Tag: Somaliland

Somaliland’s Geopolitical Relevance Outpacing Its Institutional Preparedness

Somaliland’s geopolitical relevance is rising faster than its institutional preparedness
In an era of intensifying global competition along strategic maritime corridors, the Republic of Somaliland sits at a crossroads few policymakers can afford to ignore. Positioned along the Gulf of Aden, near the Bab el-Mandeb strait through which roughly around 12% of global trade passes, Somaliland occupies territory that is no longer peripheral to global strategy. It is central.
Yet Somaliland’s geopolitical relevance is rising faster than its institutional preparedness.
For over three decades, Somaliland has defied regional patterns. It has built a functioning political order, conducted competitive elections, and maintained relative internal stability without formal international recognition. These achievements are not accidental. They are the result of leadership.
From the early stewardship of Abdirahman Ahmed Ali (Tuur), who guided the fragile reassertion of sovereignty, to the state-building vision of Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal, Somaliland’s trajectory has been shaped by leaders capable of navigating crisis and compromise. Egal’s demobilization of militias and institutional consolidation remain foundational to Somaliland’s governance model.
This pattern of leadership continuity extended through Dahir Riyale Kahin, whose administration entrenched electoral legitimacy, and Ahmed Mohamed Mohamoud (Silanyo), whose economic diplomacy, particularly the Berbera Port agreement with DP World, signalled Somaliland’s entry into the geopolitical economy of the Red Sea corridor.
Under Muse Bihi Abdi, the state navigated rising internal political contestation and external pressure, while expanding its diplomatic outreach. Today, Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi (Iro) presides over a decisive phase, as Somaliland seeks to convert de facto statehood into formal international recognition, an aspiration first answered by the State of Israel in December 2025 after its PM announced a ‘full recognition’ of Somaliland’s sovereignty.
But here lies the paradox: as Somaliland’s strategic importance grows, the model that sustained its stability is becoming insufficient.
A Strategic Location in a Crowded Theatre
The Red Sea and Gulf of Aden are undergoing rapid geopolitical transformation. The region has become a theatre of overlapping interests:
  • ​Gulf states projecting economic and security influence
  • ​Global powers securing maritime routes and military access
  • ​Regional actors competing for ports, corridors, and alliances
Berbera Port, developed through the DP World concession, has emerged as a critical node in this competition. It offers an alternative logistics corridor to landlocked Ethiopia and a potential counterweight to congested or contested routes elsewhere in the region. But this opportunity comes with exposure.
Somaliland’s economy remains highly concentrated, dependent on Berbera port revenues, livestock exports, and remittances. Its lack of international recognition limits access to global financial systems, constraining its ability to scale infrastructure, diversify its economy, and absorb external shocks.
In short, Somaliland is strategically located, but structurally constrained.
The Leadership Constraint.
Historically, Somaliland has compensated for structural limitations through leadership. Its political stability has been personality-driven; anchored in individuals with legitimacy, experience, and consensus-building capacity.
Personality-Driven model is now reaching its limits
The emerging geopolitical environment demands a different type of leadership:
  • Leaders capable of navigating multi-alignment diplomacy without or with inadequate formal recognition.
  • Leaders able to negotiate complex economic partnerships without overexposure to external actors.
  • Leaders who can translate geopolitical opportunity into domestic development.
At present, Somaliland lacks a formalized system for producing such leadership. This creates a strategic vulnerability. Without a pipeline of capable leaders, Somaliland risks entering a period where geopolitical relevance outpaces governance capacity, a gap that external actors are quick to exploit.
Recognition Is Not a Strategy
Much of Somaliland’s external engagement has been framed around the pursuit of international recognition. While recognition remains a legitimate objective, it cannot substitute for internal capacity.
Recognition, even if achieved, will not resolve:
  1.  Economic concentration
  2. Institutional fragility
  3. Youth unemployment
  4. Women and minority groups’ representational equality
  5. Governance gaps
In fact, recognition without preparation could amplify these challenges by accelerating external engagement beyond the state’s ability to manage it. The more urgent priority is internal readiness.
Policy Imperatives in a Geopolitical Context
To navigate this new era, Somaliland must recalibrate its strategy along these axes:
Strategic Autonomy in Foreign Policy:
Somaliland must avoid overdependence on any single external partner. A diversified diplomatic approach: balancing Gulf, African, and Western engagements is essential to preserve autonomy.
Economic De-Risking:
Reducing reliance on Berbera Port revenues is critical. This requires investment in trade corridors, value-added exports, and emerging sectors such as digital services.
Leadership Institutionalization:
Political parties, civil society groups, and state institutions must collectively develop mechanisms for leadership cultivation. Governance cannot remain dependent on exceptional individuals.
Inclusive State-Building
The demographic reality where youth and women form the majority must be reflected in political representation. Exclusion is not only unjust; it is destabilizing.
Governance Before Recognition:
Somaliland’s comparative advantage has been its internal legitimacy. Preserving and deepening this must take precedence over external validation.
A Narrowing Window:
Somaliland’s current position is both an opportunity and a risk. Its stability makes it attractive. Its location makes it valuable. But without institutional depth, these same factors can render it vulnerable.
The next decade will not resemble the last. The geopolitical environment is less forgiving, more competitive, and far less tolerant of governance gaps.
Somaliland’s founding generation proved that leadership can create a state under conditions of collapse. The current generation faces a different test: whether it can transform that legacy into a system capable of sustaining the state under conditions of global competition.
Failure will not come as sudden collapse but as gradual erosion of autonomy, of policy space, and of strategic control. Success, however, would place Somaliland in a rare category not merely as a stable polity in a fragile region, but as a self-made state capable of navigating great power competition on its own terms. That is the real test ahead.
About the Author:
Salma Sheikh is a political analyst, a long time Somaliland recognition advocate, and Lead Advisor on Women Affairs at the House of Representatives of the Republic of Somaliland.

A Coalition with Diverse Agendas Team up for Opposing Somaliland Recognition in the Name of Somali Unity

A Coalition with Diverse Agendas Team up for Opposing Somaliland Recognition in the Name of Somali Unity

In late 2025, Israel officially announced its recognition of Somaliland, a self-declared independent region in northern Somalia that has asserted its sovereignty since 1991 but remains largely unrecognized by the international community. The decision marks a notable realignment in diplomatic relations across the Horn of Africa and the broader Middle East. In response, a coalition of 21 Arab, Islamic, and African states issued a joint statement condemning Israel’s move. They described it as a “grave violation of international law and the United Nations Charter,” reaffirmed their commitment to Somalia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, and explicitly rejected any suggestion that the recognition could be linked to efforts to displace the Palestinian people.

The sustained and coordinated efforts of geopolitically influential powers—including Egypt, Turkey, Djibouti, and Somalia—alongside a broader alliance of Arab and Muslim states such as Jordan, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Pakistan, and the Maldives, to prevent Somaliland from obtaining international recognition, illustrate a highly complex and multidimensional geopolitical phenomenon. This opposition has intensified in parallel with Somaliland’s increasing external engagements, particularly pragmatic contacts with Israel and other non-Arab actors.

This article argues that the region’s overwhelming opposition to Somaliland’s recognition cannot credibly be interpreted as a principled or neutral position grounded in international law, Islamic solidarity, or genuine concern for Somalia’s unity. Rather, through systematic analytical deconstruction, it demonstrates that this opposition stems from a convergence of narrow national interests, deep-seated geopolitical anxieties, and defensive reactions to the potential restructuring of the existing regional order.

On the surface, this stance is articulated through legalistic rhetoric—invoking sovereignty, territorial integrity, and moral symbolism, especially in relation to the Palestinian cause. Yet in practice, a persistent and fundamental paradox emerges between states’ declared principles and their actual conduct. The gap between discourse and action reveals that strategic calculations, rather than normative commitments, drive much of the regional response to Somaliland’s bid for statehood

Somaliland in Arab Politics: ‘File’ rather than ‘cause’

Complexity and agency, as well as the historical specificity of Somaliland, are being systematically denied within the political institutions, diplomatic circles, and strategic cultures of most Arab and Islamic capitals. It is hardly ever activated as an independent object of international politics or as an acceptable instance of self-determination based on a separate colonial and post-colonial experience. Rather, it is diminished to a bureaucratic abstraction, a file that needs to be handled but not a cause that needs to be comprehended.

It is a reduction that works in two paradigms that are overlapping and expedient politically. The former views Somaliland as a strictly sovereign entity, which is subordinated to Somalia. Somaliland, under this framing, falls under the category of internal administrative or constitutional issues of the internationally recognized state of Somalia. This division offers a pre-made rationale of the categorical denial of recognition or substantive international action, which is normally expressed in slogans like the preservation of the territorial integrity and the protection of the sovereignty of the central state. More importantly, this stance puts the symbolic sacredness of inherited boundaries above the material political facts. It consciously puts aside the institutional history, electioneering, and social contract of Somaliland for the sake of maintaining a formal cartographic wholeness, which, more often than not, exists on a piece of paper.

The second paradigm perceives Somaliland as an instrumentalized variable in a more comprehensive regional and world power policy. Within this framework, Somaliland emerges as a chess piece, as well as in the Israeli-Iranian game, the growing Turkish strategic presence in Africa, and the geostrategic struggle of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the maritime arteries of the Red Sea. In this logic, Somaliland does not possess a political actor or even a political interest of its own. Instead, it is diminished to a tactical area to be exploited, limited, or neutralized as per the strategic decisions of foreign powers.

The two paradigms are united in their deliberate ignorance of facts on the ground. Somaliland has a relatively long history of a stable and functional government, a period of over thirty years. It has also created effective electoral institutions, which have been able to handle competitive and peaceful transfers of power; internal security, which is starkly opposed to the chronic instability that plagues southern Somalia; economic and commercial infrastructure, including the development and operation of the Berbera port; and the ability to find responsible ways of dealing with external actors, including Ethiopia and Taiwan. This has been accompanied by a steady claim of disinterest and adherence to international standards.

Even with these facts that can be verified, Somaliland remains to be described as a state that is an exception—something that is inconvenient that poses a danger to the psychological and political underpinnings of the post-colonial Arab regional order. The order places a heavy burden on the sanctification of inherited borders, even though these boundaries may be supported by the use of coercion or without the truly popular consent. Another tactic employed by the capitals of Somaliland in the form of persistent political and media pressure, even when there is no hostile action or strategic provocation on the part of Hargeisa, highlights the existence of a deep-seated kind of hypocrisy.

The selective invocation of legal and religious rhetoric is not a kind of policy prescription but rather an act of performance of regional power management. It shows a crisis of credibility, where the interest in Somali unity is rhetorically magnified and the welfare, rights, and political will of the population of Somaliland are systematically discriminated against. Therefore, the Somaliland problem goes beyond the scope of a local conflict. It is a critical prism in which the incoherence and instability of regional strategic thought are revealed, as well as the way in which the emergent political realities are pushed into the background of the endless reproduction of established power accounts.

Somaliland faces rejection over precedent, not reality

The action taken by the various players to oppose the recognition of Somaliland is fueled by fears that go way beyond Somaliland itself. It is fundamentally fear, which is not about the existence of Somaliland but about the meaning of its success. The rejection is not aimed at the empirical reality on the ground as much as it is aimed at the political, legal, and ethical precedent on which recognition would be created.

The action taken by the various players to oppose the recognition of Somaliland is fueled by fears that go way beyond Somaliland itself.”

This fear has been expressed in three factors that are interlinked. The former is internal political contagion. The international acceptance of Somaliland on the basis of sound governance, historical particularism, and popular consent over a long period would serve as an influential example for marginalized or peripheral states in other Arab and African states. Such areas of the Sahel as Southern Syria, Iraqi Kurdistan, Southern Yemen, and other ethnically or politically distinct regions might use the example of Somaliland to justify the claim to autonomy or independence. To other regimes that routinely repress such claims, this possibility is a massive legitimacy problem, which compels awkward inquiries about how selectively they exercise sovereignty and self-determination.

The second dimension is associated with the holiness of colonial boundaries. The case of Somaliland proves that the boundaries that were established by the European colonialists are not fixed and even natural. It demonstrates that political order, institutional effectiveness, and social cohesion can be developed without—and even against—those borders. This ideological and practical threat is a danger to centralized states that are based on inherited territorial structures as the basis of authority. The recognition of Somaliland might become a legal and political precedent to challenge disputed borders in other countries and create turmoil in regional and international politics.

The third dimension deals with the symbolic justification of the model of the centralized state, despite its obvious failure. The aggressive politics of Somali unity are not always protecting Somali citizens but instead the abstract entity of the central state. Any acceptance of Somaliland would shed an ugly light on the difference between an ineffective federal government that is unable to provide security and services to its citizens and a breakaway state that has achieved some degree of effectiveness. This contrast disputes the belief that centralized authority is inherently better or more stable and thus throws the stability of regimes that have based their legitimacy on similar arguments into doubt.

In this regard, the attack against Somaliland is essentially defensive. It is not motivated by the signs of destabilization in the region or legal inconsistency, but by the fact that the recognition of successful alternative models of governance might undermine established political systems and restructure the standards of legitimacy in the region.

Egypt: Nile, Suez, and Red Sea in geopolitics

Egypt is the most strategically articulate of the opponents of the recognition of Somaliland. Though the official discourse in Cairo is greatly centered around the issue of separatism and solidarity among the Arabs, its stand is deeply embedded in the national security issues that go far beyond Somalia.

At the core of the Egyptian position is the existential question of the Nile and the pending conflict with Ethiopia on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). The Egyptian policymakers are worried that a stronger relationship between Somaliland and Ethiopia, especially with the involvement of a third party like Israel, would give Addis Ababa strategic depth and alternative maritime access through Berbera. This would decrease the dependence of Ethiopia on the avenues that can be influenced by Egypt, and this will undermine the bargaining power of Cairo in negotiations over the Nile.

Egypt is the most strategically articulate of the opponents of the recognition of Somaliland.

Intimately connected is the issue of the Suez Canal and Red Sea maritime routes, which cause anxiety on the part of Egypt. The Bab el-Mandeb Strait is a strategic bottleneck of the world economy, and any independent actor that has relations with the opponents of Egypt in the region is viewed as a possible strategic complication. Although both nations have formal diplomatic ties and have wide-ranging security cooperation with Israel, Egypt is still conscious of new alliances that may upset its well-calculated regional equilibrium.

Here lies a very dramatic rhetorical contradiction as the Palestinian cause is invoked. On the one hand, Egypt is a state that positions its role as a supporter of Palestinian rights, but on the other hand, it has strong relationships with Israel. The Palestinian story is therefore a contagious tool of diplomatic mobilization and not a stable ethical guide. In Egypt, the opposition is also influenced by fears that the successful succession of the separate identity and self-rule of Somaliland will be heard by the marginalized regions in Egypt, and the centralized Nile Valley model of governance will be threatened.

Combined with the other positions of Egypt, it represents a strategic calculation of resource security, maritime dominance, and regional influence, which is disguised in terms of legal and moral principles.

Turkey: Safeguarding influence, not Somali unity

The Turkish attitude towards Somaliland can be seen in terms of a strategic investment, protection, and consolidation of regional influence, and not in terms of a normative language of sovereignty and unity that pervades official Turkish rhetoric. In the last ten years, Ankara has remodeled Somalia into one of the most noticeable arenas of its extra-regional foreign policy into a mix of humanitarian diplomacy, infrastructure development, military involvement, and political favor of power. In that context, the acknowledgement of Somaliland or even its increased internationalization is a structural dilemma to the vested leverage of Turkey.

There is a great material presence of Turkey in Somalia. It operates the international airport and port of Mogadishu, has its largest foreign military base in the latter, and controls security training courses of the Somali troops. These are supplemented by soft power programs on health, education, and development aid, which have created a lot of goodwill among the people. All these interactions make Turkey more than a collaborator of the Somali state but a key agent of power and entry. The preservation of the territorial integrity of Somalia, in its turn, is consonant with the interest of Ankara in the existence of a single political interlocutor with the help of which its influence can be wielded.

The contradiction of the current position of Turkey is well traced when judged by its relations with Israel. In spite of occasional rhetoric battles, Ankara still has complete diplomatic, trade, and security ties with Tel Aviv. However, it strongly resists any Somaliland-Israel interaction. Such a contradiction highlights the fact that the Turkish objection is not based on principle against Israel but on one that is against the development of other forms of diplomatic and economic routes that circumvent Turkish-dominated nodes of influence. Given a known or actively involved Somaliland, it would ease independent trade networks, security alliances, and diplomatic adoptions, which would reduce the strategic dominance of Turkey in the Horn of Africa.

The appeal to Somali unity, therefore, is rather a non-normative assertion or a legitimizing discourse of strategic entrenchment. The example of Somaliland controlling its own matters without relying on any outside help questions this story, showing how legal and humanitarian arguments are manipulatively harnessed to serve the interests of power instead of supporting the principles of self-determination or good governance in their overall formulation.

Djibouti: Berbera as economic threat disguised by false security claims

Djibouti’s opposition to Somaliland is perhaps the most transparently driven by direct material interests, even as it is publicly articulated in the language of regional security. Djibouti’s political economy is fundamentally anchored in its role as a maritime gateway for the Horn of Africa, particularly for landlocked Ethiopia. The emergence of Berbera as a modernized, competitive port directly threatens this economic model.

A fully operational Berbera port, supported by international investment and efficient management, has the potential to divert substantial trade flows away from Djibouti. This would undermine Djibouti’s monopoly over port services, reduce state revenues, and diminish its geopolitical leverage over Ethiopia. To obscure these economic motivations, Djibouti frames Berbera’s development as a security risk, warning of foreign military presence and regional destabilization. Such claims are difficult to sustain, given that Djibouti itself hosts multiple foreign military bases and has long positioned itself as a hub for international naval operations.

Beyond economics, there is a political contrast that Djibouti’s leadership finds deeply unsettling. Somaliland’s relative stability and participatory governance stand in sharp relief against Djibouti’s entrenched authoritarian system. The implicit demonstration that stability can coexist with decentralization and electoral competition undermines the narrative that centralized, personalized rule is a prerequisite for order. Djibouti’s opposition thus reflects not only economic self-preservation but also an anxiety about normative comparison. Ultimately, Djibouti’s resistance to Somaliland’s recognition is an effort to protect a fragile commercial and political monopoly. Security discourse serves as a strategic façade, lending legitimacy to what is fundamentally a defensive economic posture.

Federal Somalia: Political legitimacy over popular interest

The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) occupies a unique position in this constellation of opposition, as its resistance to Somaliland’s recognition is existential. The FGS grounds its position in the inviolability of territorial unity, presenting secession as a threat to national survival. However, this stance is less about the welfare of Somali citizens and more about preserving the political legitimacy of federal institutions headquartered in Mogadishu.

The Somali leadership’s selective application of principle is evident in its external engagements. While adopting an uncompromising posture against any Somaliland-Israel interaction, Mogadishu has itself explored engagement with Israel when such engagement aligned with immediate diplomatic or security interests. This reveals that the core issue is not Israel, but authority—specifically, who possesses the right to represent Somali territory internationally.
Recognition of Somaliland would fundamentally undermine the FGS’s claim to sovereignty over the former Somali Republic, a claim that underpins its access to international aid, security assistance, and diplomatic recognition. Such recognition could also embolden other federal member states to renegotiate their relationship with the center, accelerating centrifugal pressures within Somalia itself. In this sense, opposition to Somaliland is a strategy of regime survival rather than a coherent vision for peace or reconciliation.

The resulting tension is stark: symbolic unity is prioritized over pragmatic solutions that could stabilize the region and respect the political will of Somaliland’s population. This disconnect illustrates how international legitimacy can become detached from domestic effectiveness, producing policies that preserve form while sacrificing substance.

Other Arab States: Media pressure, double standards

The behavior of other Arab and Muslim states—including Jordan, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Pakistan, and the Maldives—reveals a consistent pattern of selective principle and narrative management. These states maintain normalized and often expanding relations with Israel, encompassing trade, security cooperation, and diplomatic exchange. Yet they apply a markedly different standard to Somaliland.

Their primary mechanism is media-driven pressure. State-aligned outlets amplify narratives portraying Somaliland’s external engagements as threats to regional stability, Arab solidarity, and the Palestinian cause. This occurs despite the absence of any material interaction between Somaliland and these states, and despite Somaliland posing no conceivable threat to their national interests.

This double standard serves several functions. It reinforces established hierarchies within the regional order, affirms the authority of larger states to define permissible diplomatic behavior, and distracts domestic audiences from the contradictions inherent in their own governments’ foreign policies. Somaliland becomes a symbolic target through which conformity to an approved narrative is enforced. Such practices underscore the instrumentalization of ethical and legal discourse. Principles are not abandoned but selectively applied in ways that preserve power asymmetries and marginalize smaller political entities.

Marginalizing Reality: Palestine as rhetorical tool

The Palestinian cause occupies a central position in Arab political discourse, often functioning as a moral touchstone for regional legitimacy. In the case of Somaliland, however, it is frequently deployed as a rhetorical weapon divorced from contextual relevance. Somaliland, which has no historical involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict, is nonetheless portrayed as a vector of normalization simply for pursuing diplomatic engagement.

This strategy has extended to the circulation of demonstrably false narratives, including allegations that Somaliland would facilitate the resettlement of Palestinians from Gaza. Such claims lack evidentiary basis and are contradicted by Somaliland’s own public positions. Their purpose is not informational accuracy but emotional mobilization, creating a moral pretext for opposition that obscures underlying strategic motives.

The instrumentalization of Palestine in this manner undermines the integrity of the cause itself. By transforming a legitimate struggle into a tool of political convenience, regional actors dilute its moral force and marginalize the lived realities of Palestinians. Somaliland becomes collateral in a symbolic conflict that serves external interests rather than advancing justice.

Red Sea, Houthi threat

The Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb strait constitute one of the world’s most critical geopolitical corridors, facilitating global energy flows and commercial shipping. Somaliland’s coastline and the port of Berbera place it at the center of this strategic geography. As a result, regional responses to Somaliland are shaped less by normative considerations than by zero-sum calculations of control and access.

Any enhancement of Somaliland’s maritime infrastructure or international partnerships is interpreted as a redistribution of influence. Established powers respond defensively, seeking to constrain Somaliland’s options rather than engage constructively. This reaction highlights a broader pattern in regional politics, where geography consistently outweighs humanitarian or legal considerations.

The double standard is again evident. States that actively cooperate with Israel in the Red Sea basin condemn Somaliland for pursuing similar engagements. The issue is not the nature of the partnership, but the challenge it poses to entrenched hierarchies of permission and control.

In the context of the Yemeni conflict, Somaliland has been rhetorically linked to the Houthi threat as a means of justifying its isolation. Claims that Somaliland-Israel relations would provoke Houthi attacks or destabilize shipping lanes lack empirical grounding. Somaliland has consistently affirmed its neutrality and has every incentive to promote maritime security.
The invocation of the Houthi threat functions as an externalized justification for policies rooted in control rather than security. It allows opposing states to frame Somaliland’s independent engagements as inherently dangerous while obscuring their own selective alliances and security arrangements.

Conclusion: The problem is not Somaliland, but what it represents

The regional opposition to Somaliland’s recognition reveals a consistent pattern of strategic contradiction. Legal principles, moral narratives, and religious symbolism are mobilized selectively to obscure narrow national interests and preserve entrenched power structures. The widespread normalization of relations with Israel by Somaliland’s critics exposes the hollowness of arguments framed around moral absolutism.

At its core, Somaliland represents an unsettling alternative: a small political entity that has achieved relative stability, participatory governance, and institutional functionality through internal consensus rather than external imposition. This reality challenges inherited assumptions about sovereignty, legitimacy, and the inevitability of centralized authority.

Somaliland thus functions as a living litmus test. It tests whether regional actors genuinely value principles such as self-determination, effective governance, and popular will, or whether they prioritize the preservation of familiar geostrategic arrangements. The intensity and coordination of opposition suggest a clear answer. The resistance is not to instability or illegality, but to the transformative implications of acknowledging a successful alternative model of political order.


Author: Gulaid Yusuf Idaan is a senior lecturer and researcher specializing in diplomacy, politics, and international relations in the Horn of Africa. He can be contacted at Idaan54@gmail.com

Unlocking America’s Leverage in the Strategic and Highly Contested Red Sea

Unlocking America’s Leverage in the Strategic and Highly Contested Red Sea

Mr. President,

Jan 4, 2025

I write on behalf of the Somaliland American Strategic Advisory Group to urge decisive U.S. action to re- recognize Somaliland and formalize a strategic partnership

Recent developments—including bipartisan congressional initiatives, the African Union’s 2005 fact finding conclusions, and Israel’s recognition of Somaliland—have created a narrow but consequential window to advance American interests in the strategic and highly contested Red Sea corridor and the Horn of Africa.

Bipartisan Congressional Momentum:
Congress has already taken substantive steps on Somaliland policy through bipartisan measures reflecting growing interest in formal ties and strategic cooperation. In the Senate, the Somaliland Partnership Act mandated reporting and feasibility studies and was introduced with bipartisan sponsorship. In the House, the Republic of Somaliland Independence Act (H.R. 3992) has been introduced and referred to committee, signaling additional support for reassessing U.S. policy. Together, these actions demonstrate cross party recognition that U.S. strategy in the Horn of Africa requires new tools and credible partners.

Legal and Historical Justification:
Somaliland became independent before Somalia and possesses more than a century of distinct political history and national identity—76 years under British Protectorate rule, 34 years of self-governance, and only a 30-year union with Somalia marked by violence. It was recognized by 35 nations upon independence in 1960. Its union with Somalia was voluntary and never ratified by a binding treaty. Somaliland’s 1991 withdrawal is supported by international legal principles, including the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the right to self-determination. (See: “The Case for the Independent Statehood of Somaliland,” American University International Law Review.) In a national referendum, over 89% of Somalilanders voted in favor of independence.

African Union Findings:
The African Union’s 2005 fact finding mission concluded that Somaliland’s political development and governance merited serious consideration, describing its statehood claim as “historically unique and self-justified.” The mission explicitly recommended engagement rather than isolation. This internal AU assessment undercuts claims that recognition would violate regional norms and provides a credible African basis for principled U.S. engagement.

Recent Diplomatic Shift:
Israel’s formal recognition of Somaliland in December 2025 marks the first instance of state level recognition and materially alters the diplomatic landscape. This development creates momentum for allied coordination and practical geopolitical cooperation while increasing the strategic value of timely U.S. leadership to shape outcomes.

Why Now and What to Do:
Somaliland offers secure logistics through the Berbera Port and Air Base, a stable democratic partner in a volatile region, and a geopolitical buffer against malign influence. Recognition and partnership with Somaliland—unlike with Somalia—do not entail open ended nation building. By recognizing Somaliland, the United States can secure a reliable ally, strengthen regional security, and advance long term national interests without the burden of failed aid programs or protracted military engagements. At the same time, the United States would gain basing access, defense cooperation opportunities, and commercial entry into Somaliland’s energy and mineral rich economy.

We recommend the following immediate steps: appoint a Special Envoy to initiate formal talks; direct the Departments of State and Defense to negotiate bilateral agreements on logistics, defense, and security initiatives; and coordinate with Congress to authorize targeted economic investment facilitation with appropriate oversight.

Mr. President, the convergence of congressional momentum, the African Union’s findings, and Israel’s recognition presents a strategic opening the United States should not cede. Acting now would secure U.S. access to a critical maritime chokepoint, expand economic opportunities for American firms, and strengthen a democratic partner in one of the world’s most strategically contested regions. We stand ready to brief your team and support an interagency process to implement these recommendations.

________________________________________

Respectfully,
IYussuf M. Issa
Somaliland Strategic Advisory Group
Ashburn, Virginia https://slsag.org

Somaliland Sovereignty Predates the Creation of Somali Republic and its Territorial Integrity

Somaliland Sovereignty Predates the Creation of Somali Republic and its Territorial Integrity.

What if the most repeated claims about Somaliland are wrong? What if the idea that its separation is a recent rebellion, that its people were always committed to pan-Somali unity, or that Israel’s move represents a sudden colonial intrusion collapses under even minimal historical scrutiny? And what if the real scandal is not Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, but how thoroughly the international system has ignored facts it once openly acknowledged?

Just a day after Christmas, on 26 December, a video call landed on the Somaliland president’s iPhone. On the other end was Benjamin Netanyahu, informing him of a decision that would detonate diplomatic outrage across Africa, the Middle East and the United Nations. Nothing about this moment was spontaneous. It was the endpoint of a long, calculated and largely clandestine process in which symbolism mattered far less than geography, intelligence and hard power.

To understand why this recognition matters, one has to begin with an inconvenient historical truth: Somaliland is not a breakaway region invented in 1991. It is a former British protectorate that became an independent state in June 1960, was recognized by more than thirty countries, and entered a voluntary union with the former Italian Somalia five days later. That union was political rather than organic, rushed rather than deliberative, and never subjected to a referendum in Somaliland itself. When it collapsed three decades later amid mass violence, Somaliland did not secede from a functioning state; it withdrew from a failed one and reclaimed a sovereignty it had already possessed.

This alone sits uncomfortably with the joint statement issued by Arab, Islamic and African states condemning Israel’s move as a violation of international law and an unprecedented assault on territorial integrity. The statement speaks as though Somaliland were a newly invented “region”, yet omits the fact that its statehood predates the Somali Republic itself. It invokes the sanctity of borders while ignoring that Somaliland has consistently defended colonial-era boundaries, whereas the Somali state openly rejected them through the doctrine of Greater Somalia. It warns of dangerous precedents while overlooking the dozens of cases in which self-determination has been selectively endorsed or denied depending on geopolitical convenience.

Declassified intelligence from the period before independence exposes how fragile the nationalist narrative always was. A 1948 CIA assessment of political organizations in British Somaliland noted that none were “purely political in character” and that they largely pursued “individual tribal or regional interests”. It estimated that only three or four per cent of the population belonged to any political party. Most explosively, it stated that the Somali Youth League, later mythologized as the voice of all Somalis, “does not have an appeal for the residents of British Somaliland”. This was not the verdict of a hostile power seeking to undermine unity, but an internal intelligence assessment written decades before Somaliland’s later rupture with Mogadishu.

The same document described early Somali nationalism as explicitly pan-Somali and dismissive of inherited borders, committed to uniting “all the inhabitants of the Somali countries”. That ideology would later become state doctrine in Mogadishu. Somaliland’s subsequent rejection of it was not a betrayal of some shared national soul; it was a continuation of a political culture that had always been cautious, localized and sceptical of ideological centralism. In this sense, Somaliland’s post-1991 governance — built around clan conferences, negotiated consent and decentralization — looks less like an anomaly and more like a return to form.

Israel’s role enters this story not as a sudden act of provocation, but as a long-term strategic calculation shaped by geography and threat perception. Somalia as a unified state never had meaningful relations with Israel. From the 1960s onward it aligned itself with pan-Arab causes, framed Israel as an imperial enemy, and became one of its most hostile critics in international forums. Somaliland, by contrast, was recognized by Israel in 1960 and quietly revisited that history after restoring its independence in 1991.

What followed, according to multiple Israeli and regional media reports, was years of discreet engagement managed largely outside formal diplomatic channels. Mossad is reported to have cultivated relationships with Somaliland’s leadership, laying political and security groundwork well before any public recognition. Israeli officials have openly thanked the agency’s leadership for its role. Key Somaliland leaders are said to have made several secret visits to Israel in 2025, meeting senior political, defense and intelligence figures. None of this was advertised, because recognition politics in Africa and the Arab world remain unforgiving.

The strategic logic is blunt. Somaliland sits on the Gulf of Aden, overlooking the Bab el-Mandeb strait through which a significant share of global trade passes. It lies within a few hundred kilometers of Houthi controled territory in Yemen, whose missiles and drones have reshaped security calculations across the Red Sea. From Berbera, Israel and its partners can monitor maritime traffic, detect launches, and project power at distances that radically alter response times. Israeli commentators have described the relationship as a force multiplier against the Houthis. Western security planners see similar advantages.

This also explains why the United Arab Emirates looms so large in the background. Long before Israel’s recognition, Abu Dhabi invested heavily in Berbera’s port and airport, reportedly turning them into advanced logistical and military facilities. The UAE’s absence from the joint condemnation statement was therefore less a mystery than a confirmation. Somaliland fits neatly into a wider Emirati strategy of controlling ports, trade routes and maritime choke-points from the Red Sea to the Horn of Africa, often operating beyond the authority of weak central governments.

China, too, factors into the equation. Its naval base in Djibouti and expanding presence along African trade routes have unsettled Western planners. Somaliland offers an alternative foothold in a region where influence is increasingly contested. From this perspective, Israel’s move is not only about countering the Houthis or extending the Abraham Accords, but about anchoring itself and its allies in a rapidly militarizing maritime corridor.

It is here that the most incendiary allegations emerge, particularly claims that Somaliland was discussed as a potential destination for Palestinians displaced from Gaza. These reports, widely circulated but officially denied, have inflamed regional reactions and colored interpretations of Israel’s motives. Whether such plans were speculative, exploratory or entirely fictitious, their very plausibility in public discourse speaks to how little Somaliland is treated as a political community in its own right, and how readily it is imagined as empty strategic space.

The backlash has been swift and severe. Fourteen UN Security Council members condemned Israel’s recognition; the African Union rejected it outright. Turkey warned of a strategy to fragment Islamic states. Somalia framed the move as an existential threat. Yet much of this outrage rests on selective memory. Somaliland is condemned for claiming self-determination, while states that suppress separatist movements within their own borders present themselves as guardians of international law. Israel is accused of expansionism, while Somalia’s own pursuit of Greater Somalia is quietly erased from the record.

None of this absolves Israel of opportunism, nor Somaliland of hard-nosed calculation. This was not an act of idealism. It was a transaction shaped by intelligence cooperation, shared threat perceptions and the cold logic of geography. It will intensify rivalries in the Horn of Africa, sharpen competition in the Red Sea, and test already fragile regional orders. It may also, paradoxically, force a long-overdue reckoning with Somaliland’s unresolved status.

The question now is whether the international community can continue to deny a political reality that intelligence agencies documented decades ago, that dozens of states once acknowledged, and that more than 39 years of effective self-rule have only reinforced. In the coming years, as the Horn of Africa becomes an ever more critical arena of global competition, that denial may prove more destabilizing than recognition itself.

by Nilantha Ilangamuwa is a founding editor of the Sri Lanka Guardian

Somaliland and Israel – Considerations for Recognition and Cooperation

Somaliland and Israel – Considerations for Recognition and Cooperation

In the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea – a space whose security-strategic importance to Israel has been prominent again in the past two years – Somaliland, an independent and pro-Western country, is established, which is not recognized by the international community. Its ultimate goal is to gain international recognition and establish alliances with countries that will help it against its enemy: the Somali government of Mogadishu. In recent years, she has been establishing close ties with the UAE and Taiwan. The rise of the Trump administration and the presence of senior Republican officials who support recognition of it are given hopes to the leaders of Somaliland, and against this background its efforts to gain recognition have been increased, including against Israel. This article examines the issue of relations with Somaliland for Israel, while presenting the supportive and inhibiting Israeli recognition of it.

Somaliland – over thirty years of independence and stability

Somaliland spans the northwestern part of what the international community recognizes as a wholesale. Somaliland was independent for five days in 1960 before joining the Union with Somalia, and was reborn as an independent state in 1991 from the brutal and long-term Somali Civil War that has been taking place since the late 1980s. Somaliland is based on a unique and separate identity that has been formed in the last hundred years: the territory was under British colonial rule (unlike the rest of Somalia, which was under Italian rule); its people have extensive ties with southern Yemenite over the other side of the Gulf of Aden where it borders; and most of its population is among the members of the Isak clan – unlike the rest of the Somalia inhabited by other clans. The Isak suffered from discrimination and violence—and even claim to have genocide—from the clans that ruled Somalia-Mogadishu, especially in the 80’s.

Since its actual independence in 1991, Somaliland has been an antithesis for taking place in Somalia: its security situation is benign, its internal arena is stable, has no significant jihadist activity, and although there are border disputes at its ends (especially in the districts where other clans live), they are specific and polluted. Since the 2000s, Somaliland has been conducting a stable and proper multi-party democratic system, with a permanent election, the last of which took place in 2024 and announced a peaceful and orderly change of government. All the significant political forces operating in it are pro-Western and suspicious of Islamist forces or China and Russia. Although they are divided on the methods of action, they all see international recognition as a supreme goal.

The fact that Somalia-Mogadishu’s problems are concentrated in the south helps the survival of Somaliland, which is far from the battlegrounds between the various clans and the powerful government of Mugheyshu and the powerful Al-Shabaab organization. In addition, Somaliland borders on relatively friendly and stable governments: Ethiopia, Puntland (an independent state actually member of the Somalia Federation), and Djibouti. With them, Somaliland had peaceful and improved relations: In 2024, Somaliland signed a strategic understanding agreement with Ethiopia, which was supposed to give the unaccessible Ethiopia to the sea a foothold in the strategic port, Barbara, insinuating future recognition of her independence (this agreement was effectively frozen, but not canceled, under Turkish-Somali pressure). Somaliland’s ties with Djibouti are also improving, and in October 2025 she signed a “Nairubi Agreement” with Puntland for security and commercial cooperation.

In recent years, Somaliland has also developed its ties with other pro-Western countries. Taiwan and the UAE are its two most strategic partners: Taiwan – the chip manufacturing giant – is investing in the development of the country’s rare metal and mineral mines, and the UAE has invested a fortune in the development of the port of Barbara. As far as the UAE is concerned, Somaliland is a strategic stronghold in the Horn of Africa alongside the other Maozia in the region – on the Yemenite island of Socotura, in Puntland, and Darfur.

Even with the United States, Somliland has reasons for cautious optimism. American delegations—including from the Pentagon—have visited the country, which markets itself as a potential strategic base for the United States in the region. President Trump said the United States is considering recognizing it, and the U.S. Congress is interested in ordering the State Department to re-examine ties with Somaliland to improve them and upgrade them. As an intermediate stage, U.S. lawmakers aim for the State Department to start separating Somalia from Somalia and Somaliland in the context of travel warnings. Republican officials, such as Senator Ted Cruz of Texas, frequently express themselves in their support for recognizing Somaliland’s independence. However, the Americans have heavy considerations that are urgent to avoid recognition, along with delays in appointments and policy formulation for Africa and the Red Sea.

Against this background, Somaliland is conducting a lobbying campaign to promote the issue of recognition. In May 2025, the Somalilan President appealed to the UN members to recognize it as an independent state. During October 2025, the media in Somaliland reported that more than 20 countries, including Israel, are approaching the decision to recognize it. Somaliland is also more correct to adopt additional sovereign features: in November 2025, it declared full control of its airspace (by disconnecting it from the symbolic sovereignty of Somalia), demanding that it be authorized by a direct permit from its authorities to move in the sky, and announced that it would not recognize visas received from the Government of Mogadishu.

International recognition by other countries is therefore the primary target for the various Somliland governments (it remains one even after the exchange of government in democratic elections). International recognition will determine the existence of Somaliland and grant it protection, at least it hopes, from a scenario in which Somalia is reinforced (one or with its allies) will be able to act in the future international legitimacy to re-apply its authority to the territory. Alongside international recognition, Somaliland strives to acquire reliable and powerful allies. The danger from the government of Mogadishu is now still imaginary, but Somaliland has more tangible concerns than other security threats, from the Houthim, through the spread of global jihad (which is currently active in neighboring Pontland), to separatism in the periphery of the territory and even subversive activity that has evidence on the ground by China and Turkey.

Importance of Somaliland to the West and Israel

The importance of Somaliland lies in its geostrategic location and correctness – especially as a stable, moderate and reliable country in a volatile region – to cooperate in a comprehensive and broad manner with Western countries. The location of Somaliland at the entrance to the Gulf of Eden – opposite southern Yemen – connecting the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean, gives it a geo-strategic uniqueness. This is the historical reason that the British Empire took over in the late 19th century, and that the United States during the Reagan administration established a military base in the 1980s, in the midst of the Cold War.

Today, the distance between the waters and territory of Somaliland and the Houthi control areas in Yemen, the port of Hadida, for example, is about 300 to 500 km. The fact that in recent years the Gulf states, the United States and Israel – each in turn – have fought the Houthis without a decision, gives the location of Somaliland and the potential ability to operate from its territory, considerable global importance, within a possible equality voucher. Somaliland has a potential to be a frontal base for a variety of missions: intelligence surveillance against the Houthis and their empowerment efforts; providing logistics to the legitimate Yemeni government in its war against the Houthis; and a base for direct operational activity against the Houthi – offensive and to thwart Houthi attacks at sea or by means of drones. The necessary parallel to Israel’s steadfast alliance with Azerbaijan, which has significantly upgraded the strategic and operational Israeli ability to deal with the Iranian threat. It is possible that Somaliland is the equivalent brick for Israel in the face of the Houchi threat.

Alongside the valuable location of Somaliland, it is equally important that its government is interested in cooperating broadly with pro-Western countries. It’s a combination of willingness and ability. Eritrea is located in an even closer location to actions against the Houthis, but police are anti-Western and friendly to Iran. Djibouti, who has the strategic location, maintains actual neutrality in conflicts. Ethiopia lacks access to the sea and relations between police and the United States are ambivalent. Somaliland therefore offers a unique combination of geo-strategic location and a willingness to agree to widespread cooperation with pro-Western countries. Its ties with the UAE – that much of the logic that guides them from a utterance point of view was the war in the Hothis – are evidence of this. Messages coming out of Somaliland indicate that the state is also willing to have broad security relations with the United States, including hosting an American base, and even with Israel.

Regarding Israel, the positive attitude of the Somaliland government is evident, even in the midst of the war in the past two years, and it is likely that there are already unofficial ties between senior officials in both countries. Somaliland has sent messages in recent months that it is ready to cooperate with pro-Israel initiatives, including the expansion of the Abraham Agreements. The public discourse in the country tends to be pro-Israel, although there are also critical voices, especially in light of the war and reports from the Gaza Strip, as well as in light of the existence of Salafi movements (non-violent) in the country.

Considerations for and against recognition of Somliland

For Somaliland, the most coveted prize is American recognition, with which, they estimate, will come recognition from many other countries close to Washington. She therefore invests effort in front of the White House and Congress. Somaliland positions itself as an antagonist for China who is willing to go as a long way to realize American interests in the strategic space of the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. In the face of the Americans, Somaliland also emphasizes its democratic and free character and hostility to radical Islamist ideologies. In conversations with American officials and media messages, she clarifies her immediate readiness for entering the Abraham Agreements. Her desire to gain recognition was so great that the Somaliland government did not even publicly reject the discourse that took place a few months ago about plans to encourage the immigration of Gazans into its territory, despite the great unpopularity that the idea has sparked in its population.

However, despite the friendliness of Washington and the strategies of Somaliland’s location, the United States still seems to be hesitant about the question of official recognition, and it has serious reasons for this.

First, on a fundamental level, U.S. policy on the Somali issue has been consistent in recent decades: recognition of the idea of “one Sommalia.” The United States has sought to strengthen the Mogadishu government, especially in light of its difficult war against Al-Shabaab over the past two decades. For the United States, Somalia-Mogadishu is an ally, also weak and failing. The United States also provides it with military assistance in the attacks against global jihadist elements. Recognition of Somliland will see as an American betrayal, which could lead to the wave of the blast in the shaky Somalia (for example, by officially withdrawing from Fontland and Jubald – both of which are still a symbolic commitment to Mogadishu’s authority – or the strengthening of Al-Shabab). This consideration should be added to international practice – an aspiration not to recognize the changes in unilateral borders or in quitting countries, with the understanding that this is a possible opening of the Pandora’s box and an appeal of existing borders in the rest of the world, especially in the Middle East and Africa.

Although this is a weighty consideration for Status-Quo-like U.S. administrations, the Trump administration may be able to violate the tradition of adherence to the idea of “one Somalia” or the reluctance to recognize quitting countries. However, there is a consideration that probably plays a more significant role for Washington at the present time: the support of most Arab countries including Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Egypt, as well as Turkey in this idea. The Arab League countries, except the UAE, are declaratively supporting the unity of Somalia and strongly opposed the recognition of Somaliland. For Turkey, Somalia-Mogdeishu is a major ally in the Red Sea region, bordering on the status of a protectorate. These powerful countries, which are mined ear in Washington, express their aversion to the possibility of recognition of Somliland.

Although their impact on Washington is much less, the African Union countries are also inclined to deeply disapprove of any official recognition of quitting countries, fearing the domino effect in the rest of Africa.

Compared to the considerations of the United States, Israel has additional considerations: Although the Qatari and Turkish attitudes against recognition of Somliland are not significant (and vice versa), it is possible that the Egyptian position, and perhaps also Chinese, is more significant. On the other hand, Israel’s proximity to the UAE reinforces the pro-Somalland consideration. However, traditionally, Israel is hesitant to recognize quitting countries, partly for fear of precedents or a boomerang effect on the issue of recognition of a Palestinian state, although this consideration seems to be less relevant at the present time, due to the actual, almost sweeping recognition that the Palestinian “state” has won in recent years.

A more significant consideration for Israel, which is supposed to arouse caution and deep thought before official recognition of Somaliland, is actually a pragmatic aspect. Israeli recognition of Somaliland, which is not accompanied by American recognition, may cause a negative effect that will harm both Israel and Somaliland. While an Israeli-Somalian agreement may appear to be reinforcement of Israel’s status in the region, at the same time causing a strong counter-reaction in the Muslim world, which in turn may place Somaliland at the focus of regional criticism and, consequently, lead to a reluctance to expand public or substantive cooperation with Israel. Israeli recognition, ironically, may actually contain efforts to expand the Abraham Accords with other Muslim countries.

Under the threshold of consciousness, at least for now

Israel is required for allies in the Red Sea area, in part to prepare for the next campaign against the Houthis. Somaliland is an ideal candidate for this cooperation, who will be able to grant Israel as a matter of action near the scene of operations. But in addition to security cooperation, relations with Somaliland also have important economic-conscious potential for Israeli national security, due to the minerals in its territory and the desire to establish relations with Muslim populations in the region. Therefore, Israel must work to expand cooperation with this entity, ideal while cooperating with the UAE and the United States.

However, Israel has serious reasons for avoiding the first country to recognize Somaliland, which is primarily an understanding that such recognition may actually act against promoting intimate relations between Israel and Somaliland due to regional responses and dynamics. As long as the United States (or at least the UAE) does not recognize Somaliland as an independent state, Israel must not act alone on this official level.

The recommendation is therefore to promote the intimate relationship with Somaliland “under the threshold of consciousness.” Israel and its allies in Washington can help Somliland in persuasion attempts with the Trump administration, but the United States must take the first public step to recognition. At the same time, the two countries can promote – even before official recognition – security and economic partnerships, the establishment of interest offices (as many other countries with Somaliland do), and even symbolic measures such as recognition of the Somaliland passports.

These are steps that will prevent the possible risks involved in official recognition, while at the same time helping both parties to advance their fundamental interests. Israeli security and economic presence in Somliland does not necessarily require official recognition, and on the other hand, Somaliland may also be preferable to intimate and quiet relations with Israel over high-profile precedent-setting declarations. Somaliland can benefit many of these ties with Israel, especially in light of the security challenges that the country may encounter in the challenging neighborhood of the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa. For Israel, Somliland may be a “vigilance breaker” in the struggle against the Houthis.

** The author wishes to thank the staff of the Institute for National Security Studies for fruitful discourse on the issue, including as part of a guest lecture given by the author at the Institute on September 30, 2025; Dr. Rashid Abdi, head of research at the Sahan Institute in Kenya, for discourse and sharing of knowledge; and the Israel-Africa Relations Institute for support and encouragement.

The opinions expressed in the publications of the Institute for National Security Studies are those of the authors only.

Fraudulent Somali e-Visa Scheme Defrauds U​.​S. Travelers, Undermines Homeland Security

Fraudulent Somali e-Visa Scheme Defrauds U​.​S. Travelers, Undermines Homeland Security

Large amounts of humanitarian and development aid to Somalia were drastically cut or halted due to concerns about efficiency and corruption as the Trump administration canceled a big portion of USAID’s projects worldwide, primarily affecting third-world nations. This action had a detrimental effect on the weak economy of Somalia. As a result, Somalia’s feeble government turned to terror techniques to steal money from travelers visiting other Horn of Africa nations such as Somaliland.

In order to put an end to this banditry, Somaliland-American community members and stakeholders are bringing it to light.

We are a coalition of U.S. citizens and dual nationals who have fallen victim to a deliberate scheme of consumer fraud and coercion perpetrated by the Government of Somalia’s Immigration & Citizenship Agency (ICA). The ICA is actively selling e-visas for travel to Somaliland, a service they know to be invalid, as Somaliland’s Immigration authorities consistently reject these documents at their ports of entry.

The consequences for travelers are severe and costly. Those relying on the fraudulent Somali e-visa for Somaliland travel are routinely stranded, miss flights, are denied entry, and incur significant additional expenses. They have to pay again for a valid Somaliland visa on arrival and face the possibilities of being sent back at their own expense.

Of even greater concern is the demonstrably inadequate capacity of the Somalia Federal Government to protect the sensitive personal information of U.S. travelers, as reported by multiple reliable sources, including the United Nations. This failure poses a serious data security risk and represents a direct threat to U.S. homeland security.

If you’re a native of Somalilnad who is currently an American citizen or resident, we seek your immediate support. We are appealing to U.S. regulatory and diplomatic bodies to halt this malicious scheme, and we need your voice.

Please exercise your rights by adding your name and signature to our appeal, and we deeply appreciate your support for this critical and time-sensitive matter

Somaliland Strategic Advocacy Group, Virginia, USA

SomalilandUSA@protonmail.com

Ethiopian Airlines Scraps Somalia’s e-Visa Requirement for Somaliland Bound Travel

Ethiopian Airlines Scraps Somalia’s e-Visa Requirement for Somaliland Bound Travel

An electronic visa system was recently implemented by the Somali government for visitors to Somalia, including areas that are not under its direct authority. The e-visa, which costs $64 each entrance, was created to expedite the admissions process and bring in money for the federal government. Passengers traveling to Somaliland, which has operated freely for more than thirty years while without international recognition, are more perplexed because of the change.

Travel issues rapidly flare up after airlines servicing Somali locations, including Somaliland, were told to make sure every passenger had the e-visa before boarding. Many Somali diaspora members and local authorities who were traveling to Hargeisa complained about challenges and lengthy layovers, especially when using transit hubs in the United Arab Emirates.

For travelers going to Somaliland, Ethiopian Airlines stopped enforcing Somalia’s new e-visa requirement.

This latest development comes after Republic of Somaliland authorities issued an order threatening to ban foreign airlines if they require travelers to obtain a Somalia’s e-visa. Subsequently, Ethiopian Airlines effectively disregarded Mogadishu’s directive by permitting visitors to Hargeisa to receive visas upon arrival at the Egal International Airport.

Another significant airline that operates flights to Somaliland, FlyDubai, is also under pressure to choose whether to abide with Somaliland’s directive or risk being banned from landing in Hargeisa.

Ethiopian Airlines action has angered Somali officials. After Ethiopian Airlines ceased implementing Somalia’s new e-visa requirement for travelers visiting Somaliland, Mohamed Nur Tarsan, Somalia’s former ambassador to Kenya, urged President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s administration to take decisive action against the airline.

DP World Funded New Science Lab for SUNSAT In Somaliland

DP World Funded New Science Lab for SUNSAT In Somaliland

“Continuous investment underscores DP World’s commitment to education, sustainability, and community development in Somaliland.”

DP World Berbera has handed over a new, science laboratory to Sheikh University of Natural Science and Technology (SUNSAT), fulfilling a US$250,000 commitment made in 2022 to advance education and empower future generations in Somaliland.

The state-of-the-art facility will enhance the university’s research and practical learning capabilities in petroleum and mining, engineering, hydrology, environmental sciences, and information and communication technology – fields critical to Somaliland sustainable development.

Supachai Wattanaveerachai, CEO, DP World Horn of Africa, said: “This project reflects DP World’s belief that education drives sustainable growth. By investing in Sheikh University, we are supporting Somaliland vision to build a generation that is equipped with knowledge, skills and innovation that is required in shaping the nation’s future. We are confident that this new laboratory will strengthen science education, open new opportunities for students and create long-term impact for the community.”

Sheikh University of Science and Technology is a community-owned public university located in the mountain-top town of Sheikh in the Sahil region. The laboratory investment is part of DP World’s broader education portfolio in Somaliland, which includes scholarship programs at Abaarso Secondary School and Barwaqo University – a fellowship initiative running from 2019 to 2031.

The handover ceremony brought together government officials, university committee members, community leaders, and local stakeholders. The laboratory handover reinforces DP World’s belief that trade and education go hand in hand – empowering people, improving livelihoods, and enabling lasting progress for the communities it serves.

DP World has also invested in major infrastructure projects including the Berbera Economic Zone (BEZ) and an upcoming edible oil terminal, both aimed at strengthening Somaliland trade ecosystem and creating local employment opportunities.

SUNSAT Lab Building

About DP World

DP World is reshaping the future of global trade to improve lives everywhere. Operating across six continents with a team of over 100,000 employees, we combine global infrastructure and local expertise to deliver seamless supply chain solutions. From Ports and Terminals to Marine Services, Logistics and Technology, we leverage innovation to create better ways to trade, minimizing disruptions from the factory floor to the customer’s door.

New Maritime Gateway: UAE to Somaliland

New Maritime Gateway: UAE to Somaliland

DP World has unveiled a new strategic shipping route linking Jebel Ali Port in the UAE to Berbera Port in Somaliland

Operating every nine days, the service strengthens DP World’s global network and enhances Berbera position as a key logistics hub and maritime gateway in East Africa.

The Jebel Ali–Berbera route improves trade connectivity between the Gulf and East Africa, providing a faster maritime link to Somaliland. Scheduled stops at Aden and Djibouti further expand access to vital port cities, enabling smoother connections to markets across the Horn of Africa.

From Berbera, cargo can reach inland destinations, including Ethiopia, offering an alternative to the traditional Djibouti Port-dependent overland routes. The service also promises more predictable transit times while mitigating risks from regional bottlenecks.

Berbera Port features a 1,050-metre quay with a 400-metre section capable of handling Triple E vessels, extensive bulk and break-bulk facilities, and an annual livestock handling capacity of around four million heads.

Ganesh Raj, group chief operating officer, Marine Services at DP World, said, “The Jebel Ali to Berbera service further complements our investment drive into Africa. Building on the significant infrastructure we have developed across the continent, the service enhances connectivity for our customers as we continue to boost trade links between the Middle East and East Africa.”

“In doing so, we are supporting the growth of resilient, sustainable corridors that unlock prosperity for our partners, customers and the communities we serve,” he added.

Berbera is home to the region’s most modern container terminal and the Berbera Special Economic Zone (BSEZ), designed to attract foreign investment and support long-term industrial growth.

DP World holds a 58.5% stake in the Berbera container and general cargo terminal, providing deep-water access to major East–West shipping lanes. The nearby Berbera Economic Zone further accelerates local industrialisation, while the port handles over 4.1 million heads of livestock annually, generating trade worth more than US$1bn.

Community initiatives, including training the region’s first “Solar Mamas” as solar-energy technicians, illustrate how trade infrastructure can deliver economic and social benefits.

Supachai Wattanaveerachai, CEO, DP World Horn of Africa, commented, “The launch of this new corridor is a milestone in our ambition to build faster, safer, and more reliable trade routes. It reflects our commitment to creating meaningful economic benefits for businesses and communities in the region.”

“Our work in Berbera is already stimulating trade and industry, while supporting wider community development. Looking ahead, this service will strengthen Berbera role as a gateway for East Africa’s future growth and prosperity,” he added.

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Al-Shabab: Designated Terrorist Group Outperforms Somalia’s Government in Basic Governance

Al-Shabab: Designated Terrorist Group Outperforms Somalia’s Government in Basic Governance

Privately, representatives of humanitarian and development organizations often confide that Al-Shabab would be a more efficient partner than the federal government.

Although Mogadishu is nominally under federal government control, Al-Shabab tax collection is more efficient, and many business owners prefer dealing with the militants. “Al-Shabab tax system is predictable and transparent,” said a Mogadishu-based NGO director who has worked extensively in rural Somalia, and asked not to be named so they could speak freely.  “The amounts levied are fixed, and you can even appeal their decisions in their courts,” explained the director. “At roadblocks on rural roads, Al-Shabab provides receipts that allow you to avoid double taxation.”

Compare that to government checkpoints “where you basically need to pay a variable bribe to get through. It is pocketed by the collectors, which means you will be taxed again at the next checkpoint,” the NGO official added. His opinion is confirmed by a research paper studying checkpoint politics in southern Somalia.

The group’s influence extends far beyond its rural strongholds. It directly governs nearly a quarter of all district capitals in Somalia, and co-governs almost all areas nominally held by the federal government outside the autonomous region of Puntland and the Republic of Somaliland.

Recent studies by independent research organizations such as the Hiraal Institute, SaferWorld, and the International Crisis Group consistently show that Somalis view the group’s governance as efficient, compared to the corruption-plagued federal system.

This uncomfortable reality – that an internationally designated terrorist group outperforms Somalia’s government in basic governance – also emerges from my experience working as deputy director for the International NGO Safety Organization in Somalia from 2016 to 2018, and extensive field research conducted in the country for my PhD between 2019 and 2022.

Why Al-Shabab governance works

The militants have built their administrative success around creating a comprehensive system that extends far beyond military control. Their approach demonstrates how effective administration can emerge from understanding local needs and implementing consistent policies. The group replicates detailed governance systems from village to national level, with clear hierarchies and accountability mechanisms.

At the heart of Al-Shabab appeal lies their justice system. The group’s Islamic courts have earned recognition, even from critics, for delivering swift and decisive rulings that are actually implemented across their territory. Unlike Somalia’s federal courts, where cases can languish for years and outcomes often depend on elite connections or bribes,Al-Shabab judges operate under strict rotation schedules, with their clan identities kept secret to ensure impartiality. The system’s credibility is reinforced by the lack of impunity – even senior Al-Shabab members face prosecution in their own courts when accused of wrongdoing.

Security provision forms another cornerstone of the group’s governance model. In territories under their control, crime and inter-clan violence have become rare. Al-Shabab maintains an absolute monopoly on violence, treating even possession of unregistered weapons as a punishable offense. This security dividend, despite taking the form of a protection racket in government-controlled areas, enables normal economic activities to flourish, and allows the population to live in peace – if they are willing to follow the militants’ strict regulations.

The group’s ban on popular stimulants like qat and tobacco, while resented by users, is appreciated especially by women concerned about the drain it imposes on the household economy.The group’s economic policies reveal a sophisticated understanding of Somalia’s structural challenges. Al-Shabab promotes economic self-reliance, encouraging consumption of locally produced foods over imports like rice and pasta, and frowning on processed foods and soft drinks filled with “chemicals” as unhealthy foreign products.

The group regulates cash crop exports to ensure domestic markets aren’t undercut by export-oriented production, and some districts under their control have experienced faster growth than nearby government-controlled areas.

Environmental protection represents one of Al-Shabab most unexpected governance innovations. The group has enacted comprehensive environmental regulations, including bans on tree-cutting, charcoal production, and plastic bag use. While initially ridiculed by international observers, these policies address serious environmental degradation in a country facing severe deforestation and an ecological crisis.

In recent agreements with local clans, Al-Shabab has explicitly named environmental protection as a condition for allowing continued traditional self-governance, demonstrating how they integrate conservation into their broader political project. This comprehensive governance model creates a self-reinforcing cycle of legitimacy. Effective service delivery builds public acceptance, which enables more sophisticated administration, which in turn allows for more ambitious policy implementation. The result is a governance system that, while rejecting liberal democratic norms, addresses many of the practical needs that Somalia’s international-backed government has failed to meet.

The humanitarian challenge

Al-Shabab has developed substantial humanitarian capabilities that operate independently of international aid systems. In the famine of 2011-2012 that killed a quarter of a million people, many victims were blocked from accessing international aid by the group, causing a popular backlash and a drop in popularity. Since then, they have improved their aid delivery capacity, funded primarily through zakat collected from local populations, supplemented by Gulf-based Islamic charities.

During the 2017 drought that threatened famine conditions across Somalia, no starvation deaths were reported in Al-Shabab controlled areas, suggesting their distribution efforts were effective rather than merely propaganda exercises. Nevertheless, the group’s humanitarian approach reflects their broader critique of international aid dependency. Its officials consistently argue that Western food aid disrupts local markets and disincentivizes Somali agricultural production.

The neutrality of NGOs is indeed questionable, as Western donors often direct aid to increase the acceptance of the federal government by the Somali population, a practice called “stabilization” in areas recently captured from, or contested by, Al-Shabab. Access to education, health, food aid, and other basic services provided by NGOs is then presented as a benefit of living under federal government rule.

The clan challenge

Perhaps Al-Shabab’s most significant achievement lies in its management of Somalia’s clan-based social structure. Both before and after the establishment of the independent state of Somalia in 1960, clan identity has dominated Somali politics, contributing to the state’s collapse in 1991, and hampering subsequent reconstruction efforts. Al-Shabab has positioned Islamic law (sharia) above traditional clan law (xeer) for the first time in Somali history. This represents a fundamental shift from collective clan responsibility to individual accountability – a change that even critics acknowledge as potentially transformative.

The group either co-opts or appoints and rotates clan elders, organizing them by geographic districts rather than clan lineage. This weakens links between local communities and broader clan families, while strengthening ties between different clans in the same region. “Al-Shabab in that sense is a modernizing force, as it exposes Somalis to being governed by the rule of law,” noted Hussein Sheikh Ali, a former director of the Hiraal Institute think-tank. “We face a per-modern society. Most people in Somalia have never dealt with modern laws; they haven’t even felt governed.”

Despite this apparent governance success, Al-Shabab faces a crucial paradox: legitimacy without popularity. While Somalis may recognize the group’s administrative competence and align with its ideology up to a degree, it appears most do not want to live under Al-Shabab rule.

Implications for international policy

These findings pose uncomfortable questions for the international community’s approach to Somalia.

Many of the stated objectives of international state-building efforts – establishing the rule of law, reducing corruption, transcending clan politics, and promoting individual responsibility – are being achieved by “terrorists” while the federal government’s progress in these fields is excruciatingly slow.

The federal rule of law exists on paper only, legislative and executive positions continue to be allocated on a clan-basis instead of through elections and merit, and much if not most international assistance is embezzled or allocated along those same clan lines.

The current strategy of treating Al-Shabab as a terrorist organization to be eliminated militarily has proven ineffective for nearly two decades. The group has survived constant pressure from African Union forces, Somali government troops, and US drone attacks – consistently adapting and maintaining its grip on a majority of the population in central and southern Somalia.

Recent military offensives by the Hassan Sheikh Mohamud government – while achieving initial successes – have seen momentum wane as Al-Shabab reasserts control over “liberated” areas. Local populations remain skeptical of the government’s staying power and maintain ties with the militants regardless.

This presents another dilemma for policymakers and humanitarian actors. Engaging with Al-Shabab risks legitimizing a designated terrorist organization and potentially violating counter-terrorism laws. Yet, ignoring the reality of the group’s administrative control perpetuates a parallel system that may ultimately prove more durable than the internationally supported federal government.

Privately, representatives of humanitarian and development organizations often confide that Al-Shabab would be a more efficient partner than the federal government to achieve food security, establish health facilities, mitigate the effects of climate change, and improve physical infrastructure.