Somali Ambassador’s Misleading Claims Regarding Possible US Recognition of Somaliland
Amid reports that President-elect Donald Trump’s administration may consider recognizing the self-governing coastal region of Somaliland as independent from Somalia, Somali Ambassador to the United States Dahir Hassan Abdi wrote an op-ed arguing that the US should support a unified Somali state. Continue reading “Somali Ambassador’s Misleading Claims Regarding Possible US Recognition of Somaliland”
Category: Blog
Irro Chose Respiratory Therapist Posing as Physician to Head the Somaliland Ministry of Health
Irro Chose Respiratory Therapist Posing as Physician to Head the Somaliland Ministry of Health
Breaking investigative report: When did the health portfolio appointee start practicing medicine as a medical doctor? The answer will surprise you. Continue reading “Irro Chose Respiratory Therapist Posing as Physician to Head the Somaliland Ministry of Health”
Forecasts for the Somaliland Presidential Election Using Electoral Survey Data
Forecasts for the Somaliland Presidential Election Using Electoral Survey Data
According to recent sources and analyses in Somaliland, the following surveyed polls were conducted
to provide Somalilanders with an overview of the upcoming elections scheduled for November
13, 2024. The figures below were modeled research based, proof display held over the past few
weeks, as well as phone interviews with various citizens across all regions of Somaliland. These
numbers are averaged statistical calculations.
Below are 2024 Somaliland Presidential Election that will be held on November 13th, 2024.
Those numbers are estimated, forecast and predicted from analyses in different sources,
educated and open minded in all regions of Somaliland. I’m emphasizing those numbers are
modeled from statistical analyses (mean, median and average calculations).
According to our analyses, this surveyed poll aims to highlight reasons and arguments presented by
supporters:
- UCID – This party is viewed as outdated and fatigued. Chairman Feysal Ali Warabe has
shown little interest and appears unwilling to invest in re-election efforts. UCID is the
oldest of the three existing parties. - Waddani – As the youngest party, Wadani is highly popular. It garnered 42% of the
vote in the 2017 presidential election. Its supporters advocate for change, as the
Kulmiye party has led Somaliland politics for the past 14 years. Analyses and reports
from Somaliland critics reveal that many of Wadani’s leaders previously belonged to
0.83% 52.13% 47.04%, including its chairman Hirsi “Hirsi Gaab,” a former Minister under
Kulmiye’s administration. Critics note that this party maintains strong ties with the central government of Somalia, which still desires Somaliland’s reintegration. Some citizens also recall the genocide perpetrated by the Siad Barre regime during the 1980s war. Wadani has not distanced itself from such associations, leading people to believe that the campaign resources may be coming from the Somali government.
Kulmiye – This party has led Somaliland for the past 14 years and, according to predictions, is expected to secure another term in the November 13, 2024, elections. While its popularity has waned, especially due to issues in Las Anod, its recent slight gains in the polls suggest that the party remains strong on security matters. Additionally, Kulmiye has made strides toward Somaliland’s recognition and sovereignty, particularly through a recent Memorandum of Understanding with Ethiopia.
Reasons Given to Choose a Party
According to our contacts on the ground, most people base their presidential choice on tribal affiliation. Tribalism remains a significant issue in Somaliland, with politicians exploiting it to fuel polarization among citizens. However, the more educated segment of the population, according to our sources, considers factors like security, international recognition, economic growth, and development in making their choices.
Below chart summarizes these findings:
Following are the most popular parties “URUURO” are the following:
- Kulmiye
- Wadani
- Horseed
- Kaah
- Hilaac
According to Article 9 of the Somaliland Constitution, political parties (“Xisbi”) shall not exceed three (3) parties: “1. The political system of the Republic of Somaliland shall be based on peace, cooperation, democracy, and plurality of political parties. 2. The number of political parties in the Republic of Somaliland shall not exceed three (3). 3. A special law shall determine the procedures for the formation of a political party, but it is unlawful for any political party to be based on regionalism or clannism.”
Our research and analysis indicate that the two main parties, Kulmiye and Wadani, will retain their status as “Xusbi.” Horseed, Kaah, and Hilaac will compete for the third position, potentially replacing UCID.
Let’s examine these three “Urur” closely:
- Horseed: Chairman Abdillahi Hussein Dirawal was a member of the SNM group, which fought for Somaliland’s freedom against the regime of Siad Barre (“Afweyne”). The party is popular in the capital, Hargeisa, which has a substantial voter base. It’s noteworthy that both Dirawal and President Muse Bihi were part of the SNM and are well-connected. If Horseed succeeds in becoming a “Xusbi,” it could serve as a strong ally to Kulmiye.
- Kaah: Chairman Mahamoud Hashi Abdi, a former Minister of the Presidency during the Silaanyo administration, leads a party popular in the Burco region. Support for this party is largely clan-based. Critics of Chairman Mahamoud cite allegations of corruption during his tenure with the Silaanyo government, particularly in connection with projects like Hargeisa Airport and the Xuba Weyne irrigation project, as well as various other initiatives. Critics argue that he cannot be trusted.
- Hilaac: Chairman Prof. Ahmed Ismail Samater, a recent returnee from the United States, joined Somaliland politics after a challenging experience in Mogadishu, Somalia. He recently withdrew from the Somaliland elections, citing the exclusion of his party from the presidential race. His recent return to Somaliland has left him with limited time to rebuild trust among supporters, particularly in the Borama region.
In conclusion, based on information gathered from key political figures and influencers in Somaliland, Horseed, led by Chairman Dirawal, has the potential to become the third official party in the upcoming election on November 13, 2024.
SOMALILAND PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION HISTORY:
All figures and data in this report were sourced from the National Election Commission of Somaliland. The first election in Somaliland was held on April 14, 2003, with 488,035 registered voters
2017 SOMALILAND PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION RESULTS:
What does Somaliland historical data tell us today?
According to the charts above, Somaliland voters have spoken:
- Party UCID is in declined and is getting closer to an elimination in 2024
election. - KULMIYE party is also losing supporters as WADDANI is getting more
popular
Author: Abdulkarim Musse Maygag – Toronto – Canada –
abdulkmu@hotmail.com
Exploring Somaliland’s Unique Clan-based Governance System
Exploring Somaliland’s Unique Clan-based Governance System
Somaliland, an unrecognized state that broke away from Somalia, has carved its own path with a distinct government, currency, and borders. Since 1991, Somaliland has risen from the ruins of civil war, showcasing the resilience and determination of its people. Renowned for their unique culture and rich history, the people of Somaliland have forged stability and peace in the Horn of Africa. Have you ever wondered about the governance system in Somaliland? What makes it unique?
Governance systems vary significantly around the world, shaped by history, religion, and culture. In Somali societies, the unique blend of clan politics forms the foundation of governance, infusing elements of democracy within a traditional framework. This article explores the complex governance system of Somaliland, where clan-ship and traditional leadership play critical roles.
In Somaliland, the clan system is not only a social structure but the foundation of the legal and political system. Somaliland is home to a number of clans, each serving as a fundamental unit of identity and governance. The clan structure aids individuals in recognizing each other and determines political positions and influence. Generally, the clan system in Somaliland is divided into five major clans. These clans hold significant power over political appointments, with the largest clans usually securing key positions such as the presidency and leadership of political parties. Because of this, members of minority clans often find themselves excluded from high-ranking roles, even within the parliament.
Clan identity is embedded in Somaliland society, fostering a sense of superiority among different clans. This system privileges certain individuals based on their clan affiliation, often leading to perceived injustices. The traditional leaders, or clan elders, have considerable power in this structure. Respected as mediators and decision-makers, these elders play central roles in conflict resolution and political nominations. Every candidate for political office is endorsed by these traditional leaders, underlining their critical influence in the political arena.
Central to Somaliland’s governance is the concept of “Xeer,” directly translated as law. Xeer represents the traditional legal system, a set of Somali regulations and laws that clans and elders use to resolve disputes and govern Somali society. While this system demonstrates a strong sense of community and continuity, it also imposes limitations. Many capable individuals find their political aspirations suffocated due to their clan background, as positions of power often remain within the dominant clans. Those who do hold political office face pressure to favor their clan members with opportunities and jobs, carrying on inequality.
The imbalance in representation and opportunity across clans can lead to accusations of favoritism, escalating potential conflicts. The issue of equitable chances is clear, with certain sectors dominated by particular clans, excluding others from participating fully. Many young people in Somaliland, despite being well-educated and capable of significantly contributing to the society, often face challenges in securing jobs and opportunities if they lack connections to major clans or influential relatives. As a result, many are forced to seek employment abroad to support their families and themselves. By boosting the voices of the younger generation, particularly in politics, Somaliland can unlock its potential for growth and development.
Somaliland’s journey towards governance uniquely intertwines traditional practices with modern aspirations. Despite challenges posed by the clan-based system, there are signs of evolving perspectives. The younger generation, educated and globally connected, increasingly advocates for inclusivity and meritocracy. They envision a future where leadership is defined by capability rather than clan affiliation. Initiatives promoting civic education and youth empowerment are gaining traction, fostering dialogue on reforming governance norms. As Somaliland navigates these dual pressures of tradition and progress, the prospect of a more equitable and inclusive society beckons, one where every citizen, regardless of clan, can contribute to the nation’s promising future.
Can this system change? Given the challenges and inequalities resulting from the clan-based governance system, one wonders if Somaliland will evolve towards a fairer, more inclusive model. Will the younger generation, with their aspirations for equality and justice, rise to reform this age-old structure? The future holds the answer, as Somaliland struggles with the tension between tradition and the pursuit of a more equitable society.
About The Author
In Somaliland’s Quest for Recognition, President Bihi is the Choice
In Somaliland’s Quest for Recognition, President Bihi is the Choice
Less than three weeks to go until election day, President Muse Bihi has a good chance to be re-elected. I like President Muse Bihi because he is an unapologetic nationalist Somalilander who puts Somaliland interest first. That alone makes him an exemplary president of Somaliland Republic. Continue reading “In Somaliland’s Quest for Recognition, President Bihi is the Choice”
Maxwell Webb’S Piece on Atlantic Council Missed Somaliland’s Pivotal Role in the Region
While Mogadishu teeters on failure, Somaliland is taking concrete steps toward long-term development and stability.
Roda J Elmi
Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister
Somaliland
Ethiopia Defends MoU with Somaliland
Ethiopia Defends MoU with Somaliland
Ethiopia has been mostly silent about the Memorandum of Understanding it signed with Somaliland while Somalia delved into garnering military, diplomatic and military support from the region on alleged grounds that the agreement violates its sovereignty.
Now Ethiopia is openly defending the agreement and did so at the U.N. General Assembly.
During his speech, Taye reaffirmed Ethiopia’s dedication to multilateralism and collaboration in the Horn of Africa, contextualizing the accord within a more comprehensive plan for mutual development. “The current political system in Somalia serves as the foundation for Ethiopia’s memorandum of understanding with Somaliland. “We reject the baseless accusations made against Ethiopia regarding this agreement, and our goal is shared growth and prosperity in the region,” Taye declared. In order to confront the more immediate threat of terrorism in the area, he advised Somalia to concentrate on cooperation. “We encourage Somalia to work with us to eliminate the terrorist threats that plague the region,” he stated.
Ethiopia also made claims that the “objective is shared growth and prosperity in the region.” Another point that the Ethiopian Foreign Affairs Minister made at the assembly is that similar agreements have been with other states.
Ethiopia doesn’t waver in its beliefs. “Our intentions are not to undermine any nation’s sovereignty but to pursue mutually beneficial partnerships,” Taye stated at the United Nations. He continued by saying that Ethiopia had just signed comparable deals with other nations in an effort to promote trade and development throughout the region.
Taye added that ” there is no reason for the Federal Government of Somalia to incite hostility that obviously intends to cover internal political tensions.”
The contributions of Ethiopia along with nations in the region to protect Somalia from terrorist groups and the sacrifices made in that regard was also highlighted – apparently to demonstrate that Ethiopia does not have ill-intentions against Somalia. But activists from Somalia would reduce this point to “service was not in exchange for land.”
An update from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs cited Taye Atske-Selassie, the Minister, as saying, in his speech at the U.N. , the MoU with Somaliland is ” based on existing political dispensation in Somalia…”
Ethiopia also made claims that the “objective is shared growth and prosperity in the region.” Another point that the Ethiopian Foreign Affairs Minister made at the assembly is that similar agreements have been with other states.
Taye added that ” there is no reason for the Federal Government of Somalia to incite hostility that obviously intends to cover internal political tensions.”
The contributions of Ethiopia along with nations in the region to protect Somalia from terrorist groups and the sacrifices made in that regard was also highlighted – apparently to demonstrate that Ethiopia does not have ill-intentions against Somalia. But activists from Somalia would reduce this point to “service was not in exchange for land.”
Landmark Study on Impacts of Early Childhood Education in Somaliland
Landmark Study on Impacts of Early Childhood Education in Somaliland
Project Overview Continue reading “Landmark Study on Impacts of Early Childhood Education in Somaliland”
Why is Egypt Involved in the Impasse Between Ethiopia and Somalia?
Why is Egypt Involved in the Impasse Between Ethiopia and Somalia?
In early 2024, a major geopolitical event unfolded in the Horn of Africa with far-reaching consequences. Ethiopia and Somaliland signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on 01 January 2024 granting Ethiopia sea access through Somaliland’s ports in exchange for potential international recognition for Somaliland, marking a significant shift in the region’s political landscape.
The move was swiftly met with opposition from Somalia. The federal government in Mogadishu, despite having no authority over Somaliland since 1991, called the MoU illegal and accused Ethiopia of violating its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Tensions have mounted between the two countries since then. Somalia’s President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has sought to strengthen his country’s military and diplomatic alliances, culminating in a defense agreement with Egypt, formally approved by Somalia’s cabinet on 19 July 2024.
A month later, on 27 August 2024, two Egyptian military planes arrived at Mogadishu airport, according to Reuters, carrying weapons and ammunition. Egypt is reportedly preparing to send 10,000 troops to Somalia as part of a new peacekeeping mission slated for next year. This move has further escalated tensions with Ethiopia, raising fears of an emerging conflict. During a speech commemorating Ethiopia’s Day of Sovereignty on 08 September 2024, Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed issued a stern warning: “Anyone wishing to provoke Ethiopia should think carefully—ten times, not just once.”
Eyasu Hailemichael, a lecturer of International Relations specializing in the Horn of Africa, noted that while the risk of direct military confrontation remains low, a proxy conflict between Egypt-backed Somalia and Ethiopia is increasingly likely and carries significant geopolitical implications. According to Eyasu, the strategic importance of the Horn of Africa, particularly its proximity to the Red Sea—a vital maritime corridor for global trade—makes regional stability crucial, and the ongoing discord threatens to disrupt supply chains, hinder economic development, and destabilize an already fragile area.
Eyasu further emphasized that the involvement of external powers like the US, China, Russia, and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries complicates the situation, raising concerns about the Horn of Africa becoming a geopolitical battleground.
Egypt’s Involvement: Genuine support or strategic maneuver?
Asrat Birhanu, a hydropolitics researcher, argues that Egypt’s involvement is less about supporting Somalia and more about countering Ethiopia’s influence in the region. He suggests that Egypt is using its military cooperation with Somalia to create a geopolitical buffer against Ethiopia and gain leverage in the ongoing Nile River dispute.
Asrat highlights the disconnect between Egypt’s portrayal as a stabilizing force and its actions. He notes that the military agreement with Somalia appears to be a thinly veiled attempt to draw the country into Egypt’s sphere of influence. “Egypt’s strategy could undermine Somalia’s sovereignty and stability, exacerbating its internal fragmentation and further destabilizing the region,” he remarked.
Moustafa Ahmad, a researcher at the United States Institute of Peace, echoed this view, noting that Egypt’s primary interest is in isolating Ethiopia rather than playing a constructive role in Somali security. “The failure of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) negotiations and Ethiopia’s continued filling of the dam have placed significant domestic pressure on Cairo. Additionally, Egypt is unwilling to accept Ethiopia’s potential naval presence in the Red Sea,” he stated.
By aligning with Somalia, Moustafa argues, Egypt risks further destabilizing a region already grappling with internal challenges, such as the ongoing fight against Al-Shabaab militants. Somalia’s military cooperation with Egypt not only hardens Ethiopia’s stance on the MoU with Somaliland but also complicates Somalia’s internal political dynamics. Some Somali federal member states have expressed dissatisfaction with Egyptian involvement under the AU Support and Stabilization Mission, preferring the continued role of Ethiopian forces, which Mogadishu is seeking to phase out.
Federico Donelli, a professor of International Relations at the University of Trieste specializing in the Red Sea region, explained that Egypt’s involvement in Somalia is driven by both strategy and opportunity. Strategically, President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has been working to revive Egypt’s regional influence, particularly through diplomacy. Concurrently, Somalia’s request for Egyptian assistance provides an opportunity to deter Ethiopia amid growing rivalry between the two countries.
However, Federico warned of significant risks to Egypt’s strategy, including potential backlash from other regional powers and the challenge of navigating complex internal dynamics and challenging terrain in Somalia. “Egyptian troops may face more vulnerabilities than they anticipate,” he cautioned. Federico also noted that Egypt’s involvement has shifted the regional balance of power, with new alliances forming around Somalia’s position while others remain neutral. However, Somalia’s fragility persists, and Egyptian intervention could increase the country’s vulnerability, he stated.
Navigating a diplomatic solution
Turkey has actively attempted to mediate between Ethiopia and Somalia, hosting two rounds of talks in Ankara. Initially, these discussions offered a glimmer of hope for resolving the crisis, but the talks collapsed due to irreconcilable differences. Somalia demands that Ethiopia scrap the MoU, while Ethiopia insists on securing sea access in a “mutually agreeable manner.” A third round of talks is scheduled, though experts remain skeptical about the likelihood of success.
According to Federico Donelli, author of Turkey in Africa: Turkey’s Strategic Involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa, Turkey has made considerable efforts to mediate, but the underlying issues remain too complex. “It is hard to imagine Ethiopia giving up access to the Red Sea, and equally difficult for Somalia to accept the MoU with Somaliland,” he said. This deadlock suggests that only a significant compromise from one side could break the impasse, something neither nation appears willing to do.
Moustafa Ahmad concurs that Somaliland’s pursuit of international recognition is the core issue. “Somalia will continue to oppose any deals involving Somaliland’s independence, and the MoU has highlighted the need to address this issue,” he stated. He also suggested that Somalia’s strengthened military cooperation with Egypt may have emboldened Mogadishu, complicating Ethiopia’s diplomatic position and straining Turkey’s mediation efforts.
Eyasu Hailemichael added that deep-seated mistrust between Ethiopia and Somalia, stemming from historical tensions and diverging national priorities, makes finding common ground exceedingly difficult. This distrust has undermined mediation efforts so far, he stressed.
As tensions escalate, the urgency for a diplomatic resolution grows. Eyasu suggests a multifaceted approach that emphasizes promoting cooperative solutions. He noted that sustained regional dialogue, facilitated by neutral bodies such as the African Union or the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), could help ease tensions and ensure long-term stability in the region.
By Abdi Biyenssa @ABiyenssa
The Predicament Somalia Is In
The Predicament Somalia Is In
Navigating the diplomatic complexities between Somalia and Ethiopia is like balancing on a tightrope, where allies, adversaries, and interests converge in intricate ways. There are 16 facts highlighting key regional and global dynamics that influence the ongoing “Ethiopian access to the sea” debate, impacting the relations between Ethiopia and Somalia. Continue reading “The Predicament Somalia Is In”
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