Tag: Somalia

Somaliland: UAE built the port. Diaspora writes the checks. Now Israel and Taiwan Want in

Somaliland: UAE built the port. Diaspora writes the checks. Now Israel and Taiwan want in.

Seven months on from recognition, the focus is pivoting from aid to hard investment. Here is what that actually looks like on the ground.

This is a bonus edition of Horn Horizons, part of the Global Power Shifts network, where I track Power, Ports, and Prosperity across the Horn and the Red Sea.

Somaliland is the closest thing the Horn has to a live experiment. A state recognized by only one country is trying to turn a Gulf-grade port and diaspora savings into a real economy. Israel and Taiwan test the edges, while the wider neighborhood watches what a single recognition unlocks.

The open question is whether any serious capital beyond the diaspora’s own actually shows up. To find out who’s buying, and where the pitch runs ahead of the plumbing beneath it, I sat down with Hana Kaise Abdi, founding partner of Bilow Capital , who guides foreign investors into Somaliland on the ground in Hargeisa.

Israel became the first and so far only country to recognize Somaliland in December last year, over objections from the African Union, the Arab League and, loudest of all, Mogadishu. A state recognized by just one country can’t borrow on international markets or draw on the development banks, so the capital that builds Somaliland arrives as investment, not debt, and most of it comes via the diaspora.

Remittances to Somalia as a whole, Somaliland included, run around $3 billion a year, much of it into land, property and businesses, and seven months on that hasn’t shifted. DP World is expanding its Berbera port terminal and the dismantling of USAID under the Trump administration has pushed donors to talk investment where they once focused on grants, but the buyer writing the checks is still overwhelmingly Somaliland’s own.

Hana wants to widen that pool. British-born, raised in Bristol by parents who fled the civil war, she moved to Hargeisa about seven years ago and co-founded Bilow Capital, which walks foreign investors through market research and due diligence, runs an accelerator, the Bilow Venture Lab, and since February has deployed a diaspora-backed fund, the Rise Fund, into startups that complete the cohort.

“The private sector’s the real route for sustainable development,” she tells me, a conviction that hardened as she watched the 2017 famine from the UK. She’s paid on the investment flow she describes, which is reason enough to hear her out and to read the numbers with that interest attached.

Recognition moved faster than the money

The harder assets moved earlier. DP World has run Berbera since 2017 and is building it toward a 2 million-container capacity, with a direct Jebel Ali service launched some eight months ago, and Hana treats the port as proof of concept — “a great symbol for what can be achieved if more foreign investors came in.”What the port mostly ships is the economy’s mainstay: live sheep and goats bound for Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, which made up about two-thirds of exports in 2024 and peak each year around Hajj time. Much of the investment case is a bet on diversifying away from that single artery.

The politics that dominate the headlines have, so far, left that balance sheet alone, which is the part that matters for anyone pricing exposure. Somalia’s annulment of its agreements with the UAE in January landed on federal Somalia and Abu Dhabi’s bases there, not on Berbera, and Hana reports no measurable effect on Somaliland itself. The 2024 memorandum meant to grant Ethiopia sea access for a step toward recognition is effectively frozen, and she doesn’t oversell it, calling Ethiopian investment interest “a matter of time” rather than a live pipeline.

Where she sees the newest interest is Taiwan, the Gulf, and Israel:

  • Taiwan: A natural counterpart — a self-governing island much of the world declines to call a country, for fear of provoking Beijing, yet trades with anyway. It moved earliest in hard assets, years before recognition was on the table: in 2021 Taiwan’s state oil company, CPC, took a 49% stake in a Somaliland exploration block, SL10B/13, operated by the British-Turkish firm Genel Energy, whose Toosan-1 prospect is estimated at up to 650 million barrels. Nothing’s out of the ground yet. The block’s still at the exploration stage, with no commercial well drilled, and Genel has been seeking a licence extension that would push a first drilling deadline toward 2027, even as its Taiwanese partner presses to move faster. Other Taiwanese firms are active in mining, fisheries, and agriculture.
  • The Gulf: Runs UAE-first, with Saudi money as the natural extension of that livestock trade.
  • Israel: The freshest and the least monetized. The areas she flags are agriculture and water (desalination and irrigation, where Israeli firms lead), technology, digital health, and health care, alongside a Red Sea security logic that’s really about the view it buys: Berbera sits across the water from Yemen, a vantage point on the Houthis and the Bab el-Mandeb chokepoint. “Very early days,” Hana said. That stretch of water’s stayed in the headlines, with the Iran-aligned Houthis recently attacking two Saudi oil tankers about 70 nautical miles southwest of Al Shuqaiq, near the strait.

The interview

Edited for length and clarity. The figures are hers unless attributed otherwise.

Q: Who’s actually putting money in?

Hana: The biggest chunk is the diaspora, without question. There’s remittance of roughly $3 billion, and while a lot of that’s consumption, a large amount goes into investment. There isn’t hard data I can point you to, but I’m diaspora, as is my whole extended family, and you can see it: a lot of the real estate is diaspora-owned, a lot of land, a lot of businesses.

Beyond that, there are two types of clients I work with. One is private-sector investors looking for market-rate returns, interested in fisheries, agriculture, mining, manufacturing, usually businesses from the Middle East or high-net-worth individuals. The other is development agencies trying to move away from the aid model into an investment model, who want to put money into things like the venture lab and the fund.

Her $3 billion figure’s worth a footnote. Remittances on that order are the standard estimate for Somalia as a whole, not Somaliland alone, and the investment share of it isn’t separately documented, a caveat she volunteers herself. Read it as direction, not measurement.

Q: What do your founders actually lack?

Hana: Capital, of course, is the first thing. But it goes beyond that. A lot of founders have brilliant ideas, and sometimes even the savings to start, but no procedures in place: financial management, operations, human resources, talent retention.

And formalization. One founder we worked with had a strong business and co-founders, but nothing was legalized or formalized, and it ended with him not being able to raise investment because of that. Moving from the informal to the formal economy is a huge missing link. Then working capital, because a lot of small businesses have no access to finance at all. And regulation, where the government hasn’t yet built an environment suited to small and medium businesses.

Q: Why the emphasis on women founders specifically?

Hana: There are a substantial number of female business owners, but they’re underrepresented and they don’t get the same opportunities. A lot of them don’t see themselves applying for something like an accelerator. They feel they might be excluded from it. So we push to bring the existing female founders through the cohorts, so they’re not left behind and get the same access to finance. It also gives them independence in their own lives and the ability to make a living themselves.

Q: For a non-diaspora investor, what about the legal framework? You’re, on paper, part of Somalia.

Hana: In practice, Somalia doesn’t regulate anything inside Somaliland, not the legal system, not the economy, definitely not the politics. Most investors just register their business here. If you go through the correct legal channels and the business or asset is in your name, and a dispute occurs with a partner on the ground, it’s very difficult to lose that case in the courts.

Some investors also choose to execute their contracts in the UAE or the UK. Either way it’s workable. The biggest misconception is how safe and how easy it actually is. As someone who’s traveled all over, Somaliland’s one of the safest places I’ve been

She’s talking about physical security, not investment risk, and there the UK Foreign Office is more cautious than she is; more on that below.

Her numbers, and the wider picture

Bilow doesn’t yet have an audited track record, and Hana’s candid that it’s early. In under a year, the venture lab has run two cohorts with about 46% female participation. Since launching the fund in February the firm has invested in 10 businesses, and seen more than 80% of participants qualify for investment after the program. One founder, she said, raised more than $200,000 in a single round, and others have opened second branches in Hargeisa or been approached directly by investors. The Rise Fund is structured as an open-ended, evergreen vehicle and began deploying immediately rather than waiting for a first close, which it hasn’t yet reached.

These are the firm’s own figures, from a party raising capital on the strength of them and with no independent registry to test them against, so read them as a founder’s self-report, not a verified return. What can be checked is the opportunity she points to, and the public record broadly supports her framing:

  • Fisheries: Her claim that the fisheries are barely exploited holds up: sector assessments put under 10% of stocks worked on a Gulf of Aden coast that ranks among East Africa’s richer fishing grounds.
  • Manufacturing: Her pitch rests on the country importing more than 90% of what it consumes, which she frames as room for import substitution rather than a solved problem.
  • Legal comfort: Real on paper, as Somaliland’s investment law grants foreign investors national treatment, a three-year tax holiday, and import-tax exemptions on equipment.

What the pitch leaves out

The formalization trap Hana cautions against is also the market’s central risk. When a viable business misses out simply because its founders never put proper contracts in place, the constraint isn’t a lack of ideas, but the fragile foundation beneath it. No accelerator program can substitute for commercial law, functional courts, or a regulator built to support small business. It’s the exact same gap a foreign investor inherits.

Recognition sits on the same ledger. Somaliland’s record of stability and peaceful transfers is real, and the safety case Hana makes is strong on its own terms, but the same non-recognition that shuts out sovereign debt also shuts out the political-risk insurance and development-finance guarantees that de-risk large projects, which is why what moves is still mostly diaspora equity and word of mouth. Her own workaround, registering locally but signing contracts under UAE or UK law, is a rational hedge and an admission of what the domestic framework can’t yet guarantee.

And she’s describing day-to-day Hargeisa, not the whole risk picture: the UK Foreign Office still advises against all but essential travel to Somaliland, and Houthi leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi declared in a televised address, days after recognition, that any Israeli presence in Somaliland would be treated as “a military target” (Times of Israel). A serious investor prices the corridor, not the city alone.

Somaliland’s story has moved faster than its balance sheet. Recognition, a Gulf-grade port, and the dismantling of USAID driven by Donald Trump and Elon Musk’s DOGE have made ‘investment, not aid’ the language everyone in Hargeisa now speaks, and Hana’s fluent in it because she’s been making that argument since before it was fashionable. But the buyers are still overwhelmingly the diaspora, because that’s most of what a largely unrecognized state has to work with, and Israeli recognition isn’t yet a financing system.

That’s also why the founders she works with keep being held back by the same unglamorous things: lack of paperwork, working capital, and basic regulation. The pitch works on paper, but the legal and regulatory rails beneath it remain fragile. I’d watch whether the aid-to-investment pivot converts into deployed private capital, and whether government policy catches up with the headlines by building the legal and banking infrastructure small businesses actually need.

The bottom line

So, who wants to invest in Somaliland? For now, the people who already believe in it.

  • The diaspora: Writes these checks because it’s personally invested in seeing Somaliland thrive, beyond the returns.
  • Israel: Has named its interests but not yet its money.
  • Taiwan: Has paid for an oil block it still has to drill.
  • The Gulf: Already the anchor customer, taking the live sheep and goats that remain the economy’s mainstay. For Abu Dhabi, Berbera is the template for doing business with an unrecognized state, feeding its wider ports strategy across Africa.
  • Ethiopia: Berbera offers the landlocked country sea access, a huge priority for Addis, and a way to diversify away from Djibouti, through which some 95% of its trade travels. DP World signed a 2021 memorandum of understanding with Addis to invest up to $1 billion in the Berbera-Ethiopia trade corridor, though where that agreement stands today is an open question.

The next twelve months will show which of those turns into deployed capital.

Between Maritime Access and Recognition: Geopolitical Implications of Rapprochement Between Ethiopia and Somaliland

Between Maritime Access and Recognition: Geopolitical Implications of Rapprochement Between Ethiopia and Somaliland

Recent statements by Somaliland’s foreign minister, Abdirahman Dahir Adam, also known as “Bakal” — affirming Ethiopia’s right to sea access and Hargeisa’s readiness to discuss this issue with the Ethiopian government — have reignited debate over Ethiopia-Somaliland relations. These remarks carry particular weight in the context of shifting power dynamics around the Red Sea, where intensifying global competition over maritime routes underscores the growing strategic importance of ports and logistical infrastructure. At the heart of this debate lies a structural geopolitical dilemma: Ethiopia’s landlocked geography on one side, and Somaliland’s uncertain status within the regional order on the other. The challenge extends beyond bilateral ties between Hargeisa and Addis Ababa, encompassing questions of sovereignty, recognition, and the balance of power in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea region.

The interview given by Somaliland’s foreign minister to the Ethiopian newspaper The Reporter on June 6, 2026, conveyed several key messages that reveal the implications and motives behind the revival of this maritime cooperation issue, the future of relations between Somaliland and Ethiopia, and the ongoing transformations in the Horn of Africa:

First, the statements emphasized the flexibility of the new administration in Hargeisa and its openness toward its Ethiopian neighbor. They suggest that Somaliland may not necessarily require formal Ethiopian recognition at this stage, but rather seeks to strengthen its partnerships with Addis Ababa and other regional and international actors. This approach is intended to bolster Somaliland’s de facto legitimacy and improve its negotiating position with Mogadishu, even in the absence of legal recognition. Despite growing expectations among Somaliland’s leadership and elite that friendly countries like Ethiopia and Kenya might follow Israel’s lead in recognizing Somaliland, Bakal clarified that his government respects Ethiopia’s policy and would never push Addis Ababa toward recognition. He expressed confidence, however, that Ethiopia will eventually view Somaliland as “a reliable and stable partner that it will eventually recognize.” This reflects a growing awareness in Hargeisa that the real value lies not only in potential recognition, but in positioning Somaliland as an indispensable partner in regional arrangements concerning ports, trade, and logistical corridors.

Second, the interview paved the way for a new negotiating track. When the Somaliland minister was asked how far his country’s new administration had changed its policy toward neighboring Ethiopia, which he described as Somaliland’s closest and most important ally in the Horn of Africa, and whether the administration wished to revive the controversial memorandum of understanding with Ethiopia, he did not provide a direct answer. Instead, he shifted the discussion away from the memorandum itself, which he said was “not the only thing” possible in the course of cooperation between the two sides, and emphasized the broader idea that Hargeisa understood Ethiopia’s maritime needs and was prepared to discuss them. He also noted that Ethiopia could make greater use of the port of Berbera, which, according to him, has not yet happened. This formulation does not necessarily indicate a formal return to the memorandum of understanding. Rather, it reflects an attempt to reproduce the strategic logic on which the memorandum was based, with a view to reintroducing it within a new negotiating framework that is less politically costly and more diplomatically acceptable. In other words, Hargeisa may be seeking to separate the strategic project from the legal and political framework that has raised regional and international objections, by presenting maritime cooperation with Ethiopia as a long-term economic and logistical project rather than a geopolitical maneuver conditional on recognition or one that infringes on questions of sovereignty.

Third, Hargeisa is seeking to capitalize on regional transformations that enhance Somaliland’s geostrategic value. This is especially true of developments related to the war with Iran and its proxies, and their repercussions for Red Sea security and global supply chains. These developments have led to a reassessment of the strategic importance of ports and vital coastal sites in the Horn of Africa, including the port of Berbera. The port is becoming increasingly attractive, especially for Ethiopia, as one of the potential alternatives for reducing its dependence on Djibouti. It is also gaining relevance as part of the broader restructuring of regional transport and trade networks, as well as emerging maritime security arrangements.

The chances of reviving the maritime access issue and reaching new arrangements between Ethiopia and Somaliland have increased

The prospects for reviving maritime cooperation and reaching new arrangements between Ethiopia and Somaliland appear stronger than before. Despite the uncertainty created by the “Ankara Declaration” signed between Ethiopia and Somalia in late 2024, several drivers continue to support — and even reinforce — the potential for a deeper partnership.

First, Internal Pressures: Domestic circumstances in both countries create incentives to break the deadlock, opening space for development and joint growth. Both governments increasingly recognize the feasibility of partnership, given the convergence of economic and strategic interests.

Second, Somaliland’s Growing Assertiveness: Somaliland’s recent success in consolidating power has emboldened Hargeisa to challenge Mogadishu more directly, strengthening its confidence in pursuing independent arrangements.

Third, Port Negotiations: Statements by Somaliland’s foreign minister did not rule out the possibility of granting Ethiopia a sovereign seaport. Rather, they suggested a willingness to negotiate better terms or wait for more favorable timing, signaling flexibility rather than outright rejection.

Fourth, Somalia’s Instability: The deteriorating situation in Somalia — marked by the federal government’s crisis of legitimacy and accumulated failures to establish a stable governance model in the south — creates further openings for Somaliland to advance alternative arrangements.

Fifth, Regional and International Context: Potential regional supporters for this type of arrangement, combined with growing international concern over Red Sea security and global supply chains, may help create an enabling environment for expanding logistical cooperation. While comprehensive political agreements remain unlikely in the near term, these dynamics could sustain incremental progress in maritime collaboration.

On the other hand, this path faces significant structural and political obstacles. Foremost among them is the legal status of Somaliland, which remains unrecognized internationally, and the firm position of Mogadishu, which enjoys broad support from the African Union and most international partners. In addition, the Ankara Declaration has created a new political reality that may make any Ethiopian return to unilateral arrangements with Hargeisa more politically and diplomatically costly. Such a move could be interpreted as a retreat from Ethiopia’s efforts to maintain calm with Somalia, especially given Addis Ababa’s ambitious demands — including a military base — and its declining reliance on Somalia, which is unable to offer a credible alternative for port access.

Beyond these bilateral challenges, the fragile balance of power in the Red Sea, overlapping interests of regional actors, and the sensitivity of port-related issues add further complications. The volatility of the regional security environment undermines the prospects for sovereign agreements and weakens the ability of both parties to commit to long-term arrangements that require durable political and security stability.

The resurgence of Ethiopia-Somaliland maritime cooperation reflects broader regional transformations. The revival of the idea of granting Ethiopia maritime access through Somaliland goes beyond economic and logistical considerations. It constitutes a critical test of sovereignty, recognition, and influence in the Horn of Africa, with far-reaching implications for relations between Mogadishu and Hargeisa, broader geopolitical balances in the region, and the interests of external powers.

1. Implications for Mogadishu-Hargeisa Relations 

For Mogadishu and Hargeisa, the issue is not merely about port facilities for Ethiopia — it sets a political precedent that directly touches on sovereignty and legitimacy. Any maritime arrangement between Ethiopia and Somaliland would deepen the divide between Somalia and Somaliland, exacerbating long-standing disputes, particularly against the backdrop of Somaliland’s normalization of relations with Israel.

While Somalia’s federal government asserts its full and exclusive authority over all Somali territory, including Hargeisa and Berbera, and threatens to use force to reintegrate Somaliland into the Somali federal state, the most dangerous aspect may not be the Somali response itself. Rather, it lies in the interplay of internal and external factors that continue to deepen the rift between the ruling elites in the south and north. The Somaliland issue is no longer merely an internal political matter that can be resolved through dialogue or gradual containment. It has become a distinct reality intertwined with regional and international calculations and interests that extend beyond the control of Somali and Somaliland leaders.

2. Implications for Regional Balances

The Ethiopia-Somaliland partnership exemplifies the intensifying geopolitical competition in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. In recent years, the region has undergone profound transformations, with the focus shifting from security issues, border disputes, and counterterrorism to ports, sea lanes, and logistics infrastructure.

Strengthening cooperation with Ethiopia would mark a qualitative leap for Somaliland, expanding its network of foreign relations and strengthening its position at the heart of the regional and geopolitical equation. It would also place Hargeisa on a clearer path toward broader international engagement as a de facto independent actor. In return, it would significantly advance Ethiopia’s strategic project to build maritime influence, including securing a permanent port and military base on the Red Sea coast. Such a development could redefine Ethiopia’s regional role and reshape the balance of power and maritime security equations in this vital corridor and the wider region.

The Future of the Ethiopia-Somaliland Partnership

Available evidence suggests that the partnership between Addis Ababa and Hargeisa will be shaped not only by internal dynamics and political will, but also by evolving regional balances across the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa. Expectations regarding maritime access and political recognition fluctuate between three possible scenarios.

Scenario 1:The Expansion of Functional Cooperation

This scenario builds on the existing trajectory of gradual cooperation, focusing on economic rather than political dimensions. It could involve greater use of the Port of Berbera, development of trade routes and infrastructure, and the creation of special economic zones. Crucially, it avoids sensitive political or sovereign arrangements that could be interpreted as implicit recognition of Somaliland or affecting its current legal status.

Grounded in pragmatism, this path allows both sides to achieve economic gains while minimizing political risks. It provides a practical and predictable framework with fewer risks, including those perceived by Somalilanders, southern Somali unionists, and their regional allies. This approach also aligns with the Ankara Declaration and with the preference of many international partners to promote economic integration while preserving the existing legal framework. It is therefore the most realistic and achievable scenario in the short and medium term, and it could evolve gradually through cumulative implementation steps rather than through a comprehensive political agreement.

Scenario 2: Negotiating a New Formula That Could Lead to Ethiopian Recognition of Somaliland

This scenario assumes that the governments of Abiy Ahmed and Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi, better known as “Irro”, will engage in serious discussions that could lead to reviving or improving the previous memorandum of understanding. This could result in a more comprehensive agreement granting Ethiopia long-term maritime privileges in exchange for political and economic gains for Somaliland. These gains could include formal recognition or steps that approach it in practice.

This scenario reflects Ethiopia’s growing maritime ambitions and Somaliland’s increasing confidence in its ability to expand its foreign policy options. However, its realization remains dependent on changes in the regional and international environment. First, Ethiopia would need to be convinced that the strategic gains outweigh the potential costs of deviating from the understandings established by the Ankara Declaration. This makes the scenario possible, though less likely, in the foreseeable future.

Scenario 3: Strategic Stagnation

In this scenario, political and diplomatic constraints prevent a breakthrough on the maritime access issue, leaving relations between the two parties uncertain. This scenario could gain strength if renewed momentum emerges in the reconciliation process between Ethiopia and Somalia. It could also become more likely if leadership priorities or political calculations change in Addis Ababa, Hargeisa, or Mogadishu. Additionally, Mogadishu’s ability to mobilize regional and international pressure could increase, leading to the containment or obstruction of any arrangements to which it is not a party. This would, in turn, reduce opportunities for maritime cooperation between Ethiopia and Somaliland.

However, such a stalemate would not address the root causes of the problem, including Ethiopia’s geographical constraints, Somaliland’s limited legal status, and increasing regional competition over sea lanes. These factors make this scenario less sustainable in the medium and long term.

Conclusions

Recent developments in relations between Ethiopia and Somaliland reveal that the issue of Ethiopian maritime access is re-emerging within new regional dynamics. Despite the constraints imposed by the Ankara Declaration and the sensitivity of the Somali sovereignty question, the motives driving both parties have become more urgent.

However, the future of this path will likely depend on the parties’ ability to reconcile the imperatives of economic geography with the requirements of political legitimacy. This makes the gradual expansion of functional economic and logistical cooperation the most likely scenario in the foreseeable future.

By contrast, the scenario of reviving the memorandum of understanding in a modified form that includes official recognition or sovereign arrangements remains contingent on deeper regional and international transformations, as well as shifting calculations among key actors. This makes the maritime access issue itself a central determinant of regional stability and a pivotal factor in reshaping the geopolitical order in the Horn of Africa in the coming years.

Source: Emirates Policy Center

President Irro of Somaliland is in Israel on a State Visit

President Irro of Somaliland is in Israel on a State Visit

On Sunday, June 14, 2026, Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi arrived in Jerusalem, making it the first time a leader from the Somaliland Republic in the Horn of Africa had visited Israel on an official visit. Since Israel became the first UN member state to formally recognize Somaliland’s sovereignty in December of last year, the bilateral relationship has drastically changed, and this visit marks a significant turning point.

The official opening of the Somaliland Embassy, an important symbolic event, is at the core of Jerusalem’s diplomatic agenda. Israeli President Isaac Herzog welcomed President Abdullahi to the President’s Residence and spoke to him in Somali and English.

Upon his arrival, President Abdullahi declared, “The people of Somaliland have built a peaceful, democratic, and resilient nation for 35 years.” “Do you see us?” we asked the world. Israel was the first to respond.

The visit comes after Israel became the first member of the UN to formally recognize the Republic of Somaliland in December 2025. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made this decision “in the spirit of the Abraham Accords,” and it was supported by pledges of broad collaboration in the fields of energy technology, agriculture, health, and water management.

The visit takes place in the context of growing regional security concerns, in addition to the diplomatic ceremony. The Red Sea, a vital conduit for international trade, is cited by analysts as the main force for the growing alliance. According to recent reports, Israel has expanded its intelligence presence in the area, and talks on the strategic value of the Berbera International Airport are still going on.

The engagement’s cornerstone continues to be security cooperation. The present team is anticipated to complete framework agreements on maritime security and information sharing, and reports suggest that Somaliland officials and presidential guard units have received training in Israel. Regional observers see these changes as an attempt to offset challenges, such as the actions of Houthi rebels operating along the Bab al-Mandab Strait.

There has been debate around the growing relationships. Israel’s recognition of Somaliland has been repeatedly denounced by the Federal Government of Somalia as an infringement on its geographical integrity and sovereignty. Concern has also been voiced by regional nations, with China expressing unease about the possibility of an Israeli presence close to its maritime trading routes.

A visit to Yad Vashem, the World Holocaust Remembrance Center, and a number of high-level talks with Israel’s defense, finance, and economy ministries are part of President Abdullahi’s program, which runs through Thursday.

Hargeisa nevertheless faces the difficulty of converting this diplomatic victory into real infrastructure and economic benefits. Jerusalem views the visit as a strategic outreach effort to broaden its regional partnerships. The international world is still concerned about how this unique collaboration would affect the precarious balance of power in the Horn of Africa as the Somaliland Embassy is ready to open.

Somaliland Is Drawn Into a Perilous Middle East

Somaliland Is Drawn Into a Perilous Middle East

Israel’s recognition of Somaliland has given the nation long-sought visibility. It has also drawn it into the growing tensions reshaping the region.

Omar Ahmed and Ismail Bihaya are still a little dazed. In late March, the two hydrologists, both 32, were taking selfies on the esplanade of Jerusalem’s mosques, framed by the dazzling gold of the Dome of the Rock. The trip, the first of their lives, had long felt out of reach. Their country, the Republic of Somaliland, does not exist in the eyes of the world. “Our passport isn’t recognized anywhere. Except now, Israel,” Omar says with a grin, back in the lab where he and his colleague spend their days testing the water quality of Hargeisa, the capital of this breakaway region of Somalia.

Everything changed on December 26. That day, Israel became the first country to formally recognize Somaliland (formerly British Somaliland) as a sovereign state. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu appeared in a video call congratulating Somaliland’s president, Abdirahman Abdullahi.

The backlash was immediate. Somalia, the African Union, the Arab League, and even the UN Security Council condemned the move, accusing Israel of violating the principle of territorial integrity.

In Hargeisa, those reactions barely registered. That night, crowds flooded the streets in celebration. For several days, Israeli journalists covering the event were greeted with cheers as they moved through the city, an almost surreal scene in a Muslim-majority country, and all the more striking in the immediate aftermath of the war in Gaza.

Downtown Hargeisa, capital of Somaliland
Downtown Hargeisa, the capital of Somaliland

 

To understand that joy, one has to go back to the late 1980s. A former British protectorate, Somaliland had actually gained independence in 1960 before voluntarily uniting with the former Italian protectorate of Somalia. The union soon began to unravel. Amid growing clan tensions, the Somalia regime in Mogadishu launched a brutal campaign against the northern region, culminating in the near-total destruction of Hargeisa in 1988. The civil war left between 50,000 and 200,000 dead. “Hundreds of thousands more were driven into exile,” recalls a businessman who returned years later. “It was apocalyptic.” In 1991, as Somalia descended into chaos, Somaliland declared independence.More than three decades later, that independence remains unrecognized. Except, now, by Israel.

Omar Ahmed, chief engineer, Somaliland, Ministry of Water
Omar Ahmed, chief engineer at Somaliland’s Ministry of Water, was part of a delegation of 25 experts sent to Israel in March to train in modern irrigation techniques

Israel’s Intentions

To inaugurate their new partnership, Israeli authorities invited 25 Somaliland hydrologists for training in modern irrigation and water management. Omar and Ismail were among them. They came back impressed. “The scale of their desalination plants is staggering,” Omar says. “They are global leaders in water management. With infrastructure like that, we could completely transform our country.” Cooperation has accelerated quickly. Beyond training programs, Israel has announced investments in Somaliland’s infrastructure. The two governments exchanged ambassadors in April. Still, few here believe Israel’s intentions are purely developmental.

Tel Aviv is widely seen as eyeing Somaliland’s strategic location: roughly 500 miles of coastline along the Gulf of Aden, through which around 12 percent of global trade passes — an ideal vantage point from which to project military power. According to Bloomberg, Israeli officials have already identified a potential coastal site for a future base, a claim Somaliland has publicly denied.

Whether Israel actually intends to establish a military presence remains officially unconfirmed. Asked directly, a senior official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs dismissed the Bloomberg report as lacking “clarity,” without explicitly denying it.

 televised debate, MMTV, alliance, Somaliland, Israel
A televised debate on MMTV, Somaliland’s main television channel, about the alliance between Somaliland and Israel.

That ambiguity contrasts with what is said more privately. Several sources with close ties to the Somaliland authorities describe the project as an “open secret.” “Israelis want a base in Somaliland to monitor the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Houthis in Yemen. The government simply cannot confirm it yet, given the ongoing turmoil in the Middle East,” said a businessman with close ties to power.

In practice, no agreement has been announced and no infrastructure is visible on the ground. But the convergence of discreet diplomatic contacts, strategic logic, and local expectations has made the prospect of a base feel less like a distant possibility than a question of timing.

America’s Interests

Other countries are watching closely.

Aerial view, port of Berbera, Somaliland, DP World
Aerial view of the port of Berbera, in western Somaliland, developed by the Emirati company DP World. Photo credit: DP World

Ethiopia, landlocked and eager for access to the sea, nearly finalized a deal in 2024 to secure a 12-mile coastal strip of Somaliland along the Gulf of Aden before backing down under pressure from Mogadishu. The United Arab Emirates, which normalized relations with Israel under the Abraham Accords, has also taken a keen interest in the region. Starting in 2016, its port operator, DP World, has built a major terminal in the Gulf port of Berbera.

“We’ve invested $400 million,” says Maftouh Harir, a DP World executive, standing high above the docks on a towering quay crane. “The goal is to serve Ethiopia, which has no access to the sea.” Out on the horizon, a control tower rises above the sea spray. Nearby, Berbera’s airport, whose runway is among the longest in Africa, is no longer open to the public. Abu Dhabi is now converting it into a military base.

Ultimately, however, Somaliland’s hopes rest largely in Washington.

Within parts of Somaliland’s establishment, support for recognition has been building. As early as 2021, the Heritage Foundation published a policy paper urging the United States to recognize Somaliland as a way to counter China’s growing influence in nearby Djibouti, where Beijing has established its only overseas naval base just miles from a US installation.

Port of Berbera, Somaliland, Emirati company, DP World
Aerial view of the Berbera, developed by the Emirati company DP World. Photo credit: DP World

Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX), a close ally of Israel, has emerged as one of Hargeisa’s most vocal supporters. During a Senate hearing on April 23, he emphasized Somaliland’s “growing strategic relevance” and suggested that Donald Trump could formally recognize the territory before the end of his term.

At the same time, several members of the House of Representatives introduced legislation in March directing the Treasury Department to identify legal barriers preventing Somaliland from accessing the US financial system. The goal is to integrate Somaliland into the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication, or SWIFT network, a crucial step for dollar transactions. “Our banks cannot raise capital on international markets,” explains a Somaliland economist. “That forces them to charge prohibitively high interest rates. Access to SWIFT would be even more decisive than diplomatic recognition.”

For now, Somaliland’s government is trying to turn these diplomatic signals into economic gains. At the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Hargeisa, a delegation of Australian businessmen has come to explore opportunities in the mining sector. “What are your impressions of the country?” the minister asks, smiling broadly. “Very positive,” replies one of the visitors. “It was important for us to see things firsthand. We’ll be sending a positive message to our shareholders.”

“They can rest easy,” the minister says. “Somaliland is a haven of peace and stability. It’s the safest place in the Horn of Africa.”

‘A Functioning Democracy, the Most Advanced in the Region’

From the ground, Hargeisa bears the marks of a surprisingly dynamic African city. Cafés are filled with a stylish youth. Students snap selfies to celebrate the opening of a waffle shop. A new shopping mall of glass and steel is preparing to open its doors. Power outages are rare. The streets are clean. Markets are well stocked. And overlooking it all, the country’s first five-star hotel, which opened last August, glows at dusk.

market, Hargeisa, capital, Somaliland
A market in Hargeisa.

Despite lacking international recognition, Somaliland’s gross domestic product (GDP) per capita is about 50 percent higher than that of Somalia, and its poverty rate is roughly half. Even more striking is its political system.

“We are a functioning democracy, the most advanced in the region,” says Guleid Jama, a lawyer known for his work defending fundamental rights. “Since 1991, we’ve held six presidential elections, each followed by a peaceful transfer of power.” He is quick to add a caveat. “Our constitution, adopted in 2001, is relatively progressive. But our penal code still reflects the Mussolini-era legacy of Italian colonial law. Police frequently interfere with journalists and opposition figures.”

Marwo Sucaad, an opposition leader, confirms the mixed picture. “Our governments are elected democratically. There’s no doubt about that,” she says. “The 2024 campaign was vibrant, turnout was high. But corruption exists, and women remain largely excluded from power. No democracy is perfect, though.”

Marwo Sucaad, leading opposition figure, KAAH party, Hargeisa
The politician Marwo Sucaad, a leading opposition figure, at the headquarters of her Kaah party in Hargeisa.

Yet Somaliland’s stability rests on a delicate political balance. Power is largely concentrated in the hands of the central clan, which dominates the country demographically and territorially, particularly around Hargeisa. Other major groups in the west and the in the east, are integrated into the political system, but not without tension.

So far, this equilibrium has held. Since 1991, Somaliland has avoided the kind of fragmentation seen elsewhere in the region by maintaining a relatively cohesive state structure and repeated peaceful transfers of power. But that cohesion is not immutable. In the eastern regions, territorial disputes persist. In Las Anod, clashes that erupted in 2023 between Somaliland forces and local militias aligned with Somalia in the south left hundreds dead and displaced tens of thousands, exposing the fragility of the territory’s hold over its eastern fringes.

Israel’s arrival may now complicate that fragile balance.

‘Now That We Are Allied With Israel, Could This War Reach Us?’

Gulf of Aden, coast, Berbera, Somaliland, port
Berbera, Somaliland’s main port city, sits on the coast of the Gulf of Aden.

Barely two months after recognition, Tel Aviv became embroiled in a confrontation with Iran whose consequences could extend into the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. On the set of Somaliland’s main television channel, MMTV, the tone of debate has shifted.

“Now that we are allied with Israel, could this war reach us?” a journalist asked a political analyst in early April. “We have nothing to fear,” the analyst replied confidently. “Since the attacks of October 7, 2023, Israel has gained the upper hand over its enemies. It has become the dominant power in the Middle East. This alliance will allow us to develop, just as Saudi Arabia benefited from US protection after World War II.”

Others are less assured. In Yemen, the Houthi movement declared on December 28 that Berbera had become a “legitimate target.” Somaliland has limited means of deterrence. Its military is largely equipped with tanks and rocket launchers captured from Mogadishu at the end of the 1980s civil war and has no air-defense capabilities.

patrol, Somaliland, coast guard, port of Berbera
On patrol with Somaliland’s coast guard at the entrance to the port of Berbera. With limited resources, they monitor nearly 500 miles of coastline facing Yemen.

“Somaliland is preparing for this kind of scenario,” insists a senior official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Our generals are working day and night to ensure the country’s security.”

But for opposition figures, the greater risk lies elsewhere. “The eastern regions are still disputed,” worries Marwo Suad. “Somalia, backed by Turkey, China, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, could resume hostilities in response to Israel’s recognition. We are on the brink of another war.” Al-Shabaab, a powerful Somali insurgency group affiliated with al-Qaeda, has also vowed to fight any attempt by Israel to establish a presence in Somaliland.

“Only Washington can rein in Somalia’s backers,” says Marwo Suad. “That is the only protection that truly matters.” The government appears to share that view. In late February, it declared its readiness to grant the United States “exclusive access” to its mineral resources, as well as access to military bases. US military delegations visited Hargeisa and Berbera in June and November 2025. Still, there is little indication that Washington is eager to deploy troops, especially as the United States already maintains a base in Djibouti and cooperates with Mogadishu on counterterrorism.

On patrol, Somaliland, coast guard, Yemen
On patrol with Somaliland’s coast guard at the entrance to the port of Berbera. With limited resources, they monitor nearly 800 kilometers of coastline facing Yeme

For Somaliland’s leadership, however, recognition is only a means to a more immediate end: economic development. And here, the gap between expectations and reality remains stark.

Beneath Somaliland’s soil, geological surveys also suggest the presence of oil, gas, lithium, rare earth elements, and other minerals. Several foreign companies have already taken positions. The British firm Genel Energy has been exploring hydrocarbons since 2012. Taiwan’s Chang Development Company and Saudi Arabia’s Kilomass are looking into lithium. EAU Mining, the Australian company whose delegation visited Hargeisa, may soon follow. Yet beyond these early indicators, few deposits have been formally confirmed, and most projects are still at a preliminary stage.

Australian mining investors, foreign minister, Somaliland
A group of Australian mining investors meets with the foreign minister in Hargeisa

On the ground, investors are watching more than they are committing. The businessmen arriving in Hargeisa are not responding to a proven resource boom so much as to a political signal: the possibility that recognition could unlock access to international markets, financing, and legal protections that have long been out of reach.

Ahmed Osman Guelleh, a local industrialist, urges caution. “Mining is not how we will create the thousands of industrial jobs our youth need,” he says, standing in a warehouse stacked with crates of Coca-Cola bottled in his factory north of Hargeisa. “We need to focus on manufacturing, technology, and agriculture. Once we build that economic base, international recognition will follow naturally.”

For now, Somaliland faces structural constraints that recognition alone cannot resolve. Electricity is expensive, generated almost entirely from fuel oil. The workforce remains largely unskilled. Water is scarce in this arid climate. In the laboratory in Hargeisa, where he spends his days testing the city’s water, Omar Ahmed has been thinking about that gap ever since he returned from Israel.

“The scale of what we saw there… it’s billions of dollars,” he says. “Our entire Ministry of Water runs on about $1.8 million a year. Agriculture gets barely $2.8 million. Even with help from NGOs, we’re talking about a few million here and there. What we actually need is on a completely different scale.”

He pauses. “That’s the real gap. We come back with the knowledge, but we don’t have the money to do anything with it.” In a country that does not officially exist, recognition may open doors. But it will not, on its own, build a future.

Somalia & Somaliland: Battlegrounds as Turkey and Israel Seek the Control of the Red Sea

Somalia & Somaliland: Battlegrounds as Turkey and Israel Seek the Control of the Red Sea

Turkey and Israel are intensifying competition in the Horn of Africa, with Somalia and Somaliland emerging as key battlegrounds for oil, military influence and control of vital Red Sea trade routes.

Turkey has consolidated its position through formal agreements with Somalia’s federal government, securing major offshore and onshore oil and gas exploration rights alongside a strong military presence through its largest overseas training base. Israel, meanwhile, has moved closer to Somaliland after becoming the first country to formally recognize the territory as an independent state and is exploring plans for a military base near the Gulf of Aden to monitor Yemen’s Houthis and secure strategic access to the Red Sea corridor.

Earlier this year, Somalia confirmed it was ready to begin its first offshore oil drilling operations, with a Turkish government-owned drilling ship expected to arrive off its coast, according to BBC. The move followed the successful completion of seismic surveys last year by Turkey’s research vessel Oruç Reis, which collected 3D seismic data across key offshore blocks.

Somalia is estimated to hold at least 30 billion barrels of offshore oil potential and around 6 billion cubic meters of natural gas, though much of it remains unproven compared with established producers such as Libya and Nigeria.

Since 2011, Turkey has become one of Mogadishu’s closest allies, combining humanitarian support, military training and infrastructure investment. In December 2025, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said Ankara planned to establish a spaceport in Somalia.

Subsequent reports later confirmed that Turkey was exploring a broader aerospace facility, including a spaceport for satellite and possible missile launches, alongside plans for a naval base, while F-16 fighter jets were deployed inside Somalia in early 2026. In February 2026, Turkey also dispatched ageing U.S.-made M48 and M60 tanks through the streets of Mogadishu in a protected convoy after they were unloaded from a Turkish Navy landing ship.

According to reports, the tanks were deployed to secure Turkish facilities in the Warsheikh area, about 37 miles north of the capital, where Ankara is building the site for satellite launches and broader aerospace operations. Separately, Turkey recently reopened its $50 million military base in Mogadishu, reinforcing Ankara’s role in Somalia’s security sector and its support for the training of Somali National Army soldiers, including elite units involved in operations against Al-Shabaab.

Israel, meanwhile, has focused on Somaliland, whose coastline faces Yemen across the Gulf of Aden. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced in late 2025 that Israel had formally recognized Somaliland, describing the decision as being “in the spirit of the Abraham Accords.” The recognition triggered strong condemnation from Somalia and several Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia, Palestine, Egypt, Kuwait, Iraq, Jordan and Qatar, all of which rejected the decision as illegal and warned that it threatened regional stability and Somalia’s territorial unity.

Turkey also criticized the move, with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan calling Israel’s recognition of Somaliland “illegitimate and unacceptable” and later saying it “does not benefit” the region during a February visit to Ethiopia, one of Israel’s key allies in the Horn of Africa.

Despite the criticism, a Bloomberg report in March confirmed that Israel was exploring plans to build a military base in Somaliland to monitor and target Yemen’s Houthis, taking advantage of the region’s strategic location near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Defending the move, Shiri Fein-Grossman, chief executive of the Israel-Africa Relations Institute and a former member of Israel’s National Security Council, told Israeli outlet i24 News: “Everyone just looks at the map and understands what Israel is looking for here.”

“The recognition of Somaliland gives Israel a strategic location near the Houthis in Yemen and comes at a time that Israel needs as many friends as possible.”

Beyond Somalia and Somaliland, tensions between Turkey and Israel have deepened over Gaza, Syria and wider regional power projection, further exposing a growing geopolitical rivalry between the two military powers.

Middle East Eye reported that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has increasingly shifted his rhetoric towards Turkey as Ankara expands its influence across the eastern Mediterranean and Africa, particularly around Cyprus and Greece. In a post on X, Netanyahu accused President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of “massacring his own Kurdish citizens” and “accommodating Iran’s terror regime and its proxies”.

Turkey responded with sharp condemnation, with officials in Ankara describing Netanyahu as the “Hitler of the era”, citing Israel’s military actions in Gaza and across the region.

While Somalia and Somaliland remain central to their competition in the Horn of Africa, the broader dispute reflects a much wider struggle for influence stretching from the Red Sea to the Middle East, with both military powers seeking strategic bases in the two African territories to strengthen their regional reach.

Olamilekan Okebiorun is a business journalist covering markets, technology, and changing landscape of African economies for Business Insider Africa.

A Coalition with Diverse Agendas Team up for Opposing Somaliland Recognition in the Name of Somali Unity

A Coalition with Diverse Agendas Team up for Opposing Somaliland Recognition in the Name of Somali Unity

In late 2025, Israel officially announced its recognition of Somaliland, a self-declared independent region in northern Somalia that has asserted its sovereignty since 1991 but remains largely unrecognized by the international community. The decision marks a notable realignment in diplomatic relations across the Horn of Africa and the broader Middle East. In response, a coalition of 21 Arab, Islamic, and African states issued a joint statement condemning Israel’s move. They described it as a “grave violation of international law and the United Nations Charter,” reaffirmed their commitment to Somalia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, and explicitly rejected any suggestion that the recognition could be linked to efforts to displace the Palestinian people.

The sustained and coordinated efforts of geopolitically influential powers—including Egypt, Turkey, Djibouti, and Somalia—alongside a broader alliance of Arab and Muslim states such as Jordan, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Pakistan, and the Maldives, to prevent Somaliland from obtaining international recognition, illustrate a highly complex and multidimensional geopolitical phenomenon. This opposition has intensified in parallel with Somaliland’s increasing external engagements, particularly pragmatic contacts with Israel and other non-Arab actors.

This article argues that the region’s overwhelming opposition to Somaliland’s recognition cannot credibly be interpreted as a principled or neutral position grounded in international law, Islamic solidarity, or genuine concern for Somalia’s unity. Rather, through systematic analytical deconstruction, it demonstrates that this opposition stems from a convergence of narrow national interests, deep-seated geopolitical anxieties, and defensive reactions to the potential restructuring of the existing regional order.

On the surface, this stance is articulated through legalistic rhetoric—invoking sovereignty, territorial integrity, and moral symbolism, especially in relation to the Palestinian cause. Yet in practice, a persistent and fundamental paradox emerges between states’ declared principles and their actual conduct. The gap between discourse and action reveals that strategic calculations, rather than normative commitments, drive much of the regional response to Somaliland’s bid for statehood

Somaliland in Arab Politics: ‘File’ rather than ‘cause’

Complexity and agency, as well as the historical specificity of Somaliland, are being systematically denied within the political institutions, diplomatic circles, and strategic cultures of most Arab and Islamic capitals. It is hardly ever activated as an independent object of international politics or as an acceptable instance of self-determination based on a separate colonial and post-colonial experience. Rather, it is diminished to a bureaucratic abstraction, a file that needs to be handled but not a cause that needs to be comprehended.

It is a reduction that works in two paradigms that are overlapping and expedient politically. The former views Somaliland as a strictly sovereign entity, which is subordinated to Somalia. Somaliland, under this framing, falls under the category of internal administrative or constitutional issues of the internationally recognized state of Somalia. This division offers a pre-made rationale of the categorical denial of recognition or substantive international action, which is normally expressed in slogans like the preservation of the territorial integrity and the protection of the sovereignty of the central state. More importantly, this stance puts the symbolic sacredness of inherited boundaries above the material political facts. It consciously puts aside the institutional history, electioneering, and social contract of Somaliland for the sake of maintaining a formal cartographic wholeness, which, more often than not, exists on a piece of paper.

The second paradigm perceives Somaliland as an instrumentalized variable in a more comprehensive regional and world power policy. Within this framework, Somaliland emerges as a chess piece, as well as in the Israeli-Iranian game, the growing Turkish strategic presence in Africa, and the geostrategic struggle of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the maritime arteries of the Red Sea. In this logic, Somaliland does not possess a political actor or even a political interest of its own. Instead, it is diminished to a tactical area to be exploited, limited, or neutralized as per the strategic decisions of foreign powers.

The two paradigms are united in their deliberate ignorance of facts on the ground. Somaliland has a relatively long history of a stable and functional government, a period of over thirty years. It has also created effective electoral institutions, which have been able to handle competitive and peaceful transfers of power; internal security, which is starkly opposed to the chronic instability that plagues southern Somalia; economic and commercial infrastructure, including the development and operation of the Berbera port; and the ability to find responsible ways of dealing with external actors, including Ethiopia and Taiwan. This has been accompanied by a steady claim of disinterest and adherence to international standards.

Even with these facts that can be verified, Somaliland remains to be described as a state that is an exception—something that is inconvenient that poses a danger to the psychological and political underpinnings of the post-colonial Arab regional order. The order places a heavy burden on the sanctification of inherited borders, even though these boundaries may be supported by the use of coercion or without the truly popular consent. Another tactic employed by the capitals of Somaliland in the form of persistent political and media pressure, even when there is no hostile action or strategic provocation on the part of Hargeisa, highlights the existence of a deep-seated kind of hypocrisy.

The selective invocation of legal and religious rhetoric is not a kind of policy prescription but rather an act of performance of regional power management. It shows a crisis of credibility, where the interest in Somali unity is rhetorically magnified and the welfare, rights, and political will of the population of Somaliland are systematically discriminated against. Therefore, the Somaliland problem goes beyond the scope of a local conflict. It is a critical prism in which the incoherence and instability of regional strategic thought are revealed, as well as the way in which the emergent political realities are pushed into the background of the endless reproduction of established power accounts.

Somaliland faces rejection over precedent, not reality

The action taken by the various players to oppose the recognition of Somaliland is fueled by fears that go way beyond Somaliland itself. It is fundamentally fear, which is not about the existence of Somaliland but about the meaning of its success. The rejection is not aimed at the empirical reality on the ground as much as it is aimed at the political, legal, and ethical precedent on which recognition would be created.

The action taken by the various players to oppose the recognition of Somaliland is fueled by fears that go way beyond Somaliland itself.”

This fear has been expressed in three factors that are interlinked. The former is internal political contagion. The international acceptance of Somaliland on the basis of sound governance, historical particularism, and popular consent over a long period would serve as an influential example for marginalized or peripheral states in other Arab and African states. Such areas of the Sahel as Southern Syria, Iraqi Kurdistan, Southern Yemen, and other ethnically or politically distinct regions might use the example of Somaliland to justify the claim to autonomy or independence. To other regimes that routinely repress such claims, this possibility is a massive legitimacy problem, which compels awkward inquiries about how selectively they exercise sovereignty and self-determination.

The second dimension is associated with the holiness of colonial boundaries. The case of Somaliland proves that the boundaries that were established by the European colonialists are not fixed and even natural. It demonstrates that political order, institutional effectiveness, and social cohesion can be developed without—and even against—those borders. This ideological and practical threat is a danger to centralized states that are based on inherited territorial structures as the basis of authority. The recognition of Somaliland might become a legal and political precedent to challenge disputed borders in other countries and create turmoil in regional and international politics.

The third dimension deals with the symbolic justification of the model of the centralized state, despite its obvious failure. The aggressive politics of Somali unity are not always protecting Somali citizens but instead the abstract entity of the central state. Any acceptance of Somaliland would shed an ugly light on the difference between an ineffective federal government that is unable to provide security and services to its citizens and a breakaway state that has achieved some degree of effectiveness. This contrast disputes the belief that centralized authority is inherently better or more stable and thus throws the stability of regimes that have based their legitimacy on similar arguments into doubt.

In this regard, the attack against Somaliland is essentially defensive. It is not motivated by the signs of destabilization in the region or legal inconsistency, but by the fact that the recognition of successful alternative models of governance might undermine established political systems and restructure the standards of legitimacy in the region.

Egypt: Nile, Suez, and Red Sea in geopolitics

Egypt is the most strategically articulate of the opponents of the recognition of Somaliland. Though the official discourse in Cairo is greatly centered around the issue of separatism and solidarity among the Arabs, its stand is deeply embedded in the national security issues that go far beyond Somalia.

At the core of the Egyptian position is the existential question of the Nile and the pending conflict with Ethiopia on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). The Egyptian policymakers are worried that a stronger relationship between Somaliland and Ethiopia, especially with the involvement of a third party like Israel, would give Addis Ababa strategic depth and alternative maritime access through Berbera. This would decrease the dependence of Ethiopia on the avenues that can be influenced by Egypt, and this will undermine the bargaining power of Cairo in negotiations over the Nile.

Egypt is the most strategically articulate of the opponents of the recognition of Somaliland.

Intimately connected is the issue of the Suez Canal and Red Sea maritime routes, which cause anxiety on the part of Egypt. The Bab el-Mandeb Strait is a strategic bottleneck of the world economy, and any independent actor that has relations with the opponents of Egypt in the region is viewed as a possible strategic complication. Although both nations have formal diplomatic ties and have wide-ranging security cooperation with Israel, Egypt is still conscious of new alliances that may upset its well-calculated regional equilibrium.

Here lies a very dramatic rhetorical contradiction as the Palestinian cause is invoked. On the one hand, Egypt is a state that positions its role as a supporter of Palestinian rights, but on the other hand, it has strong relationships with Israel. The Palestinian story is therefore a contagious tool of diplomatic mobilization and not a stable ethical guide. In Egypt, the opposition is also influenced by fears that the successful succession of the separate identity and self-rule of Somaliland will be heard by the marginalized regions in Egypt, and the centralized Nile Valley model of governance will be threatened.

Combined with the other positions of Egypt, it represents a strategic calculation of resource security, maritime dominance, and regional influence, which is disguised in terms of legal and moral principles.

Turkey: Safeguarding influence, not Somali unity

The Turkish attitude towards Somaliland can be seen in terms of a strategic investment, protection, and consolidation of regional influence, and not in terms of a normative language of sovereignty and unity that pervades official Turkish rhetoric. In the last ten years, Ankara has remodeled Somalia into one of the most noticeable arenas of its extra-regional foreign policy into a mix of humanitarian diplomacy, infrastructure development, military involvement, and political favor of power. In that context, the acknowledgement of Somaliland or even its increased internationalization is a structural dilemma to the vested leverage of Turkey.

There is a great material presence of Turkey in Somalia. It operates the international airport and port of Mogadishu, has its largest foreign military base in the latter, and controls security training courses of the Somali troops. These are supplemented by soft power programs on health, education, and development aid, which have created a lot of goodwill among the people. All these interactions make Turkey more than a collaborator of the Somali state but a key agent of power and entry. The preservation of the territorial integrity of Somalia, in its turn, is consonant with the interest of Ankara in the existence of a single political interlocutor with the help of which its influence can be wielded.

The contradiction of the current position of Turkey is well traced when judged by its relations with Israel. In spite of occasional rhetoric battles, Ankara still has complete diplomatic, trade, and security ties with Tel Aviv. However, it strongly resists any Somaliland-Israel interaction. Such a contradiction highlights the fact that the Turkish objection is not based on principle against Israel but on one that is against the development of other forms of diplomatic and economic routes that circumvent Turkish-dominated nodes of influence. Given a known or actively involved Somaliland, it would ease independent trade networks, security alliances, and diplomatic adoptions, which would reduce the strategic dominance of Turkey in the Horn of Africa.

The appeal to Somali unity, therefore, is rather a non-normative assertion or a legitimizing discourse of strategic entrenchment. The example of Somaliland controlling its own matters without relying on any outside help questions this story, showing how legal and humanitarian arguments are manipulatively harnessed to serve the interests of power instead of supporting the principles of self-determination or good governance in their overall formulation.

Djibouti: Berbera as economic threat disguised by false security claims

Djibouti’s opposition to Somaliland is perhaps the most transparently driven by direct material interests, even as it is publicly articulated in the language of regional security. Djibouti’s political economy is fundamentally anchored in its role as a maritime gateway for the Horn of Africa, particularly for landlocked Ethiopia. The emergence of Berbera as a modernized, competitive port directly threatens this economic model.

A fully operational Berbera port, supported by international investment and efficient management, has the potential to divert substantial trade flows away from Djibouti. This would undermine Djibouti’s monopoly over port services, reduce state revenues, and diminish its geopolitical leverage over Ethiopia. To obscure these economic motivations, Djibouti frames Berbera’s development as a security risk, warning of foreign military presence and regional destabilization. Such claims are difficult to sustain, given that Djibouti itself hosts multiple foreign military bases and has long positioned itself as a hub for international naval operations.

Beyond economics, there is a political contrast that Djibouti’s leadership finds deeply unsettling. Somaliland’s relative stability and participatory governance stand in sharp relief against Djibouti’s entrenched authoritarian system. The implicit demonstration that stability can coexist with decentralization and electoral competition undermines the narrative that centralized, personalized rule is a prerequisite for order. Djibouti’s opposition thus reflects not only economic self-preservation but also an anxiety about normative comparison. Ultimately, Djibouti’s resistance to Somaliland’s recognition is an effort to protect a fragile commercial and political monopoly. Security discourse serves as a strategic façade, lending legitimacy to what is fundamentally a defensive economic posture.

Federal Somalia: Political legitimacy over popular interest

The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) occupies a unique position in this constellation of opposition, as its resistance to Somaliland’s recognition is existential. The FGS grounds its position in the inviolability of territorial unity, presenting secession as a threat to national survival. However, this stance is less about the welfare of Somali citizens and more about preserving the political legitimacy of federal institutions headquartered in Mogadishu.

The Somali leadership’s selective application of principle is evident in its external engagements. While adopting an uncompromising posture against any Somaliland-Israel interaction, Mogadishu has itself explored engagement with Israel when such engagement aligned with immediate diplomatic or security interests. This reveals that the core issue is not Israel, but authority—specifically, who possesses the right to represent Somali territory internationally.
Recognition of Somaliland would fundamentally undermine the FGS’s claim to sovereignty over the former Somali Republic, a claim that underpins its access to international aid, security assistance, and diplomatic recognition. Such recognition could also embolden other federal member states to renegotiate their relationship with the center, accelerating centrifugal pressures within Somalia itself. In this sense, opposition to Somaliland is a strategy of regime survival rather than a coherent vision for peace or reconciliation.

The resulting tension is stark: symbolic unity is prioritized over pragmatic solutions that could stabilize the region and respect the political will of Somaliland’s population. This disconnect illustrates how international legitimacy can become detached from domestic effectiveness, producing policies that preserve form while sacrificing substance.

Other Arab States: Media pressure, double standards

The behavior of other Arab and Muslim states—including Jordan, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Pakistan, and the Maldives—reveals a consistent pattern of selective principle and narrative management. These states maintain normalized and often expanding relations with Israel, encompassing trade, security cooperation, and diplomatic exchange. Yet they apply a markedly different standard to Somaliland.

Their primary mechanism is media-driven pressure. State-aligned outlets amplify narratives portraying Somaliland’s external engagements as threats to regional stability, Arab solidarity, and the Palestinian cause. This occurs despite the absence of any material interaction between Somaliland and these states, and despite Somaliland posing no conceivable threat to their national interests.

This double standard serves several functions. It reinforces established hierarchies within the regional order, affirms the authority of larger states to define permissible diplomatic behavior, and distracts domestic audiences from the contradictions inherent in their own governments’ foreign policies. Somaliland becomes a symbolic target through which conformity to an approved narrative is enforced. Such practices underscore the instrumentalization of ethical and legal discourse. Principles are not abandoned but selectively applied in ways that preserve power asymmetries and marginalize smaller political entities.

Marginalizing Reality: Palestine as rhetorical tool

The Palestinian cause occupies a central position in Arab political discourse, often functioning as a moral touchstone for regional legitimacy. In the case of Somaliland, however, it is frequently deployed as a rhetorical weapon divorced from contextual relevance. Somaliland, which has no historical involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict, is nonetheless portrayed as a vector of normalization simply for pursuing diplomatic engagement.

This strategy has extended to the circulation of demonstrably false narratives, including allegations that Somaliland would facilitate the resettlement of Palestinians from Gaza. Such claims lack evidentiary basis and are contradicted by Somaliland’s own public positions. Their purpose is not informational accuracy but emotional mobilization, creating a moral pretext for opposition that obscures underlying strategic motives.

The instrumentalization of Palestine in this manner undermines the integrity of the cause itself. By transforming a legitimate struggle into a tool of political convenience, regional actors dilute its moral force and marginalize the lived realities of Palestinians. Somaliland becomes collateral in a symbolic conflict that serves external interests rather than advancing justice.

Red Sea, Houthi threat

The Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb strait constitute one of the world’s most critical geopolitical corridors, facilitating global energy flows and commercial shipping. Somaliland’s coastline and the port of Berbera place it at the center of this strategic geography. As a result, regional responses to Somaliland are shaped less by normative considerations than by zero-sum calculations of control and access.

Any enhancement of Somaliland’s maritime infrastructure or international partnerships is interpreted as a redistribution of influence. Established powers respond defensively, seeking to constrain Somaliland’s options rather than engage constructively. This reaction highlights a broader pattern in regional politics, where geography consistently outweighs humanitarian or legal considerations.

The double standard is again evident. States that actively cooperate with Israel in the Red Sea basin condemn Somaliland for pursuing similar engagements. The issue is not the nature of the partnership, but the challenge it poses to entrenched hierarchies of permission and control.

In the context of the Yemeni conflict, Somaliland has been rhetorically linked to the Houthi threat as a means of justifying its isolation. Claims that Somaliland-Israel relations would provoke Houthi attacks or destabilize shipping lanes lack empirical grounding. Somaliland has consistently affirmed its neutrality and has every incentive to promote maritime security.
The invocation of the Houthi threat functions as an externalized justification for policies rooted in control rather than security. It allows opposing states to frame Somaliland’s independent engagements as inherently dangerous while obscuring their own selective alliances and security arrangements.

Conclusion: The problem is not Somaliland, but what it represents

The regional opposition to Somaliland’s recognition reveals a consistent pattern of strategic contradiction. Legal principles, moral narratives, and religious symbolism are mobilized selectively to obscure narrow national interests and preserve entrenched power structures. The widespread normalization of relations with Israel by Somaliland’s critics exposes the hollowness of arguments framed around moral absolutism.

At its core, Somaliland represents an unsettling alternative: a small political entity that has achieved relative stability, participatory governance, and institutional functionality through internal consensus rather than external imposition. This reality challenges inherited assumptions about sovereignty, legitimacy, and the inevitability of centralized authority.

Somaliland thus functions as a living litmus test. It tests whether regional actors genuinely value principles such as self-determination, effective governance, and popular will, or whether they prioritize the preservation of familiar geostrategic arrangements. The intensity and coordination of opposition suggest a clear answer. The resistance is not to instability or illegality, but to the transformative implications of acknowledging a successful alternative model of political order.


Author: Gulaid Yusuf Idaan is a senior lecturer and researcher specializing in diplomacy, politics, and international relations in the Horn of Africa. He can be contacted at Idaan54@gmail.com

Somaliland Sovereignty Predates the Creation of Somali Republic and its Territorial Integrity

Somaliland Sovereignty Predates the Creation of Somali Republic and its Territorial Integrity.

What if the most repeated claims about Somaliland are wrong? What if the idea that its separation is a recent rebellion, that its people were always committed to pan-Somali unity, or that Israel’s move represents a sudden colonial intrusion collapses under even minimal historical scrutiny? And what if the real scandal is not Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, but how thoroughly the international system has ignored facts it once openly acknowledged?

Just a day after Christmas, on 26 December, a video call landed on the Somaliland president’s iPhone. On the other end was Benjamin Netanyahu, informing him of a decision that would detonate diplomatic outrage across Africa, the Middle East and the United Nations. Nothing about this moment was spontaneous. It was the endpoint of a long, calculated and largely clandestine process in which symbolism mattered far less than geography, intelligence and hard power.

To understand why this recognition matters, one has to begin with an inconvenient historical truth: Somaliland is not a breakaway region invented in 1991. It is a former British protectorate that became an independent state in June 1960, was recognized by more than thirty countries, and entered a voluntary union with the former Italian Somalia five days later. That union was political rather than organic, rushed rather than deliberative, and never subjected to a referendum in Somaliland itself. When it collapsed three decades later amid mass violence, Somaliland did not secede from a functioning state; it withdrew from a failed one and reclaimed a sovereignty it had already possessed.

This alone sits uncomfortably with the joint statement issued by Arab, Islamic and African states condemning Israel’s move as a violation of international law and an unprecedented assault on territorial integrity. The statement speaks as though Somaliland were a newly invented “region”, yet omits the fact that its statehood predates the Somali Republic itself. It invokes the sanctity of borders while ignoring that Somaliland has consistently defended colonial-era boundaries, whereas the Somali state openly rejected them through the doctrine of Greater Somalia. It warns of dangerous precedents while overlooking the dozens of cases in which self-determination has been selectively endorsed or denied depending on geopolitical convenience.

Declassified intelligence from the period before independence exposes how fragile the nationalist narrative always was. A 1948 CIA assessment of political organizations in British Somaliland noted that none were “purely political in character” and that they largely pursued “individual tribal or regional interests”. It estimated that only three or four per cent of the population belonged to any political party. Most explosively, it stated that the Somali Youth League, later mythologized as the voice of all Somalis, “does not have an appeal for the residents of British Somaliland”. This was not the verdict of a hostile power seeking to undermine unity, but an internal intelligence assessment written decades before Somaliland’s later rupture with Mogadishu.

The same document described early Somali nationalism as explicitly pan-Somali and dismissive of inherited borders, committed to uniting “all the inhabitants of the Somali countries”. That ideology would later become state doctrine in Mogadishu. Somaliland’s subsequent rejection of it was not a betrayal of some shared national soul; it was a continuation of a political culture that had always been cautious, localized and sceptical of ideological centralism. In this sense, Somaliland’s post-1991 governance — built around clan conferences, negotiated consent and decentralization — looks less like an anomaly and more like a return to form.

Israel’s role enters this story not as a sudden act of provocation, but as a long-term strategic calculation shaped by geography and threat perception. Somalia as a unified state never had meaningful relations with Israel. From the 1960s onward it aligned itself with pan-Arab causes, framed Israel as an imperial enemy, and became one of its most hostile critics in international forums. Somaliland, by contrast, was recognized by Israel in 1960 and quietly revisited that history after restoring its independence in 1991.

What followed, according to multiple Israeli and regional media reports, was years of discreet engagement managed largely outside formal diplomatic channels. Mossad is reported to have cultivated relationships with Somaliland’s leadership, laying political and security groundwork well before any public recognition. Israeli officials have openly thanked the agency’s leadership for its role. Key Somaliland leaders are said to have made several secret visits to Israel in 2025, meeting senior political, defense and intelligence figures. None of this was advertised, because recognition politics in Africa and the Arab world remain unforgiving.

The strategic logic is blunt. Somaliland sits on the Gulf of Aden, overlooking the Bab el-Mandeb strait through which a significant share of global trade passes. It lies within a few hundred kilometers of Houthi controled territory in Yemen, whose missiles and drones have reshaped security calculations across the Red Sea. From Berbera, Israel and its partners can monitor maritime traffic, detect launches, and project power at distances that radically alter response times. Israeli commentators have described the relationship as a force multiplier against the Houthis. Western security planners see similar advantages.

This also explains why the United Arab Emirates looms so large in the background. Long before Israel’s recognition, Abu Dhabi invested heavily in Berbera’s port and airport, reportedly turning them into advanced logistical and military facilities. The UAE’s absence from the joint condemnation statement was therefore less a mystery than a confirmation. Somaliland fits neatly into a wider Emirati strategy of controlling ports, trade routes and maritime choke-points from the Red Sea to the Horn of Africa, often operating beyond the authority of weak central governments.

China, too, factors into the equation. Its naval base in Djibouti and expanding presence along African trade routes have unsettled Western planners. Somaliland offers an alternative foothold in a region where influence is increasingly contested. From this perspective, Israel’s move is not only about countering the Houthis or extending the Abraham Accords, but about anchoring itself and its allies in a rapidly militarizing maritime corridor.

It is here that the most incendiary allegations emerge, particularly claims that Somaliland was discussed as a potential destination for Palestinians displaced from Gaza. These reports, widely circulated but officially denied, have inflamed regional reactions and colored interpretations of Israel’s motives. Whether such plans were speculative, exploratory or entirely fictitious, their very plausibility in public discourse speaks to how little Somaliland is treated as a political community in its own right, and how readily it is imagined as empty strategic space.

The backlash has been swift and severe. Fourteen UN Security Council members condemned Israel’s recognition; the African Union rejected it outright. Turkey warned of a strategy to fragment Islamic states. Somalia framed the move as an existential threat. Yet much of this outrage rests on selective memory. Somaliland is condemned for claiming self-determination, while states that suppress separatist movements within their own borders present themselves as guardians of international law. Israel is accused of expansionism, while Somalia’s own pursuit of Greater Somalia is quietly erased from the record.

None of this absolves Israel of opportunism, nor Somaliland of hard-nosed calculation. This was not an act of idealism. It was a transaction shaped by intelligence cooperation, shared threat perceptions and the cold logic of geography. It will intensify rivalries in the Horn of Africa, sharpen competition in the Red Sea, and test already fragile regional orders. It may also, paradoxically, force a long-overdue reckoning with Somaliland’s unresolved status.

The question now is whether the international community can continue to deny a political reality that intelligence agencies documented decades ago, that dozens of states once acknowledged, and that more than 39 years of effective self-rule have only reinforced. In the coming years, as the Horn of Africa becomes an ever more critical arena of global competition, that denial may prove more destabilizing than recognition itself.

by Nilantha Ilangamuwa is a founding editor of the Sri Lanka Guardian

Somaliland and Israel – Considerations for Recognition and Cooperation

Somaliland and Israel – Considerations for Recognition and Cooperation

In the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea – a space whose security-strategic importance to Israel has been prominent again in the past two years – Somaliland, an independent and pro-Western country, is established, which is not recognized by the international community. Its ultimate goal is to gain international recognition and establish alliances with countries that will help it against its enemy: the Somali government of Mogadishu. In recent years, she has been establishing close ties with the UAE and Taiwan. The rise of the Trump administration and the presence of senior Republican officials who support recognition of it are given hopes to the leaders of Somaliland, and against this background its efforts to gain recognition have been increased, including against Israel. This article examines the issue of relations with Somaliland for Israel, while presenting the supportive and inhibiting Israeli recognition of it.

Somaliland – over thirty years of independence and stability

Somaliland spans the northwestern part of what the international community recognizes as a wholesale. Somaliland was independent for five days in 1960 before joining the Union with Somalia, and was reborn as an independent state in 1991 from the brutal and long-term Somali Civil War that has been taking place since the late 1980s. Somaliland is based on a unique and separate identity that has been formed in the last hundred years: the territory was under British colonial rule (unlike the rest of Somalia, which was under Italian rule); its people have extensive ties with southern Yemenite over the other side of the Gulf of Aden where it borders; and most of its population is among the members of the Isak clan – unlike the rest of the Somalia inhabited by other clans. The Isak suffered from discrimination and violence—and even claim to have genocide—from the clans that ruled Somalia-Mogadishu, especially in the 80’s.

Since its actual independence in 1991, Somaliland has been an antithesis for taking place in Somalia: its security situation is benign, its internal arena is stable, has no significant jihadist activity, and although there are border disputes at its ends (especially in the districts where other clans live), they are specific and polluted. Since the 2000s, Somaliland has been conducting a stable and proper multi-party democratic system, with a permanent election, the last of which took place in 2024 and announced a peaceful and orderly change of government. All the significant political forces operating in it are pro-Western and suspicious of Islamist forces or China and Russia. Although they are divided on the methods of action, they all see international recognition as a supreme goal.

The fact that Somalia-Mogadishu’s problems are concentrated in the south helps the survival of Somaliland, which is far from the battlegrounds between the various clans and the powerful government of Mugheyshu and the powerful Al-Shabaab organization. In addition, Somaliland borders on relatively friendly and stable governments: Ethiopia, Puntland (an independent state actually member of the Somalia Federation), and Djibouti. With them, Somaliland had peaceful and improved relations: In 2024, Somaliland signed a strategic understanding agreement with Ethiopia, which was supposed to give the unaccessible Ethiopia to the sea a foothold in the strategic port, Barbara, insinuating future recognition of her independence (this agreement was effectively frozen, but not canceled, under Turkish-Somali pressure). Somaliland’s ties with Djibouti are also improving, and in October 2025 she signed a “Nairubi Agreement” with Puntland for security and commercial cooperation.

In recent years, Somaliland has also developed its ties with other pro-Western countries. Taiwan and the UAE are its two most strategic partners: Taiwan – the chip manufacturing giant – is investing in the development of the country’s rare metal and mineral mines, and the UAE has invested a fortune in the development of the port of Barbara. As far as the UAE is concerned, Somaliland is a strategic stronghold in the Horn of Africa alongside the other Maozia in the region – on the Yemenite island of Socotura, in Puntland, and Darfur.

Even with the United States, Somliland has reasons for cautious optimism. American delegations—including from the Pentagon—have visited the country, which markets itself as a potential strategic base for the United States in the region. President Trump said the United States is considering recognizing it, and the U.S. Congress is interested in ordering the State Department to re-examine ties with Somaliland to improve them and upgrade them. As an intermediate stage, U.S. lawmakers aim for the State Department to start separating Somalia from Somalia and Somaliland in the context of travel warnings. Republican officials, such as Senator Ted Cruz of Texas, frequently express themselves in their support for recognizing Somaliland’s independence. However, the Americans have heavy considerations that are urgent to avoid recognition, along with delays in appointments and policy formulation for Africa and the Red Sea.

Against this background, Somaliland is conducting a lobbying campaign to promote the issue of recognition. In May 2025, the Somalilan President appealed to the UN members to recognize it as an independent state. During October 2025, the media in Somaliland reported that more than 20 countries, including Israel, are approaching the decision to recognize it. Somaliland is also more correct to adopt additional sovereign features: in November 2025, it declared full control of its airspace (by disconnecting it from the symbolic sovereignty of Somalia), demanding that it be authorized by a direct permit from its authorities to move in the sky, and announced that it would not recognize visas received from the Government of Mogadishu.

International recognition by other countries is therefore the primary target for the various Somliland governments (it remains one even after the exchange of government in democratic elections). International recognition will determine the existence of Somaliland and grant it protection, at least it hopes, from a scenario in which Somalia is reinforced (one or with its allies) will be able to act in the future international legitimacy to re-apply its authority to the territory. Alongside international recognition, Somaliland strives to acquire reliable and powerful allies. The danger from the government of Mogadishu is now still imaginary, but Somaliland has more tangible concerns than other security threats, from the Houthim, through the spread of global jihad (which is currently active in neighboring Pontland), to separatism in the periphery of the territory and even subversive activity that has evidence on the ground by China and Turkey.

Importance of Somaliland to the West and Israel

The importance of Somaliland lies in its geostrategic location and correctness – especially as a stable, moderate and reliable country in a volatile region – to cooperate in a comprehensive and broad manner with Western countries. The location of Somaliland at the entrance to the Gulf of Eden – opposite southern Yemen – connecting the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean, gives it a geo-strategic uniqueness. This is the historical reason that the British Empire took over in the late 19th century, and that the United States during the Reagan administration established a military base in the 1980s, in the midst of the Cold War.

Today, the distance between the waters and territory of Somaliland and the Houthi control areas in Yemen, the port of Hadida, for example, is about 300 to 500 km. The fact that in recent years the Gulf states, the United States and Israel – each in turn – have fought the Houthis without a decision, gives the location of Somaliland and the potential ability to operate from its territory, considerable global importance, within a possible equality voucher. Somaliland has a potential to be a frontal base for a variety of missions: intelligence surveillance against the Houthis and their empowerment efforts; providing logistics to the legitimate Yemeni government in its war against the Houthis; and a base for direct operational activity against the Houthi – offensive and to thwart Houthi attacks at sea or by means of drones. The necessary parallel to Israel’s steadfast alliance with Azerbaijan, which has significantly upgraded the strategic and operational Israeli ability to deal with the Iranian threat. It is possible that Somaliland is the equivalent brick for Israel in the face of the Houchi threat.

Alongside the valuable location of Somaliland, it is equally important that its government is interested in cooperating broadly with pro-Western countries. It’s a combination of willingness and ability. Eritrea is located in an even closer location to actions against the Houthis, but police are anti-Western and friendly to Iran. Djibouti, who has the strategic location, maintains actual neutrality in conflicts. Ethiopia lacks access to the sea and relations between police and the United States are ambivalent. Somaliland therefore offers a unique combination of geo-strategic location and a willingness to agree to widespread cooperation with pro-Western countries. Its ties with the UAE – that much of the logic that guides them from a utterance point of view was the war in the Hothis – are evidence of this. Messages coming out of Somaliland indicate that the state is also willing to have broad security relations with the United States, including hosting an American base, and even with Israel.

Regarding Israel, the positive attitude of the Somaliland government is evident, even in the midst of the war in the past two years, and it is likely that there are already unofficial ties between senior officials in both countries. Somaliland has sent messages in recent months that it is ready to cooperate with pro-Israel initiatives, including the expansion of the Abraham Agreements. The public discourse in the country tends to be pro-Israel, although there are also critical voices, especially in light of the war and reports from the Gaza Strip, as well as in light of the existence of Salafi movements (non-violent) in the country.

Considerations for and against recognition of Somliland

For Somaliland, the most coveted prize is American recognition, with which, they estimate, will come recognition from many other countries close to Washington. She therefore invests effort in front of the White House and Congress. Somaliland positions itself as an antagonist for China who is willing to go as a long way to realize American interests in the strategic space of the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. In the face of the Americans, Somaliland also emphasizes its democratic and free character and hostility to radical Islamist ideologies. In conversations with American officials and media messages, she clarifies her immediate readiness for entering the Abraham Agreements. Her desire to gain recognition was so great that the Somaliland government did not even publicly reject the discourse that took place a few months ago about plans to encourage the immigration of Gazans into its territory, despite the great unpopularity that the idea has sparked in its population.

However, despite the friendliness of Washington and the strategies of Somaliland’s location, the United States still seems to be hesitant about the question of official recognition, and it has serious reasons for this.

First, on a fundamental level, U.S. policy on the Somali issue has been consistent in recent decades: recognition of the idea of “one Sommalia.” The United States has sought to strengthen the Mogadishu government, especially in light of its difficult war against Al-Shabaab over the past two decades. For the United States, Somalia-Mogadishu is an ally, also weak and failing. The United States also provides it with military assistance in the attacks against global jihadist elements. Recognition of Somliland will see as an American betrayal, which could lead to the wave of the blast in the shaky Somalia (for example, by officially withdrawing from Fontland and Jubald – both of which are still a symbolic commitment to Mogadishu’s authority – or the strengthening of Al-Shabab). This consideration should be added to international practice – an aspiration not to recognize the changes in unilateral borders or in quitting countries, with the understanding that this is a possible opening of the Pandora’s box and an appeal of existing borders in the rest of the world, especially in the Middle East and Africa.

Although this is a weighty consideration for Status-Quo-like U.S. administrations, the Trump administration may be able to violate the tradition of adherence to the idea of “one Somalia” or the reluctance to recognize quitting countries. However, there is a consideration that probably plays a more significant role for Washington at the present time: the support of most Arab countries including Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Egypt, as well as Turkey in this idea. The Arab League countries, except the UAE, are declaratively supporting the unity of Somalia and strongly opposed the recognition of Somaliland. For Turkey, Somalia-Mogdeishu is a major ally in the Red Sea region, bordering on the status of a protectorate. These powerful countries, which are mined ear in Washington, express their aversion to the possibility of recognition of Somliland.

Although their impact on Washington is much less, the African Union countries are also inclined to deeply disapprove of any official recognition of quitting countries, fearing the domino effect in the rest of Africa.

Compared to the considerations of the United States, Israel has additional considerations: Although the Qatari and Turkish attitudes against recognition of Somliland are not significant (and vice versa), it is possible that the Egyptian position, and perhaps also Chinese, is more significant. On the other hand, Israel’s proximity to the UAE reinforces the pro-Somalland consideration. However, traditionally, Israel is hesitant to recognize quitting countries, partly for fear of precedents or a boomerang effect on the issue of recognition of a Palestinian state, although this consideration seems to be less relevant at the present time, due to the actual, almost sweeping recognition that the Palestinian “state” has won in recent years.

A more significant consideration for Israel, which is supposed to arouse caution and deep thought before official recognition of Somaliland, is actually a pragmatic aspect. Israeli recognition of Somaliland, which is not accompanied by American recognition, may cause a negative effect that will harm both Israel and Somaliland. While an Israeli-Somalian agreement may appear to be reinforcement of Israel’s status in the region, at the same time causing a strong counter-reaction in the Muslim world, which in turn may place Somaliland at the focus of regional criticism and, consequently, lead to a reluctance to expand public or substantive cooperation with Israel. Israeli recognition, ironically, may actually contain efforts to expand the Abraham Accords with other Muslim countries.

Under the threshold of consciousness, at least for now

Israel is required for allies in the Red Sea area, in part to prepare for the next campaign against the Houthis. Somaliland is an ideal candidate for this cooperation, who will be able to grant Israel as a matter of action near the scene of operations. But in addition to security cooperation, relations with Somaliland also have important economic-conscious potential for Israeli national security, due to the minerals in its territory and the desire to establish relations with Muslim populations in the region. Therefore, Israel must work to expand cooperation with this entity, ideal while cooperating with the UAE and the United States.

However, Israel has serious reasons for avoiding the first country to recognize Somaliland, which is primarily an understanding that such recognition may actually act against promoting intimate relations between Israel and Somaliland due to regional responses and dynamics. As long as the United States (or at least the UAE) does not recognize Somaliland as an independent state, Israel must not act alone on this official level.

The recommendation is therefore to promote the intimate relationship with Somaliland “under the threshold of consciousness.” Israel and its allies in Washington can help Somliland in persuasion attempts with the Trump administration, but the United States must take the first public step to recognition. At the same time, the two countries can promote – even before official recognition – security and economic partnerships, the establishment of interest offices (as many other countries with Somaliland do), and even symbolic measures such as recognition of the Somaliland passports.

These are steps that will prevent the possible risks involved in official recognition, while at the same time helping both parties to advance their fundamental interests. Israeli security and economic presence in Somliland does not necessarily require official recognition, and on the other hand, Somaliland may also be preferable to intimate and quiet relations with Israel over high-profile precedent-setting declarations. Somaliland can benefit many of these ties with Israel, especially in light of the security challenges that the country may encounter in the challenging neighborhood of the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa. For Israel, Somliland may be a “vigilance breaker” in the struggle against the Houthis.

** The author wishes to thank the staff of the Institute for National Security Studies for fruitful discourse on the issue, including as part of a guest lecture given by the author at the Institute on September 30, 2025; Dr. Rashid Abdi, head of research at the Sahan Institute in Kenya, for discourse and sharing of knowledge; and the Israel-Africa Relations Institute for support and encouragement.

The opinions expressed in the publications of the Institute for National Security Studies are those of the authors only.

Fraudulent Somali e-Visa Scheme Defrauds U​.​S. Travelers, Undermines Homeland Security

Fraudulent Somali e-Visa Scheme Defrauds U​.​S. Travelers, Undermines Homeland Security

Large amounts of humanitarian and development aid to Somalia were drastically cut or halted due to concerns about efficiency and corruption as the Trump administration canceled a big portion of USAID’s projects worldwide, primarily affecting third-world nations. This action had a detrimental effect on the weak economy of Somalia. As a result, Somalia’s feeble government turned to terror techniques to steal money from travelers visiting other Horn of Africa nations such as Somaliland.

In order to put an end to this banditry, Somaliland-American community members and stakeholders are bringing it to light.

We are a coalition of U.S. citizens and dual nationals who have fallen victim to a deliberate scheme of consumer fraud and coercion perpetrated by the Government of Somalia’s Immigration & Citizenship Agency (ICA). The ICA is actively selling e-visas for travel to Somaliland, a service they know to be invalid, as Somaliland’s Immigration authorities consistently reject these documents at their ports of entry.

The consequences for travelers are severe and costly. Those relying on the fraudulent Somali e-visa for Somaliland travel are routinely stranded, miss flights, are denied entry, and incur significant additional expenses. They have to pay again for a valid Somaliland visa on arrival and face the possibilities of being sent back at their own expense.

Of even greater concern is the demonstrably inadequate capacity of the Somalia Federal Government to protect the sensitive personal information of U.S. travelers, as reported by multiple reliable sources, including the United Nations. This failure poses a serious data security risk and represents a direct threat to U.S. homeland security.

If you’re a native of Somalilnad who is currently an American citizen or resident, we seek your immediate support. We are appealing to U.S. regulatory and diplomatic bodies to halt this malicious scheme, and we need your voice.

Please exercise your rights by adding your name and signature to our appeal, and we deeply appreciate your support for this critical and time-sensitive matter

Somaliland Strategic Advocacy Group, Virginia, USA

SomalilandUSA@protonmail.com

Ethiopian Airlines Scraps Somalia’s e-Visa Requirement for Somaliland Bound Travel

Ethiopian Airlines Scraps Somalia’s e-Visa Requirement for Somaliland Bound Travel

An electronic visa system was recently implemented by the Somali government for visitors to Somalia, including areas that are not under its direct authority. The e-visa, which costs $64 each entrance, was created to expedite the admissions process and bring in money for the federal government. Passengers traveling to Somaliland, which has operated freely for more than thirty years while without international recognition, are more perplexed because of the change.

Travel issues rapidly flare up after airlines servicing Somali locations, including Somaliland, were told to make sure every passenger had the e-visa before boarding. Many Somali diaspora members and local authorities who were traveling to Hargeisa complained about challenges and lengthy layovers, especially when using transit hubs in the United Arab Emirates.

For travelers going to Somaliland, Ethiopian Airlines stopped enforcing Somalia’s new e-visa requirement.

This latest development comes after Republic of Somaliland authorities issued an order threatening to ban foreign airlines if they require travelers to obtain a Somalia’s e-visa. Subsequently, Ethiopian Airlines effectively disregarded Mogadishu’s directive by permitting visitors to Hargeisa to receive visas upon arrival at the Egal International Airport.

Another significant airline that operates flights to Somaliland, FlyDubai, is also under pressure to choose whether to abide with Somaliland’s directive or risk being banned from landing in Hargeisa.

Ethiopian Airlines action has angered Somali officials. After Ethiopian Airlines ceased implementing Somalia’s new e-visa requirement for travelers visiting Somaliland, Mohamed Nur Tarsan, Somalia’s former ambassador to Kenya, urged President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s administration to take decisive action against the airline.