Tag: Horn of Africa

Somalia Observes as the UAE Deepens Its Military Ties with Somaliland

Somalia Observes as the U.A.E. Deepens Its Military Ties with Somaliland

As the Gulf state increases its power in the Horn of Africa, the United Arab Emirates -UAE – and Somaliland are strengthening their military and security collaboration. This development may further exacerbate tensions between Abu Dhabi and the federal government of Somalia. Continue reading “Somalia Observes as the UAE Deepens Its Military Ties with Somaliland”

Two Summits in Djibouti, but no Talk of Djibouti’s Own Struggles

Two Summits in Djibouti, but no Talk of Djibouti’s Own Struggles

The Horn of Africa is facing an unprecedented confluence of crises, marked by civil wars in Ethiopia and Sudan, escalating tensions between Somalia and Ethiopia, and the persistent threat of Al-Shabaab’s insurgency in Somalia.

Against this backdrop, two high-profile forums were held recently in Djibouti, aimed at addressing regional stability and security. The Heritage Institute for Policy Studies convened its annual three-day dialogue on regional stability, while the East Africa Security Forum (EASF) brought together diplomats, military leaders, and private-sector stakeholders under the auspices of the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA).

However, conspicuously absent from both forums were discussions about Djibouti’s own internal issues: widespread hunger, endemic insecurity, and a lack of democratic governance. These omissions raise critical questions about the priorities of regional and international stakeholders and the inherent challenges of hosting such discussions in a country with pressing internal issues.

The Horn of Africa is a region teetering on the edge of collapse. In Ethiopia and Sudan, civil wars have left thousands dead and millions displaced. Somalia continues to battle the Al-Shabaab insurgency, a persistent threat to national and regional stability.

Meanwhile, tensions between Somalia and Ethiopia have flared over a contentious port deal Addis Ababa signed with Somaliland, the breakaway region whose sovereignty remains unrecognized internationally.
Amid this chaos, Djibouti has positioned itself as a relative island of stability, hosting international military bases and serving as a hub for diplomatic activity.

Yet beneath this façade, Djibouti grapples with its own set of crises, including hunger exacerbated by prolonged droughts, economic vulnerabilities, and a political system often criticized for its lack of democratic freedoms.

Between April and June 2024, for instance, an estimated 221,000 people or 19 percent of the analyzed population (out of 1.18 million people), were facing high levels of acute food insecurity, according to the Integrated Food Security (IPC).

In the 2024 Global Hunger Index, Djibouti ranks 92nd out of 127 countries, with a score of 21.2, indicating a serious level of hunger. Djibouti imports 90% of its food, making it vulnerable to international market price fluctuations, according to the European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations. The country’s hot, dry climate also limits agricultural production.

Djibouti has a poverty rate of 79%, with 42% of the population living in extreme poverty. High levels of unemployment also contribute to humanitarian needs.

Djibouti’s geographical location makes it a strategic hub for international military bases, hosting troops from the United States, China, France, Japan, and Italy. Djibouti’s maritime territory is increasingly plagued by illegal fishing activities, primarily conducted by foreign fleets from Yemen and China. These unregulated operations deplete fish stocks, threatening the livelihoods of local fishing communities and disrupting the marine ecosystem.

Illegal fishing not only undermines Djibouti’s economic prospects but also poses a security threat. It has been linked to organized criminal networks that use fishing vessels as cover for smuggling goods, weapons, and even people. Additionally, the lack of effective maritime surveillance leaves Djibouti’s waters vulnerable to exploitation, highlighting a significant gap in its security infrastructure.

The government’s inability to monitor and regulate its maritime borders exacerbates the issue. While international partnerships, such as those with the European Union’s naval operations and other anti-piracy missions, aim to strengthen maritime security, the focus often remains on piracy rather than illegal fishing. This imbalance leaves the problem of unregulated fishing largely unaddressed.

While these bases contribute to regional security, they do not shield Djibouti from internal and neighboring conflicts. The Horn of Africa is one of the most volatile regions globally, with civil wars in Ethiopia and Sudan, Al-Shabaab’s insurgency in Somalia, and heightened tensions between neighboring states.

These conflicts spill over into Djibouti, straining its limited resources and exposing vulnerabilities in its security apparatus. For instance, tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia over territorial disputes and Somaliland’s independence aspirations often find expression in Djibouti’s border areas, leading to localized instability. The porous borders make it difficult for authorities to control the influx of refugees and militants, further complicating security management.

Domestically, Djibouti faces political repression and a lack of democratic governance, which exacerbate insecurity. The government, led by President Ismaïl Omar Guelleh since 1999, has faced allegations of being an Al-Shabaab sympathizer. There are also allegations that Somalia’s Salaam Bank, which has been linked with Al-Shabaab over the years, also has links with Guelleh’s inner political circle.

His government continues to face strong criticism for stifling dissent and consolidating power. This political climate fosters discontent among the populace and raises concerns about the state’s ability to manage internal security effectively.

Human trafficking is a persistent and growing problem in Djibouti, largely driven by its proximity to conflict zones and its strategic location as a transit point to Yemen and the Arabian Peninsula. The majority of trafficked individuals come from Somalia and Ethiopia, fleeing poverty, conflict, and political instability. These migrants often seek better opportunities in Gulf countries but become victims of exploitation and abuse along the way.

Djibouti serves as a key transit route for smugglers and traffickers who promise desperate migrants passage to Yemen, often under dire and dangerous conditions. The journey involves crossing the treacherous Gulf of Aden, frequently in overcrowded and unseaworthy vessels. Many do not survive the crossing, falling victim to drowning, starvation, or abuse at the hands of smugglers.

The human trafficking networks operating in Djibouti are highly organized, exploiting the country’s weak border controls and limited law enforcement resources. Despite efforts by international organizations and NGOs to combat trafficking, the scale of the problem remains overwhelming. Trafficked individuals often face inhumane treatment, including forced labor and sexual exploitation, both en route and upon arrival in their destination countries.

Despite these glaring issues, the forums held in Djibouti turned their focus outward, concentrating on the region’s broader security dilemmas. The absence of discussions on Djibouti’s internal challenges is reflective of its strategic position and the delicate balancing act required in such high-stakes gatherings.

From November 25 to 27, scholars, politicians, and traditional leaders gathered for the Heritage Institute’s annual forum, hosted in Djibouti. The focus was on fostering dialogue among key stakeholders from across the Horn of Africa, with an emphasis on addressing regional instability. Central to the discussions were the civil wars in Ethiopia and Sudan, Somalia’s ongoing political challenges, and the threat posed by Al-Shabaab.

The forum offered a unique opportunity for regional leaders to confront pressing transnational issues. However, its agenda sidestepped domestic concerns within Djibouti, opting instead to spotlight regional dynamics. The decision to omit discussions about Djibouti’s hunger crisis, insecurity, or democratic deficits can be attributed to several factors, including the forum’s regional scope and the host nation’s influence over the agenda.

The East Africa Security Forum (EASF) held from November 21 to 23 at Camp Lemonnier, the East Africa Security Forum took a decidedly security-focused approach. Organized by the U.S.-led Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa, the forum emphasized enhancing collaboration between the U.S. and its regional partners. Discussions revolved around managing inter- and intra-state conflicts, leveraging private-sector investments for stability, and tackling tribal and national affiliations that often fuel regional discord.

Once again, Djibouti’s internal issues were notably absent. Instead, the forum concentrated on broader regional and international security priorities, aligning with U.S. strategic interests in the Horn of Africa. As a key U.S. ally and the site of America’s largest military base in Africa, Djibouti enjoys a degree of diplomatic immunity when it comes to scrutiny of its internal affairs.

This narrative of stability is carefully cultivated and fiercely protected in Djibouti. Raising issues such as hunger, insecurity, or democratic deficits in high-profile forums held within Djibouti could be seen as diplomatically provocative, potentially jeopardizing relations with the host nation.

Consequently, organizers often tread cautiously, prioritizing external challenges over internal critiques.

However, this approach is not without consequences. Ignoring Djibouti’s domestic issues risks perpetuating cycles of poverty, eroding governance, and undermining the very stability that makes it a valuable partner in regional security efforts.

Djibouti’s hunger crisis, driven by prolonged droughts and economic stagnation, continues to affect a significant portion of its population. Failing to address these issues in forums ostensibly focused on stability undermines efforts to build a resilient and secure region.

International actors, including the U.S. and multilateral organizations, have a responsibility to advocate for transparency and reform in Djibouti but they often choose no to. The absence of meaningful U.S. advocacy for transparency and reform enables Djibouti’s entrenched authoritarian practices, stifling democratic progress.

President Ismaïl Omar Guelleh has presided over a system marked by political repression, corruption, and limited civic freedoms. Without external pressure for reform, this system remains unchallenged, perpetuating governance practices that prioritize elite interests over public welfare.

By avoiding discussions on governance and democracy, forums inadvertently legitimize Djibouti’s authoritarian tendencies. This silence not only perpetuates existing power structures but also undermines broader efforts to promote democratic principles across the region.

Djibouti’s lack of transparency hampers economic development by discouraging foreign investment and allowing corruption to flourish. With a centralized economy heavily dependent on port revenues and rents from military bases, unchecked governance risks deepening economic inequality and fostering discontent among marginalized communities.

Future forums must adopt a more inclusive and holistic approach to addressing the Horn of Africa’s challenges. This includes incorporating discussions on domestic issues within host nations like Djibouti, even when such topics are diplomatically sensitive.

Message from Somaliland SAG on America’s Evolving Foreign Policy towards Africa

Message from Somaliland SAG on America’s Evolving Foreign Policy towards Africa

Recent changes in Washington have led to a notable transformation in how the United States approaches foreign aid and international relations, with Somaliland emerging as a key partner that aligns closely with America’s fundamental interests. Continue reading “Message from Somaliland SAG on America’s Evolving Foreign Policy towards Africa”

Berbera: A Strategic Gateway for India’s Trade and Security in the Horn of Africa

Berbera: A Strategic Gateway for India’s Trade and Security in the Horn of Africa

The Port of Berbera, situated in Somaliland along the Gulf of Aden, is fast emerging as a vital hub in the Horn of Africa, offering strategic and economic opportunities for countries seeking to secure their trade routes and expand geopolitical influence. With its 500-mile coastline and proximity to key global shipping lanes, Berbera provides a stable and secure alternative to the high-risk zones near Yemen. For India, Berbera represents a strategic opportunity to strengthen its trade ties with Africa, enhance maritime security, and counter destabilizing forces in the region, particularly as the global trade environment grows increasingly volatile. Continue reading “Berbera: A Strategic Gateway for India’s Trade and Security in the Horn of Africa”

Somaliland Promotes Protection of Freedom of Expression

Somaliland Promotes Protection of Freedom of Expression

According to the Somaliland administration, the right to freedom of expression will be strengthened, and journalists and citizens will not face jail time for voicing opinions that the government finds objectionable.

The Minister of Information, Ahmed Yasin Sh. Ali Ayaanle, has emphasized that they will defend freedom of expression in response to President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi Cirro’s recent promise to the media and civil society organizations.

“We are committed to ensuring that no one is imprisoned for their opinions, as long as they do not violate the law, or report unpopular facts, then we will become a nation governed by the law and free,” added the minister.

According to American Freedom House’s annual surveys, Somaliland ranks first in East Africa and frequently outperforms Kenya in terms of civil and political rights protection.

In the past administrations, the widespread incarceration of the media and others who voice opinions that differ from those of the government in power, however, hinders Somaliland’s advancement in political and civil freedoms.

During the election campaign, the current president – Cirro – and his Waddani party promised to improve the defense of these essential rights.

Outlining A Comprehensive Foreign Policy Vision for the New Admin Under President-elect H.E. Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi “Cirro”

Outlining A Comprehensive Foreign Policy Vision for the New Admin Under President-elect H.E. Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi “Cirro”

“Re-imagining Somaliland Foreign Policy: A Vision for Sovereignty, Security, and Prosperity”

Somaliland stands at a critical juncture in its history. Decades of resilience, meticulous state-building, and a commitment to democratic governance have positioned it as a beacon of stability in the often turbulent Horn of Africa. While the region grapples with conflicts, fragile states, and authoritarian regimes, Somaliland has charted an extraordinary path, characterized by grassroots peace-building, credible elections, and a functioning governance structure. Continue reading “Outlining A Comprehensive Foreign Policy Vision for the New Admin Under President-elect H.E. Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi “Cirro””

Maxwell Webb’S Piece on Atlantic Council Missed Somaliland’s Pivotal Role in the Region

Maxwell Webb’S Piece on Atlantic Council Missed Somaliland’s Pivotal Role in the Region
The article titled “Nine months later: The regional implications of the Ethiopia-Somaliland MOU” authored by Maxwell Webb and published by the Atlantic Council, misses a crucial element by neglecting Somaliland’s pivotal role in the region.
While the author attempts to analyze the involvement of actors like Djibouti, Turkey, Egypt and Al Shabab, Somaliland’s strategic importance is notably underplayed, despite being the primary signatory alongside Ethiopia. The piece also overlooks Somaliland’s position and control of the strategic waterway of the Gulf of Aden and its consistent political stability—factors that should have been central to this analysis.
Somaliland clearly stands in stark contrast to Mogadishu, which, despite international recognition, remains stuck in instability and state failure. Somaliland continues to flourish, with democratic elections—its fourth, scheduled for November, showcasing a commitment to democracy, governance and progress.
The MoU between Ethiopia and Somaliland is not just a diplomatic agreement but a forward-looking partnership aimed at shared prosperity, growth, and regional stability—a point the author fails to emphasize enough.
Moreover, Mogadishu’s tantrums on this MoU is seen by many as a distraction from its numerous domestic failures and impending collapse after years of international community support.
While Mogadishu teeters on failure, Somaliland is taking concrete steps toward long-term development and stability.
The author, despite overwhelming evidence, overlooks Somaliland’s emergence as a stable partner in the Horn of Africa and overemphasizes the role of Somalia, thereby reducing the article’s impact.
In short, Somaliland’s vision for the future aspirations and its centrality to regional growth deserved a much stronger focus. This would have provided a more accurate and comprehensive view of the significance of the MoU for the two nations involved.
In conclusion, this article reminded me of a college professor of mine who would grade assignments with a “W.” When pressed for clarification, he would respond with, “Too many words, not enough substance.”

Roda J Elmi
Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister
Somaliland

Why is Egypt Involved in the Impasse Between Ethiopia and Somalia?

Why is Egypt Involved in the Impasse Between Ethiopia and Somalia?

In early 2024, a major geopolitical event unfolded in the Horn of Africa with far-reaching consequences. Ethiopia and Somaliland signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on 01 January 2024 granting Ethiopia sea access through Somaliland’s ports in exchange for potential international recognition for Somaliland, marking a significant shift in the region’s political landscape.

The move was swiftly met with opposition from Somalia. The federal government in Mogadishu, despite having no authority over Somaliland since 1991, called the MoU illegal and accused Ethiopia of violating its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Tensions have mounted between the two countries since then. Somalia’s President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has sought to strengthen his country’s military and diplomatic alliances, culminating in a defense agreement with Egypt, formally approved by Somalia’s cabinet on 19 July 2024.

A month later, on 27 August 2024, two Egyptian military planes arrived at Mogadishu airport, according to Reuters, carrying weapons and ammunition. Egypt is reportedly preparing to send 10,000 troops to Somalia as part of a new peacekeeping mission slated for next year. This move has further escalated tensions with Ethiopia, raising fears of an emerging conflict. During a speech commemorating Ethiopia’s Day of Sovereignty on 08 September 2024, Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed issued a stern warning: “Anyone wishing to provoke Ethiopia should think carefully—ten times, not just once.”

Eyasu Hailemichael, a lecturer of International Relations specializing in the Horn of Africa, noted that while the risk of direct military confrontation remains low, a proxy conflict between Egypt-backed Somalia and Ethiopia is increasingly likely and carries significant geopolitical implications. According to Eyasu, the strategic importance of the Horn of Africa, particularly its proximity to the Red Sea—a vital maritime corridor for global trade—makes regional stability crucial, and the ongoing discord threatens to disrupt supply chains, hinder economic development, and destabilize an already fragile area.

Eyasu further emphasized that the involvement of external powers like the US, China, Russia, and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries complicates the situation, raising concerns about the Horn of Africa becoming a geopolitical battleground.

Egypt’s Involvement: Genuine support or strategic maneuver?

Asrat Birhanu, a hydropolitics researcher, argues that Egypt’s involvement is less about supporting Somalia and more about countering Ethiopia’s influence in the region. He suggests that Egypt is using its military cooperation with Somalia to create a geopolitical buffer against Ethiopia and gain leverage in the ongoing Nile River dispute.

Asrat highlights the disconnect between Egypt’s portrayal as a stabilizing force and its actions. He notes that the military agreement with Somalia appears to be a thinly veiled attempt to draw the country into Egypt’s sphere of influence. “Egypt’s strategy could undermine Somalia’s sovereignty and stability, exacerbating its internal fragmentation and further destabilizing the region,” he remarked.

Moustafa Ahmad, a researcher at the United States Institute of Peace, echoed this view, noting that Egypt’s primary interest is in isolating Ethiopia rather than playing a constructive role in Somali security. “The failure of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) negotiations and Ethiopia’s continued filling of the dam have placed significant domestic pressure on Cairo. Additionally, Egypt is unwilling to accept Ethiopia’s potential naval presence in the Red Sea,” he stated.

By aligning with Somalia, Moustafa argues, Egypt risks further destabilizing a region already grappling with internal challenges, such as the ongoing fight against Al-Shabaab militants. Somalia’s military cooperation with Egypt not only hardens Ethiopia’s stance on the MoU with Somaliland but also complicates Somalia’s internal political dynamics. Some Somali federal member states have expressed dissatisfaction with Egyptian involvement under the AU Support and Stabilization Mission, preferring the continued role of Ethiopian forces, which Mogadishu is seeking to phase out.

Federico Donelli, a professor of International Relations at the University of Trieste specializing in the Red Sea region, explained that Egypt’s involvement in Somalia is driven by both strategy and opportunity. Strategically, President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has been working to revive Egypt’s regional influence, particularly through diplomacy. Concurrently, Somalia’s request for Egyptian assistance provides an opportunity to deter Ethiopia amid growing rivalry between the two countries.

However, Federico warned of significant risks to Egypt’s strategy, including potential backlash from other regional powers and the challenge of navigating complex internal dynamics and challenging terrain in Somalia. “Egyptian troops may face more vulnerabilities than they anticipate,” he cautioned. Federico also noted that Egypt’s involvement has shifted the regional balance of power, with new alliances forming around Somalia’s position while others remain neutral. However, Somalia’s fragility persists, and Egyptian intervention could increase the country’s vulnerability, he stated.

Navigating a diplomatic solution

Turkey has actively attempted to mediate between Ethiopia and Somalia, hosting two rounds of talks in Ankara. Initially, these discussions offered a glimmer of hope for resolving the crisis, but the talks collapsed due to irreconcilable differences. Somalia demands that Ethiopia scrap the MoU, while Ethiopia insists on securing sea access in a “mutually agreeable manner.” A third round of talks is scheduled, though experts remain skeptical about the likelihood of success.

According to Federico Donelli, author of Turkey in Africa: Turkey’s Strategic Involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa, Turkey has made considerable efforts to mediate, but the underlying issues remain too complex. “It is hard to imagine Ethiopia giving up access to the Red Sea, and equally difficult for Somalia to accept the MoU with Somaliland,” he said. This deadlock suggests that only a significant compromise from one side could break the impasse, something neither nation appears willing to do.

Moustafa Ahmad concurs that Somaliland’s pursuit of international recognition is the core issue. “Somalia will continue to oppose any deals involving Somaliland’s independence, and the MoU has highlighted the need to address this issue,” he stated. He also suggested that Somalia’s strengthened military cooperation with Egypt may have emboldened Mogadishu, complicating Ethiopia’s diplomatic position and straining Turkey’s mediation efforts.

Eyasu Hailemichael added that deep-seated mistrust between Ethiopia and Somalia, stemming from historical tensions and diverging national priorities, makes finding common ground exceedingly difficult. This distrust has undermined mediation efforts so far, he stressed.

As tensions escalate, the urgency for a diplomatic resolution grows. Eyasu suggests a multifaceted approach that emphasizes promoting cooperative solutions. He noted that sustained regional dialogue, facilitated by neutral bodies such as the African Union or the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), could help ease tensions and ensure long-term stability in the region.

By Abdi Biyenssa @ABiyenssa

The New Triangle of Tension in the Horn of Africa

The New Triangle of Tension in the Horn of Africa

The Horn of Africa has recently witnessed rapid developments following Ethiopia’s announcement of the completion of the construction of the Renaissance Dam. Meanwhile, Egypt has deployed military equipment and sent delegations to Somalia as part of the joint defense pact between the two countries. This has sparked a media war between Egypt, Ethiopia and Somalia, signaling potentially dangerous developments in the region, which– according to some analysis – could escalate into direct military conflict. Continue reading “The New Triangle of Tension in the Horn of Africa”