Tag: Somaliland

The Deep State Within the Current Somaliland Administration

The Deep State Within the Current Somaliland Administration
President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi (Irro) assumed office with a constitutional mandate and cautious optimism from the public. For many, it was a moment that signaled the possibility of steadier leadership and a more inclusive national tone. He stepped into a landscape shaped by long-standing political complexities, emerging pressures, and the quiet expectations of a society looking for calm, clarity, and cohesion.

Complicating this environment was the steady rise of ideological soft power, originating from both regional actors and internal clergy-politician alliances. Over time, these networks – not rooted in democratic legitimacy – have cultivated influence through symbolic authority, narrative control, and long-term positioning. Their impact has gone largely unchecked, quietly eroding the ideological coherence that once defined Somaliland sovereign claim.

One of the earliest signals that the road ahead would be difficult came with the formation of Irro’s cabinet. While national expectations for sweeping change may not have been universally high, key constituencies—particularly those that delivered electoral victory—expected principled leadership and meaningful inclusion. Instead, the cabinet suggested compromise. Several appointees lacked experience, and many who had stood closest to the president’s platform were left out. This created an executive structure vulnerable to internal maneuvering and a lack of cohesion.

For much of the public, the appointments felt like continuity. But for Irro’s political base, the failure to distinguish this administration from previous ones triggered a sharp legitimacy gap. That gap widened as ministries began operating in silos, agendas clashed, and state coordination weakened. The presidency, once seen as a potential driver of direction, began to resemble a balancing act between internal power centers rather than a cohesive seat of leadership.

The early decision to proceed with parliamentary and municipal elections, while a sound procedure, further prolonged the campaign atmosphere. Rather than closing the chapter on electoral rivalry, it sustained the political tension and postponed the focus on governance.

Meanwhile, perceptions of exclusion began to surface. Certain regions and civil service constituencies have expressed concerns about marginalization in appointments and decision-making. Whether these claims are substantiated or not, they have traction—especially in a political culture where symbolic balance and inclusive optics play an essential role in stability.

The absence of a coherent ideological voice within government has also become increasingly evident. Past administrations, despite their limitations, upheld a consistent message of sovereignty, statehood, and legal continuity. Today, those narratives are faint. In their absence, revisionist discourse and external ideological influence are gaining space—unchecked by a strong internal counter-narrative.

This ideological vacuum is especially dangerous among Somaliland youth. With civic education limited and engagement channels narrow, young people are increasingly vulnerable to polarizing rhetoric—both tribal and foreign. In a context where the youth represent the majority, this poses a serious long-term risk to national unity and social cohesion.

Somaliland political culture—grounded in consensus, regional inclusion, and symbolic legitimacy—is under quiet strain. Its erosion, even if gradual, opens the door to deeper fragmentation. In a state still unrecognized but widely respected for its internal stability, perception matters just as much as structure.

There is still time for President Irro to re-calibrate. Doing so will require more than reshuffling personnel. It demands clear direction, a renewed commitment to inclusiveness, and the elevation of credible voices who can restore trust in government. Rebuilding cohesion starts with listening—not just to allies, but to those feeling pushed to the margins.

Irro was not elected to maintain inertia. He was elected to guide Somaliland through complexity—with fairness, balance, and vision.

Whether this administration succeeds in that mission will shape not just its legacy, but the future of the nation itself.

Mohamed Khader, Hargeisa, Somaliland

Somtuna – A Sustainable Export-driven Venture for Somaliland Economy

Somtuna – A Sustainable Export-driven Venture for Somaliland Economy

The Horn of Africa is poised to benefit from a surge in blue economy investments, as regional and international players turn their attention to the vast, under exploited potential of the area’s coastal waters.

Continue reading “Somtuna – A Sustainable Export-driven Venture for Somaliland Economy”

Questions on the Status of Ankara Communique between Ethiopia & Somalia are Increasing

Questions on the Status of Ankara Communique between Ethiopia & Somalia are Increasing

Concerns are mounting regarding the current status of the Ankara communiqué, which was designed to pave the way for a comprehensive agreement between Somalia and Ethiopia by May 2025. This timeline holds significant importance for both nations, yet officials have been notably reticent about any complications that may be obstructing the ongoing negotiations. Interestingly, even the Turkish government, which has actively facilitated and supported these discussions, has not offered any recent updates or insights into the progression of talks. Continue reading “Questions on the Status of Ankara Communique between Ethiopia & Somalia are Increasing”

Somaliland yet to Respond to Somalia’s Entry-point Ban on Taiwan Passports

Somaliland yet to Respond to Somalia’s Entry-point Ban on Taiwan Passports

The ban, which took effect on Wednesday, was announced in a notice issued by Somalia’s civil aviation authority last week, according to a report, citing Taiwan’s foreign ministry.

Taiwan has strongly condemned Somalia for imposing a ban on travelers holding Taiwanese passports, preventing them from entering or transiting through the East African nation.

According to a BBC report, citing Taiwan’s foreign ministry, the ban, which took effect on Wednesday, was announced in a notice issued by Somalia’s civil aviation authority last week. Somali authorities have yet to publicly comment on the decision, added the report.

The move comes amid deepening unofficial ties between Taiwan and Somaliland — a self-declared republic that broke away from Somalia in 1991 but lacks international recognition.

In 2020, Taiwan and Somaliland established reciprocal representative offices, a step that drew condemnation from both China and Somalia.

Somalia’s civil aviation authority issued a notice to airlines saying that Taiwanese passports “will no longer be valid for entry into or transit through the Federal Republic of Somalia” from 30 April, BBC quoted Taiwan’s foreign ministry as saying in a statement late on Tuesday.

“The ministry of foreign affairs has strongly protested Somalia’s action made under the instigation of China to restrict the travel freedom and safety of Taiwanese nationals and has demanded that the Somali government immediately revoke the notice,” the ministry added.

Taiwan’s foreign ministry has advised its citizens to avoid traveling to Somalia or Somaliland for their own safety, pending a reversal of Somalia’s recent ban on Taiwanese passport holders, reported BBC, citing Taiwanese media.

Neither Somalia nor Somaliland has issued an official response to the travel ban. China, however, welcomed the move.

“We highly appreciate this legitimate measure, which reflects Somalia’s firm adherence to the one-China principle,” AFP quoted Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun as saying to reporters on Wednesday.

Taiwan operates under its own constitution, holds regular multiparty elections, and governs itself independently. However, China considers Taiwan a breakaway province and has vowed to reclaim it by force if necessary.

Under pressure from Beijing’s diplomatic campaign, Taiwan — officially known as the Republic of China — is formally recognized by only a small number of countries.

Somaliland, which declared independence from Somalia in 1991 after the collapse of the Siyad Barre regime, is also not internationally recognized. Like Taiwan, it holds regular elections and operates as a de facto independent state.

In contrast, much of Somalia remains under the control of the Al-Shabab militant group, an al-Qaeda affiliate. The Somali government regards Somaliland as part of its sovereign territory and has condemned a recent agreement between Somaliland and Ethiopia over leasing access to a port.

Somaliland’s Diplomatic Momentum Stumbling Dangerously under the Current Foreign Minister

Somaliland’s Diplomatic Momentum Stumbling Dangerously under the Current Foreign Minister

For nearly two decades, I have watched Somaliland with admiration. As a former senior Africa analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency, I have studied fragile states, insurgencies, and democratic experiments across the continent. Continue reading “Somaliland’s Diplomatic Momentum Stumbling Dangerously under the Current Foreign Minister”

Insiders and Insurgents: The Joint Venture of Al-shabab & Somali Government

Insiders and Insurgents: The Joint Venture of Al-shabab & Somali Government

At the heart of the Horn of Africa is a chilling story—one that combines corruption, terror, and insurgency into a deadly cycle. Somalia, forever plagued by political instability and extremism, is now in the hot seat for its suspected harboring of an unholy trinity: a low-key, transactional relationship between branches of its government and the Al-Qaeda-linked militant group Al-Shabaab. This is less a story of betrayal but more an expose on how terror had become a cross-ventured business. Continue reading “Insiders and Insurgents: The Joint Venture of Al-shabab & Somali Government”

Somaliland’s Centuries-old Borders won’t be Altered by Somalia’s PM Visit to Las Anod

Somaliland’s Centuries-old Borders won’t be Altered by Somalia’s PM Visit to Las Anod

Following Mogadishu’s official recognition of the SSC-Khatumo administration, Somaliland has accused the federal government of intentionally sabotaging regional peace and escalating instability in Somaliland. Continue reading “Somaliland’s Centuries-old Borders won’t be Altered by Somalia’s PM Visit to Las Anod”

US Risks Losing Key Ally in the Horn of Africa – Somaliland – if Continues Clinging to Outdated Policies

Why the US should recognize Somaliland: A game-changer for security and strategy.

Somaliland’s Berbera port sits at the heart of a global power struggle; As China, Iran and Russia tighten their grip on vital waterways, the US risks losing a key ally in the Horn of Africa by clinging to outdated policies. Continue reading “US Risks Losing Key Ally in the Horn of Africa – Somaliland – if Continues Clinging to Outdated Policies”

Somalia Observes as the UAE Deepens Its Military Ties with Somaliland

Somalia Observes as the U.A.E. Deepens Its Military Ties with Somaliland

As the Gulf state increases its power in the Horn of Africa, the United Arab Emirates -UAE – and Somaliland are strengthening their military and security collaboration. This development may further exacerbate tensions between Abu Dhabi and the federal government of Somalia. Continue reading “Somalia Observes as the UAE Deepens Its Military Ties with Somaliland”

Two Summits in Djibouti, but no Talk of Djibouti’s Own Struggles

Two Summits in Djibouti, but no Talk of Djibouti’s Own Struggles

The Horn of Africa is facing an unprecedented confluence of crises, marked by civil wars in Ethiopia and Sudan, escalating tensions between Somalia and Ethiopia, and the persistent threat of Al-Shabaab’s insurgency in Somalia.

Against this backdrop, two high-profile forums were held recently in Djibouti, aimed at addressing regional stability and security. The Heritage Institute for Policy Studies convened its annual three-day dialogue on regional stability, while the East Africa Security Forum (EASF) brought together diplomats, military leaders, and private-sector stakeholders under the auspices of the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA).

However, conspicuously absent from both forums were discussions about Djibouti’s own internal issues: widespread hunger, endemic insecurity, and a lack of democratic governance. These omissions raise critical questions about the priorities of regional and international stakeholders and the inherent challenges of hosting such discussions in a country with pressing internal issues.

The Horn of Africa is a region teetering on the edge of collapse. In Ethiopia and Sudan, civil wars have left thousands dead and millions displaced. Somalia continues to battle the Al-Shabaab insurgency, a persistent threat to national and regional stability.

Meanwhile, tensions between Somalia and Ethiopia have flared over a contentious port deal Addis Ababa signed with Somaliland, the breakaway region whose sovereignty remains unrecognized internationally.
Amid this chaos, Djibouti has positioned itself as a relative island of stability, hosting international military bases and serving as a hub for diplomatic activity.

Yet beneath this façade, Djibouti grapples with its own set of crises, including hunger exacerbated by prolonged droughts, economic vulnerabilities, and a political system often criticized for its lack of democratic freedoms.

Between April and June 2024, for instance, an estimated 221,000 people or 19 percent of the analyzed population (out of 1.18 million people), were facing high levels of acute food insecurity, according to the Integrated Food Security (IPC).

In the 2024 Global Hunger Index, Djibouti ranks 92nd out of 127 countries, with a score of 21.2, indicating a serious level of hunger. Djibouti imports 90% of its food, making it vulnerable to international market price fluctuations, according to the European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations. The country’s hot, dry climate also limits agricultural production.

Djibouti has a poverty rate of 79%, with 42% of the population living in extreme poverty. High levels of unemployment also contribute to humanitarian needs.

Djibouti’s geographical location makes it a strategic hub for international military bases, hosting troops from the United States, China, France, Japan, and Italy. Djibouti’s maritime territory is increasingly plagued by illegal fishing activities, primarily conducted by foreign fleets from Yemen and China. These unregulated operations deplete fish stocks, threatening the livelihoods of local fishing communities and disrupting the marine ecosystem.

Illegal fishing not only undermines Djibouti’s economic prospects but also poses a security threat. It has been linked to organized criminal networks that use fishing vessels as cover for smuggling goods, weapons, and even people. Additionally, the lack of effective maritime surveillance leaves Djibouti’s waters vulnerable to exploitation, highlighting a significant gap in its security infrastructure.

The government’s inability to monitor and regulate its maritime borders exacerbates the issue. While international partnerships, such as those with the European Union’s naval operations and other anti-piracy missions, aim to strengthen maritime security, the focus often remains on piracy rather than illegal fishing. This imbalance leaves the problem of unregulated fishing largely unaddressed.

While these bases contribute to regional security, they do not shield Djibouti from internal and neighboring conflicts. The Horn of Africa is one of the most volatile regions globally, with civil wars in Ethiopia and Sudan, Al-Shabaab’s insurgency in Somalia, and heightened tensions between neighboring states.

These conflicts spill over into Djibouti, straining its limited resources and exposing vulnerabilities in its security apparatus. For instance, tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia over territorial disputes and Somaliland’s independence aspirations often find expression in Djibouti’s border areas, leading to localized instability. The porous borders make it difficult for authorities to control the influx of refugees and militants, further complicating security management.

Domestically, Djibouti faces political repression and a lack of democratic governance, which exacerbate insecurity. The government, led by President Ismaïl Omar Guelleh since 1999, has faced allegations of being an Al-Shabaab sympathizer. There are also allegations that Somalia’s Salaam Bank, which has been linked with Al-Shabaab over the years, also has links with Guelleh’s inner political circle.

His government continues to face strong criticism for stifling dissent and consolidating power. This political climate fosters discontent among the populace and raises concerns about the state’s ability to manage internal security effectively.

Human trafficking is a persistent and growing problem in Djibouti, largely driven by its proximity to conflict zones and its strategic location as a transit point to Yemen and the Arabian Peninsula. The majority of trafficked individuals come from Somalia and Ethiopia, fleeing poverty, conflict, and political instability. These migrants often seek better opportunities in Gulf countries but become victims of exploitation and abuse along the way.

Djibouti serves as a key transit route for smugglers and traffickers who promise desperate migrants passage to Yemen, often under dire and dangerous conditions. The journey involves crossing the treacherous Gulf of Aden, frequently in overcrowded and unseaworthy vessels. Many do not survive the crossing, falling victim to drowning, starvation, or abuse at the hands of smugglers.

The human trafficking networks operating in Djibouti are highly organized, exploiting the country’s weak border controls and limited law enforcement resources. Despite efforts by international organizations and NGOs to combat trafficking, the scale of the problem remains overwhelming. Trafficked individuals often face inhumane treatment, including forced labor and sexual exploitation, both en route and upon arrival in their destination countries.

Despite these glaring issues, the forums held in Djibouti turned their focus outward, concentrating on the region’s broader security dilemmas. The absence of discussions on Djibouti’s internal challenges is reflective of its strategic position and the delicate balancing act required in such high-stakes gatherings.

From November 25 to 27, scholars, politicians, and traditional leaders gathered for the Heritage Institute’s annual forum, hosted in Djibouti. The focus was on fostering dialogue among key stakeholders from across the Horn of Africa, with an emphasis on addressing regional instability. Central to the discussions were the civil wars in Ethiopia and Sudan, Somalia’s ongoing political challenges, and the threat posed by Al-Shabaab.

The forum offered a unique opportunity for regional leaders to confront pressing transnational issues. However, its agenda sidestepped domestic concerns within Djibouti, opting instead to spotlight regional dynamics. The decision to omit discussions about Djibouti’s hunger crisis, insecurity, or democratic deficits can be attributed to several factors, including the forum’s regional scope and the host nation’s influence over the agenda.

The East Africa Security Forum (EASF) held from November 21 to 23 at Camp Lemonnier, the East Africa Security Forum took a decidedly security-focused approach. Organized by the U.S.-led Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa, the forum emphasized enhancing collaboration between the U.S. and its regional partners. Discussions revolved around managing inter- and intra-state conflicts, leveraging private-sector investments for stability, and tackling tribal and national affiliations that often fuel regional discord.

Once again, Djibouti’s internal issues were notably absent. Instead, the forum concentrated on broader regional and international security priorities, aligning with U.S. strategic interests in the Horn of Africa. As a key U.S. ally and the site of America’s largest military base in Africa, Djibouti enjoys a degree of diplomatic immunity when it comes to scrutiny of its internal affairs.

This narrative of stability is carefully cultivated and fiercely protected in Djibouti. Raising issues such as hunger, insecurity, or democratic deficits in high-profile forums held within Djibouti could be seen as diplomatically provocative, potentially jeopardizing relations with the host nation.

Consequently, organizers often tread cautiously, prioritizing external challenges over internal critiques.

However, this approach is not without consequences. Ignoring Djibouti’s domestic issues risks perpetuating cycles of poverty, eroding governance, and undermining the very stability that makes it a valuable partner in regional security efforts.

Djibouti’s hunger crisis, driven by prolonged droughts and economic stagnation, continues to affect a significant portion of its population. Failing to address these issues in forums ostensibly focused on stability undermines efforts to build a resilient and secure region.

International actors, including the U.S. and multilateral organizations, have a responsibility to advocate for transparency and reform in Djibouti but they often choose no to. The absence of meaningful U.S. advocacy for transparency and reform enables Djibouti’s entrenched authoritarian practices, stifling democratic progress.

President Ismaïl Omar Guelleh has presided over a system marked by political repression, corruption, and limited civic freedoms. Without external pressure for reform, this system remains unchallenged, perpetuating governance practices that prioritize elite interests over public welfare.

By avoiding discussions on governance and democracy, forums inadvertently legitimize Djibouti’s authoritarian tendencies. This silence not only perpetuates existing power structures but also undermines broader efforts to promote democratic principles across the region.

Djibouti’s lack of transparency hampers economic development by discouraging foreign investment and allowing corruption to flourish. With a centralized economy heavily dependent on port revenues and rents from military bases, unchecked governance risks deepening economic inequality and fostering discontent among marginalized communities.

Future forums must adopt a more inclusive and holistic approach to addressing the Horn of Africa’s challenges. This includes incorporating discussions on domestic issues within host nations like Djibouti, even when such topics are diplomatically sensitive.