa la xidhay maalmo yar ka dib markii markabkani ka ambabaxay dekedda, tiiyoon arrin aan la shaacin ilaa hadda wax dambi ahna lagu soo oogin masuuliyiintaas halka madaxdii shirkadaha shidaalka lahaana aan weli haba yaraatee wax ficil ah laga qaadin.

La macaamilka markabkan, warqadda ogolaansha ee la siiyey, iyo hawl fududenyta dekeddu u sameysey waxay ka hor imaneysaa qaraarkii madaxweynaha Maraykanku soo saaray tiiyoo Somaliland u keeni karta in la saaro cunaqabateyn xili la rabo in Aqoonsiga Somaliland laga iibiyo Maraykan iyo weliba Israa’iil oo aqoonsatey Somaliland in arrinkani shaki ku abuuro.

Agaasimaha Dekedda Berbera, Cabdi Diriye, oo madaxweynuhu magacaabo, ayaan ka soo jawaabin codsiyo loo diray oo arrintan khuseeya, qabanina dhawr telifoon oo loo diray, ka hor daabacaadda maqaalkan.

Suaasha imaneysaa waxaa weeye maxaa Telesom soo galiyey arrinkan ee ay xayirtay bogan soo bandhigay khiyaamadan qaranka halista ku ah. Telesom waa laan la mid ah shirkadda weyn Hurmuud fadhigeeduna yahay Muqdishu oo go’aamadda halkaas ayaa looga soo yeedhiyaa.

Djibouti at a Crossroads: The Presidential Transition Crisis Ahead of April 2026 Elections

Djibouti at a Crossroads: The Presidential Transition Crisis Ahead of April 2026 Elections

As Djibouti approaches its presidential elections, scheduled for April 2026, the contours of a complex political crisis are emerging within the ruling system. This crisis is rooted in chronic structural fragility, a tribal monopoly on power and deepening political uncertainty. The situation has been further exacerbated by President Ismail Omar Guelleh’s intention to amend the constitution to allow himself to run for a sixth term. Compounding this tension are growing divisions within the ruling elite over his possible successor.

These internal disagreements surfaced publicly in September following the resignation of Alexis Mohamed Gueldon, one of President Guelleh’s most prominent advisors and his official international spokesperson. Gueldon attributed his resignation to the country’s “democratic regression” and “nepotistic practices.” He also said that the president had “gone too far” – a clear reference to Guelleh’s intention to amend the constitution to remain in power.

Crisis of Power Transition in Djibouti

President Guelleh and his regime now face a twofold challenge. The first is constitutional; the 77-year-old president has exceeded the legal age limit for presidential candidacy (75). Despite his declining health, there are indications that he is seeking to replicate a previous amendment to the constitution to remove this limit. In an interview in May 2025, Guelleh left the door open to the possibility of running again – a move that has been met with internal resistance.

The second challenge concerns the identity of President Guelleh’s potential successor, an issue that could redefine the country’s political and social order. Guelleh’s options appear limited, and any move to designate a successor must be carefully calibrated to preserve regime cohesion and safeguard the influence of his family and clan, the Mamasan. In this context, the resignation of Gueldon, who belongs to the same clan, has fueled speculation that the president is grooming his stepson, Naguib Abdullah Kamil, who is affiliated with the Afar community, to succeed him.

Such a move risks intensifying ethnic polarization within the ruling coalition. The al-Issa tribe elite view Kamil as a threat to their historical dominance and privileges. This could prompt them to block his rise and prevent a transfer of leadership to the Afar, potentially through pressure to keep Guelleh at the top of the power pyramid or aligning with another candidate from within the clan, such as Gueldon, known for his extensive connections and political ambitions.

Consolidating Authoritarianism or a Potential Shift?

Given the current dynamics, three possible trajectories can be anticipated for the future of Djibouti’s ruling regime and the broader political landscape:

1. A Constitutional Amendment to Extend Guelleh’s Presidency

This scenario appears plausible, given President Guelleh’s extensive network of local, regional and international relationships, and his ability to navigate a political framework that enables him to balance and subordinate internal and external dynamics to his own objectives. Such a move would effectively extend the status quo and consolidate the regime’s de facto legitimacy and continuity, as well as preserve the interests of the elite without dismantling the tribal structure.

However, this path carries significant risks – including the erosion of the regime’s credibility, increased institutional fragility, growing public discontent and a strengthened opposition – which could ultimately destabilize the governance system in the medium term.

2. Engineering a Disciplined Transition of Power

This trajectory would require President Guelleh to recognize the need to lead an internal negotiated process to promote an agreed-upon successor. A likely successor could be his stepson, Kamil, who enjoys support from his influential mother and the Afar elite, or another figure from al-Issa/Mamasan clan. Such a managed transition could enhance the regime’s ability to reproduce itself while attracting regional and international endorsement, as it would offer a controlled and stable transfer of power. The key challenge, however, lies in forging internal consensus around the potential heir and reducing ethnic and factional rivalries within the ruling elite.

3. An Electoral Process Controlled by an Issa Candidate

The likelihood of this trajectory increases if al-Issa elite perceive a shift in power dynamics in favor of the Afar – particularly with the potential rise of Kamel. In response, they may push for elections, aiming to ensure victory for one of their prominent figures, thereby safeguarding their influence in the post-Guelleh era.

However this strategy risks deepening divisions and sparking elite-level confrontations, potentially drawing in the military and security forces – especially if the electoral process resembles previous ones marked by allegations of fraud and a lack of meaningful reforms to promote political inclusivity. Such conditions could lead to renewed opposition boycotts and further destabilize the political landscape.

Beyond Guelleh: Local and Regional Implications

Djibouti’s allies, with France at the forefront, are expected to play a leading role in facilitating a smooth transition of power

International and regional powers regard Djibouti as a strategic hub for expanding their influence in the wider region encompassing the Red Sea, East Africa, and the western Indian Ocean. These actors have long viewed President Guelleh and his regime as central to safeguarding their interests, relying on the political stability maintained throughout his tenure. As a result, they have often turned a blind eye to his authoritarian practices – such as fragmenting the local opposition and silencing dissent – which have enabled him to solidify his rule for over 25 years.

However, this stability appears tenuous and largely superficial. It does not stem from strong state institutions or effective governance, but rather from delicate tribal dynamics and the concentration of power in a few individuals who shape the country’s political landscape. With growing concerns surrounding succession and the ongoing discourse about the post-Guelleh era, there are genuine apprehensions of escalating tensions and conflict among Djibouti’s political and tribal elites. Such developments could undermine the governance system and weaken state institutions, pushing the small nation overlooking the Bab al-Mandab Strait into a period of turbulence, with significant implications for regional stability and the strategic interests of key regional and international players.

An uncontrolled succession crisis in Djibouti would have far-reaching consequences extending far beyond its domestic political sphere.  It would worsen regional instability and heighten geopolitical competition among the foreign powers maintaining military bases in the country. This would complicate their operational and strategic decision-making, potentially prompting a recalibration of their military strategies and presence. For example, the establishment of a Chinese military base in 2017 and Houthi attacks in the Red Sea have already weakened the US position in Djibouti. Restrictions imposed by Djibouti on US military activities have prompted Washington to explore alternative options, including expanding its presence in Kenya, making it its first non-NATO sub-Saharan African ally, as well as the growing US interest in Somaliland.

Conclusions

The months ahead will be pivotal in shaping the future of Djibouti. The choice between extending President Guelleh’s rule and initiating a political transition represents a delicate balancing act for the regime, which must demonstrate its ability to adapt to both domestic and external pressures for reform and democratic change. The decisions made by Djibouti’s leadership, particularly by Guelleh himself, could either pave the way for a new political era or maintain the status quo, with the risk of eventual regime collapse and national instability.

While international and regional partners prioritize sustainable stability and predictable transformation, external support for the ruling clan may no longer guarantee its endurance and political security. In this context, Djibouti’s allies –  especially France – are expected to play a leading role in diplomatic engagement and soft intervention. Their efforts may focus on  encouraging a peaceful transfer of power through internal consensus or a more transparent electoral process, rather than prolonging Guelleh’s grip on power

Somalia Unionist Factions are Stirring up Divisions inside Somaliland

Somalia Unionist Factions Stirring up Divisions inside Somaliland

Fostering Internal Fragmentation to Block Clean Breaks

Prologue

As a researcher who spent years immersed in East African affairs, I’ve always been drawn to the intricate web of histories, identities, and power struggles that define the region. It’s a place where resilience shines through chaos, but also where old wounds fester in unexpected ways. A few years back, I wrote an article called “The Dutch Paradox,” exploring how the Netherlands, a nation that clawed its way to independence through bloody revolts against Spanish rule, later turned around and inflicted some of the most brutal colonial regimes on places like Indonesia and South Africa. It was a stark reminder that the fight for freedom doesn’t always translate to empathy for others’ struggles. That lens has shaped how I see the Somali situation today: a people united by so much, language, faith, culture, yet torn apart by the very divisions they sometimes wield as weapons. It’s what I call the Somali Paradox, where Somali unionists are actively stoking internal rifts in Somaliland to sabotage its push for a clean, recognized breakaway, all while Somalia itself hangs together as a fragile patchwork of semi-independent states. In this piece, I’ll draw on my experiences and observations to unpack this irony, blending history, current events, and a bit of forward-thinking, in hopes of humanizing the stakes for everyone involved.

Abstraction

At its core, the Somali Paradox is about how Somali unionist factions are stirring up divisions inside Somaliland to weaken its case for international recognition as a separate country. It’s a tactic that feels almost poetic in its contradiction, promoting splits to prevent a split, especially since Somalia operates as a loose federation that’s always one crisis away from falling apart. Drawing from my time in the region and parallels to historical paradoxes like the Dutch one, this article walks through the colonial roots, the failed dream of a Greater Somalia, the brutal civil war of the 1990s, and Somaliland’s quiet success in building its own path since 1991. We’ll look at the here-and-now, including Israel’s bold recognition of Somaliland on December 26, 2025, which has thrown fuel on the fire amid swirling debates over Somali diaspora politics, whispers of Palestinian resettlement, and Ethiopia’s hunger for sea access. Using insights from diplomatic chatter, news outlets, and the raw voices on social media, I’ll weigh whether this paradox can hold up long-term. We’ll touch on moves to chip away at Somaliland by carving out places like Awdal and SSC-Khatumo, and explore what comes next: the dangers of endless division versus the promise of real talks that could lead to peace and shared growth, maybe even as two separate states under a bigger Somali umbrella.

Introduction

I’ve often heard Somalis described as one of the most unified ethnic groups in Africa, sharing a single language, a deep Islamic faith, and a nomadic heritage that transcends borders. But you see the cracks nowhere better: colonialism’s arbitrary lines, fierce clan loyalties, and outside powers pulling strings. This ideal of unity masks a messy reality, and nowhere is that clearer than in the Somali Paradox. It’s the way pro-union forces quietly or not so quietly, encouraging fractures within Somaliland to stop it from gaining full independence, all to cling to the idea of a single Somalia on the map.

This strategy has ramped up since Israel shocked the world by recognizing Somaliland as a sovereign nation on December 26, 2025, the first UN member state to do so. I remember the buzz among my contacts in the Horn; it wasn’t just about borders, but how it tangled with bigger storms: Ethiopia’s desperate need for a port, wild rumors about relocating Palestinians from Gaza, and even U.S. election-year drama involving Somali-Americans like Rep. Ilhan Omar and barbs from Donald Trump. Somalis around the globe reacted with raw emotion, anger, betrayal, a sense of being under siege, especially with rising anti-Muslim sentiment in the West fueling the fire.

In response, unionists are doubling down on splintering Somaliland, pushing for breakaway pockets like Awdal in the west and SSC-Khatumo in the east, much like Somalia’s own clan-run states such as Puntland or Jubaland. It’s division to fight division, and it begs tough questions: Will this really stop Somaliland’s momentum? And what’s best for ordinary Somalis, a bunch of feuding mini-states under foreign thumbs, or some kind of negotiated setup where everyone wins? In my Dutch Paradox piece, I argued that nations often repeat the cycles they escaped; here, Somalis risk doing the same, using fragmentation as a tool when it once tore them apart. This article pulls together threads from history, today’s headlines, and online conversations, aiming for a fair shake from all sides: Somalis in Mogadishu, Somalilanders in Hargeisa, regional players, and the diaspora I’ve connected with over years.

Historical Trends: From Colonial Scars to Broken Dreams

The roots of Somali division go back to the late 1800s, when European powers sliced up Somali lands like a pie: the British in the north and Italians in the south. I’ve personally seen how these borders still haunt people, stories of families split, resources fought over. The British approach in the north was hands-off, letting clans handle their affairs, which bred a unique sense of self-reliance. Down south, Italian rule was harsher, more top-down, setting the stage for resentment.

When independence hit in 1960, the north and south united as the Somali Republic, with British Somaliland independent for just five days before jumping in. It was all fueled by the romantic idea of Greater Somalia, reuniting all Somalis. But under Siad Barre’s 1969 regime, that dream turned nightmare, the disastrous Ogaden War with Ethiopia in 1977-78 crushed spirits and sparked rebellions. Northern Isaaq clans bore the brunt, facing what many call genocide, like the 1988 bombing of Hargeisa that killed tens of thousands. Survivors speak louder even today; their pain is palpable, a reminder of how unity imposed by force crumbles.

Barre’s fall in 1991 unleashed hell in the south, warlords, famine, terrorists like Al-Shabaab. But in the north, clans gathered at the 1993 Borama Conference, reclaiming independence as Somaliland on May 18, 1991, back to those old British borders. They’ve built something remarkable: elections, stability, a functioning government, all without recognition. Meanwhile, Somalia’s 2012 constitution created a federal system with autonomous states like Puntland (born in 1998) and Jubaland (2013), each with their own armies and deals. It was meant to embrace clan differences, but it’s just deepened the divides, with constant squabbles over money and power. It’s this very model that unionists are now trying to force on Somaliland, echoing the Dutch irony: fighting for your own freedom, then denying it to others.

Current Situation: Israel’s Move and the Web of Tensions

Israel’s recognition of Somaliland on December 26, 2025, felt like an earthquake. Prime Minister Netanyahu called it backing a “real, working state” in a tough neighborhood, and Somaliland’s President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi hailed it as a breakthrough, talking security ties, trade, and even embassies. Then came Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar’s visit to Hargeisa on January 6, 2026, stressing Red Sea safety and poking at “virtual” states like Palestine. For Israel, it’s about strategy, eyes on the Houthis, maybe a foothold at Berbera Port.

The backlash was fierce. Somalia blasted it as an attack on its sovereignty, with protests in Mogadishu and emergency parliament meetings. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud tied it to alleged Palestinian relocation plans from Gaza, denied all around, but the rumor mill churned. The African Union held a crisis session on January 6, slamming the move and calling for reversal, fearing it could unravel anti-terror work. Djibouti cut flights to Somaliland starting January 7, Yemen cried foul, the EU stuck to Somalia’s borders, and the UN Security Council debated amid warnings of chaos.

It all links back to Ethiopia’s 2024 deal with Somaliland: leasing coastline for a naval base, maybe in exchange for recognition, Somalia sees it as theft. Add in U.S. tensions, with Trump’s 2025 comments against Somali immigrants and Omar pushing back on ICE raids, and it’s a powder keg. On social media platforms like X, it’s a mix: Somalilanders cheering “historic courage,” U.S. reps like Chris Smith calling for America to follow, while unionists warn of “neocolonial games.

As someone who has closely followed the Horn of Africa for years, listening to elders and sharing their stories, debating with unionists over long phone calls, and now tracking the passionate voices emerging both at home and in the diaspora, fiery threads on X, and heartfelt conversations with friends from Minneapolis to London, I firmly believe that Israel’s recognition of Somaliland has dramatically supercharged the Somali Paradox. What might once have remained a slow-burning, largely internal debate has suddenly been thrust under an intense global spotlight, sharply illuminating, and, in many ways, deepening, and the local fractures that have long simmered just beneath the surface.

The Somali Paradox: Creating Many Splits to Stop Somaliland Departure 

At the core of the Somali Paradox lies a calculated strategy: Somali unionist factions are deliberately engineering multiple internal splits within Somaliland to thwart its singular, clean break toward independence, thereby safeguarding the illusion of a unified Somalia. Somalia itself functions as a patchwork of semi-autonomous clan-based entities, such as Puntland and Jubaland, which operate like independent mini-states with their own militaries, resources, and foreign policies, yet these same forces are now exporting this model northward to undermine Somaliland’s cohesion and international appeal. For instance, in the western region of Awdal, home to the Gadabuursi and Ciise clans and a longstanding unionist stronghold, recent protests have featured crowds waving Palestinian flags in defiance of Israel’s recognition, while armed groups seize territory and key figures defect to align with Mogadishu. Locals increasingly decry Somaliland as a “one-clan show,” dominated by the Isaaq and allegedly sustained through coercive force since its 1991 declaration. Similarly, in the east, SSC-Khatumo’s decisive 2023 victories expelled Somaliland forces from Las Anod, establishing the area as Somalia’s sixth federal member state and highlighting how these engineered divisions portray Somaliland as fractured and unworthy of sovereignty.

This approach of fostering numerous splits to block one major division carries profound risks, as it not only erodes Somaliland’s stability but could boomerang to exacerbate Somalia’s own vulnerabilities. Post-Israel’s recognition, Somaliland authorities have intensified crackdowns, arresting imams and scholars who criticize the move and monitoring religious sermons, which further tarnishes their image of democratic governance and plays into unionist narratives. Unionists argue that legitimizing “de facto” entities like Somaliland accelerates widespread fragmentation, hollowing out central authority, while Somalilanders counter that their secession is an escape from Somalia’s dysfunctions, where groups like Al-Shabaab often outmaneuver the federal government in providing order. As one of my contacts poignantly put it, “Division feeds the extremists; unity starves them.” Yet, by mirroring its federal chaos onto Somaliland, potentially reducing its control to just 65-70% of claimed territory amid non-Isaaq clan resistance and the specter of civil war, Somalia invites broader balkanization across the Horn. This echoes the Dutch Paradox I explored in my earlier work: a nation that fought fiercely for its own unity, only to impose divisive colonial tactics elsewhere, perpetuating cycles of instability rather than breaking them.

Future Pathways: Can the Paradox Last, and What’s Best for Somalis?

Short-term, yeah, this tactic could stall things, making Somaliland seem unstable and scaring off more recognitions. Israel’s step might encourage the U.S. UK and other countries to follow, but Awdal and SSC-Khatumo show the cracks. Long-term, though? It could backfire, boosting Al-Shabaab, clan wars, and outsiders. Analysts I’ve followed warn of redrawn maps, more terror, and Israel stirring the pot against Turkey’s Somali ties.

What’s truly in Somali interests? Not endless mini-states under foreign watch that just breeds dependency. Better: sit down on a round table and negotiate. Give and take is the only sustainable way out. Some see recognition as a “dangerous spark” in the Horn; others, a smart reset for stability. On conversations on social media platforms like X; it’s split: one post says Israel came “too late” as Somaliland shrinks to a “tribal enclave,” another bets on economic wins drawing more allies.

Paths ahead: dug-in divisions leading to total breakup, a recognition wave solidifying Somaliland-Other countries bonds, or deals that heal Somali wounds. From my Dutch Paradox view, breaking cycles means choosing empathy over repetition.

Conclusion

The Somali Paradox lays bare the painful gap between rhetoric of unbreakable unity and the fractured realities on the ground. Israel’s recognition, just over a week ago, followed by high-level visits, AU condemnations, and regional backlash, has exposed these fault lines more vividly than ever, intensifying efforts to splinter Somaliland while underscoring Somalia’s own persistent vulnerabilities.

Tactical internal divisions may temporarily delay Somaliland’s clean break by magnifying clan dissent and painting it as unstable, but they invite far greater perils: renewed civil war, proliferating terrorism, and escalating geopolitical tensions across the Horn, as cautioned by the UN, AU, and regional leaders.

For the Somalis I’ve come to know, from resilient diaspora entrepreneurs rebuilding lives abroad to pastoralists navigating daily hardships at home, the sustainable way forward lies in pragmatic, inclusive agreements that honor diverse identities and aspirations. Whether through strengthened federalism, a loose confederation, or even respectful coexistence as two states, mediated dialogue could address not just internal matters but also other geopolitical interests.

Transforming paradox into genuine progress requires setting aside division as a weapon and embracing shared prosperity instead. It’s ultimately a deeply human story, one of a proud people charting a path through inherited pain toward a more secure, self-determined future amid relentless global pressures.

Unlocking America’s Leverage in the Strategic and Highly Contested Red Sea

Unlocking America’s Leverage in the Strategic and Highly Contested Red Sea

Mr. President,

Jan 4, 2025

I write on behalf of the Somaliland American Strategic Advisory Group to urge decisive U.S. action to re- recognize Somaliland and formalize a strategic partnership

Recent developments—including bipartisan congressional initiatives, the African Union’s 2005 fact finding conclusions, and Israel’s recognition of Somaliland—have created a narrow but consequential window to advance American interests in the strategic and highly contested Red Sea corridor and the Horn of Africa.

Bipartisan Congressional Momentum:
Congress has already taken substantive steps on Somaliland policy through bipartisan measures reflecting growing interest in formal ties and strategic cooperation. In the Senate, the Somaliland Partnership Act mandated reporting and feasibility studies and was introduced with bipartisan sponsorship. In the House, the Republic of Somaliland Independence Act (H.R. 3992) has been introduced and referred to committee, signaling additional support for reassessing U.S. policy. Together, these actions demonstrate cross party recognition that U.S. strategy in the Horn of Africa requires new tools and credible partners.

Legal and Historical Justification:
Somaliland became independent before Somalia and possesses more than a century of distinct political history and national identity—76 years under British Protectorate rule, 34 years of self-governance, and only a 30-year union with Somalia marked by violence. It was recognized by 35 nations upon independence in 1960. Its union with Somalia was voluntary and never ratified by a binding treaty. Somaliland’s 1991 withdrawal is supported by international legal principles, including the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the right to self-determination. (See: “The Case for the Independent Statehood of Somaliland,” American University International Law Review.) In a national referendum, over 89% of Somalilanders voted in favor of independence.

African Union Findings:
The African Union’s 2005 fact finding mission concluded that Somaliland’s political development and governance merited serious consideration, describing its statehood claim as “historically unique and self-justified.” The mission explicitly recommended engagement rather than isolation. This internal AU assessment undercuts claims that recognition would violate regional norms and provides a credible African basis for principled U.S. engagement.

Recent Diplomatic Shift:
Israel’s formal recognition of Somaliland in December 2025 marks the first instance of state level recognition and materially alters the diplomatic landscape. This development creates momentum for allied coordination and practical geopolitical cooperation while increasing the strategic value of timely U.S. leadership to shape outcomes.

Why Now and What to Do:
Somaliland offers secure logistics through the Berbera Port and Air Base, a stable democratic partner in a volatile region, and a geopolitical buffer against malign influence. Recognition and partnership with Somaliland—unlike with Somalia—do not entail open ended nation building. By recognizing Somaliland, the United States can secure a reliable ally, strengthen regional security, and advance long term national interests without the burden of failed aid programs or protracted military engagements. At the same time, the United States would gain basing access, defense cooperation opportunities, and commercial entry into Somaliland’s energy and mineral rich economy.

We recommend the following immediate steps: appoint a Special Envoy to initiate formal talks; direct the Departments of State and Defense to negotiate bilateral agreements on logistics, defense, and security initiatives; and coordinate with Congress to authorize targeted economic investment facilitation with appropriate oversight.

Mr. President, the convergence of congressional momentum, the African Union’s findings, and Israel’s recognition presents a strategic opening the United States should not cede. Acting now would secure U.S. access to a critical maritime chokepoint, expand economic opportunities for American firms, and strengthen a democratic partner in one of the world’s most strategically contested regions. We stand ready to brief your team and support an interagency process to implement these recommendations.

________________________________________

Respectfully,
IYussuf M. Issa
Somaliland Strategic Advisory Group
Ashburn, Virginia https://slsag.org

Somaliland Sovereignty Predates the Creation of Somali Republic and its Territorial Integrity

Somaliland Sovereignty Predates the Creation of Somali Republic and its Territorial Integrity.

What if the most repeated claims about Somaliland are wrong? What if the idea that its separation is a recent rebellion, that its people were always committed to pan-Somali unity, or that Israel’s move represents a sudden colonial intrusion collapses under even minimal historical scrutiny? And what if the real scandal is not Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, but how thoroughly the international system has ignored facts it once openly acknowledged?

Just a day after Christmas, on 26 December, a video call landed on the Somaliland president’s iPhone. On the other end was Benjamin Netanyahu, informing him of a decision that would detonate diplomatic outrage across Africa, the Middle East and the United Nations. Nothing about this moment was spontaneous. It was the endpoint of a long, calculated and largely clandestine process in which symbolism mattered far less than geography, intelligence and hard power.

To understand why this recognition matters, one has to begin with an inconvenient historical truth: Somaliland is not a breakaway region invented in 1991. It is a former British protectorate that became an independent state in June 1960, was recognized by more than thirty countries, and entered a voluntary union with the former Italian Somalia five days later. That union was political rather than organic, rushed rather than deliberative, and never subjected to a referendum in Somaliland itself. When it collapsed three decades later amid mass violence, Somaliland did not secede from a functioning state; it withdrew from a failed one and reclaimed a sovereignty it had already possessed.

This alone sits uncomfortably with the joint statement issued by Arab, Islamic and African states condemning Israel’s move as a violation of international law and an unprecedented assault on territorial integrity. The statement speaks as though Somaliland were a newly invented “region”, yet omits the fact that its statehood predates the Somali Republic itself. It invokes the sanctity of borders while ignoring that Somaliland has consistently defended colonial-era boundaries, whereas the Somali state openly rejected them through the doctrine of Greater Somalia. It warns of dangerous precedents while overlooking the dozens of cases in which self-determination has been selectively endorsed or denied depending on geopolitical convenience.

Declassified intelligence from the period before independence exposes how fragile the nationalist narrative always was. A 1948 CIA assessment of political organizations in British Somaliland noted that none were “purely political in character” and that they largely pursued “individual tribal or regional interests”. It estimated that only three or four per cent of the population belonged to any political party. Most explosively, it stated that the Somali Youth League, later mythologized as the voice of all Somalis, “does not have an appeal for the residents of British Somaliland”. This was not the verdict of a hostile power seeking to undermine unity, but an internal intelligence assessment written decades before Somaliland’s later rupture with Mogadishu.

The same document described early Somali nationalism as explicitly pan-Somali and dismissive of inherited borders, committed to uniting “all the inhabitants of the Somali countries”. That ideology would later become state doctrine in Mogadishu. Somaliland’s subsequent rejection of it was not a betrayal of some shared national soul; it was a continuation of a political culture that had always been cautious, localized and sceptical of ideological centralism. In this sense, Somaliland’s post-1991 governance — built around clan conferences, negotiated consent and decentralization — looks less like an anomaly and more like a return to form.

Israel’s role enters this story not as a sudden act of provocation, but as a long-term strategic calculation shaped by geography and threat perception. Somalia as a unified state never had meaningful relations with Israel. From the 1960s onward it aligned itself with pan-Arab causes, framed Israel as an imperial enemy, and became one of its most hostile critics in international forums. Somaliland, by contrast, was recognized by Israel in 1960 and quietly revisited that history after restoring its independence in 1991.

What followed, according to multiple Israeli and regional media reports, was years of discreet engagement managed largely outside formal diplomatic channels. Mossad is reported to have cultivated relationships with Somaliland’s leadership, laying political and security groundwork well before any public recognition. Israeli officials have openly thanked the agency’s leadership for its role. Key Somaliland leaders are said to have made several secret visits to Israel in 2025, meeting senior political, defense and intelligence figures. None of this was advertised, because recognition politics in Africa and the Arab world remain unforgiving.

The strategic logic is blunt. Somaliland sits on the Gulf of Aden, overlooking the Bab el-Mandeb strait through which a significant share of global trade passes. It lies within a few hundred kilometers of Houthi controled territory in Yemen, whose missiles and drones have reshaped security calculations across the Red Sea. From Berbera, Israel and its partners can monitor maritime traffic, detect launches, and project power at distances that radically alter response times. Israeli commentators have described the relationship as a force multiplier against the Houthis. Western security planners see similar advantages.

This also explains why the United Arab Emirates looms so large in the background. Long before Israel’s recognition, Abu Dhabi invested heavily in Berbera’s port and airport, reportedly turning them into advanced logistical and military facilities. The UAE’s absence from the joint condemnation statement was therefore less a mystery than a confirmation. Somaliland fits neatly into a wider Emirati strategy of controlling ports, trade routes and maritime choke-points from the Red Sea to the Horn of Africa, often operating beyond the authority of weak central governments.

China, too, factors into the equation. Its naval base in Djibouti and expanding presence along African trade routes have unsettled Western planners. Somaliland offers an alternative foothold in a region where influence is increasingly contested. From this perspective, Israel’s move is not only about countering the Houthis or extending the Abraham Accords, but about anchoring itself and its allies in a rapidly militarizing maritime corridor.

It is here that the most incendiary allegations emerge, particularly claims that Somaliland was discussed as a potential destination for Palestinians displaced from Gaza. These reports, widely circulated but officially denied, have inflamed regional reactions and colored interpretations of Israel’s motives. Whether such plans were speculative, exploratory or entirely fictitious, their very plausibility in public discourse speaks to how little Somaliland is treated as a political community in its own right, and how readily it is imagined as empty strategic space.

The backlash has been swift and severe. Fourteen UN Security Council members condemned Israel’s recognition; the African Union rejected it outright. Turkey warned of a strategy to fragment Islamic states. Somalia framed the move as an existential threat. Yet much of this outrage rests on selective memory. Somaliland is condemned for claiming self-determination, while states that suppress separatist movements within their own borders present themselves as guardians of international law. Israel is accused of expansionism, while Somalia’s own pursuit of Greater Somalia is quietly erased from the record.

None of this absolves Israel of opportunism, nor Somaliland of hard-nosed calculation. This was not an act of idealism. It was a transaction shaped by intelligence cooperation, shared threat perceptions and the cold logic of geography. It will intensify rivalries in the Horn of Africa, sharpen competition in the Red Sea, and test already fragile regional orders. It may also, paradoxically, force a long-overdue reckoning with Somaliland’s unresolved status.

The question now is whether the international community can continue to deny a political reality that intelligence agencies documented decades ago, that dozens of states once acknowledged, and that more than 39 years of effective self-rule have only reinforced. In the coming years, as the Horn of Africa becomes an ever more critical arena of global competition, that denial may prove more destabilizing than recognition itself.

by Nilantha Ilangamuwa is a founding editor of the Sri Lanka Guardian

Somaliland and Israel – Considerations for Recognition and Cooperation

Somaliland and Israel – Considerations for Recognition and Cooperation

In the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea – a space whose security-strategic importance to Israel has been prominent again in the past two years – Somaliland, an independent and pro-Western country, is established, which is not recognized by the international community. Its ultimate goal is to gain international recognition and establish alliances with countries that will help it against its enemy: the Somali government of Mogadishu. In recent years, she has been establishing close ties with the UAE and Taiwan. The rise of the Trump administration and the presence of senior Republican officials who support recognition of it are given hopes to the leaders of Somaliland, and against this background its efforts to gain recognition have been increased, including against Israel. This article examines the issue of relations with Somaliland for Israel, while presenting the supportive and inhibiting Israeli recognition of it.

Somaliland – over thirty years of independence and stability

Somaliland spans the northwestern part of what the international community recognizes as a wholesale. Somaliland was independent for five days in 1960 before joining the Union with Somalia, and was reborn as an independent state in 1991 from the brutal and long-term Somali Civil War that has been taking place since the late 1980s. Somaliland is based on a unique and separate identity that has been formed in the last hundred years: the territory was under British colonial rule (unlike the rest of Somalia, which was under Italian rule); its people have extensive ties with southern Yemenite over the other side of the Gulf of Aden where it borders; and most of its population is among the members of the Isak clan – unlike the rest of the Somalia inhabited by other clans. The Isak suffered from discrimination and violence—and even claim to have genocide—from the clans that ruled Somalia-Mogadishu, especially in the 80’s.

Since its actual independence in 1991, Somaliland has been an antithesis for taking place in Somalia: its security situation is benign, its internal arena is stable, has no significant jihadist activity, and although there are border disputes at its ends (especially in the districts where other clans live), they are specific and polluted. Since the 2000s, Somaliland has been conducting a stable and proper multi-party democratic system, with a permanent election, the last of which took place in 2024 and announced a peaceful and orderly change of government. All the significant political forces operating in it are pro-Western and suspicious of Islamist forces or China and Russia. Although they are divided on the methods of action, they all see international recognition as a supreme goal.

The fact that Somalia-Mogadishu’s problems are concentrated in the south helps the survival of Somaliland, which is far from the battlegrounds between the various clans and the powerful government of Mugheyshu and the powerful Al-Shabaab organization. In addition, Somaliland borders on relatively friendly and stable governments: Ethiopia, Puntland (an independent state actually member of the Somalia Federation), and Djibouti. With them, Somaliland had peaceful and improved relations: In 2024, Somaliland signed a strategic understanding agreement with Ethiopia, which was supposed to give the unaccessible Ethiopia to the sea a foothold in the strategic port, Barbara, insinuating future recognition of her independence (this agreement was effectively frozen, but not canceled, under Turkish-Somali pressure). Somaliland’s ties with Djibouti are also improving, and in October 2025 she signed a “Nairubi Agreement” with Puntland for security and commercial cooperation.

In recent years, Somaliland has also developed its ties with other pro-Western countries. Taiwan and the UAE are its two most strategic partners: Taiwan – the chip manufacturing giant – is investing in the development of the country’s rare metal and mineral mines, and the UAE has invested a fortune in the development of the port of Barbara. As far as the UAE is concerned, Somaliland is a strategic stronghold in the Horn of Africa alongside the other Maozia in the region – on the Yemenite island of Socotura, in Puntland, and Darfur.

Even with the United States, Somliland has reasons for cautious optimism. American delegations—including from the Pentagon—have visited the country, which markets itself as a potential strategic base for the United States in the region. President Trump said the United States is considering recognizing it, and the U.S. Congress is interested in ordering the State Department to re-examine ties with Somaliland to improve them and upgrade them. As an intermediate stage, U.S. lawmakers aim for the State Department to start separating Somalia from Somalia and Somaliland in the context of travel warnings. Republican officials, such as Senator Ted Cruz of Texas, frequently express themselves in their support for recognizing Somaliland’s independence. However, the Americans have heavy considerations that are urgent to avoid recognition, along with delays in appointments and policy formulation for Africa and the Red Sea.

Against this background, Somaliland is conducting a lobbying campaign to promote the issue of recognition. In May 2025, the Somalilan President appealed to the UN members to recognize it as an independent state. During October 2025, the media in Somaliland reported that more than 20 countries, including Israel, are approaching the decision to recognize it. Somaliland is also more correct to adopt additional sovereign features: in November 2025, it declared full control of its airspace (by disconnecting it from the symbolic sovereignty of Somalia), demanding that it be authorized by a direct permit from its authorities to move in the sky, and announced that it would not recognize visas received from the Government of Mogadishu.

International recognition by other countries is therefore the primary target for the various Somliland governments (it remains one even after the exchange of government in democratic elections). International recognition will determine the existence of Somaliland and grant it protection, at least it hopes, from a scenario in which Somalia is reinforced (one or with its allies) will be able to act in the future international legitimacy to re-apply its authority to the territory. Alongside international recognition, Somaliland strives to acquire reliable and powerful allies. The danger from the government of Mogadishu is now still imaginary, but Somaliland has more tangible concerns than other security threats, from the Houthim, through the spread of global jihad (which is currently active in neighboring Pontland), to separatism in the periphery of the territory and even subversive activity that has evidence on the ground by China and Turkey.

Importance of Somaliland to the West and Israel

The importance of Somaliland lies in its geostrategic location and correctness – especially as a stable, moderate and reliable country in a volatile region – to cooperate in a comprehensive and broad manner with Western countries. The location of Somaliland at the entrance to the Gulf of Eden – opposite southern Yemen – connecting the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean, gives it a geo-strategic uniqueness. This is the historical reason that the British Empire took over in the late 19th century, and that the United States during the Reagan administration established a military base in the 1980s, in the midst of the Cold War.

Today, the distance between the waters and territory of Somaliland and the Houthi control areas in Yemen, the port of Hadida, for example, is about 300 to 500 km. The fact that in recent years the Gulf states, the United States and Israel – each in turn – have fought the Houthis without a decision, gives the location of Somaliland and the potential ability to operate from its territory, considerable global importance, within a possible equality voucher. Somaliland has a potential to be a frontal base for a variety of missions: intelligence surveillance against the Houthis and their empowerment efforts; providing logistics to the legitimate Yemeni government in its war against the Houthis; and a base for direct operational activity against the Houthi – offensive and to thwart Houthi attacks at sea or by means of drones. The necessary parallel to Israel’s steadfast alliance with Azerbaijan, which has significantly upgraded the strategic and operational Israeli ability to deal with the Iranian threat. It is possible that Somaliland is the equivalent brick for Israel in the face of the Houchi threat.

Alongside the valuable location of Somaliland, it is equally important that its government is interested in cooperating broadly with pro-Western countries. It’s a combination of willingness and ability. Eritrea is located in an even closer location to actions against the Houthis, but police are anti-Western and friendly to Iran. Djibouti, who has the strategic location, maintains actual neutrality in conflicts. Ethiopia lacks access to the sea and relations between police and the United States are ambivalent. Somaliland therefore offers a unique combination of geo-strategic location and a willingness to agree to widespread cooperation with pro-Western countries. Its ties with the UAE – that much of the logic that guides them from a utterance point of view was the war in the Hothis – are evidence of this. Messages coming out of Somaliland indicate that the state is also willing to have broad security relations with the United States, including hosting an American base, and even with Israel.

Regarding Israel, the positive attitude of the Somaliland government is evident, even in the midst of the war in the past two years, and it is likely that there are already unofficial ties between senior officials in both countries. Somaliland has sent messages in recent months that it is ready to cooperate with pro-Israel initiatives, including the expansion of the Abraham Agreements. The public discourse in the country tends to be pro-Israel, although there are also critical voices, especially in light of the war and reports from the Gaza Strip, as well as in light of the existence of Salafi movements (non-violent) in the country.

Considerations for and against recognition of Somliland

For Somaliland, the most coveted prize is American recognition, with which, they estimate, will come recognition from many other countries close to Washington. She therefore invests effort in front of the White House and Congress. Somaliland positions itself as an antagonist for China who is willing to go as a long way to realize American interests in the strategic space of the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. In the face of the Americans, Somaliland also emphasizes its democratic and free character and hostility to radical Islamist ideologies. In conversations with American officials and media messages, she clarifies her immediate readiness for entering the Abraham Agreements. Her desire to gain recognition was so great that the Somaliland government did not even publicly reject the discourse that took place a few months ago about plans to encourage the immigration of Gazans into its territory, despite the great unpopularity that the idea has sparked in its population.

However, despite the friendliness of Washington and the strategies of Somaliland’s location, the United States still seems to be hesitant about the question of official recognition, and it has serious reasons for this.

First, on a fundamental level, U.S. policy on the Somali issue has been consistent in recent decades: recognition of the idea of “one Sommalia.” The United States has sought to strengthen the Mogadishu government, especially in light of its difficult war against Al-Shabaab over the past two decades. For the United States, Somalia-Mogadishu is an ally, also weak and failing. The United States also provides it with military assistance in the attacks against global jihadist elements. Recognition of Somliland will see as an American betrayal, which could lead to the wave of the blast in the shaky Somalia (for example, by officially withdrawing from Fontland and Jubald – both of which are still a symbolic commitment to Mogadishu’s authority – or the strengthening of Al-Shabab). This consideration should be added to international practice – an aspiration not to recognize the changes in unilateral borders or in quitting countries, with the understanding that this is a possible opening of the Pandora’s box and an appeal of existing borders in the rest of the world, especially in the Middle East and Africa.

Although this is a weighty consideration for Status-Quo-like U.S. administrations, the Trump administration may be able to violate the tradition of adherence to the idea of “one Somalia” or the reluctance to recognize quitting countries. However, there is a consideration that probably plays a more significant role for Washington at the present time: the support of most Arab countries including Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Egypt, as well as Turkey in this idea. The Arab League countries, except the UAE, are declaratively supporting the unity of Somalia and strongly opposed the recognition of Somaliland. For Turkey, Somalia-Mogdeishu is a major ally in the Red Sea region, bordering on the status of a protectorate. These powerful countries, which are mined ear in Washington, express their aversion to the possibility of recognition of Somliland.

Although their impact on Washington is much less, the African Union countries are also inclined to deeply disapprove of any official recognition of quitting countries, fearing the domino effect in the rest of Africa.

Compared to the considerations of the United States, Israel has additional considerations: Although the Qatari and Turkish attitudes against recognition of Somliland are not significant (and vice versa), it is possible that the Egyptian position, and perhaps also Chinese, is more significant. On the other hand, Israel’s proximity to the UAE reinforces the pro-Somalland consideration. However, traditionally, Israel is hesitant to recognize quitting countries, partly for fear of precedents or a boomerang effect on the issue of recognition of a Palestinian state, although this consideration seems to be less relevant at the present time, due to the actual, almost sweeping recognition that the Palestinian “state” has won in recent years.

A more significant consideration for Israel, which is supposed to arouse caution and deep thought before official recognition of Somaliland, is actually a pragmatic aspect. Israeli recognition of Somaliland, which is not accompanied by American recognition, may cause a negative effect that will harm both Israel and Somaliland. While an Israeli-Somalian agreement may appear to be reinforcement of Israel’s status in the region, at the same time causing a strong counter-reaction in the Muslim world, which in turn may place Somaliland at the focus of regional criticism and, consequently, lead to a reluctance to expand public or substantive cooperation with Israel. Israeli recognition, ironically, may actually contain efforts to expand the Abraham Accords with other Muslim countries.

Under the threshold of consciousness, at least for now

Israel is required for allies in the Red Sea area, in part to prepare for the next campaign against the Houthis. Somaliland is an ideal candidate for this cooperation, who will be able to grant Israel as a matter of action near the scene of operations. But in addition to security cooperation, relations with Somaliland also have important economic-conscious potential for Israeli national security, due to the minerals in its territory and the desire to establish relations with Muslim populations in the region. Therefore, Israel must work to expand cooperation with this entity, ideal while cooperating with the UAE and the United States.

However, Israel has serious reasons for avoiding the first country to recognize Somaliland, which is primarily an understanding that such recognition may actually act against promoting intimate relations between Israel and Somaliland due to regional responses and dynamics. As long as the United States (or at least the UAE) does not recognize Somaliland as an independent state, Israel must not act alone on this official level.

The recommendation is therefore to promote the intimate relationship with Somaliland “under the threshold of consciousness.” Israel and its allies in Washington can help Somliland in persuasion attempts with the Trump administration, but the United States must take the first public step to recognition. At the same time, the two countries can promote – even before official recognition – security and economic partnerships, the establishment of interest offices (as many other countries with Somaliland do), and even symbolic measures such as recognition of the Somaliland passports.

These are steps that will prevent the possible risks involved in official recognition, while at the same time helping both parties to advance their fundamental interests. Israeli security and economic presence in Somliland does not necessarily require official recognition, and on the other hand, Somaliland may also be preferable to intimate and quiet relations with Israel over high-profile precedent-setting declarations. Somaliland can benefit many of these ties with Israel, especially in light of the security challenges that the country may encounter in the challenging neighborhood of the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa. For Israel, Somliland may be a “vigilance breaker” in the struggle against the Houthis.

** The author wishes to thank the staff of the Institute for National Security Studies for fruitful discourse on the issue, including as part of a guest lecture given by the author at the Institute on September 30, 2025; Dr. Rashid Abdi, head of research at the Sahan Institute in Kenya, for discourse and sharing of knowledge; and the Israel-Africa Relations Institute for support and encouragement.

The opinions expressed in the publications of the Institute for National Security Studies are those of the authors only.

Khatumo – the 6th Federal Member State – and Mogadishu’s Calculations

Khatumo – the 6th Federal Member State – and Mogadishu’s Calculations

In a remarkable development, an expanded local conference held in Las Anod in July 2025 announced the formation of Somalia’s sixth federal state – the Northeastern State of Somalia, also known as Khatumo. This newly declared state encompasses the regions of Sool, Sanaag and Ayn, which remain contested by Somaliland and Puntland. These two states have rejected this development, denouncing it as a threat and a strategic maneuver by Mogadishu to reinforce its federal authority. This step risks heightening tensions and deepening political and tribal polarization in a region already plagued by a fragile and complex legal and political environment.

The central government in Mogadishu has maintained strong support for the emerging situation in the northeast. This started with supporting the armed tribal movement led by the Dhulbahante and Warsangali clans in February 2023. The movement gained momentum culminating in the defeat of the Somaliland army in August 2023 and the establishment of the Khatumo administration – a reality Mogadishu provisionally recognized in October 2023.

Further solidifying its support, Mogadishu formally accepted the new administration as a full member of the Somali federation, designating it as the sixth regional state. This decision followed a controversial visit by Somali Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre to Las Anod, the capital of the new state, in April 2025. Furthermore, the Somali federal government has played a pivotal role in establishing the new state (the northeastern state) and provided it with legitimacy. This marks an important juncture in the history of this region and reflects the aspirations of marginalized communities to reclaim their key historical role in shaping Somalia’s national political framework.

The central government in Mogadishu considers itself the primary beneficiary of this new reality. Its key motives and calculations for redrawing Somalia’s political map include the following:

First, Advancing Centralist Orientations: The rise of the new state contributes to the recalibration of the federal balance of power in favor of the central government. This shift enhances Mogadishu’s weight in shaping national policy and potentially expands its reach over regional states. It also positions Mogadishu to play a decisive role in shaping the political elite of the new federal member (Las Anod). The new state is expected to align more closely with centralist visions of governance and future power dynamics within Somalia.

Second, Undermining Somaliland’s Sovereignty Agenda: Mogadishu and unionist elites in southern Somalia have taken the lead in creating the Northeastern State with the aim of delivering a severe blow to Somaliland’s long-standing bid for independence based on colonial-era borders (the former British Protectorate). The government of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has sensed troubling shifts in international and regional attitudes toward the Somali question, with an increasing interest in Somaliland at the expense of Somalia. Notably, signs of a changing mood in Washington suggest a potential reconsideration of the “One Somalia” policy, raising the possibility of formal recognition for Somaliland.

Khatumo State and its geographical boundaries as they appear on the map

Third, Curtailing Puntland Influence: Mogadishu’s support for Khatumo reflects a desire to empower Las Anod to chart its own course, independent of Puntland agenda. This approach disregards Garowe concerns, particularly regarding federal plans to reorganize local forces and militias – formerly affiliated with the Khatumo administration – to integrate them in the federal army. Garowe interprets these moves as a calculated move to alter regional power dynamics and impose federal control. Such changes could reduce Puntland territorial scope, reshape its social fabric and limit its ability to maintain influence, autonomy and strategic balance.

Fourth, Pursuing Economic, Geo-strategic and Demographic Objectives: The region is believed to hold significant hydrocarbon reserves. It also occupies a key strategic location that enhances the federal state’s access to the Gulf of Aden. This positioning serves as a hedge against potential shifts in international focus toward Somaliland and Puntland, which could undermine Mogadishu’s strategic relevance. Additionally, the central government may seek to weaken entrenched tribal dynamics which dominate the Somali political landscape by altering the demographic composition in areas dominated by rival clans. This includes challenging the influence of the Isaq and Darod clans in Hargeisa and Garowe, respectively, while reinforcing the position of the Hawiye clan, to which President Sheikh Mohamud and most of the elites in the center belong.

Fifth, Conveying Messages to the International Community and Somalia’s Partners: Through its actions, Mogadishu aims to project growing confidence in its ability to manage both internal and external affairs independently. In return, it expects foreign actors to recognize and engage with the federal government as the legitimate authority that is capable of guiding Somalia out of its prolonged crises. This includes asserting control over constitutional reforms, managing the relationship between the center and the peripheries and setting the terms for foreign cooperation with Somaliland and other regional states.

Somaliland and Puntland Positions and Options 

Somaliland and Puntland share common concerns regarding the fate of disputed territories, particularly Sool, Sanaag and Ayn. Somaliland has firmly rejected the creation of the Northeastern State on territories it considers “under its jurisdiction.” Hargeisa views this move as an attempt by Mogadishu to exert political influence through tribal affiliations, potentially inciting internal conflict. It also sees the development as part of a broader strategy to undermine its authority, destabilize its governance and  derail its aspirations for international recognition as an independent state.

Similarly, Puntland has strongly opposed this development and pledged to confront it. Garowe perceives the move as a direct threat to its territorial integrity and political authority. It accuses the Federal Government of Somalia of complicity in fragmenting the country. Puntland officials have warned that “the federal government is attempting to divide the nation into conflicting regional entities.”

This situation may prompt both Hargeisa and Garowe to consider possible responses, ranging from reconciliation and collaboration in confronting the central government, to more aggressive actions to challenge the legitimacy of the new administration and dismantle it.

1. Reconciliation and Strategic Alignment: Despite the tension and rivalry that have characterized the relationship between the two stable neighboring regions – Somaliland and Puntland – over the past 30 years, the current crisis may present an opportunity for them to reconcile and collaborate. Recent developments suggest a potential shift in attitudes, which could strengthen their positions and complicate the central government’s efforts to assert control over the disputed territories. A united front could reshape the political landscape and challenge the federal government’s ambitions in the region.

2. Operational Escalation and Strategic Encirclement: Somaliland may view the situation as a window for decisive military action aimed at recapturing the city of Las Anod and surrounding areas, dismantling its opponents’ presence and halting their progress toward federal integration. Puntland, meanwhile, is unlikely to remain passive in the face of such escalation by Hargeisa against Las Anod. It could potentially find itself in conflict with the latter, particularly if the new administration crosses the boundaries set by President Said Deni, which include attempts to extend its administrative reach into areas still under Puntland control, including the Sanaag region.

3. Negotiation and Diplomatic Engagement: This remains the most viable path for resolving Somalia’s current political deadlock. International mediation and support could help facilitate a broader dialogue addressing key issues such as the constitutional crisis and the legal status of the new administration. However, entrenched positions and deep-seated mistrust among Somali stakeholders continue to hinder progress toward peace and reconciliation. For instance, Somaliland President Abdirahman Irro has emphasized that talks with Mogadishu cannot proceed until concerns over sovereignty violations and the establishment of a separate administration are addressed. This suggests that any revival of negotiations between northern and southern Somalia would require a shift in Mogadishu’s approach.

The Consequences of the Creation of the New State and Its Future

The establishment of the new Federal member state in Somalia carries significant implications for the country’s future. It comes at a time of political uncertainty, persistent security challenges and financial strain, compounded by declining external support due to changing priorities among donors. The federal government and its supporters view the new state as a means to enhance national unity, peace, stability and development by integrating regions into the federal framework. However, Puntland and Somaliland view the initiative as a threat to their traditional spheres of influence and sovereignty, prompting strong opposition and resistance to any redrawing of Somalia’s political and administrative map.

Meanwhile, public sentiment across Somalia is marked by a mix of anticipation and cautious optimism. Some view the development as an opportunity to strengthen and expand the federal model and rebuild Somali federalism on the principles of equitable partnership and national unity. Others fear it may further complicate Somalia’s already intricate political dynamics, potentially escalating tensions and conflict both in the region and the country as a whole. Domestic and international stakeholders remain hopeful that these significant changes will prompt meaningful political dialogue among all Somali parties and stakeholders to forge consensus and chart a stable path forward.

The success of the new administration hinges on its ability to establish itself within a politically charged environment rife with tribal rivalries. It faces considerable hurdles in establishing functioning executive and legislative institutions, securing financial and logistical support and ensuring basic security. Most critically,  it must gain recognition and legitimacy, especially from other federal entities, amid a lack of consensus at both regional and federal levels. Without garnering sufficient acceptance from neighboring states, the administration risks remaining a symbolic entity.

Even at the local level, the new federal entity still lacks inclusive cohesion and effective control over all the territories it claims to represent. Skepticism persists among certain tribal groups, especially the Warsangli clan, about fair representation. In the Sanag region, divisions remain between supporters of the new entity and others who maintain allegiance to Puntland political and administrative structures. These tribal and regional contradictions pose significant obstacles to consolidating loyalty and building a unified governance framework.

Summary and Conclusions

The declaration of a new federal state in the Khatumo region of northeastern Somalia has sparked political controversy and deepened divisions among the Somali population. Reactions from the federal government, Somaliland and Puntland reflect growing tensions and competing visions for Somalia’s future. The disputed region’s strategic importance is likely to grow as tribal competition and regional polarization intensify, further complicating the already fragile situation in the country.

Despite the initial enthusiasm from supporters and strong opposition from rivals, the emerging administration faces numerous challenges on its path toward full federal integration. Addressing its fragile legitimacy will require expanding its representative base, resolving tribal divisions, securing both governmental and external support, improving security and living conditions and gaining recognition from other members of the Somali Federation, particularly Puntland. Additionally, mitigating potential threats from Somaliland will be essential to ensuring the stability and viability of the new state.