Tag: Horn of Africa

Presidential Election will Bolster Somaliland’s Determination to Gain Recognition

Presidential Election will Bolster Somaliland’s Determination to Gain Recognition

On November 13, the 1.5 million registered voters of Somaliland Republic in the volatile Horn of Africa region went to the polls to elect a new leader.

Continue reading “Presidential Election will Bolster Somaliland’s Determination to Gain Recognition”

Maxwell Webb’S Piece on Atlantic Council Missed Somaliland’s Pivotal Role in the Region

Maxwell Webb’S Piece on Atlantic Council Missed Somaliland’s Pivotal Role in the Region
The article titled “Nine months later: The regional implications of the Ethiopia-Somaliland MOU” authored by Maxwell Webb and published by the Atlantic Council, misses a crucial element by neglecting Somaliland’s pivotal role in the region.
While the author attempts to analyze the involvement of actors like Djibouti, Turkey, Egypt and Al Shabab, Somaliland’s strategic importance is notably underplayed, despite being the primary signatory alongside Ethiopia. The piece also overlooks Somaliland’s position and control of the strategic waterway of the Gulf of Aden and its consistent political stability—factors that should have been central to this analysis.
Somaliland clearly stands in stark contrast to Mogadishu, which, despite international recognition, remains stuck in instability and state failure. Somaliland continues to flourish, with democratic elections—its fourth, scheduled for November, showcasing a commitment to democracy, governance and progress.
The MoU between Ethiopia and Somaliland is not just a diplomatic agreement but a forward-looking partnership aimed at shared prosperity, growth, and regional stability—a point the author fails to emphasize enough.
Moreover, Mogadishu’s tantrums on this MoU is seen by many as a distraction from its numerous domestic failures and impending collapse after years of international community support.
While Mogadishu teeters on failure, Somaliland is taking concrete steps toward long-term development and stability.
The author, despite overwhelming evidence, overlooks Somaliland’s emergence as a stable partner in the Horn of Africa and overemphasizes the role of Somalia, thereby reducing the article’s impact.
In short, Somaliland’s vision for the future aspirations and its centrality to regional growth deserved a much stronger focus. This would have provided a more accurate and comprehensive view of the significance of the MoU for the two nations involved.
In conclusion, this article reminded me of a college professor of mine who would grade assignments with a “W.” When pressed for clarification, he would respond with, “Too many words, not enough substance.”

Roda J Elmi
Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister
Somaliland

Why is Egypt Involved in the Impasse Between Ethiopia and Somalia?

Why is Egypt Involved in the Impasse Between Ethiopia and Somalia?

In early 2024, a major geopolitical event unfolded in the Horn of Africa with far-reaching consequences. Ethiopia and Somaliland signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on 01 January 2024 granting Ethiopia sea access through Somaliland’s ports in exchange for potential international recognition for Somaliland, marking a significant shift in the region’s political landscape.

The move was swiftly met with opposition from Somalia. The federal government in Mogadishu, despite having no authority over Somaliland since 1991, called the MoU illegal and accused Ethiopia of violating its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Tensions have mounted between the two countries since then. Somalia’s President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has sought to strengthen his country’s military and diplomatic alliances, culminating in a defense agreement with Egypt, formally approved by Somalia’s cabinet on 19 July 2024.

A month later, on 27 August 2024, two Egyptian military planes arrived at Mogadishu airport, according to Reuters, carrying weapons and ammunition. Egypt is reportedly preparing to send 10,000 troops to Somalia as part of a new peacekeeping mission slated for next year. This move has further escalated tensions with Ethiopia, raising fears of an emerging conflict. During a speech commemorating Ethiopia’s Day of Sovereignty on 08 September 2024, Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed issued a stern warning: “Anyone wishing to provoke Ethiopia should think carefully—ten times, not just once.”

Eyasu Hailemichael, a lecturer of International Relations specializing in the Horn of Africa, noted that while the risk of direct military confrontation remains low, a proxy conflict between Egypt-backed Somalia and Ethiopia is increasingly likely and carries significant geopolitical implications. According to Eyasu, the strategic importance of the Horn of Africa, particularly its proximity to the Red Sea—a vital maritime corridor for global trade—makes regional stability crucial, and the ongoing discord threatens to disrupt supply chains, hinder economic development, and destabilize an already fragile area.

Eyasu further emphasized that the involvement of external powers like the US, China, Russia, and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries complicates the situation, raising concerns about the Horn of Africa becoming a geopolitical battleground.

Egypt’s Involvement: Genuine support or strategic maneuver?

Asrat Birhanu, a hydropolitics researcher, argues that Egypt’s involvement is less about supporting Somalia and more about countering Ethiopia’s influence in the region. He suggests that Egypt is using its military cooperation with Somalia to create a geopolitical buffer against Ethiopia and gain leverage in the ongoing Nile River dispute.

Asrat highlights the disconnect between Egypt’s portrayal as a stabilizing force and its actions. He notes that the military agreement with Somalia appears to be a thinly veiled attempt to draw the country into Egypt’s sphere of influence. “Egypt’s strategy could undermine Somalia’s sovereignty and stability, exacerbating its internal fragmentation and further destabilizing the region,” he remarked.

Moustafa Ahmad, a researcher at the United States Institute of Peace, echoed this view, noting that Egypt’s primary interest is in isolating Ethiopia rather than playing a constructive role in Somali security. “The failure of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) negotiations and Ethiopia’s continued filling of the dam have placed significant domestic pressure on Cairo. Additionally, Egypt is unwilling to accept Ethiopia’s potential naval presence in the Red Sea,” he stated.

By aligning with Somalia, Moustafa argues, Egypt risks further destabilizing a region already grappling with internal challenges, such as the ongoing fight against Al-Shabaab militants. Somalia’s military cooperation with Egypt not only hardens Ethiopia’s stance on the MoU with Somaliland but also complicates Somalia’s internal political dynamics. Some Somali federal member states have expressed dissatisfaction with Egyptian involvement under the AU Support and Stabilization Mission, preferring the continued role of Ethiopian forces, which Mogadishu is seeking to phase out.

Federico Donelli, a professor of International Relations at the University of Trieste specializing in the Red Sea region, explained that Egypt’s involvement in Somalia is driven by both strategy and opportunity. Strategically, President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has been working to revive Egypt’s regional influence, particularly through diplomacy. Concurrently, Somalia’s request for Egyptian assistance provides an opportunity to deter Ethiopia amid growing rivalry between the two countries.

However, Federico warned of significant risks to Egypt’s strategy, including potential backlash from other regional powers and the challenge of navigating complex internal dynamics and challenging terrain in Somalia. “Egyptian troops may face more vulnerabilities than they anticipate,” he cautioned. Federico also noted that Egypt’s involvement has shifted the regional balance of power, with new alliances forming around Somalia’s position while others remain neutral. However, Somalia’s fragility persists, and Egyptian intervention could increase the country’s vulnerability, he stated.

Navigating a diplomatic solution

Turkey has actively attempted to mediate between Ethiopia and Somalia, hosting two rounds of talks in Ankara. Initially, these discussions offered a glimmer of hope for resolving the crisis, but the talks collapsed due to irreconcilable differences. Somalia demands that Ethiopia scrap the MoU, while Ethiopia insists on securing sea access in a “mutually agreeable manner.” A third round of talks is scheduled, though experts remain skeptical about the likelihood of success.

According to Federico Donelli, author of Turkey in Africa: Turkey’s Strategic Involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa, Turkey has made considerable efforts to mediate, but the underlying issues remain too complex. “It is hard to imagine Ethiopia giving up access to the Red Sea, and equally difficult for Somalia to accept the MoU with Somaliland,” he said. This deadlock suggests that only a significant compromise from one side could break the impasse, something neither nation appears willing to do.

Moustafa Ahmad concurs that Somaliland’s pursuit of international recognition is the core issue. “Somalia will continue to oppose any deals involving Somaliland’s independence, and the MoU has highlighted the need to address this issue,” he stated. He also suggested that Somalia’s strengthened military cooperation with Egypt may have emboldened Mogadishu, complicating Ethiopia’s diplomatic position and straining Turkey’s mediation efforts.

Eyasu Hailemichael added that deep-seated mistrust between Ethiopia and Somalia, stemming from historical tensions and diverging national priorities, makes finding common ground exceedingly difficult. This distrust has undermined mediation efforts so far, he stressed.

As tensions escalate, the urgency for a diplomatic resolution grows. Eyasu suggests a multifaceted approach that emphasizes promoting cooperative solutions. He noted that sustained regional dialogue, facilitated by neutral bodies such as the African Union or the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), could help ease tensions and ensure long-term stability in the region.

By Abdi Biyenssa @ABiyenssa

The New Triangle of Tension in the Horn of Africa

The New Triangle of Tension in the Horn of Africa

The Horn of Africa has recently witnessed rapid developments following Ethiopia’s announcement of the completion of the construction of the Renaissance Dam. Meanwhile, Egypt has deployed military equipment and sent delegations to Somalia as part of the joint defense pact between the two countries. This has sparked a media war between Egypt, Ethiopia and Somalia, signaling potentially dangerous developments in the region, which– according to some analysis – could escalate into direct military conflict. Continue reading “The New Triangle of Tension in the Horn of Africa”

The Predicament Somalia Is In

The Predicament Somalia Is In

Navigating the diplomatic complexities between Somalia and Ethiopia is like balancing on a tightrope, where allies, adversaries, and interests converge in intricate ways. There are 16 facts highlighting key regional and global dynamics that influence the ongoing “Ethiopian access to the sea” debate, impacting the relations between Ethiopia and Somalia. Continue reading “The Predicament Somalia Is In”

Can Alliance Led by Egypt Hinder Ethiopia’s Quest for Sea Access?

Can Alliance Led by Egypt Hinder Ethiopia’s Quest for Sea Access?

For scholars in the field of political science and international relations, the international realm is basically the realm of balance of power, where states continuously struggle for much power and sustainable peace. Continue reading “Can Alliance Led by Egypt Hinder Ethiopia’s Quest for Sea Access?”

Competing Diplomatic Maneuvers Over Somalia: Will Cairo Triumph Over Ankara?

Competing Diplomatic Maneuvers Over Somalia: Will Cairo Triumph Over Ankara?

Somalia’s President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud is set to begin an official trip to Cairo, Egypt, on Tuesday. The visit happens during a crucial period, aligning with initial discussions between Somalia and Ethiopia being held in Ankara, Turkey. Continue reading “Competing Diplomatic Maneuvers Over Somalia: Will Cairo Triumph Over Ankara?”

Unlocking New Horizons with Bilow Capital in Somaliland

Unlocking New Horizons with Bilow Capital in Somaliland

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Somaliland’s MoU with Ethiopia is Widely Supported

Somaliland’s MoU with Ethiopia is Widely Supported

The signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Ethiopia and Somaliland that granted the former access to the Gulf of Aden, adjacent to the Red Sea, has sparked significant discussions among scholars and policymakers. Continue reading “Somaliland’s MoU with Ethiopia is Widely Supported”

Interests of Turkey & Somalia Overlap A Little, Their Deal Is No Game Changer

Interests of Turkey & Somalia Overlap A Little, Their Deal Is No Game Changer

 

A recent defense deal between Somalia and Turkey has great significance for Somalia and the region’s security. The agreement, which covers both land and sea, aims to enhance defense cooperation between Turkey and Somalia. It includes the possibility of Turkey providing both training and equipment for a Somali navy.

Its near-term impact should, however, not be exaggerated.

Instead, it should be understood as a good-faith agreement signed between asymmetric powers whose interests overlap a little, at present. My research on the geopolitics and security agreements over the past few decades covering Turkey, Somalia, and the wider East African region leads to my analysis that Mogadishu and Ankara entered into the agreement for different reasons.

Turkey, the more powerful partner, signed the agreement to bolster its reputation as a security partner and an important actor in sub-Saharan Africa. It wants to cement its role as a critical player in Somalia’s future and improve its international visibility and prestige domestically.

Turkey plans to expand its training role to the maritime realm in Somalia and complement its terrestrial military training facility in Mogadishu. It may also provide — but is unlikely to sell (given Somalia’s severe budgetary constraints) — arms to Somalia now that the arms embargo has been lifted.

 

 

Somalia, as the less powerful partner, signed the agreement to build its defense capacities, particularly offshore. It entered into the deal eventually to gain the capabilities to project force throughout the territories it claims.

Mogadishu’s means to project force in its territorial waters are currently limited. Hence, the illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing and piracy.

Somalia’s leaders likely hope that Turkey will be able to train and equip Somali soldiers and sailors. This would give Mogadishu the capability to project limited force and thus better police its territories, both maritime and terrestrial. In doing so, it hopes to eventually gain a monopoly on the use of force within its borders, including semi-autonomous regions such as Jubaland and the de facto-independent state of Somaliland.

Limited Scope

In my view, there are limitations to what Turkey can achieve through this agreement in terms of its ambitions in the region. Even if the agreement were fully implemented, Ankara would not be involved in confronting Mogadishu’s rivals (including Ethiopia) within the region.

In short, the agreement is limited in scope and in terms of capabilities being offered. It will need to be long-term to accomplish anything close to affecting political and military outcomes on the ground — inside and outside Somalia.

It does not, in my view, represent the beginning of a new system of regional alliances that will pit Turkey and Somalia along with Egypt against Ethiopia, Somaliland, and possibly other regional states such as the United Arab Emirates.

The Background

The Turkey-Somalia agreement should be seen in the light of what the deal gives each signatory — not as part of a new system of regional alliances that are adjusting to the deal signed between Ethiopia and Somaliland at the beginning of 2024.

Under this agreement, Ethiopia will get a 50-year lease on a strip of land on Somaliland’s Red Sea coast for naval and commercial maritime use, and access to the Berbera port. In return, Addis Ababa would recognize Somaliland’s independence from Somalia.

This deal has set off a diplomatic storm in the region. It has been opposed by Somalia and Turkey, as well as the U.S., China, and Egypt. The agreement is certainly important. It has the potential to make an impact on the political and security fabric of the region as Ethiopia may eventually have a maritime security and commercial footprint in the Gulf of Aden.

These two recent deals in the Horn of Africa, however, are driven by the national interests of Somalia, Ethiopia, and Somaliland. They speak to their primary interests — territory and sovereignty.

The genesis of engagement and agreements with external actors has come from one or more of these Horn of Africa states. This was similarly the case with the 2017 Berbera Port deal between Ethiopia, Somaliland, and Dubai’s DP World. It was the case with Qatar’s engagement with Somalia on electoral politics, also in 2017.

It should come as little surprise that the region’s states — like others in the international state system — work to further their interests in their own backyard.

For its part, Turkey’s interests, like those of other foreign powers in the Horn of Africa, are generally opportunistic. Their intent is short-term gains. In my view, Turkey doesn’t have military interests in the Horn of Africa, and Ankara has limited capabilities even if it did.

This isn’t a criticism of Turkey. All states have limited capabilities and they generally prioritize them — especially when it comes to security architecture — close to home, where it matters. Turkey is no different.

No Gunboat Diplomacy

Turkey will be a good partner for Somalia and vice versa. They have a decade of history together and the agreement gives both Ankara and Mogadishu something of value.

In Turkey, Somalia has found a capable partner that can offer training, expertise, and some arms. And this means that the context was only partially about the recent Ethiopia-Somaliland deal.

Mogadishu’s leaders are under no illusion.

They know their own projection of limited power against what they see as encroachments on Somalia’s terrestrial and maritime territories is years in the future. But so is Ethiopia’s floating of a navy off the coast of Somaliland.

We should, therefore, not expect Turkish-trained and equipped Somali troops to be invading Somaliland, or Turkish ships crewed by Somali sailors to be skirmishing with Ethiopia in the Gulf of Aden any time soon. Instead, we should understand the agreement as one among many that may become embodied as something of strategic value only much later.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Brendon J. Cannon is an assistant professor at Khalifa University.