Importance of Somaliland to the West and Israel

The importance of Somaliland lies in its geostrategic location and correctness – especially as a stable, moderate and reliable country in a volatile region – to cooperate in a comprehensive and broad manner with Western countries. The location of Somaliland at the entrance to the Gulf of Eden – opposite southern Yemen – connecting the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean, gives it a geo-strategic uniqueness. This is the historical reason that the British Empire took over in the late 19th century, and that the United States during the Reagan administration established a military base in the 1980s, in the midst of the Cold War.

Today, the distance between the waters and territory of Somaliland and the Houthi control areas in Yemen, the port of Hadida, for example, is about 300 to 500 km. The fact that in recent years the Gulf states, the United States and Israel – each in turn – have fought the Houthis without a decision, gives the location of Somaliland and the potential ability to operate from its territory, considerable global importance, within a possible equality voucher. Somaliland has a potential to be a frontal base for a variety of missions: intelligence surveillance against the Houthis and their empowerment efforts; providing logistics to the legitimate Yemeni government in its war against the Houthis; and a base for direct operational activity against the Houthi – offensive and to thwart Houthi attacks at sea or by means of drones. The necessary parallel to Israel’s steadfast alliance with Azerbaijan, which has significantly upgraded the strategic and operational Israeli ability to deal with the Iranian threat. It is possible that Somaliland is the equivalent brick for Israel in the face of the Houchi threat.

Alongside the valuable location of Somaliland, it is equally important that its government is interested in cooperating broadly with pro-Western countries. It’s a combination of willingness and ability. Eritrea is located in an even closer location to actions against the Houthis, but police are anti-Western and friendly to Iran. Djibouti, who has the strategic location, maintains actual neutrality in conflicts. Ethiopia lacks access to the sea and relations between police and the United States are ambivalent. Somaliland therefore offers a unique combination of geo-strategic location and a willingness to agree to widespread cooperation with pro-Western countries. Its ties with the UAE – that much of the logic that guides them from a utterance point of view was the war in the Hothis – are evidence of this. Messages coming out of Somaliland indicate that the state is also willing to have broad security relations with the United States, including hosting an American base, and even with Israel.

Regarding Israel, the positive attitude of the Somaliland government is evident, even in the midst of the war in the past two years, and it is likely that there are already unofficial ties between senior officials in both countries. Somaliland has sent messages in recent months that it is ready to cooperate with pro-Israel initiatives, including the expansion of the Abraham Agreements. The public discourse in the country tends to be pro-Israel, although there are also critical voices, especially in light of the war and reports from the Gaza Strip, as well as in light of the existence of Salafi movements (non-violent) in the country.

Considerations for and against recognition of Somliland

For Somaliland, the most coveted prize is American recognition, with which, they estimate, will come recognition from many other countries close to Washington. She therefore invests effort in front of the White House and Congress. Somaliland positions itself as an antagonist for China who is willing to go as a long way to realize American interests in the strategic space of the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. In the face of the Americans, Somaliland also emphasizes its democratic and free character and hostility to radical Islamist ideologies. In conversations with American officials and media messages, she clarifies her immediate readiness for entering the Abraham Agreements. Her desire to gain recognition was so great that the Somaliland government did not even publicly reject the discourse that took place a few months ago about plans to encourage the immigration of Gazans into its territory, despite the great unpopularity that the idea has sparked in its population.

However, despite the friendliness of Washington and the strategies of Somaliland’s location, the United States still seems to be hesitant about the question of official recognition, and it has serious reasons for this.

First, on a fundamental level, U.S. policy on the Somali issue has been consistent in recent decades: recognition of the idea of “one Sommalia.” The United States has sought to strengthen the Mogadishu government, especially in light of its difficult war against Al-Shabaab over the past two decades. For the United States, Somalia-Mogadishu is an ally, also weak and failing. The United States also provides it with military assistance in the attacks against global jihadist elements. Recognition of Somliland will see as an American betrayal, which could lead to the wave of the blast in the shaky Somalia (for example, by officially withdrawing from Fontland and Jubald – both of which are still a symbolic commitment to Mogadishu’s authority – or the strengthening of Al-Shabab). This consideration should be added to international practice – an aspiration not to recognize the changes in unilateral borders or in quitting countries, with the understanding that this is a possible opening of the Pandora’s box and an appeal of existing borders in the rest of the world, especially in the Middle East and Africa.

Although this is a weighty consideration for Status-Quo-like U.S. administrations, the Trump administration may be able to violate the tradition of adherence to the idea of “one Somalia” or the reluctance to recognize quitting countries. However, there is a consideration that probably plays a more significant role for Washington at the present time: the support of most Arab countries including Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Egypt, as well as Turkey in this idea. The Arab League countries, except the UAE, are declaratively supporting the unity of Somalia and strongly opposed the recognition of Somaliland. For Turkey, Somalia-Mogdeishu is a major ally in the Red Sea region, bordering on the status of a protectorate. These powerful countries, which are mined ear in Washington, express their aversion to the possibility of recognition of Somliland.

Although their impact on Washington is much less, the African Union countries are also inclined to deeply disapprove of any official recognition of quitting countries, fearing the domino effect in the rest of Africa.

Compared to the considerations of the United States, Israel has additional considerations: Although the Qatari and Turkish attitudes against recognition of Somliland are not significant (and vice versa), it is possible that the Egyptian position, and perhaps also Chinese, is more significant. On the other hand, Israel’s proximity to the UAE reinforces the pro-Somalland consideration. However, traditionally, Israel is hesitant to recognize quitting countries, partly for fear of precedents or a boomerang effect on the issue of recognition of a Palestinian state, although this consideration seems to be less relevant at the present time, due to the actual, almost sweeping recognition that the Palestinian “state” has won in recent years.

A more significant consideration for Israel, which is supposed to arouse caution and deep thought before official recognition of Somaliland, is actually a pragmatic aspect. Israeli recognition of Somaliland, which is not accompanied by American recognition, may cause a negative effect that will harm both Israel and Somaliland. While an Israeli-Somalian agreement may appear to be reinforcement of Israel’s status in the region, at the same time causing a strong counter-reaction in the Muslim world, which in turn may place Somaliland at the focus of regional criticism and, consequently, lead to a reluctance to expand public or substantive cooperation with Israel. Israeli recognition, ironically, may actually contain efforts to expand the Abraham Accords with other Muslim countries.

Under the threshold of consciousness, at least for now

Israel is required for allies in the Red Sea area, in part to prepare for the next campaign against the Houthis. Somaliland is an ideal candidate for this cooperation, who will be able to grant Israel as a matter of action near the scene of operations. But in addition to security cooperation, relations with Somaliland also have important economic-conscious potential for Israeli national security, due to the minerals in its territory and the desire to establish relations with Muslim populations in the region. Therefore, Israel must work to expand cooperation with this entity, ideal while cooperating with the UAE and the United States.

However, Israel has serious reasons for avoiding the first country to recognize Somaliland, which is primarily an understanding that such recognition may actually act against promoting intimate relations between Israel and Somaliland due to regional responses and dynamics. As long as the United States (or at least the UAE) does not recognize Somaliland as an independent state, Israel must not act alone on this official level.

The recommendation is therefore to promote the intimate relationship with Somaliland “under the threshold of consciousness.” Israel and its allies in Washington can help Somliland in persuasion attempts with the Trump administration, but the United States must take the first public step to recognition. At the same time, the two countries can promote – even before official recognition – security and economic partnerships, the establishment of interest offices (as many other countries with Somaliland do), and even symbolic measures such as recognition of the Somaliland passports.

These are steps that will prevent the possible risks involved in official recognition, while at the same time helping both parties to advance their fundamental interests. Israeli security and economic presence in Somliland does not necessarily require official recognition, and on the other hand, Somaliland may also be preferable to intimate and quiet relations with Israel over high-profile precedent-setting declarations. Somaliland can benefit many of these ties with Israel, especially in light of the security challenges that the country may encounter in the challenging neighborhood of the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa. For Israel, Somliland may be a “vigilance breaker” in the struggle against the Houthis.

** The author wishes to thank the staff of the Institute for National Security Studies for fruitful discourse on the issue, including as part of a guest lecture given by the author at the Institute on September 30, 2025; Dr. Rashid Abdi, head of research at the Sahan Institute in Kenya, for discourse and sharing of knowledge; and the Israel-Africa Relations Institute for support and encouragement.