Tag: Somalia

Somaliland Is Drawn Into a Perilous Middle East

Somaliland Is Drawn Into a Perilous Middle East

Israel’s recognition of Somaliland has given the nation long-sought visibility. It has also drawn it into the growing tensions reshaping the region.

Omar Ahmed and Ismail Bihaya are still a little dazed. In late March, the two hydrologists, both 32, were taking selfies on the esplanade of Jerusalem’s mosques, framed by the dazzling gold of the Dome of the Rock. The trip, the first of their lives, had long felt out of reach. Their country, the Republic of Somaliland, does not exist in the eyes of the world. “Our passport isn’t recognized anywhere. Except now, Israel,” Omar says with a grin, back in the lab where he and his colleague spend their days testing the water quality of Hargeisa, the capital of this breakaway region of Somalia.

Everything changed on December 26. That day, Israel became the first country to formally recognize Somaliland (formerly British Somaliland) as a sovereign state. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu appeared in a video call congratulating Somaliland’s president, Abdirahman Abdullahi.

The backlash was immediate. Somalia, the African Union, the Arab League, and even the UN Security Council condemned the move, accusing Israel of violating the principle of territorial integrity.

In Hargeisa, those reactions barely registered. That night, crowds flooded the streets in celebration. For several days, Israeli journalists covering the event were greeted with cheers as they moved through the city, an almost surreal scene in a Muslim-majority country, and all the more striking in the immediate aftermath of the war in Gaza.

Downtown Hargeisa, capital of Somaliland
Downtown Hargeisa, the capital of Somaliland

 

To understand that joy, one has to go back to the late 1980s. A former British protectorate, Somaliland had actually gained independence in 1960 before voluntarily uniting with the former Italian protectorate of Somalia. The union soon began to unravel. Amid growing clan tensions, the Somalia regime in Mogadishu launched a brutal campaign against the northern region, culminating in the near-total destruction of Hargeisa in 1988. The civil war left between 50,000 and 200,000 dead. “Hundreds of thousands more were driven into exile,” recalls a businessman who returned years later. “It was apocalyptic.” In 1991, as Somalia descended into chaos, Somaliland declared independence.More than three decades later, that independence remains unrecognized. Except, now, by Israel.

Omar Ahmed, chief engineer, Somaliland, Ministry of Water
Omar Ahmed, chief engineer at Somaliland’s Ministry of Water, was part of a delegation of 25 experts sent to Israel in March to train in modern irrigation techniques

Israel’s Intentions

To inaugurate their new partnership, Israeli authorities invited 25 Somaliland hydrologists for training in modern irrigation and water management. Omar and Ismail were among them. They came back impressed. “The scale of their desalination plants is staggering,” Omar says. “They are global leaders in water management. With infrastructure like that, we could completely transform our country.” Cooperation has accelerated quickly. Beyond training programs, Israel has announced investments in Somaliland’s infrastructure. The two governments exchanged ambassadors in April. Still, few here believe Israel’s intentions are purely developmental.

Tel Aviv is widely seen as eyeing Somaliland’s strategic location: roughly 500 miles of coastline along the Gulf of Aden, through which around 12 percent of global trade passes — an ideal vantage point from which to project military power. According to Bloomberg, Israeli officials have already identified a potential coastal site for a future base, a claim Somaliland has publicly denied.

Whether Israel actually intends to establish a military presence remains officially unconfirmed. Asked directly, a senior official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs dismissed the Bloomberg report as lacking “clarity,” without explicitly denying it.

 televised debate, MMTV, alliance, Somaliland, Israel
A televised debate on MMTV, Somaliland’s main television channel, about the alliance between Somaliland and Israel.

That ambiguity contrasts with what is said more privately. Several sources with close ties to the Somaliland authorities describe the project as an “open secret.” “Israelis want a base in Somaliland to monitor the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Houthis in Yemen. The government simply cannot confirm it yet, given the ongoing turmoil in the Middle East,” said a businessman with close ties to power.

In practice, no agreement has been announced and no infrastructure is visible on the ground. But the convergence of discreet diplomatic contacts, strategic logic, and local expectations has made the prospect of a base feel less like a distant possibility than a question of timing.

America’s Interests

Other countries are watching closely.

Aerial view, port of Berbera, Somaliland, DP World
Aerial view of the port of Berbera, in western Somaliland, developed by the Emirati company DP World. Photo credit: DP World

Ethiopia, landlocked and eager for access to the sea, nearly finalized a deal in 2024 to secure a 12-mile coastal strip of Somaliland along the Gulf of Aden before backing down under pressure from Mogadishu. The United Arab Emirates, which normalized relations with Israel under the Abraham Accords, has also taken a keen interest in the region. Starting in 2016, its port operator, DP World, has built a major terminal in the Gulf port of Berbera.

“We’ve invested $400 million,” says Maftouh Harir, a DP World executive, standing high above the docks on a towering quay crane. “The goal is to serve Ethiopia, which has no access to the sea.” Out on the horizon, a control tower rises above the sea spray. Nearby, Berbera’s airport, whose runway is among the longest in Africa, is no longer open to the public. Abu Dhabi is now converting it into a military base.

Ultimately, however, Somaliland’s hopes rest largely in Washington.

Within parts of Somaliland’s establishment, support for recognition has been building. As early as 2021, the Heritage Foundation published a policy paper urging the United States to recognize Somaliland as a way to counter China’s growing influence in nearby Djibouti, where Beijing has established its only overseas naval base just miles from a US installation.

Port of Berbera, Somaliland, Emirati company, DP World
Aerial view of the Berbera, developed by the Emirati company DP World. Photo credit: DP World

Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX), a close ally of Israel, has emerged as one of Hargeisa’s most vocal supporters. During a Senate hearing on April 23, he emphasized Somaliland’s “growing strategic relevance” and suggested that Donald Trump could formally recognize the territory before the end of his term.

At the same time, several members of the House of Representatives introduced legislation in March directing the Treasury Department to identify legal barriers preventing Somaliland from accessing the US financial system. The goal is to integrate Somaliland into the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication, or SWIFT network, a crucial step for dollar transactions. “Our banks cannot raise capital on international markets,” explains a Somaliland economist. “That forces them to charge prohibitively high interest rates. Access to SWIFT would be even more decisive than diplomatic recognition.”

For now, Somaliland’s government is trying to turn these diplomatic signals into economic gains. At the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Hargeisa, a delegation of Australian businessmen has come to explore opportunities in the mining sector. “What are your impressions of the country?” the minister asks, smiling broadly. “Very positive,” replies one of the visitors. “It was important for us to see things firsthand. We’ll be sending a positive message to our shareholders.”

“They can rest easy,” the minister says. “Somaliland is a haven of peace and stability. It’s the safest place in the Horn of Africa.”

‘A Functioning Democracy, the Most Advanced in the Region’

From the ground, Hargeisa bears the marks of a surprisingly dynamic African city. Cafés are filled with a stylish youth. Students snap selfies to celebrate the opening of a waffle shop. A new shopping mall of glass and steel is preparing to open its doors. Power outages are rare. The streets are clean. Markets are well stocked. And overlooking it all, the country’s first five-star hotel, which opened last August, glows at dusk.

market, Hargeisa, capital, Somaliland
A market in Hargeisa.

Despite lacking international recognition, Somaliland’s gross domestic product (GDP) per capita is about 50 percent higher than that of Somalia, and its poverty rate is roughly half. Even more striking is its political system.

“We are a functioning democracy, the most advanced in the region,” says Guleid Jama, a lawyer known for his work defending fundamental rights. “Since 1991, we’ve held six presidential elections, each followed by a peaceful transfer of power.” He is quick to add a caveat. “Our constitution, adopted in 2001, is relatively progressive. But our penal code still reflects the Mussolini-era legacy of Italian colonial law. Police frequently interfere with journalists and opposition figures.”

Marwo Sucaad, an opposition leader, confirms the mixed picture. “Our governments are elected democratically. There’s no doubt about that,” she says. “The 2024 campaign was vibrant, turnout was high. But corruption exists, and women remain largely excluded from power. No democracy is perfect, though.”

Marwo Sucaad, leading opposition figure, KAAH party, Hargeisa
The politician Marwo Sucaad, a leading opposition figure, at the headquarters of her Kaah party in Hargeisa.

Yet Somaliland’s stability rests on a delicate political balance. Power is largely concentrated in the hands of the central clan, which dominates the country demographically and territorially, particularly around Hargeisa. Other major groups in the west and the in the east, are integrated into the political system, but not without tension.

So far, this equilibrium has held. Since 1991, Somaliland has avoided the kind of fragmentation seen elsewhere in the region by maintaining a relatively cohesive state structure and repeated peaceful transfers of power. But that cohesion is not immutable. In the eastern regions, territorial disputes persist. In Las Anod, clashes that erupted in 2023 between Somaliland forces and local militias aligned with Somalia in the south left hundreds dead and displaced tens of thousands, exposing the fragility of the territory’s hold over its eastern fringes.

Israel’s arrival may now complicate that fragile balance.

‘Now That We Are Allied With Israel, Could This War Reach Us?’

Gulf of Aden, coast, Berbera, Somaliland, port
Berbera, Somaliland’s main port city, sits on the coast of the Gulf of Aden.

Barely two months after recognition, Tel Aviv became embroiled in a confrontation with Iran whose consequences could extend into the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. On the set of Somaliland’s main television channel, MMTV, the tone of debate has shifted.

“Now that we are allied with Israel, could this war reach us?” a journalist asked a political analyst in early April. “We have nothing to fear,” the analyst replied confidently. “Since the attacks of October 7, 2023, Israel has gained the upper hand over its enemies. It has become the dominant power in the Middle East. This alliance will allow us to develop, just as Saudi Arabia benefited from US protection after World War II.”

Others are less assured. In Yemen, the Houthi movement declared on December 28 that Berbera had become a “legitimate target.” Somaliland has limited means of deterrence. Its military is largely equipped with tanks and rocket launchers captured from Mogadishu at the end of the 1980s civil war and has no air-defense capabilities.

patrol, Somaliland, coast guard, port of Berbera
On patrol with Somaliland’s coast guard at the entrance to the port of Berbera. With limited resources, they monitor nearly 500 miles of coastline facing Yemen.

“Somaliland is preparing for this kind of scenario,” insists a senior official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Our generals are working day and night to ensure the country’s security.”

But for opposition figures, the greater risk lies elsewhere. “The eastern regions are still disputed,” worries Marwo Suad. “Somalia, backed by Turkey, China, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, could resume hostilities in response to Israel’s recognition. We are on the brink of another war.” Al-Shabaab, a powerful Somali insurgency group affiliated with al-Qaeda, has also vowed to fight any attempt by Israel to establish a presence in Somaliland.

“Only Washington can rein in Somalia’s backers,” says Marwo Suad. “That is the only protection that truly matters.” The government appears to share that view. In late February, it declared its readiness to grant the United States “exclusive access” to its mineral resources, as well as access to military bases. US military delegations visited Hargeisa and Berbera in June and November 2025. Still, there is little indication that Washington is eager to deploy troops, especially as the United States already maintains a base in Djibouti and cooperates with Mogadishu on counterterrorism.

On patrol, Somaliland, coast guard, Yemen
On patrol with Somaliland’s coast guard at the entrance to the port of Berbera. With limited resources, they monitor nearly 800 kilometers of coastline facing Yeme

For Somaliland’s leadership, however, recognition is only a means to a more immediate end: economic development. And here, the gap between expectations and reality remains stark.

Beneath Somaliland’s soil, geological surveys also suggest the presence of oil, gas, lithium, rare earth elements, and other minerals. Several foreign companies have already taken positions. The British firm Genel Energy has been exploring hydrocarbons since 2012. Taiwan’s Chang Development Company and Saudi Arabia’s Kilomass are looking into lithium. EAU Mining, the Australian company whose delegation visited Hargeisa, may soon follow. Yet beyond these early indicators, few deposits have been formally confirmed, and most projects are still at a preliminary stage.

Australian mining investors, foreign minister, Somaliland
A group of Australian mining investors meets with the foreign minister in Hargeisa

On the ground, investors are watching more than they are committing. The businessmen arriving in Hargeisa are not responding to a proven resource boom so much as to a political signal: the possibility that recognition could unlock access to international markets, financing, and legal protections that have long been out of reach.

Ahmed Osman Guelleh, a local industrialist, urges caution. “Mining is not how we will create the thousands of industrial jobs our youth need,” he says, standing in a warehouse stacked with crates of Coca-Cola bottled in his factory north of Hargeisa. “We need to focus on manufacturing, technology, and agriculture. Once we build that economic base, international recognition will follow naturally.”

For now, Somaliland faces structural constraints that recognition alone cannot resolve. Electricity is expensive, generated almost entirely from fuel oil. The workforce remains largely unskilled. Water is scarce in this arid climate. In the laboratory in Hargeisa, where he spends his days testing the city’s water, Omar Ahmed has been thinking about that gap ever since he returned from Israel.

“The scale of what we saw there… it’s billions of dollars,” he says. “Our entire Ministry of Water runs on about $1.8 million a year. Agriculture gets barely $2.8 million. Even with help from NGOs, we’re talking about a few million here and there. What we actually need is on a completely different scale.”

He pauses. “That’s the real gap. We come back with the knowledge, but we don’t have the money to do anything with it.” In a country that does not officially exist, recognition may open doors. But it will not, on its own, build a future.

Somalia & Somaliland: Battlegrounds as Turkey and Israel Seek the Control of the Red Sea

Somalia & Somaliland: Battlegrounds as Turkey and Israel Seek the Control of the Red Sea

Turkey and Israel are intensifying competition in the Horn of Africa, with Somalia and Somaliland emerging as key battlegrounds for oil, military influence and control of vital Red Sea trade routes.

Turkey has consolidated its position through formal agreements with Somalia’s federal government, securing major offshore and onshore oil and gas exploration rights alongside a strong military presence through its largest overseas training base. Israel, meanwhile, has moved closer to Somaliland after becoming the first country to formally recognize the territory as an independent state and is exploring plans for a military base near the Gulf of Aden to monitor Yemen’s Houthis and secure strategic access to the Red Sea corridor.

Earlier this year, Somalia confirmed it was ready to begin its first offshore oil drilling operations, with a Turkish government-owned drilling ship expected to arrive off its coast, according to BBC. The move followed the successful completion of seismic surveys last year by Turkey’s research vessel Oruç Reis, which collected 3D seismic data across key offshore blocks.

Somalia is estimated to hold at least 30 billion barrels of offshore oil potential and around 6 billion cubic meters of natural gas, though much of it remains unproven compared with established producers such as Libya and Nigeria.

Since 2011, Turkey has become one of Mogadishu’s closest allies, combining humanitarian support, military training and infrastructure investment. In December 2025, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said Ankara planned to establish a spaceport in Somalia.

Subsequent reports later confirmed that Turkey was exploring a broader aerospace facility, including a spaceport for satellite and possible missile launches, alongside plans for a naval base, while F-16 fighter jets were deployed inside Somalia in early 2026. In February 2026, Turkey also dispatched ageing U.S.-made M48 and M60 tanks through the streets of Mogadishu in a protected convoy after they were unloaded from a Turkish Navy landing ship.

According to reports, the tanks were deployed to secure Turkish facilities in the Warsheikh area, about 37 miles north of the capital, where Ankara is building the site for satellite launches and broader aerospace operations. Separately, Turkey recently reopened its $50 million military base in Mogadishu, reinforcing Ankara’s role in Somalia’s security sector and its support for the training of Somali National Army soldiers, including elite units involved in operations against Al-Shabaab.

Israel, meanwhile, has focused on Somaliland, whose coastline faces Yemen across the Gulf of Aden. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced in late 2025 that Israel had formally recognized Somaliland, describing the decision as being “in the spirit of the Abraham Accords.” The recognition triggered strong condemnation from Somalia and several Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia, Palestine, Egypt, Kuwait, Iraq, Jordan and Qatar, all of which rejected the decision as illegal and warned that it threatened regional stability and Somalia’s territorial unity.

Turkey also criticized the move, with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan calling Israel’s recognition of Somaliland “illegitimate and unacceptable” and later saying it “does not benefit” the region during a February visit to Ethiopia, one of Israel’s key allies in the Horn of Africa.

Despite the criticism, a Bloomberg report in March confirmed that Israel was exploring plans to build a military base in Somaliland to monitor and target Yemen’s Houthis, taking advantage of the region’s strategic location near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Defending the move, Shiri Fein-Grossman, chief executive of the Israel-Africa Relations Institute and a former member of Israel’s National Security Council, told Israeli outlet i24 News: “Everyone just looks at the map and understands what Israel is looking for here.”

“The recognition of Somaliland gives Israel a strategic location near the Houthis in Yemen and comes at a time that Israel needs as many friends as possible.”

Beyond Somalia and Somaliland, tensions between Turkey and Israel have deepened over Gaza, Syria and wider regional power projection, further exposing a growing geopolitical rivalry between the two military powers.

Middle East Eye reported that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has increasingly shifted his rhetoric towards Turkey as Ankara expands its influence across the eastern Mediterranean and Africa, particularly around Cyprus and Greece. In a post on X, Netanyahu accused President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of “massacring his own Kurdish citizens” and “accommodating Iran’s terror regime and its proxies”.

Turkey responded with sharp condemnation, with officials in Ankara describing Netanyahu as the “Hitler of the era”, citing Israel’s military actions in Gaza and across the region.

While Somalia and Somaliland remain central to their competition in the Horn of Africa, the broader dispute reflects a much wider struggle for influence stretching from the Red Sea to the Middle East, with both military powers seeking strategic bases in the two African territories to strengthen their regional reach.

Olamilekan Okebiorun is a business journalist covering markets, technology, and changing landscape of African economies for Business Insider Africa.

A Coalition with Diverse Agendas Team up for Opposing Somaliland Recognition in the Name of Somali Unity

A Coalition with Diverse Agendas Team up for Opposing Somaliland Recognition in the Name of Somali Unity

In late 2025, Israel officially announced its recognition of Somaliland, a self-declared independent region in northern Somalia that has asserted its sovereignty since 1991 but remains largely unrecognized by the international community. The decision marks a notable realignment in diplomatic relations across the Horn of Africa and the broader Middle East. In response, a coalition of 21 Arab, Islamic, and African states issued a joint statement condemning Israel’s move. They described it as a “grave violation of international law and the United Nations Charter,” reaffirmed their commitment to Somalia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, and explicitly rejected any suggestion that the recognition could be linked to efforts to displace the Palestinian people.

The sustained and coordinated efforts of geopolitically influential powers—including Egypt, Turkey, Djibouti, and Somalia—alongside a broader alliance of Arab and Muslim states such as Jordan, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Pakistan, and the Maldives, to prevent Somaliland from obtaining international recognition, illustrate a highly complex and multidimensional geopolitical phenomenon. This opposition has intensified in parallel with Somaliland’s increasing external engagements, particularly pragmatic contacts with Israel and other non-Arab actors.

This article argues that the region’s overwhelming opposition to Somaliland’s recognition cannot credibly be interpreted as a principled or neutral position grounded in international law, Islamic solidarity, or genuine concern for Somalia’s unity. Rather, through systematic analytical deconstruction, it demonstrates that this opposition stems from a convergence of narrow national interests, deep-seated geopolitical anxieties, and defensive reactions to the potential restructuring of the existing regional order.

On the surface, this stance is articulated through legalistic rhetoric—invoking sovereignty, territorial integrity, and moral symbolism, especially in relation to the Palestinian cause. Yet in practice, a persistent and fundamental paradox emerges between states’ declared principles and their actual conduct. The gap between discourse and action reveals that strategic calculations, rather than normative commitments, drive much of the regional response to Somaliland’s bid for statehood

Somaliland in Arab Politics: ‘File’ rather than ‘cause’

Complexity and agency, as well as the historical specificity of Somaliland, are being systematically denied within the political institutions, diplomatic circles, and strategic cultures of most Arab and Islamic capitals. It is hardly ever activated as an independent object of international politics or as an acceptable instance of self-determination based on a separate colonial and post-colonial experience. Rather, it is diminished to a bureaucratic abstraction, a file that needs to be handled but not a cause that needs to be comprehended.

It is a reduction that works in two paradigms that are overlapping and expedient politically. The former views Somaliland as a strictly sovereign entity, which is subordinated to Somalia. Somaliland, under this framing, falls under the category of internal administrative or constitutional issues of the internationally recognized state of Somalia. This division offers a pre-made rationale of the categorical denial of recognition or substantive international action, which is normally expressed in slogans like the preservation of the territorial integrity and the protection of the sovereignty of the central state. More importantly, this stance puts the symbolic sacredness of inherited boundaries above the material political facts. It consciously puts aside the institutional history, electioneering, and social contract of Somaliland for the sake of maintaining a formal cartographic wholeness, which, more often than not, exists on a piece of paper.

The second paradigm perceives Somaliland as an instrumentalized variable in a more comprehensive regional and world power policy. Within this framework, Somaliland emerges as a chess piece, as well as in the Israeli-Iranian game, the growing Turkish strategic presence in Africa, and the geostrategic struggle of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the maritime arteries of the Red Sea. In this logic, Somaliland does not possess a political actor or even a political interest of its own. Instead, it is diminished to a tactical area to be exploited, limited, or neutralized as per the strategic decisions of foreign powers.

The two paradigms are united in their deliberate ignorance of facts on the ground. Somaliland has a relatively long history of a stable and functional government, a period of over thirty years. It has also created effective electoral institutions, which have been able to handle competitive and peaceful transfers of power; internal security, which is starkly opposed to the chronic instability that plagues southern Somalia; economic and commercial infrastructure, including the development and operation of the Berbera port; and the ability to find responsible ways of dealing with external actors, including Ethiopia and Taiwan. This has been accompanied by a steady claim of disinterest and adherence to international standards.

Even with these facts that can be verified, Somaliland remains to be described as a state that is an exception—something that is inconvenient that poses a danger to the psychological and political underpinnings of the post-colonial Arab regional order. The order places a heavy burden on the sanctification of inherited borders, even though these boundaries may be supported by the use of coercion or without the truly popular consent. Another tactic employed by the capitals of Somaliland in the form of persistent political and media pressure, even when there is no hostile action or strategic provocation on the part of Hargeisa, highlights the existence of a deep-seated kind of hypocrisy.

The selective invocation of legal and religious rhetoric is not a kind of policy prescription but rather an act of performance of regional power management. It shows a crisis of credibility, where the interest in Somali unity is rhetorically magnified and the welfare, rights, and political will of the population of Somaliland are systematically discriminated against. Therefore, the Somaliland problem goes beyond the scope of a local conflict. It is a critical prism in which the incoherence and instability of regional strategic thought are revealed, as well as the way in which the emergent political realities are pushed into the background of the endless reproduction of established power accounts.

Somaliland faces rejection over precedent, not reality

The action taken by the various players to oppose the recognition of Somaliland is fueled by fears that go way beyond Somaliland itself. It is fundamentally fear, which is not about the existence of Somaliland but about the meaning of its success. The rejection is not aimed at the empirical reality on the ground as much as it is aimed at the political, legal, and ethical precedent on which recognition would be created.

The action taken by the various players to oppose the recognition of Somaliland is fueled by fears that go way beyond Somaliland itself.”

This fear has been expressed in three factors that are interlinked. The former is internal political contagion. The international acceptance of Somaliland on the basis of sound governance, historical particularism, and popular consent over a long period would serve as an influential example for marginalized or peripheral states in other Arab and African states. Such areas of the Sahel as Southern Syria, Iraqi Kurdistan, Southern Yemen, and other ethnically or politically distinct regions might use the example of Somaliland to justify the claim to autonomy or independence. To other regimes that routinely repress such claims, this possibility is a massive legitimacy problem, which compels awkward inquiries about how selectively they exercise sovereignty and self-determination.

The second dimension is associated with the holiness of colonial boundaries. The case of Somaliland proves that the boundaries that were established by the European colonialists are not fixed and even natural. It demonstrates that political order, institutional effectiveness, and social cohesion can be developed without—and even against—those borders. This ideological and practical threat is a danger to centralized states that are based on inherited territorial structures as the basis of authority. The recognition of Somaliland might become a legal and political precedent to challenge disputed borders in other countries and create turmoil in regional and international politics.

The third dimension deals with the symbolic justification of the model of the centralized state, despite its obvious failure. The aggressive politics of Somali unity are not always protecting Somali citizens but instead the abstract entity of the central state. Any acceptance of Somaliland would shed an ugly light on the difference between an ineffective federal government that is unable to provide security and services to its citizens and a breakaway state that has achieved some degree of effectiveness. This contrast disputes the belief that centralized authority is inherently better or more stable and thus throws the stability of regimes that have based their legitimacy on similar arguments into doubt.

In this regard, the attack against Somaliland is essentially defensive. It is not motivated by the signs of destabilization in the region or legal inconsistency, but by the fact that the recognition of successful alternative models of governance might undermine established political systems and restructure the standards of legitimacy in the region.

Egypt: Nile, Suez, and Red Sea in geopolitics

Egypt is the most strategically articulate of the opponents of the recognition of Somaliland. Though the official discourse in Cairo is greatly centered around the issue of separatism and solidarity among the Arabs, its stand is deeply embedded in the national security issues that go far beyond Somalia.

At the core of the Egyptian position is the existential question of the Nile and the pending conflict with Ethiopia on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). The Egyptian policymakers are worried that a stronger relationship between Somaliland and Ethiopia, especially with the involvement of a third party like Israel, would give Addis Ababa strategic depth and alternative maritime access through Berbera. This would decrease the dependence of Ethiopia on the avenues that can be influenced by Egypt, and this will undermine the bargaining power of Cairo in negotiations over the Nile.

Egypt is the most strategically articulate of the opponents of the recognition of Somaliland.

Intimately connected is the issue of the Suez Canal and Red Sea maritime routes, which cause anxiety on the part of Egypt. The Bab el-Mandeb Strait is a strategic bottleneck of the world economy, and any independent actor that has relations with the opponents of Egypt in the region is viewed as a possible strategic complication. Although both nations have formal diplomatic ties and have wide-ranging security cooperation with Israel, Egypt is still conscious of new alliances that may upset its well-calculated regional equilibrium.

Here lies a very dramatic rhetorical contradiction as the Palestinian cause is invoked. On the one hand, Egypt is a state that positions its role as a supporter of Palestinian rights, but on the other hand, it has strong relationships with Israel. The Palestinian story is therefore a contagious tool of diplomatic mobilization and not a stable ethical guide. In Egypt, the opposition is also influenced by fears that the successful succession of the separate identity and self-rule of Somaliland will be heard by the marginalized regions in Egypt, and the centralized Nile Valley model of governance will be threatened.

Combined with the other positions of Egypt, it represents a strategic calculation of resource security, maritime dominance, and regional influence, which is disguised in terms of legal and moral principles.

Turkey: Safeguarding influence, not Somali unity

The Turkish attitude towards Somaliland can be seen in terms of a strategic investment, protection, and consolidation of regional influence, and not in terms of a normative language of sovereignty and unity that pervades official Turkish rhetoric. In the last ten years, Ankara has remodeled Somalia into one of the most noticeable arenas of its extra-regional foreign policy into a mix of humanitarian diplomacy, infrastructure development, military involvement, and political favor of power. In that context, the acknowledgement of Somaliland or even its increased internationalization is a structural dilemma to the vested leverage of Turkey.

There is a great material presence of Turkey in Somalia. It operates the international airport and port of Mogadishu, has its largest foreign military base in the latter, and controls security training courses of the Somali troops. These are supplemented by soft power programs on health, education, and development aid, which have created a lot of goodwill among the people. All these interactions make Turkey more than a collaborator of the Somali state but a key agent of power and entry. The preservation of the territorial integrity of Somalia, in its turn, is consonant with the interest of Ankara in the existence of a single political interlocutor with the help of which its influence can be wielded.

The contradiction of the current position of Turkey is well traced when judged by its relations with Israel. In spite of occasional rhetoric battles, Ankara still has complete diplomatic, trade, and security ties with Tel Aviv. However, it strongly resists any Somaliland-Israel interaction. Such a contradiction highlights the fact that the Turkish objection is not based on principle against Israel but on one that is against the development of other forms of diplomatic and economic routes that circumvent Turkish-dominated nodes of influence. Given a known or actively involved Somaliland, it would ease independent trade networks, security alliances, and diplomatic adoptions, which would reduce the strategic dominance of Turkey in the Horn of Africa.

The appeal to Somali unity, therefore, is rather a non-normative assertion or a legitimizing discourse of strategic entrenchment. The example of Somaliland controlling its own matters without relying on any outside help questions this story, showing how legal and humanitarian arguments are manipulatively harnessed to serve the interests of power instead of supporting the principles of self-determination or good governance in their overall formulation.

Djibouti: Berbera as economic threat disguised by false security claims

Djibouti’s opposition to Somaliland is perhaps the most transparently driven by direct material interests, even as it is publicly articulated in the language of regional security. Djibouti’s political economy is fundamentally anchored in its role as a maritime gateway for the Horn of Africa, particularly for landlocked Ethiopia. The emergence of Berbera as a modernized, competitive port directly threatens this economic model.

A fully operational Berbera port, supported by international investment and efficient management, has the potential to divert substantial trade flows away from Djibouti. This would undermine Djibouti’s monopoly over port services, reduce state revenues, and diminish its geopolitical leverage over Ethiopia. To obscure these economic motivations, Djibouti frames Berbera’s development as a security risk, warning of foreign military presence and regional destabilization. Such claims are difficult to sustain, given that Djibouti itself hosts multiple foreign military bases and has long positioned itself as a hub for international naval operations.

Beyond economics, there is a political contrast that Djibouti’s leadership finds deeply unsettling. Somaliland’s relative stability and participatory governance stand in sharp relief against Djibouti’s entrenched authoritarian system. The implicit demonstration that stability can coexist with decentralization and electoral competition undermines the narrative that centralized, personalized rule is a prerequisite for order. Djibouti’s opposition thus reflects not only economic self-preservation but also an anxiety about normative comparison. Ultimately, Djibouti’s resistance to Somaliland’s recognition is an effort to protect a fragile commercial and political monopoly. Security discourse serves as a strategic façade, lending legitimacy to what is fundamentally a defensive economic posture.

Federal Somalia: Political legitimacy over popular interest

The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) occupies a unique position in this constellation of opposition, as its resistance to Somaliland’s recognition is existential. The FGS grounds its position in the inviolability of territorial unity, presenting secession as a threat to national survival. However, this stance is less about the welfare of Somali citizens and more about preserving the political legitimacy of federal institutions headquartered in Mogadishu.

The Somali leadership’s selective application of principle is evident in its external engagements. While adopting an uncompromising posture against any Somaliland-Israel interaction, Mogadishu has itself explored engagement with Israel when such engagement aligned with immediate diplomatic or security interests. This reveals that the core issue is not Israel, but authority—specifically, who possesses the right to represent Somali territory internationally.
Recognition of Somaliland would fundamentally undermine the FGS’s claim to sovereignty over the former Somali Republic, a claim that underpins its access to international aid, security assistance, and diplomatic recognition. Such recognition could also embolden other federal member states to renegotiate their relationship with the center, accelerating centrifugal pressures within Somalia itself. In this sense, opposition to Somaliland is a strategy of regime survival rather than a coherent vision for peace or reconciliation.

The resulting tension is stark: symbolic unity is prioritized over pragmatic solutions that could stabilize the region and respect the political will of Somaliland’s population. This disconnect illustrates how international legitimacy can become detached from domestic effectiveness, producing policies that preserve form while sacrificing substance.

Other Arab States: Media pressure, double standards

The behavior of other Arab and Muslim states—including Jordan, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Pakistan, and the Maldives—reveals a consistent pattern of selective principle and narrative management. These states maintain normalized and often expanding relations with Israel, encompassing trade, security cooperation, and diplomatic exchange. Yet they apply a markedly different standard to Somaliland.

Their primary mechanism is media-driven pressure. State-aligned outlets amplify narratives portraying Somaliland’s external engagements as threats to regional stability, Arab solidarity, and the Palestinian cause. This occurs despite the absence of any material interaction between Somaliland and these states, and despite Somaliland posing no conceivable threat to their national interests.

This double standard serves several functions. It reinforces established hierarchies within the regional order, affirms the authority of larger states to define permissible diplomatic behavior, and distracts domestic audiences from the contradictions inherent in their own governments’ foreign policies. Somaliland becomes a symbolic target through which conformity to an approved narrative is enforced. Such practices underscore the instrumentalization of ethical and legal discourse. Principles are not abandoned but selectively applied in ways that preserve power asymmetries and marginalize smaller political entities.

Marginalizing Reality: Palestine as rhetorical tool

The Palestinian cause occupies a central position in Arab political discourse, often functioning as a moral touchstone for regional legitimacy. In the case of Somaliland, however, it is frequently deployed as a rhetorical weapon divorced from contextual relevance. Somaliland, which has no historical involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict, is nonetheless portrayed as a vector of normalization simply for pursuing diplomatic engagement.

This strategy has extended to the circulation of demonstrably false narratives, including allegations that Somaliland would facilitate the resettlement of Palestinians from Gaza. Such claims lack evidentiary basis and are contradicted by Somaliland’s own public positions. Their purpose is not informational accuracy but emotional mobilization, creating a moral pretext for opposition that obscures underlying strategic motives.

The instrumentalization of Palestine in this manner undermines the integrity of the cause itself. By transforming a legitimate struggle into a tool of political convenience, regional actors dilute its moral force and marginalize the lived realities of Palestinians. Somaliland becomes collateral in a symbolic conflict that serves external interests rather than advancing justice.

Red Sea, Houthi threat

The Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb strait constitute one of the world’s most critical geopolitical corridors, facilitating global energy flows and commercial shipping. Somaliland’s coastline and the port of Berbera place it at the center of this strategic geography. As a result, regional responses to Somaliland are shaped less by normative considerations than by zero-sum calculations of control and access.

Any enhancement of Somaliland’s maritime infrastructure or international partnerships is interpreted as a redistribution of influence. Established powers respond defensively, seeking to constrain Somaliland’s options rather than engage constructively. This reaction highlights a broader pattern in regional politics, where geography consistently outweighs humanitarian or legal considerations.

The double standard is again evident. States that actively cooperate with Israel in the Red Sea basin condemn Somaliland for pursuing similar engagements. The issue is not the nature of the partnership, but the challenge it poses to entrenched hierarchies of permission and control.

In the context of the Yemeni conflict, Somaliland has been rhetorically linked to the Houthi threat as a means of justifying its isolation. Claims that Somaliland-Israel relations would provoke Houthi attacks or destabilize shipping lanes lack empirical grounding. Somaliland has consistently affirmed its neutrality and has every incentive to promote maritime security.
The invocation of the Houthi threat functions as an externalized justification for policies rooted in control rather than security. It allows opposing states to frame Somaliland’s independent engagements as inherently dangerous while obscuring their own selective alliances and security arrangements.

Conclusion: The problem is not Somaliland, but what it represents

The regional opposition to Somaliland’s recognition reveals a consistent pattern of strategic contradiction. Legal principles, moral narratives, and religious symbolism are mobilized selectively to obscure narrow national interests and preserve entrenched power structures. The widespread normalization of relations with Israel by Somaliland’s critics exposes the hollowness of arguments framed around moral absolutism.

At its core, Somaliland represents an unsettling alternative: a small political entity that has achieved relative stability, participatory governance, and institutional functionality through internal consensus rather than external imposition. This reality challenges inherited assumptions about sovereignty, legitimacy, and the inevitability of centralized authority.

Somaliland thus functions as a living litmus test. It tests whether regional actors genuinely value principles such as self-determination, effective governance, and popular will, or whether they prioritize the preservation of familiar geostrategic arrangements. The intensity and coordination of opposition suggest a clear answer. The resistance is not to instability or illegality, but to the transformative implications of acknowledging a successful alternative model of political order.


Author: Gulaid Yusuf Idaan is a senior lecturer and researcher specializing in diplomacy, politics, and international relations in the Horn of Africa. He can be contacted at Idaan54@gmail.com

Somaliland Sovereignty Predates the Creation of Somali Republic and its Territorial Integrity

Somaliland Sovereignty Predates the Creation of Somali Republic and its Territorial Integrity.

What if the most repeated claims about Somaliland are wrong? What if the idea that its separation is a recent rebellion, that its people were always committed to pan-Somali unity, or that Israel’s move represents a sudden colonial intrusion collapses under even minimal historical scrutiny? And what if the real scandal is not Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, but how thoroughly the international system has ignored facts it once openly acknowledged?

Just a day after Christmas, on 26 December, a video call landed on the Somaliland president’s iPhone. On the other end was Benjamin Netanyahu, informing him of a decision that would detonate diplomatic outrage across Africa, the Middle East and the United Nations. Nothing about this moment was spontaneous. It was the endpoint of a long, calculated and largely clandestine process in which symbolism mattered far less than geography, intelligence and hard power.

To understand why this recognition matters, one has to begin with an inconvenient historical truth: Somaliland is not a breakaway region invented in 1991. It is a former British protectorate that became an independent state in June 1960, was recognized by more than thirty countries, and entered a voluntary union with the former Italian Somalia five days later. That union was political rather than organic, rushed rather than deliberative, and never subjected to a referendum in Somaliland itself. When it collapsed three decades later amid mass violence, Somaliland did not secede from a functioning state; it withdrew from a failed one and reclaimed a sovereignty it had already possessed.

This alone sits uncomfortably with the joint statement issued by Arab, Islamic and African states condemning Israel’s move as a violation of international law and an unprecedented assault on territorial integrity. The statement speaks as though Somaliland were a newly invented “region”, yet omits the fact that its statehood predates the Somali Republic itself. It invokes the sanctity of borders while ignoring that Somaliland has consistently defended colonial-era boundaries, whereas the Somali state openly rejected them through the doctrine of Greater Somalia. It warns of dangerous precedents while overlooking the dozens of cases in which self-determination has been selectively endorsed or denied depending on geopolitical convenience.

Declassified intelligence from the period before independence exposes how fragile the nationalist narrative always was. A 1948 CIA assessment of political organizations in British Somaliland noted that none were “purely political in character” and that they largely pursued “individual tribal or regional interests”. It estimated that only three or four per cent of the population belonged to any political party. Most explosively, it stated that the Somali Youth League, later mythologized as the voice of all Somalis, “does not have an appeal for the residents of British Somaliland”. This was not the verdict of a hostile power seeking to undermine unity, but an internal intelligence assessment written decades before Somaliland’s later rupture with Mogadishu.

The same document described early Somali nationalism as explicitly pan-Somali and dismissive of inherited borders, committed to uniting “all the inhabitants of the Somali countries”. That ideology would later become state doctrine in Mogadishu. Somaliland’s subsequent rejection of it was not a betrayal of some shared national soul; it was a continuation of a political culture that had always been cautious, localized and sceptical of ideological centralism. In this sense, Somaliland’s post-1991 governance — built around clan conferences, negotiated consent and decentralization — looks less like an anomaly and more like a return to form.

Israel’s role enters this story not as a sudden act of provocation, but as a long-term strategic calculation shaped by geography and threat perception. Somalia as a unified state never had meaningful relations with Israel. From the 1960s onward it aligned itself with pan-Arab causes, framed Israel as an imperial enemy, and became one of its most hostile critics in international forums. Somaliland, by contrast, was recognized by Israel in 1960 and quietly revisited that history after restoring its independence in 1991.

What followed, according to multiple Israeli and regional media reports, was years of discreet engagement managed largely outside formal diplomatic channels. Mossad is reported to have cultivated relationships with Somaliland’s leadership, laying political and security groundwork well before any public recognition. Israeli officials have openly thanked the agency’s leadership for its role. Key Somaliland leaders are said to have made several secret visits to Israel in 2025, meeting senior political, defense and intelligence figures. None of this was advertised, because recognition politics in Africa and the Arab world remain unforgiving.

The strategic logic is blunt. Somaliland sits on the Gulf of Aden, overlooking the Bab el-Mandeb strait through which a significant share of global trade passes. It lies within a few hundred kilometers of Houthi controled territory in Yemen, whose missiles and drones have reshaped security calculations across the Red Sea. From Berbera, Israel and its partners can monitor maritime traffic, detect launches, and project power at distances that radically alter response times. Israeli commentators have described the relationship as a force multiplier against the Houthis. Western security planners see similar advantages.

This also explains why the United Arab Emirates looms so large in the background. Long before Israel’s recognition, Abu Dhabi invested heavily in Berbera’s port and airport, reportedly turning them into advanced logistical and military facilities. The UAE’s absence from the joint condemnation statement was therefore less a mystery than a confirmation. Somaliland fits neatly into a wider Emirati strategy of controlling ports, trade routes and maritime choke-points from the Red Sea to the Horn of Africa, often operating beyond the authority of weak central governments.

China, too, factors into the equation. Its naval base in Djibouti and expanding presence along African trade routes have unsettled Western planners. Somaliland offers an alternative foothold in a region where influence is increasingly contested. From this perspective, Israel’s move is not only about countering the Houthis or extending the Abraham Accords, but about anchoring itself and its allies in a rapidly militarizing maritime corridor.

It is here that the most incendiary allegations emerge, particularly claims that Somaliland was discussed as a potential destination for Palestinians displaced from Gaza. These reports, widely circulated but officially denied, have inflamed regional reactions and colored interpretations of Israel’s motives. Whether such plans were speculative, exploratory or entirely fictitious, their very plausibility in public discourse speaks to how little Somaliland is treated as a political community in its own right, and how readily it is imagined as empty strategic space.

The backlash has been swift and severe. Fourteen UN Security Council members condemned Israel’s recognition; the African Union rejected it outright. Turkey warned of a strategy to fragment Islamic states. Somalia framed the move as an existential threat. Yet much of this outrage rests on selective memory. Somaliland is condemned for claiming self-determination, while states that suppress separatist movements within their own borders present themselves as guardians of international law. Israel is accused of expansionism, while Somalia’s own pursuit of Greater Somalia is quietly erased from the record.

None of this absolves Israel of opportunism, nor Somaliland of hard-nosed calculation. This was not an act of idealism. It was a transaction shaped by intelligence cooperation, shared threat perceptions and the cold logic of geography. It will intensify rivalries in the Horn of Africa, sharpen competition in the Red Sea, and test already fragile regional orders. It may also, paradoxically, force a long-overdue reckoning with Somaliland’s unresolved status.

The question now is whether the international community can continue to deny a political reality that intelligence agencies documented decades ago, that dozens of states once acknowledged, and that more than 39 years of effective self-rule have only reinforced. In the coming years, as the Horn of Africa becomes an ever more critical arena of global competition, that denial may prove more destabilizing than recognition itself.

by Nilantha Ilangamuwa is a founding editor of the Sri Lanka Guardian

Somaliland and Israel – Considerations for Recognition and Cooperation

Somaliland and Israel – Considerations for Recognition and Cooperation

In the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea – a space whose security-strategic importance to Israel has been prominent again in the past two years – Somaliland, an independent and pro-Western country, is established, which is not recognized by the international community. Its ultimate goal is to gain international recognition and establish alliances with countries that will help it against its enemy: the Somali government of Mogadishu. In recent years, she has been establishing close ties with the UAE and Taiwan. The rise of the Trump administration and the presence of senior Republican officials who support recognition of it are given hopes to the leaders of Somaliland, and against this background its efforts to gain recognition have been increased, including against Israel. This article examines the issue of relations with Somaliland for Israel, while presenting the supportive and inhibiting Israeli recognition of it.

Somaliland – over thirty years of independence and stability

Somaliland spans the northwestern part of what the international community recognizes as a wholesale. Somaliland was independent for five days in 1960 before joining the Union with Somalia, and was reborn as an independent state in 1991 from the brutal and long-term Somali Civil War that has been taking place since the late 1980s. Somaliland is based on a unique and separate identity that has been formed in the last hundred years: the territory was under British colonial rule (unlike the rest of Somalia, which was under Italian rule); its people have extensive ties with southern Yemenite over the other side of the Gulf of Aden where it borders; and most of its population is among the members of the Isak clan – unlike the rest of the Somalia inhabited by other clans. The Isak suffered from discrimination and violence—and even claim to have genocide—from the clans that ruled Somalia-Mogadishu, especially in the 80’s.

Since its actual independence in 1991, Somaliland has been an antithesis for taking place in Somalia: its security situation is benign, its internal arena is stable, has no significant jihadist activity, and although there are border disputes at its ends (especially in the districts where other clans live), they are specific and polluted. Since the 2000s, Somaliland has been conducting a stable and proper multi-party democratic system, with a permanent election, the last of which took place in 2024 and announced a peaceful and orderly change of government. All the significant political forces operating in it are pro-Western and suspicious of Islamist forces or China and Russia. Although they are divided on the methods of action, they all see international recognition as a supreme goal.

The fact that Somalia-Mogadishu’s problems are concentrated in the south helps the survival of Somaliland, which is far from the battlegrounds between the various clans and the powerful government of Mugheyshu and the powerful Al-Shabaab organization. In addition, Somaliland borders on relatively friendly and stable governments: Ethiopia, Puntland (an independent state actually member of the Somalia Federation), and Djibouti. With them, Somaliland had peaceful and improved relations: In 2024, Somaliland signed a strategic understanding agreement with Ethiopia, which was supposed to give the unaccessible Ethiopia to the sea a foothold in the strategic port, Barbara, insinuating future recognition of her independence (this agreement was effectively frozen, but not canceled, under Turkish-Somali pressure). Somaliland’s ties with Djibouti are also improving, and in October 2025 she signed a “Nairubi Agreement” with Puntland for security and commercial cooperation.

In recent years, Somaliland has also developed its ties with other pro-Western countries. Taiwan and the UAE are its two most strategic partners: Taiwan – the chip manufacturing giant – is investing in the development of the country’s rare metal and mineral mines, and the UAE has invested a fortune in the development of the port of Barbara. As far as the UAE is concerned, Somaliland is a strategic stronghold in the Horn of Africa alongside the other Maozia in the region – on the Yemenite island of Socotura, in Puntland, and Darfur.

Even with the United States, Somliland has reasons for cautious optimism. American delegations—including from the Pentagon—have visited the country, which markets itself as a potential strategic base for the United States in the region. President Trump said the United States is considering recognizing it, and the U.S. Congress is interested in ordering the State Department to re-examine ties with Somaliland to improve them and upgrade them. As an intermediate stage, U.S. lawmakers aim for the State Department to start separating Somalia from Somalia and Somaliland in the context of travel warnings. Republican officials, such as Senator Ted Cruz of Texas, frequently express themselves in their support for recognizing Somaliland’s independence. However, the Americans have heavy considerations that are urgent to avoid recognition, along with delays in appointments and policy formulation for Africa and the Red Sea.

Against this background, Somaliland is conducting a lobbying campaign to promote the issue of recognition. In May 2025, the Somalilan President appealed to the UN members to recognize it as an independent state. During October 2025, the media in Somaliland reported that more than 20 countries, including Israel, are approaching the decision to recognize it. Somaliland is also more correct to adopt additional sovereign features: in November 2025, it declared full control of its airspace (by disconnecting it from the symbolic sovereignty of Somalia), demanding that it be authorized by a direct permit from its authorities to move in the sky, and announced that it would not recognize visas received from the Government of Mogadishu.

International recognition by other countries is therefore the primary target for the various Somliland governments (it remains one even after the exchange of government in democratic elections). International recognition will determine the existence of Somaliland and grant it protection, at least it hopes, from a scenario in which Somalia is reinforced (one or with its allies) will be able to act in the future international legitimacy to re-apply its authority to the territory. Alongside international recognition, Somaliland strives to acquire reliable and powerful allies. The danger from the government of Mogadishu is now still imaginary, but Somaliland has more tangible concerns than other security threats, from the Houthim, through the spread of global jihad (which is currently active in neighboring Pontland), to separatism in the periphery of the territory and even subversive activity that has evidence on the ground by China and Turkey.

Importance of Somaliland to the West and Israel

The importance of Somaliland lies in its geostrategic location and correctness – especially as a stable, moderate and reliable country in a volatile region – to cooperate in a comprehensive and broad manner with Western countries. The location of Somaliland at the entrance to the Gulf of Eden – opposite southern Yemen – connecting the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean, gives it a geo-strategic uniqueness. This is the historical reason that the British Empire took over in the late 19th century, and that the United States during the Reagan administration established a military base in the 1980s, in the midst of the Cold War.

Today, the distance between the waters and territory of Somaliland and the Houthi control areas in Yemen, the port of Hadida, for example, is about 300 to 500 km. The fact that in recent years the Gulf states, the United States and Israel – each in turn – have fought the Houthis without a decision, gives the location of Somaliland and the potential ability to operate from its territory, considerable global importance, within a possible equality voucher. Somaliland has a potential to be a frontal base for a variety of missions: intelligence surveillance against the Houthis and their empowerment efforts; providing logistics to the legitimate Yemeni government in its war against the Houthis; and a base for direct operational activity against the Houthi – offensive and to thwart Houthi attacks at sea or by means of drones. The necessary parallel to Israel’s steadfast alliance with Azerbaijan, which has significantly upgraded the strategic and operational Israeli ability to deal with the Iranian threat. It is possible that Somaliland is the equivalent brick for Israel in the face of the Houchi threat.

Alongside the valuable location of Somaliland, it is equally important that its government is interested in cooperating broadly with pro-Western countries. It’s a combination of willingness and ability. Eritrea is located in an even closer location to actions against the Houthis, but police are anti-Western and friendly to Iran. Djibouti, who has the strategic location, maintains actual neutrality in conflicts. Ethiopia lacks access to the sea and relations between police and the United States are ambivalent. Somaliland therefore offers a unique combination of geo-strategic location and a willingness to agree to widespread cooperation with pro-Western countries. Its ties with the UAE – that much of the logic that guides them from a utterance point of view was the war in the Hothis – are evidence of this. Messages coming out of Somaliland indicate that the state is also willing to have broad security relations with the United States, including hosting an American base, and even with Israel.

Regarding Israel, the positive attitude of the Somaliland government is evident, even in the midst of the war in the past two years, and it is likely that there are already unofficial ties between senior officials in both countries. Somaliland has sent messages in recent months that it is ready to cooperate with pro-Israel initiatives, including the expansion of the Abraham Agreements. The public discourse in the country tends to be pro-Israel, although there are also critical voices, especially in light of the war and reports from the Gaza Strip, as well as in light of the existence of Salafi movements (non-violent) in the country.

Considerations for and against recognition of Somliland

For Somaliland, the most coveted prize is American recognition, with which, they estimate, will come recognition from many other countries close to Washington. She therefore invests effort in front of the White House and Congress. Somaliland positions itself as an antagonist for China who is willing to go as a long way to realize American interests in the strategic space of the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. In the face of the Americans, Somaliland also emphasizes its democratic and free character and hostility to radical Islamist ideologies. In conversations with American officials and media messages, she clarifies her immediate readiness for entering the Abraham Agreements. Her desire to gain recognition was so great that the Somaliland government did not even publicly reject the discourse that took place a few months ago about plans to encourage the immigration of Gazans into its territory, despite the great unpopularity that the idea has sparked in its population.

However, despite the friendliness of Washington and the strategies of Somaliland’s location, the United States still seems to be hesitant about the question of official recognition, and it has serious reasons for this.

First, on a fundamental level, U.S. policy on the Somali issue has been consistent in recent decades: recognition of the idea of “one Sommalia.” The United States has sought to strengthen the Mogadishu government, especially in light of its difficult war against Al-Shabaab over the past two decades. For the United States, Somalia-Mogadishu is an ally, also weak and failing. The United States also provides it with military assistance in the attacks against global jihadist elements. Recognition of Somliland will see as an American betrayal, which could lead to the wave of the blast in the shaky Somalia (for example, by officially withdrawing from Fontland and Jubald – both of which are still a symbolic commitment to Mogadishu’s authority – or the strengthening of Al-Shabab). This consideration should be added to international practice – an aspiration not to recognize the changes in unilateral borders or in quitting countries, with the understanding that this is a possible opening of the Pandora’s box and an appeal of existing borders in the rest of the world, especially in the Middle East and Africa.

Although this is a weighty consideration for Status-Quo-like U.S. administrations, the Trump administration may be able to violate the tradition of adherence to the idea of “one Somalia” or the reluctance to recognize quitting countries. However, there is a consideration that probably plays a more significant role for Washington at the present time: the support of most Arab countries including Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Egypt, as well as Turkey in this idea. The Arab League countries, except the UAE, are declaratively supporting the unity of Somalia and strongly opposed the recognition of Somaliland. For Turkey, Somalia-Mogdeishu is a major ally in the Red Sea region, bordering on the status of a protectorate. These powerful countries, which are mined ear in Washington, express their aversion to the possibility of recognition of Somliland.

Although their impact on Washington is much less, the African Union countries are also inclined to deeply disapprove of any official recognition of quitting countries, fearing the domino effect in the rest of Africa.

Compared to the considerations of the United States, Israel has additional considerations: Although the Qatari and Turkish attitudes against recognition of Somliland are not significant (and vice versa), it is possible that the Egyptian position, and perhaps also Chinese, is more significant. On the other hand, Israel’s proximity to the UAE reinforces the pro-Somalland consideration. However, traditionally, Israel is hesitant to recognize quitting countries, partly for fear of precedents or a boomerang effect on the issue of recognition of a Palestinian state, although this consideration seems to be less relevant at the present time, due to the actual, almost sweeping recognition that the Palestinian “state” has won in recent years.

A more significant consideration for Israel, which is supposed to arouse caution and deep thought before official recognition of Somaliland, is actually a pragmatic aspect. Israeli recognition of Somaliland, which is not accompanied by American recognition, may cause a negative effect that will harm both Israel and Somaliland. While an Israeli-Somalian agreement may appear to be reinforcement of Israel’s status in the region, at the same time causing a strong counter-reaction in the Muslim world, which in turn may place Somaliland at the focus of regional criticism and, consequently, lead to a reluctance to expand public or substantive cooperation with Israel. Israeli recognition, ironically, may actually contain efforts to expand the Abraham Accords with other Muslim countries.

Under the threshold of consciousness, at least for now

Israel is required for allies in the Red Sea area, in part to prepare for the next campaign against the Houthis. Somaliland is an ideal candidate for this cooperation, who will be able to grant Israel as a matter of action near the scene of operations. But in addition to security cooperation, relations with Somaliland also have important economic-conscious potential for Israeli national security, due to the minerals in its territory and the desire to establish relations with Muslim populations in the region. Therefore, Israel must work to expand cooperation with this entity, ideal while cooperating with the UAE and the United States.

However, Israel has serious reasons for avoiding the first country to recognize Somaliland, which is primarily an understanding that such recognition may actually act against promoting intimate relations between Israel and Somaliland due to regional responses and dynamics. As long as the United States (or at least the UAE) does not recognize Somaliland as an independent state, Israel must not act alone on this official level.

The recommendation is therefore to promote the intimate relationship with Somaliland “under the threshold of consciousness.” Israel and its allies in Washington can help Somliland in persuasion attempts with the Trump administration, but the United States must take the first public step to recognition. At the same time, the two countries can promote – even before official recognition – security and economic partnerships, the establishment of interest offices (as many other countries with Somaliland do), and even symbolic measures such as recognition of the Somaliland passports.

These are steps that will prevent the possible risks involved in official recognition, while at the same time helping both parties to advance their fundamental interests. Israeli security and economic presence in Somliland does not necessarily require official recognition, and on the other hand, Somaliland may also be preferable to intimate and quiet relations with Israel over high-profile precedent-setting declarations. Somaliland can benefit many of these ties with Israel, especially in light of the security challenges that the country may encounter in the challenging neighborhood of the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa. For Israel, Somliland may be a “vigilance breaker” in the struggle against the Houthis.

** The author wishes to thank the staff of the Institute for National Security Studies for fruitful discourse on the issue, including as part of a guest lecture given by the author at the Institute on September 30, 2025; Dr. Rashid Abdi, head of research at the Sahan Institute in Kenya, for discourse and sharing of knowledge; and the Israel-Africa Relations Institute for support and encouragement.

The opinions expressed in the publications of the Institute for National Security Studies are those of the authors only.

Fraudulent Somali e-Visa Scheme Defrauds U​.​S. Travelers, Undermines Homeland Security

Fraudulent Somali e-Visa Scheme Defrauds U​.​S. Travelers, Undermines Homeland Security

Large amounts of humanitarian and development aid to Somalia were drastically cut or halted due to concerns about efficiency and corruption as the Trump administration canceled a big portion of USAID’s projects worldwide, primarily affecting third-world nations. This action had a detrimental effect on the weak economy of Somalia. As a result, Somalia’s feeble government turned to terror techniques to steal money from travelers visiting other Horn of Africa nations such as Somaliland.

In order to put an end to this banditry, Somaliland-American community members and stakeholders are bringing it to light.

We are a coalition of U.S. citizens and dual nationals who have fallen victim to a deliberate scheme of consumer fraud and coercion perpetrated by the Government of Somalia’s Immigration & Citizenship Agency (ICA). The ICA is actively selling e-visas for travel to Somaliland, a service they know to be invalid, as Somaliland’s Immigration authorities consistently reject these documents at their ports of entry.

The consequences for travelers are severe and costly. Those relying on the fraudulent Somali e-visa for Somaliland travel are routinely stranded, miss flights, are denied entry, and incur significant additional expenses. They have to pay again for a valid Somaliland visa on arrival and face the possibilities of being sent back at their own expense.

Of even greater concern is the demonstrably inadequate capacity of the Somalia Federal Government to protect the sensitive personal information of U.S. travelers, as reported by multiple reliable sources, including the United Nations. This failure poses a serious data security risk and represents a direct threat to U.S. homeland security.

If you’re a native of Somalilnad who is currently an American citizen or resident, we seek your immediate support. We are appealing to U.S. regulatory and diplomatic bodies to halt this malicious scheme, and we need your voice.

Please exercise your rights by adding your name and signature to our appeal, and we deeply appreciate your support for this critical and time-sensitive matter

Somaliland Strategic Advocacy Group, Virginia, USA

SomalilandUSA@protonmail.com

Ethiopian Airlines Scraps Somalia’s e-Visa Requirement for Somaliland Bound Travel

Ethiopian Airlines Scraps Somalia’s e-Visa Requirement for Somaliland Bound Travel

An electronic visa system was recently implemented by the Somali government for visitors to Somalia, including areas that are not under its direct authority. The e-visa, which costs $64 each entrance, was created to expedite the admissions process and bring in money for the federal government. Passengers traveling to Somaliland, which has operated freely for more than thirty years while without international recognition, are more perplexed because of the change.

Travel issues rapidly flare up after airlines servicing Somali locations, including Somaliland, were told to make sure every passenger had the e-visa before boarding. Many Somali diaspora members and local authorities who were traveling to Hargeisa complained about challenges and lengthy layovers, especially when using transit hubs in the United Arab Emirates.

For travelers going to Somaliland, Ethiopian Airlines stopped enforcing Somalia’s new e-visa requirement.

This latest development comes after Republic of Somaliland authorities issued an order threatening to ban foreign airlines if they require travelers to obtain a Somalia’s e-visa. Subsequently, Ethiopian Airlines effectively disregarded Mogadishu’s directive by permitting visitors to Hargeisa to receive visas upon arrival at the Egal International Airport.

Another significant airline that operates flights to Somaliland, FlyDubai, is also under pressure to choose whether to abide with Somaliland’s directive or risk being banned from landing in Hargeisa.

Ethiopian Airlines action has angered Somali officials. After Ethiopian Airlines ceased implementing Somalia’s new e-visa requirement for travelers visiting Somaliland, Mohamed Nur Tarsan, Somalia’s former ambassador to Kenya, urged President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s administration to take decisive action against the airline.

Al-Shabab: Designated Terrorist Group Outperforms Somalia’s Government in Basic Governance

Al-Shabab: Designated Terrorist Group Outperforms Somalia’s Government in Basic Governance

Privately, representatives of humanitarian and development organizations often confide that Al-Shabab would be a more efficient partner than the federal government.

Although Mogadishu is nominally under federal government control, Al-Shabab tax collection is more efficient, and many business owners prefer dealing with the militants. “Al-Shabab tax system is predictable and transparent,” said a Mogadishu-based NGO director who has worked extensively in rural Somalia, and asked not to be named so they could speak freely.  “The amounts levied are fixed, and you can even appeal their decisions in their courts,” explained the director. “At roadblocks on rural roads, Al-Shabab provides receipts that allow you to avoid double taxation.”

Compare that to government checkpoints “where you basically need to pay a variable bribe to get through. It is pocketed by the collectors, which means you will be taxed again at the next checkpoint,” the NGO official added. His opinion is confirmed by a research paper studying checkpoint politics in southern Somalia.

The group’s influence extends far beyond its rural strongholds. It directly governs nearly a quarter of all district capitals in Somalia, and co-governs almost all areas nominally held by the federal government outside the autonomous region of Puntland and the Republic of Somaliland.

Recent studies by independent research organizations such as the Hiraal Institute, SaferWorld, and the International Crisis Group consistently show that Somalis view the group’s governance as efficient, compared to the corruption-plagued federal system.

This uncomfortable reality – that an internationally designated terrorist group outperforms Somalia’s government in basic governance – also emerges from my experience working as deputy director for the International NGO Safety Organization in Somalia from 2016 to 2018, and extensive field research conducted in the country for my PhD between 2019 and 2022.

Why Al-Shabab governance works

The militants have built their administrative success around creating a comprehensive system that extends far beyond military control. Their approach demonstrates how effective administration can emerge from understanding local needs and implementing consistent policies. The group replicates detailed governance systems from village to national level, with clear hierarchies and accountability mechanisms.

At the heart of Al-Shabab appeal lies their justice system. The group’s Islamic courts have earned recognition, even from critics, for delivering swift and decisive rulings that are actually implemented across their territory. Unlike Somalia’s federal courts, where cases can languish for years and outcomes often depend on elite connections or bribes,Al-Shabab judges operate under strict rotation schedules, with their clan identities kept secret to ensure impartiality. The system’s credibility is reinforced by the lack of impunity – even senior Al-Shabab members face prosecution in their own courts when accused of wrongdoing.

Security provision forms another cornerstone of the group’s governance model. In territories under their control, crime and inter-clan violence have become rare. Al-Shabab maintains an absolute monopoly on violence, treating even possession of unregistered weapons as a punishable offense. This security dividend, despite taking the form of a protection racket in government-controlled areas, enables normal economic activities to flourish, and allows the population to live in peace – if they are willing to follow the militants’ strict regulations.

The group’s ban on popular stimulants like qat and tobacco, while resented by users, is appreciated especially by women concerned about the drain it imposes on the household economy.The group’s economic policies reveal a sophisticated understanding of Somalia’s structural challenges. Al-Shabab promotes economic self-reliance, encouraging consumption of locally produced foods over imports like rice and pasta, and frowning on processed foods and soft drinks filled with “chemicals” as unhealthy foreign products.

The group regulates cash crop exports to ensure domestic markets aren’t undercut by export-oriented production, and some districts under their control have experienced faster growth than nearby government-controlled areas.

Environmental protection represents one of Al-Shabab most unexpected governance innovations. The group has enacted comprehensive environmental regulations, including bans on tree-cutting, charcoal production, and plastic bag use. While initially ridiculed by international observers, these policies address serious environmental degradation in a country facing severe deforestation and an ecological crisis.

In recent agreements with local clans, Al-Shabab has explicitly named environmental protection as a condition for allowing continued traditional self-governance, demonstrating how they integrate conservation into their broader political project. This comprehensive governance model creates a self-reinforcing cycle of legitimacy. Effective service delivery builds public acceptance, which enables more sophisticated administration, which in turn allows for more ambitious policy implementation. The result is a governance system that, while rejecting liberal democratic norms, addresses many of the practical needs that Somalia’s international-backed government has failed to meet.

The humanitarian challenge

Al-Shabab has developed substantial humanitarian capabilities that operate independently of international aid systems. In the famine of 2011-2012 that killed a quarter of a million people, many victims were blocked from accessing international aid by the group, causing a popular backlash and a drop in popularity. Since then, they have improved their aid delivery capacity, funded primarily through zakat collected from local populations, supplemented by Gulf-based Islamic charities.

During the 2017 drought that threatened famine conditions across Somalia, no starvation deaths were reported in Al-Shabab controlled areas, suggesting their distribution efforts were effective rather than merely propaganda exercises. Nevertheless, the group’s humanitarian approach reflects their broader critique of international aid dependency. Its officials consistently argue that Western food aid disrupts local markets and disincentivizes Somali agricultural production.

The neutrality of NGOs is indeed questionable, as Western donors often direct aid to increase the acceptance of the federal government by the Somali population, a practice called “stabilization” in areas recently captured from, or contested by, Al-Shabab. Access to education, health, food aid, and other basic services provided by NGOs is then presented as a benefit of living under federal government rule.

The clan challenge

Perhaps Al-Shabab’s most significant achievement lies in its management of Somalia’s clan-based social structure. Both before and after the establishment of the independent state of Somalia in 1960, clan identity has dominated Somali politics, contributing to the state’s collapse in 1991, and hampering subsequent reconstruction efforts. Al-Shabab has positioned Islamic law (sharia) above traditional clan law (xeer) for the first time in Somali history. This represents a fundamental shift from collective clan responsibility to individual accountability – a change that even critics acknowledge as potentially transformative.

The group either co-opts or appoints and rotates clan elders, organizing them by geographic districts rather than clan lineage. This weakens links between local communities and broader clan families, while strengthening ties between different clans in the same region. “Al-Shabab in that sense is a modernizing force, as it exposes Somalis to being governed by the rule of law,” noted Hussein Sheikh Ali, a former director of the Hiraal Institute think-tank. “We face a per-modern society. Most people in Somalia have never dealt with modern laws; they haven’t even felt governed.”

Despite this apparent governance success, Al-Shabab faces a crucial paradox: legitimacy without popularity. While Somalis may recognize the group’s administrative competence and align with its ideology up to a degree, it appears most do not want to live under Al-Shabab rule.

Implications for international policy

These findings pose uncomfortable questions for the international community’s approach to Somalia.

Many of the stated objectives of international state-building efforts – establishing the rule of law, reducing corruption, transcending clan politics, and promoting individual responsibility – are being achieved by “terrorists” while the federal government’s progress in these fields is excruciatingly slow.

The federal rule of law exists on paper only, legislative and executive positions continue to be allocated on a clan-basis instead of through elections and merit, and much if not most international assistance is embezzled or allocated along those same clan lines.

The current strategy of treating Al-Shabab as a terrorist organization to be eliminated militarily has proven ineffective for nearly two decades. The group has survived constant pressure from African Union forces, Somali government troops, and US drone attacks – consistently adapting and maintaining its grip on a majority of the population in central and southern Somalia.

Recent military offensives by the Hassan Sheikh Mohamud government – while achieving initial successes – have seen momentum wane as Al-Shabab reasserts control over “liberated” areas. Local populations remain skeptical of the government’s staying power and maintain ties with the militants regardless.

This presents another dilemma for policymakers and humanitarian actors. Engaging with Al-Shabab risks legitimizing a designated terrorist organization and potentially violating counter-terrorism laws. Yet, ignoring the reality of the group’s administrative control perpetuates a parallel system that may ultimately prove more durable than the internationally supported federal government.

Privately, representatives of humanitarian and development organizations often confide that Al-Shabab would be a more efficient partner than the federal government to achieve food security, establish health facilities, mitigate the effects of climate change, and improve physical infrastructure.

Khatumo – the 6th Federal Member State – and Mogadishu’s Calculations

Khatumo – the 6th Federal Member State – and Mogadishu’s Calculations

In a remarkable development, an expanded local conference held in Las Anod in July 2025 announced the formation of Somalia’s sixth federal state – the Northeastern State of Somalia, also known as Khatumo. This newly declared state encompasses the regions of Sool, Sanaag and Ayn, which remain contested by Somaliland and Puntland. These two states have rejected this development, denouncing it as a threat and a strategic maneuver by Mogadishu to reinforce its federal authority. This step risks heightening tensions and deepening political and tribal polarization in a region already plagued by a fragile and complex legal and political environment.

The central government in Mogadishu has maintained strong support for the emerging situation in the northeast. This started with supporting the armed tribal movement led by the Dhulbahante and Warsangali clans in February 2023. The movement gained momentum culminating in the defeat of the Somaliland army in August 2023 and the establishment of the Khatumo administration – a reality Mogadishu provisionally recognized in October 2023.

Further solidifying its support, Mogadishu formally accepted the new administration as a full member of the Somali federation, designating it as the sixth regional state. This decision followed a controversial visit by Somali Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre to Las Anod, the capital of the new state, in April 2025. Furthermore, the Somali federal government has played a pivotal role in establishing the new state (the northeastern state) and provided it with legitimacy. This marks an important juncture in the history of this region and reflects the aspirations of marginalized communities to reclaim their key historical role in shaping Somalia’s national political framework.

The central government in Mogadishu considers itself the primary beneficiary of this new reality. Its key motives and calculations for redrawing Somalia’s political map include the following:

First, Advancing Centralist Orientations: The rise of the new state contributes to the recalibration of the federal balance of power in favor of the central government. This shift enhances Mogadishu’s weight in shaping national policy and potentially expands its reach over regional states. It also positions Mogadishu to play a decisive role in shaping the political elite of the new federal member (Las Anod). The new state is expected to align more closely with centralist visions of governance and future power dynamics within Somalia.

Second, Undermining Somaliland’s Sovereignty Agenda: Mogadishu and unionist elites in southern Somalia have taken the lead in creating the Northeastern State with the aim of delivering a severe blow to Somaliland’s long-standing bid for independence based on colonial-era borders (the former British Protectorate). The government of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has sensed troubling shifts in international and regional attitudes toward the Somali question, with an increasing interest in Somaliland at the expense of Somalia. Notably, signs of a changing mood in Washington suggest a potential reconsideration of the “One Somalia” policy, raising the possibility of formal recognition for Somaliland.

Khatumo State and its geographical boundaries as they appear on the map

Third, Curtailing Puntland Influence: Mogadishu’s support for Khatumo reflects a desire to empower Las Anod to chart its own course, independent of Puntland agenda. This approach disregards Garowe concerns, particularly regarding federal plans to reorganize local forces and militias – formerly affiliated with the Khatumo administration – to integrate them in the federal army. Garowe interprets these moves as a calculated move to alter regional power dynamics and impose federal control. Such changes could reduce Puntland territorial scope, reshape its social fabric and limit its ability to maintain influence, autonomy and strategic balance.

Fourth, Pursuing Economic, Geo-strategic and Demographic Objectives: The region is believed to hold significant hydrocarbon reserves. It also occupies a key strategic location that enhances the federal state’s access to the Gulf of Aden. This positioning serves as a hedge against potential shifts in international focus toward Somaliland and Puntland, which could undermine Mogadishu’s strategic relevance. Additionally, the central government may seek to weaken entrenched tribal dynamics which dominate the Somali political landscape by altering the demographic composition in areas dominated by rival clans. This includes challenging the influence of the Isaq and Darod clans in Hargeisa and Garowe, respectively, while reinforcing the position of the Hawiye clan, to which President Sheikh Mohamud and most of the elites in the center belong.

Fifth, Conveying Messages to the International Community and Somalia’s Partners: Through its actions, Mogadishu aims to project growing confidence in its ability to manage both internal and external affairs independently. In return, it expects foreign actors to recognize and engage with the federal government as the legitimate authority that is capable of guiding Somalia out of its prolonged crises. This includes asserting control over constitutional reforms, managing the relationship between the center and the peripheries and setting the terms for foreign cooperation with Somaliland and other regional states.

Somaliland and Puntland Positions and Options 

Somaliland and Puntland share common concerns regarding the fate of disputed territories, particularly Sool, Sanaag and Ayn. Somaliland has firmly rejected the creation of the Northeastern State on territories it considers “under its jurisdiction.” Hargeisa views this move as an attempt by Mogadishu to exert political influence through tribal affiliations, potentially inciting internal conflict. It also sees the development as part of a broader strategy to undermine its authority, destabilize its governance and  derail its aspirations for international recognition as an independent state.

Similarly, Puntland has strongly opposed this development and pledged to confront it. Garowe perceives the move as a direct threat to its territorial integrity and political authority. It accuses the Federal Government of Somalia of complicity in fragmenting the country. Puntland officials have warned that “the federal government is attempting to divide the nation into conflicting regional entities.”

This situation may prompt both Hargeisa and Garowe to consider possible responses, ranging from reconciliation and collaboration in confronting the central government, to more aggressive actions to challenge the legitimacy of the new administration and dismantle it.

1. Reconciliation and Strategic Alignment: Despite the tension and rivalry that have characterized the relationship between the two stable neighboring regions – Somaliland and Puntland – over the past 30 years, the current crisis may present an opportunity for them to reconcile and collaborate. Recent developments suggest a potential shift in attitudes, which could strengthen their positions and complicate the central government’s efforts to assert control over the disputed territories. A united front could reshape the political landscape and challenge the federal government’s ambitions in the region.

2. Operational Escalation and Strategic Encirclement: Somaliland may view the situation as a window for decisive military action aimed at recapturing the city of Las Anod and surrounding areas, dismantling its opponents’ presence and halting their progress toward federal integration. Puntland, meanwhile, is unlikely to remain passive in the face of such escalation by Hargeisa against Las Anod. It could potentially find itself in conflict with the latter, particularly if the new administration crosses the boundaries set by President Said Deni, which include attempts to extend its administrative reach into areas still under Puntland control, including the Sanaag region.

3. Negotiation and Diplomatic Engagement: This remains the most viable path for resolving Somalia’s current political deadlock. International mediation and support could help facilitate a broader dialogue addressing key issues such as the constitutional crisis and the legal status of the new administration. However, entrenched positions and deep-seated mistrust among Somali stakeholders continue to hinder progress toward peace and reconciliation. For instance, Somaliland President Abdirahman Irro has emphasized that talks with Mogadishu cannot proceed until concerns over sovereignty violations and the establishment of a separate administration are addressed. This suggests that any revival of negotiations between northern and southern Somalia would require a shift in Mogadishu’s approach.

The Consequences of the Creation of the New State and Its Future

The establishment of the new Federal member state in Somalia carries significant implications for the country’s future. It comes at a time of political uncertainty, persistent security challenges and financial strain, compounded by declining external support due to changing priorities among donors. The federal government and its supporters view the new state as a means to enhance national unity, peace, stability and development by integrating regions into the federal framework. However, Puntland and Somaliland view the initiative as a threat to their traditional spheres of influence and sovereignty, prompting strong opposition and resistance to any redrawing of Somalia’s political and administrative map.

Meanwhile, public sentiment across Somalia is marked by a mix of anticipation and cautious optimism. Some view the development as an opportunity to strengthen and expand the federal model and rebuild Somali federalism on the principles of equitable partnership and national unity. Others fear it may further complicate Somalia’s already intricate political dynamics, potentially escalating tensions and conflict both in the region and the country as a whole. Domestic and international stakeholders remain hopeful that these significant changes will prompt meaningful political dialogue among all Somali parties and stakeholders to forge consensus and chart a stable path forward.

The success of the new administration hinges on its ability to establish itself within a politically charged environment rife with tribal rivalries. It faces considerable hurdles in establishing functioning executive and legislative institutions, securing financial and logistical support and ensuring basic security. Most critically,  it must gain recognition and legitimacy, especially from other federal entities, amid a lack of consensus at both regional and federal levels. Without garnering sufficient acceptance from neighboring states, the administration risks remaining a symbolic entity.

Even at the local level, the new federal entity still lacks inclusive cohesion and effective control over all the territories it claims to represent. Skepticism persists among certain tribal groups, especially the Warsangli clan, about fair representation. In the Sanag region, divisions remain between supporters of the new entity and others who maintain allegiance to Puntland political and administrative structures. These tribal and regional contradictions pose significant obstacles to consolidating loyalty and building a unified governance framework.

Summary and Conclusions

The declaration of a new federal state in the Khatumo region of northeastern Somalia has sparked political controversy and deepened divisions among the Somali population. Reactions from the federal government, Somaliland and Puntland reflect growing tensions and competing visions for Somalia’s future. The disputed region’s strategic importance is likely to grow as tribal competition and regional polarization intensify, further complicating the already fragile situation in the country.

Despite the initial enthusiasm from supporters and strong opposition from rivals, the emerging administration faces numerous challenges on its path toward full federal integration. Addressing its fragile legitimacy will require expanding its representative base, resolving tribal divisions, securing both governmental and external support, improving security and living conditions and gaining recognition from other members of the Somali Federation, particularly Puntland. Additionally, mitigating potential threats from Somaliland will be essential to ensuring the stability and viability of the new state.

Somaliland Foreign Minister Bakaal under the Shadow of US DOJ’s Investigation

Somaliland Foreign Minister Bakaal under the Shadow of US DOJ’s Investigation

By any measure, President Abdirahaman Mohamed Abdillahi “Cirro” has appointed the weakest cabinet in Somaliland’s history. Instead of selecting ministers based on qualifications, merit, or vision, most were chosen for clan identity (DEI – Diversity, Equality, & Inclusion) or campaign contributions. No appointment has been more damaging to Somaliland’s national security and foreign policy than the naming of Mr. Abdirahman Adam Bakaal as Foreign Minister.

Bakaal has no foreign policy background, no government experience, and only a high school education which impairs his effective communication with other diplomats.

His sole qualification for office appears to be the $120,000 campaign contribution his wife, Muna Firdhin, made to Irro’s 2024 presidential bid. That payment secured him the position of Foreign Minister—one of the most vital posts for a country still fighting for international recognition.

This was a reckless political bargain, and Somaliland is now paying the price.

Bakaal cannot represent Somaliland credibly while under the shadow of an active U.S. Department of Justice investigation.In Minneapolis, Minnesota, his wife, Muna Firdhin, 44, has already been charged in the “Feeding Our Future” fraud scheme. Prosecutors say she stole more than $1 million from a federal child nutrition program, using the funds to purchase a house, luxury items and to bankroll Irro’s campaign. An indictment of Bakaal himself remains a possibility.

The mere fact that Somaliland’s Foreign Minister is entangled in such a scandal undermines our international credibility. No serious government can defend appointing a chief diplomat who may face criminal prosecution abroad

Somaliland’s diplomacy has been in disarray since Bakaal assumed office. Instead of strengthening ties with our most important ally and trading partner, Ethiopia, Cirro administration has pursued repeated visits to Qatar—a state openly hostile to Somaliland’s independence. Such moves raise legitimate fears that backroom deals are being struck that compromise our sovereignty.

More troubling, Abdirahman Beyle, a known Siad Barre apologist and former Somalia Finance Minister, and Jama Mohamoud Abdillahi Egal – widely known as (@Jgabush) Gabush and is Cirro cousin, are shaping Somaliland’s foreign policy. This is a betrayal of the very idea of Somaliland’s independence, fought for with sacrifice and defended for more than three decades.

President Cirro must come clean: does he truly believe in Somaliland’s independence, or is his government quietly preparing to unite with the failed state of Somalia under pressure from foreign sponsors?

While the government flounders, Somaliland diaspora remains one of our strongest assets. But too much energy is wasted on social media arguments with Somaliland detractors. Instead, the diaspora should engage where it matters most: local politics and advocacy.

Recently, Congressman Scott Perry (R-PA) has introduced legislation in the U.S. Congress to recognize Somaliland. Every Somaliland supporter should lobby their representatives to co-sponsor this bill. Write to your congressman. Write to local newspapers and universities. Tell Somaliland story and expose the failure of U.S. policy, which rewards chaos and corruption in Mogadishu while ignoring peace and democracy in Hargeisa.

I still remember the 1980s, when the Somali National Movement (SNM) was fighting against Somalia’s Marxist dictator, Siad Barre. Despite Barre enjoying the support of the United States, Italy, Arab countries, a large embassy in Washington, D.C., and a powerful lobby led by Paul Manafort—later Trump’s campaign manager—a handful of determined patriots operated from a small office in Falls Church, Virginia. From there, they waged a relentless media campaign, exposing the atrocities of Barre’s regime to the world.

Their efforts eventually contributed to the U.S. cutting off aid, the regime’s financial lifeline. That office was led by the resolute and determined leadership of Dr. Ibrahim Meygag Samatar. We can replicate those efforts today, but only if we unite and rise above the divisive clan politics that continue to hold us back.

Our representative in Washington, Bashir Goth, must also do more. He has failed to engage with the diaspora, leaving untapped powerful resource that could amplify Somaliland’s case in the United States. This must change immediately!

Somaliland has no shortage of qualified, respected figures who could represent our cause on the world stage—individuals like Professor Ahmed Ismail Samatar of Macalester College and others with decades of academic and diplomatic experience. Instead, we are saddled with a Foreign Minister whose main credential is a campaign payoff and whose loyalty to Somaliland is in question.

As Harry Truman famously said: “The buck stops here.” President Cirro cannot pass the blame. The appointment of Bakaal was his decision, and the damage done to Somaliland’s diplomacy is his responsibility. The people of Somaliland deserve better than an “anti-Somaliland” figure at the helm of our foreign policy at this critical juncture.

If Cirro truly cares about Somaliland’s independence, stability, and international reputation, he must act decisively and remove Bakaal from office.

For the sake of Somaliland’s sovereignty and dignity, Bakaal must go.

Author:  Ali-Guban Mohamed