The Turkish-Somali Agreement: A Calculated Adventure or a Step into the Unknown?

The Turkish-Somali Agreement: A Calculated Adventure or a Step into the Unknown?

On February 8, 2024, Turkish Defense Minister Yasar Guler and his Somali counterpart Abdulkadir Mohamed Nur signed a framework agreement for economic and military cooperation in Ankara between Türkiye and Somalia. This agreement is exceptional and unprecedented for Türkiye with any country. An expanded agreement provides Ankara with almost complete land, sea, and air military influence over Somalia.

Content of the Agreement

The full details of the agreement were not available as only some of its articles were published. Anadolu Agency said the agreement – which, according to the Turkish defense ministry, came at the request of Mogadishu – aims to support Somalia and help protect it from external threats, terrorism, piracy, and illegal fishing.

Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud said: “The agreement aims to establish a joint force from both countries. This force will protect the coast and territorial waters of Somalia and invest in Somalia’s maritime resources for 10 years. This joint force will be active for 10 years only. After that, Somalia will have its naval force to perform this task.”

According to additional information leaked to the media, the framework of this initial agreement also includes the following:

1. Executing joint air, land, and sea military exercises between the two countries.
2. Türkiye will construct ships and sell them in Somalia. Turkish navy has the right to use existing Somali ports and establish new ports and naval bases.
3. Cooperation and coordination between the two countries on maritime navigation and trade.
4. Türkiye will establish Somali coast guard forces.
5. Türkiye will help Somalia extract its petroleum and gas resources from its territorial waters.
6. Establish Turkish and other joint military bases in Somalia (air, naval, and land bases).
7. Türkiye will help Somalia protect its marine environment and prevent pollution.
8. Turkish companies will handle all the installations and industries, or Somalia will have Ankara’s permission to cooperate with other firms.
9. Somali airspace will be fully opened to Turkish civilian and military use.
10. This framework agreement will be followed by sub-agreements that will subsequently regulate the execution of the agreement terms.

After signing the agreement, some foreign media outlets said that Türkiye would extract oil and gas from Somali territorial waters for 10 years, and 30 percent of the revenue would go to Türkiye to fund projects and industries to be carried out by Ankara in Somalia. On March 7, Türkiye and Somalia signed an oil and gas cooperation memorandum of understanding. However, Somali Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources Abdirisaaq Omar Mohamed refuted reports that indicated that Türkiye will earn 30 percent of the revenue.

Endorsing the Agreement and Developing its Terms

On February 21, the Somali cabinet ratified the military cooperation agreement with Türkiye. However, in Türkiye, the agreement will be presented to the parliament for debate and ratification. Then, it will be published in the official gazette. However, the Turkish constitution stipulates that agreements with secret terms can be ratified directly by the president without going through parliament. Most likely, Ankara will follow this path to maintain the secrecy of some terms. Otherwise, the Turkish government might wait for a while before submitting the agreement to parliament, considering recent local elections, mainly if it contains terms that might put Turkish soldiers at risk.

Two weeks after signing the Somali-Turkish framework agreement, the Turkish parliament agreed to the government’s request to allow Ankara to deploy its navy off the Somali coast, Bab el-Mandeb, the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Arabian Sea, as part of Türkiye’s participation in the European forces to protect navigation from piracy and terrorism.

Türkiye’s Balance Between Somalia and Ethiopia

Several motives exist behind this expanded and exceptional agreement between Ankara and Mogadishu. Regional conditions have helped to realize it in this way. The following are some of the critical motives:

1. The Somali government’s feeling of danger and concern after Ethiopia signed in early 2024 the Berbera Port agreement with Somaliland, which allows Addis Ababa to rent a land road from Ethiopia to the Red Sea on the coastline of Somaliland and use Berbera Port for 50 years. In exchange, Addis Ababa will recognize Somaliland’s independence. On January 7, Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud issued a law that annuls this agreement, which threatens his country’s territorial integrity, and described it as “illegal.” The Turkish stand aligns with Mogadishu. On January 4, the Turkish government said, “Ankara follows with concern the signing of an agreement between Somaliland and Ethiopia to establish land roads and build a port. Ankara reaffirms the need to protect Somali territorial integrity, respect international law, and settle disputes between Somalia and Somaliland through diplomatic dialogue.” In the past, Ankara had tried to mediate between the two Somali parties. However, Mogadishu stood by its declared position, rejecting a foreign mediation on this issue, which it considers an internal dispute. In contrast, Mogadishu agreed in 2014 to Ankara’s request to open a consulate in Somaliland. A spokesperson of the Somali government welcomed the Turkish Foreign Ministry statement and said it was “a strong and sincere expression of Türkiye’s support of Mogadishu.”
2. For years, Türkiye has been trying to expand its influence in the Horn of Africa by cementing its ties with Somalia, Ethiopia, and Djibouti. Ankara has a military base in Somalia used for training purposes without any presence of Turkish troops there. The Red Sea crisis – which started after Houthis attacks against commercial vessels under the pretext of supporting Gaza – has increased the international military presence in the region. For Ankara, this means a growing competition over influence in this vital region. Therefore, Türkiye has found in Mogadishu’s request for military support a pivotal opportunity to boost its influence in the region without the need to join the American-British coalition and antagonize Houthis.
3. Türkiye’s military role on Somali shores might increase in the future rapprochement between Ankara, Washington, and NATO. Ankara realizes that American military presence in the region might not be permanent. Washington has started to prefer reliance on its Middle Eastern allies to ensure stability because the US is preoccupied with confronting China in the East. Therefore, if this American-Turkish rapprochement happens, Ankara’s military presence on the Somali coast might be a valuable card for Washington-Ankara cooperation through a joint interest to ensure freedom of navigation there and combatting piracy and terrorism. On February 14, the US and Somalia agreed to construct five military bases in Somalia. However, the presence of Turkish troops with broader jurisdiction on Somali territories might alleviate the burden on Washington there or provide Ankara with a competitive pressure card with the US if Turkish-American ties retreat. The vast Turkish military presence in Somalia could be a key card in Ankara’s hand in any future negotiations with the US to define the scope of Ankara-Washington cooperation or disagreement in the Middle East. Moreover, expanding Türkiye’s influence in Somalia will boost Ankara’s position in its competition with China in the Horn of Africa.

In contrast to all these key motives, Ankara realizes the need to balance its ties with Somalia and Ethiopia. Turkish-Ethiopian ties accelerated recently when both signed military agreements. The expanded Ankara-Mogadishu military agreement might foil Addis Ababa’s plans to access the Red Sea. However, Türkiye believes Ethiopia prefers not to sacrifice its good relations with Türkiye considering its continuous dispute with Egypt. Even if the Turkish-Somali agreement leads to the decline of Ankara’s relations with Addis Ababa, Türkiye prefers to maintain strong ties with Somalia and maybe sacrifice its relations with Ethiopia if it is forced to for several reasons, notably:

• Somalia enjoys a geographic and strategic position that is more critical for Ankara than Ethiopia’s position in the Horn of Africa. It has 3,000 kilometers of coastline and is close to the strategic Bab el-Mandeb strait.
• Türkiye helped Ethiopia in its war against the Tigray rebels. Addis Ababa accused Egypt indirectly of arming and supporting the Tigray rebels. Ankara has shown good intent and desire to cooperate with Addis Ababa under challenging times and is doing the same with Somalia for similar reasons, not to pressure Ethiopia. Moreover, Ankara thinks that the division of Somali territories through the Ethiopia-Somaliland agreement will allow Addis Ababa to cooperate with other countries and boost its power, which might limit Ethiopia’s need for Türkiye. Moreover, Egypt has previously expressed a desire to establish a military base in Somalia to pressure Ethiopia and maybe confront Ankara’s project to establish a military base on the Sudanese Suakin Island. Therefore, Türkiye’s presence in Somalia is strategically more important for Ankara than its tactical cooperation with Ethiopia.
• Türkiye enjoys closer relations with Somalia than Ethiopia. Ankara supported Washington in its military intervention in Somalia in 1993. In 2017, Türkiye also established its largest military base abroad near Mogadishu to provide Somali troops with training and help in counter-terrorism efforts. Moreover, President Erdogan’s family – particularly his son-in-law Seljuk Albayrak – has important trade transactions with Somalia, notably Mogadishu’s port and airport management. Moreover, since 2011, Ankara has provided Somalia with humanitarian aid and financial grants. In 2021, Türkiye granted Somalia US$ 30 million to cover part of public employees’ and MPs salaries.
• Ankara believes that the Somalia-Ethiopia power balance currently favors the latter. Therefore, Ankara’s military support for Mogadishu through the military cooperation agreement might push Addis Ababa to solve its dispute with Somalia through diplomacy. Consequently, this will positively affect Somalia’s disagreement with Somaliland in the future.
• Ankara believes that its support for Mogadishu is part of its firm position that Somalia’s territorial integrity and international laws must be respected, which should not irritate Addis Ababa in principle.

Türkiye’s move to sign a military agreement with Somalia could be considered a calculated risk in Ankara’s ties with Addis Ababa, even with other countries supporting Somaliland, such as the United Kingdom. Ankara reiterates that this step is part of its respect for international law and protection of Somalia’s territorial integrity and is not aimed against any third party. Mogadishu helped Ankara through statements by the Somali president, who affirmed that “this agreement has no hostile objectives against any other country in the region.”

Potential Risks, Obstacles Facing the Agreement’s Implementation

At first glance, the expanded Turkish-Somali military-economic cooperation agreement might seem a positive step based on the win-win formula Mogadishu has foiled efforts to gain Ethiopia’s recognition of Somaliland’s independence. In exchange, Ankara gains a larger military presence than any competitor in the strategic Horn of Africa region. Moreover, Türkiye might achieve key economic gains if oil and gas are found on the Somali coast. However, implementing this agreement – the date of which has not been set yet – might present several challenges and threats for Ankara, notably:

1. Turkish military presence in Somalia might face terrorist attacks or drag Ankara into a long and agonizing fight with the terrorist Al-Shabab Movement. In a statement, the latter rejected this agreement, considered it null, and aimed to expand Ankara’s regional domination. In the past, Shabab has targeted Turkish interests, including its embassy, Turkish Airlines offices, several Turkish business people, and its military base.
2. The vague future of the ongoing tension between the Houthis in Yemen and the US and British forces in the Red Sea and Bab El-Mandeb. Ankara has no interest in a military confrontation with Houthis. However, Turkish influence in the Horn of Africa might force Iran to ask Houthis to provoke Turkish forces to expel them from the region. Ankara might also find itself compelled to face Houthis if its influence grows in the region and targets Somali interests in Bab El-Mandeb.
3. Somalia has long seashores and requires a substantial naval force to protect them. It is unknown if Ankara can effectively provide this protection until Mogadishu can establish its own naval force. Retired admiral Turker Erturk points out that “sending Turkish warships to protect Somali shores weakens Türkiye’s defense capability in the east of the Mediterranean in the face of Greece’s growing ambitions supported by the US and France and Ankara’s position in the east of the Mediterranean and the Aegean Sea. Sending Turkish exploration ships to Somali shores means an implicit recognition that Ankara has abandoned exploration of the east of the Mediterranean and surrendered to reality. This put the lives of Turkish soldiers at the risk of facing terrorist groups there.”

In conclusion, the expanded Turkish-Somali military-economic cooperation agreement seems very ambitious. It might be larger than Ankara’s capabilities to implement it, and it might be an incomplete or partial step to achieving immediate political goals, notably ending Somaliland secession efforts. It remains to be seen if Türkiye can practically and effectively implement the articles of this agreement. Such implementation depends on Ankara’s economic and military capabilities and ability to face these challenges and improve its relations with Washington.