African Agency & Chinese Power: The Case of Djibouti
It seems unlikely that Djibouti – smaller than Belgium and with fewer than 1 million inhabitants – can expect to enjoy any agency vis-à-vis the Chinese behemoth.
Djibouti’s agency depends upon many factors, including its strategic geographical location; the great powers’ concern over the security of sea lanes of communications and, as a result, piracy in the Gulf of Aden; China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and interest in establishing a naval base there; and reactions to these Chinese decisions by Djibouti’s other partners. In other words, the great powers’ interest in and competition over Djibouti have widened this country’s room for maneuver.
Against all expectations, tiny Djibouti enjoys a considerable amount of agency in its relations with China, despite the considerable power inequality. This agency depends upon many factors, among them Djibouti’s strategic geographical location, great powers’ concern over piracy in the Gulf of Aden, China’s BRI and its naval base in the country, and Djibouti’s other partners’ reaction to these moves by China. In other words, great powers’ interest in and competition over Djibouti have boosted its agency, probably to a greater extent than anywhere else. What is agency? A simple definition is the ‘ability [of any country] to make independent decisions and strengthen its bargaining power’. However, it is necessary to unpack this concept, particularly in the context of Africa and Africa–China relations. Are we talking
about a state, a government, a leader or a group of power holders? What kinds of action on their part help to build agency? How have African actors managed their agency? In this policy insight it is hypothesized that, in this context, agency is the capacity of a government (Djibouti), supported by significant sections of its elite as well as other international actors, to partly mitigate the asymmetry of its relationship with a great power (China) in making specific decisions that lessen the risk of its becoming over-dependent upon the latter. Of course, the huge power gap between China (9.6 million km2, 1.4 billion inhabitants, $15 trillion gross domestic product [GDP] in 2019) and Djibouti (23200 km2, 1 million inhabitants, $3.2 billion GDP) is hard to deny, resulting in a highly asymmetrical relationship. Nonetheless, this gap does not necessarily lead to a neo-colonial relationship; and the weak is not necessarily without recourse.
Djibouti’s geographical location has for a long time attracted naval powers’ interest. At the end of the 19th century its proximity to Bab el Mandab, the strait that controls entry to the Red Sea, just opposite Aden, then controlled by the UK, was the main driver of its colonization by France. Today, located amid the Gulf’s oil-producing countries and close to the Suez Canal, Djibouti lies at the intersection of shipping lanes vital to many economies in both Europe and Asia. On average, 4.8 million barrels of crude oil (2.5% of the global total) and 8–9% of the world’s international trade pass through the Red Sea every day. Since Djibouti’s independence in 1977, France has maintained military facilities (1 450 soldiers) there because of its commitment to the country’s security and its intention to continue to benefit from the strategic location. Djibouti’s location also convinced the US to set up a military base there in the early 2000s. Mainly aimed at contributing to its global war against terrorism, particularly in Somalia and Yemen, the US’ military base in Djibouti is larger (4 000 personnel) and more comprehensive than that of any other military presence in the country. Its ground troops, air force, naval units and special forces are based at Camp Lemonier, next to Djibouti International Airport, and it has a drone base at Chabelley airport in the desert. Djibouti is also the main maritime gateway to Ethiopia, a major regional economy that has not had direct access to the sea since Eritrea’s independence in 1993. The recent modernization of Djibouti’s port facilities and the construction of a new railway line linking Djibouti and Addis Ababa in 2018, built by Chinese companies and with Beijing’s financial support, have enhanced the importance of this port city/state. Although the gradual normalization of Ethiopia–Eritrea relations may give the former more options, the Eritrean ports of Assab and Massawa will have difficulties matching Djibouti’s facilities in the foreseeable future. Djibouti thus has a good chance of remaining the main maritime and transportation hub of the Horn of Africa. Finally, three international cable lanes meet south of Bab al-Mandab, next to Djibouti, which is another incentive for the great powers to maintain a military presence in the country.
The South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA)