Tag: Horn of Africa

Why Rahm Emanuel Misjudged Netanyahu’s Somaliland Strategy

Why Rahm Emanuel Misjudged Netanyahu’s Somaliland Strategy

Recognizing the independent republic is the opening move to anchor Israel as an indispensable security power in the region.

On a recent visit to Israel, former Obama administration Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel mocked Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s Somaliland strategy, arguing that Israel had “lost Europe” and “lost America,” and was left with only the small republic in the Horn of Africa.

He badly misread Netanyahu’s strategic calculus. Israel’s recognition of Somaliland is Israel’s most strategically consequential foreign-policy move in years. Far from diminishing its Western alignment, this opening gambit positions Israel as the indispensable security guarantor of the world’s most critical maritime corridors, exponentially increasing its value to both the United States and Europe.

Israel’s recognition of Somaliland roots the Jewish state firmly in its own region—the Middle East and the Red Sea—where its future will actually be decided, not in Washington or Europe. By expanding its partnership with Eritrea and deepening ties with Ethiopia, Somaliland and Sudan, Israel will become the ultimate security guarantor of the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea and the southwestern Indian Ocean.

Partnering with Horn of Africa nations allows Israel to deploy its advanced technology and agriculture to lift hundreds of millions out of poverty, cementing it as an undeniable force for good.

In doing so, Israel will make itself indispensable to the security and economy of Europe, America and the Gulf states threatened by Iran. The West supports Israel not out of sentiment, but because it is indispensable to security and economic interests. During the Cold War, Israel contained Soviet influence and hostile Arab states; today, its strategic role in counterterrorism remains unmatched.

However, Israel was strongest when it had alliances with regional actors, such as Iran, Turkey and an Ethiopia that controlled Eritrea and the Red Sea. Today, Iran and Turkey are enemies, while a struggling Ethiopia is choked off from the sea, denied access to Eritrean ports by Eritrean dictator Isaias Afwerki. This tyrant now aligns with Iran, opposes Israel, fuels Sudan’s Muslim Brotherhood, tried to block Somaliland’s independence, and actively backs the Houthis and Al-Shabaab to destabilize the region.

Today, Israel counts the Gulf states, particularly the United Arab Emirates, as allies, while Saudi Arabia navigates the volatile landscape left by America’s regional retreat. If Israel steps up to secure the region, Saudi Arabia will inevitably fall into alignment once Israel proves it is the only reliable security provider in the Red Sea.

Israel’s traditional Arab adversaries—Iraq, Syria, Libya and Yemen—have collapsed, only to be replaced by a far more volatile threat: radical non-state Islamist actors like Hezbollah and the Houthis, alongside the imminent rise of Iran-backed forces in Sudan. Meanwhile, severe economic crises render Israel’s cold peace with Egypt and Jordan entirely unpredictable.

Partnering with Horn of Africa nations allows Israel to deploy its advanced technology and agriculture to lift hundreds of millions out of poverty, cementing it as an undeniable force for good.

Israel must forge a new security apparatus tailored to its own survival while making itself indispensable to the United States and Europe. This requires crushing the Houthis, restoring Yemen’s legitimate government and containing Iran-backed Islamist threats in Sudan as well as the Eritrean regime. Ultimately, the United States and Europe need a reliable Israeli security guarantee in the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf to safeguard their own economic and existential interests.

It is within this new strategic framework that Somaliland becomes vital. Recognizing Somaliland is not only a moral imperative for Israel—aligning with Jewish values of backing liberty and self-determination—but also a cornerstone of Israel’s future security architecture. This grand strategy requires Israel to fill the security vacuum across the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea and the southwestern Indian Ocean in partnership with regional powers, and Somaliland is the beginning of that vision.

Israel already aligns with Ethiopia and Somaliland; Eritrea is the missing piece of the puzzle. Sudan lies within Eritrea’s strategic geography, and its ground forces possess the military capacity to crush the Houthis. With an aging dictator making political change inevitable, a powerful coalition is within reach. By combining Israel’s air superiority and defensive tech, Gulf financial power and the proven ground forces of Eritrea and Ethiopia, only a strong naval force to pacify Yemen and Sudan, contain Iran and permanently secure the Red Sea is required.

The Tigrinya people, the overwhelming majority who live in Eritrea, share a common destiny with Israel and the Jewish people. Just as the Jews have no homeland but Israel, they have no homeland but their own. Neither Eritrea nor Israel is a member of the Arab League or the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). Although the Tigrinya and the Jews are the overwhelming majorities in their respective countries, they remain tiny minorities in the wider region, surrounded by half a billion Arabs and Muslims.

Eritrea holds a strategic location at Bab el-Mandab in the Red Sea, ground military capability, historical perspective and the strategic patience to play the long game thanks to the Tigrinya nation’s homogeneity and nationalism. Eritrea stands as the region’s most stable state, yet its dictator weaponizes that stability to fuel regional chaos. A partnership with Israel would leverage the Tigrinya’s cheap labor and abundant resources alongside Israel’s know-how to produce high-quality ammunition and drones more cheaply than Iran and Turkey.

Their survival and future are permanently bound together. Today, China and the imperialist leaders of Iran and Turkey use proxies to threaten the Tigrinya’s historical role as the ultimate security guarantor of the Red Sea. That role must be reclaimed to remain vital to the security of Israel, the United States and Western allies, leveraging technology, investment and markets to overcome our existential crises at home: abject poverty and environmental devastation.

Rahm Emanuel thus missed a core truth: Israel’s survival depends on mastering its own backyard, not relying on Western capitals. Somaliland is just the start.

The final, essential piece of this Red Sea architecture is Eritrea, anchored by a Tigrinya majority bound to the Jewish people through the ancient Orit faith, and united against the shared security threat from Iran and its Islamist proxies.

Habtom Ghebrezghiabher , Ph.D., from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, is an expert on geopolitical and security dynamics in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea region.

President Irro of Somaliland is in Israel on a State Visit

President Irro of Somaliland is in Israel on a State Visit

On Sunday, June 14, 2026, Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi arrived in Jerusalem, making it the first time a leader from the Somaliland Republic in the Horn of Africa had visited Israel on an official visit. Since Israel became the first UN member state to formally recognize Somaliland’s sovereignty in December of last year, the bilateral relationship has drastically changed, and this visit marks a significant turning point.

The official opening of the Somaliland Embassy, an important symbolic event, is at the core of Jerusalem’s diplomatic agenda. Israeli President Isaac Herzog welcomed President Abdullahi to the President’s Residence and spoke to him in Somali and English.

Upon his arrival, President Abdullahi declared, “The people of Somaliland have built a peaceful, democratic, and resilient nation for 35 years.” “Do you see us?” we asked the world. Israel was the first to respond.

The visit comes after Israel became the first member of the UN to formally recognize the Republic of Somaliland in December 2025. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made this decision “in the spirit of the Abraham Accords,” and it was supported by pledges of broad collaboration in the fields of energy technology, agriculture, health, and water management.

The visit takes place in the context of growing regional security concerns, in addition to the diplomatic ceremony. The Red Sea, a vital conduit for international trade, is cited by analysts as the main force for the growing alliance. According to recent reports, Israel has expanded its intelligence presence in the area, and talks on the strategic value of the Berbera International Airport are still going on.

The engagement’s cornerstone continues to be security cooperation. The present team is anticipated to complete framework agreements on maritime security and information sharing, and reports suggest that Somaliland officials and presidential guard units have received training in Israel. Regional observers see these changes as an attempt to offset challenges, such as the actions of Houthi rebels operating along the Bab al-Mandab Strait.

There has been debate around the growing relationships. Israel’s recognition of Somaliland has been repeatedly denounced by the Federal Government of Somalia as an infringement on its geographical integrity and sovereignty. Concern has also been voiced by regional nations, with China expressing unease about the possibility of an Israeli presence close to its maritime trading routes.

A visit to Yad Vashem, the World Holocaust Remembrance Center, and a number of high-level talks with Israel’s defense, finance, and economy ministries are part of President Abdullahi’s program, which runs through Thursday.

Hargeisa nevertheless faces the difficulty of converting this diplomatic victory into real infrastructure and economic benefits. Jerusalem views the visit as a strategic outreach effort to broaden its regional partnerships. The international world is still concerned about how this unique collaboration would affect the precarious balance of power in the Horn of Africa as the Somaliland Embassy is ready to open.

Israel’s Deputy Ambassador to Ethiopia Praises Somaliland

Israel’s Deputy Ambassador to Ethiopia Praises Somaliland

Israel is seeking to deepen ties with Somaliland following its recognition of the territory as an independent state in December 2025, with Israeli officials pointing to potential cooperation in agriculture, logistics, and infrastructure as part of a broader push tied to its highly controversial move to become the first country to recognize Somaliland.

Speaking to The Reporter Ethiopia, Israel’s deputy ambassador to Ethiopia, Tomer Bar-Lavi, said recent high-level talks between Israeli and Somaliland business leaders in Addis Ababa had produced positive initial engagement and could pave the way for future investment discussions.

“There were some initial meetings and they were very positive,” Bar-Lavi said. “We saw that the sentiment is there, and it’s very positive on both sides.”

He said Israeli companies were prepared to support Somaliland in sectors including agriculture, logistics, infrastructure, and medicine, though any future projects would depend on commercial demand.

“Our businesses are demand-driven,” he said. “They can provide whatever the other side needs regarding agriculture, logistics, infrastructure, medicine, and beyond.”

Israel’s recognition of Somaliland has attracted attention across the Horn of Africa and the wider international community. Somaliland, which declared independence from Somalia in 1991 following the collapse of the Somali central government, has since maintained de facto autonomy with its own government, security forces, currency, and domestic institutions.

Despite functioning as a self-governing territory for more than three decades, Somaliland has struggled to gain formal international recognition. Israel’s decision to recognize Somaliland therefore marked a historic diplomatic breakthrough for Hargeisa, making Israel the first country to officially acknowledge Somaliland as a “sovereign state.” The move has sparked diplomatic backlash from Somalia, which continues to regard Somaliland as part of its territory, as well as from several of Somalia’s allies and many Muslim-majority countries that have criticized Israel’s decision and condemned the recognition as a violation of Somalia’s territorial integrity.

Since the recognition announcement, relations between Tel Aviv and Hargeisa have expanded. Last month, Israel announced the appointment of a non-resident ambassador to Somaliland. In addition, officials from both governments have exchanged diplomatic correspondence concerning potential trade opportunities, investment projects, and broader economic partnerships.

Bar-Lavi told The Reporter that Israel viewed the move as recognition of “a reality which has existed on the ground” and described Somaliland as “a stable new partner in the Horn of Africa.”

Asked whether the decision could complicate Israel’s ties with Ethiopia or other African states, Bar-Lavi said each country pursued its own strategic interests and argued that Somaliland’s inclusion in regional diplomacy should be viewed positively.

“In our view, we are recognizing a reality which has existed,” he said. “This is a moderate country which has been de facto independent for decades, fighting terrorism.”

He added that Somaliland had expressed interest in joining international frameworks such as the Abraham Accords, which Israel sees as promoting regional cooperation.

“Israel has very good relations with the vast majority of Sub-Saharan African states and adding one more such state is, in our view, a very positive move that should be taken as an example by others,” Bar-Lavi said.

Though much of the relationship between Israel and Somaliland has remained opaque, developments in recent months have drawn increasing attention, particularly following the appointment of ambassadors representing Tel Aviv and Hargeisa. Israel has shown growing interest in expanding its security footprint in the Horn of Africa, a region that has become a battleground for competition among emerging Middle Eastern powers. The United Arab Emirates, which has long maintained significant influence in both Somaliland and Puntland, has also been linked to plans for a multi-country military network across the region, including in Somaliland.

According to a recent report by Le Monde, Berbera Airport is undergoing a major but low-profile military redevelopment involving several international actors. Drawing on satellite imagery and security sources, the newspaper reported that extensive construction took place between late 2025 and early 2026, coinciding with Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, including buried structures believed to be fortified fuel or ammunition storage sites, as well as elevated installations thought to support air defense systems similar to those seen in other Emirati-backed facilities in the region.

The report noted that the project is being led by the UAE under its defense partnership with Somaliland, while sources also allege that the development serves the strategic interests of both the United States and Israel. Le Monde also reported that Somaliland intelligence officials have quietly received training in Tel Aviv and that Israeli intelligence personnel have recently visited Berbera, reinforcing earlier reports of growing security cooperation between the two sides.

Although neither the UAE, Israel, nor Somaliland has officially acknowledged the existence of a military base in Berbera, Abu Dhabi already maintains extensive control over the port through a $400 million investment agreement signed with Somaliland authorities. The UAE has also been linked to a similar military facility in Puntland’s Bosaso, which has reportedly served as a transit hub for military logistics and mercenary operations connected to Abu Dhabi’s support for the RSF in Sudan. Somaliland officials, meanwhile, have not ruled out the possibility that military cooperation could become part of broader relations with Israel.

The remarks made by Bar-Lavi reflects the deepening ties between Hargeisa and Tel Aviv, despite widespread criticism from Somalia’s allies, the African Union, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and several members of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Somaliland’s president recently described Israel as a “reliable partner.” Previously, the president had praised Israel’s decisions and signaled his administration’s willingness to further strengthen and deepen relations between the two sides.

Israeli President to Receive Credentials of Somaliland Ambassador

Israeli President to Receive Credentials of Somaliland Ambassador

Israeli President Isaac Herzog will receive the diplomatic credentials of the first-ever ambassador of Somaliland, Mohamed Hagi, along with those of other new envoys on Monday, his office announced.

The ceremony comes on the heels of Israel approving the appointment of veteran diplomat Michael Lotem as ambassador to Somaliland in April.

Somaliland dissolved its union with Somalia and declared its independence in 1991. Israel is the first country to recognize Somaliland.

Situated in the Horn of Africa, Somaliland’s northern coast lies directly across the Gulf of Aden from Yemen, where the Houthis control territory. Israel is reportedly interested in establishing a base in Somaliland to counter Houthi and Iranian threats to Red Sea shipping. Officials in Hargeisa, Somaliland’s capital, are interested in cooperating in areas of energy, infrastructure and agriculture, among other things.

Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi has also expressed interest in joining the Abraham Accords.

Herzog will also receive the credentials of ambassadors from Australia, South Korea, Vietnam and the Vatican.

Somalia & Somaliland: Battlegrounds as Turkey and Israel Seek the Control of the Red Sea

Somalia & Somaliland: Battlegrounds as Turkey and Israel Seek the Control of the Red Sea

Turkey and Israel are intensifying competition in the Horn of Africa, with Somalia and Somaliland emerging as key battlegrounds for oil, military influence and control of vital Red Sea trade routes.

Turkey has consolidated its position through formal agreements with Somalia’s federal government, securing major offshore and onshore oil and gas exploration rights alongside a strong military presence through its largest overseas training base. Israel, meanwhile, has moved closer to Somaliland after becoming the first country to formally recognize the territory as an independent state and is exploring plans for a military base near the Gulf of Aden to monitor Yemen’s Houthis and secure strategic access to the Red Sea corridor.

Earlier this year, Somalia confirmed it was ready to begin its first offshore oil drilling operations, with a Turkish government-owned drilling ship expected to arrive off its coast, according to BBC. The move followed the successful completion of seismic surveys last year by Turkey’s research vessel Oruç Reis, which collected 3D seismic data across key offshore blocks.

Somalia is estimated to hold at least 30 billion barrels of offshore oil potential and around 6 billion cubic meters of natural gas, though much of it remains unproven compared with established producers such as Libya and Nigeria.

Since 2011, Turkey has become one of Mogadishu’s closest allies, combining humanitarian support, military training and infrastructure investment. In December 2025, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said Ankara planned to establish a spaceport in Somalia.

Subsequent reports later confirmed that Turkey was exploring a broader aerospace facility, including a spaceport for satellite and possible missile launches, alongside plans for a naval base, while F-16 fighter jets were deployed inside Somalia in early 2026. In February 2026, Turkey also dispatched ageing U.S.-made M48 and M60 tanks through the streets of Mogadishu in a protected convoy after they were unloaded from a Turkish Navy landing ship.

According to reports, the tanks were deployed to secure Turkish facilities in the Warsheikh area, about 37 miles north of the capital, where Ankara is building the site for satellite launches and broader aerospace operations. Separately, Turkey recently reopened its $50 million military base in Mogadishu, reinforcing Ankara’s role in Somalia’s security sector and its support for the training of Somali National Army soldiers, including elite units involved in operations against Al-Shabaab.

Israel, meanwhile, has focused on Somaliland, whose coastline faces Yemen across the Gulf of Aden. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced in late 2025 that Israel had formally recognized Somaliland, describing the decision as being “in the spirit of the Abraham Accords.” The recognition triggered strong condemnation from Somalia and several Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia, Palestine, Egypt, Kuwait, Iraq, Jordan and Qatar, all of which rejected the decision as illegal and warned that it threatened regional stability and Somalia’s territorial unity.

Turkey also criticized the move, with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan calling Israel’s recognition of Somaliland “illegitimate and unacceptable” and later saying it “does not benefit” the region during a February visit to Ethiopia, one of Israel’s key allies in the Horn of Africa.

Despite the criticism, a Bloomberg report in March confirmed that Israel was exploring plans to build a military base in Somaliland to monitor and target Yemen’s Houthis, taking advantage of the region’s strategic location near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Defending the move, Shiri Fein-Grossman, chief executive of the Israel-Africa Relations Institute and a former member of Israel’s National Security Council, told Israeli outlet i24 News: “Everyone just looks at the map and understands what Israel is looking for here.”

“The recognition of Somaliland gives Israel a strategic location near the Houthis in Yemen and comes at a time that Israel needs as many friends as possible.”

Beyond Somalia and Somaliland, tensions between Turkey and Israel have deepened over Gaza, Syria and wider regional power projection, further exposing a growing geopolitical rivalry between the two military powers.

Middle East Eye reported that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has increasingly shifted his rhetoric towards Turkey as Ankara expands its influence across the eastern Mediterranean and Africa, particularly around Cyprus and Greece. In a post on X, Netanyahu accused President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of “massacring his own Kurdish citizens” and “accommodating Iran’s terror regime and its proxies”.

Turkey responded with sharp condemnation, with officials in Ankara describing Netanyahu as the “Hitler of the era”, citing Israel’s military actions in Gaza and across the region.

While Somalia and Somaliland remain central to their competition in the Horn of Africa, the broader dispute reflects a much wider struggle for influence stretching from the Red Sea to the Middle East, with both military powers seeking strategic bases in the two African territories to strengthen their regional reach.

Olamilekan Okebiorun is a business journalist covering markets, technology, and changing landscape of African economies for Business Insider Africa.

Somaliland’s Geopolitical Relevance Outpacing Its Institutional Preparedness

Somaliland’s geopolitical relevance is rising faster than its institutional preparedness
In an era of intensifying global competition along strategic maritime corridors, the Republic of Somaliland sits at a crossroads few policymakers can afford to ignore. Positioned along the Gulf of Aden, near the Bab el-Mandeb strait through which roughly around 12% of global trade passes, Somaliland occupies territory that is no longer peripheral to global strategy. It is central.
Yet Somaliland’s geopolitical relevance is rising faster than its institutional preparedness.
For over three decades, Somaliland has defied regional patterns. It has built a functioning political order, conducted competitive elections, and maintained relative internal stability without formal international recognition. These achievements are not accidental. They are the result of leadership.
From the early stewardship of Abdirahman Ahmed Ali (Tuur), who guided the fragile reassertion of sovereignty, to the state-building vision of Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal, Somaliland’s trajectory has been shaped by leaders capable of navigating crisis and compromise. Egal’s demobilization of militias and institutional consolidation remain foundational to Somaliland’s governance model.
This pattern of leadership continuity extended through Dahir Riyale Kahin, whose administration entrenched electoral legitimacy, and Ahmed Mohamed Mohamoud (Silanyo), whose economic diplomacy, particularly the Berbera Port agreement with DP World, signalled Somaliland’s entry into the geopolitical economy of the Red Sea corridor.
Under Muse Bihi Abdi, the state navigated rising internal political contestation and external pressure, while expanding its diplomatic outreach. Today, Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi (Iro) presides over a decisive phase, as Somaliland seeks to convert de facto statehood into formal international recognition, an aspiration first answered by the State of Israel in December 2025 after its PM announced a ‘full recognition’ of Somaliland’s sovereignty.
But here lies the paradox: as Somaliland’s strategic importance grows, the model that sustained its stability is becoming insufficient.
A Strategic Location in a Crowded Theatre
The Red Sea and Gulf of Aden are undergoing rapid geopolitical transformation. The region has become a theatre of overlapping interests:
  • ​Gulf states projecting economic and security influence
  • ​Global powers securing maritime routes and military access
  • ​Regional actors competing for ports, corridors, and alliances
Berbera Port, developed through the DP World concession, has emerged as a critical node in this competition. It offers an alternative logistics corridor to landlocked Ethiopia and a potential counterweight to congested or contested routes elsewhere in the region. But this opportunity comes with exposure.
Somaliland’s economy remains highly concentrated, dependent on Berbera port revenues, livestock exports, and remittances. Its lack of international recognition limits access to global financial systems, constraining its ability to scale infrastructure, diversify its economy, and absorb external shocks.
In short, Somaliland is strategically located, but structurally constrained.
The Leadership Constraint.
Historically, Somaliland has compensated for structural limitations through leadership. Its political stability has been personality-driven; anchored in individuals with legitimacy, experience, and consensus-building capacity.
Personality-Driven model is now reaching its limits
The emerging geopolitical environment demands a different type of leadership:
  • Leaders capable of navigating multi-alignment diplomacy without or with inadequate formal recognition.
  • Leaders able to negotiate complex economic partnerships without overexposure to external actors.
  • Leaders who can translate geopolitical opportunity into domestic development.
At present, Somaliland lacks a formalized system for producing such leadership. This creates a strategic vulnerability. Without a pipeline of capable leaders, Somaliland risks entering a period where geopolitical relevance outpaces governance capacity, a gap that external actors are quick to exploit.
Recognition Is Not a Strategy
Much of Somaliland’s external engagement has been framed around the pursuit of international recognition. While recognition remains a legitimate objective, it cannot substitute for internal capacity.
Recognition, even if achieved, will not resolve:
  1.  Economic concentration
  2. Institutional fragility
  3. Youth unemployment
  4. Women and minority groups’ representational equality
  5. Governance gaps
In fact, recognition without preparation could amplify these challenges by accelerating external engagement beyond the state’s ability to manage it. The more urgent priority is internal readiness.
Policy Imperatives in a Geopolitical Context
To navigate this new era, Somaliland must recalibrate its strategy along these axes:
Strategic Autonomy in Foreign Policy:
Somaliland must avoid overdependence on any single external partner. A diversified diplomatic approach: balancing Gulf, African, and Western engagements is essential to preserve autonomy.
Economic De-Risking:
Reducing reliance on Berbera Port revenues is critical. This requires investment in trade corridors, value-added exports, and emerging sectors such as digital services.
Leadership Institutionalization:
Political parties, civil society groups, and state institutions must collectively develop mechanisms for leadership cultivation. Governance cannot remain dependent on exceptional individuals.
Inclusive State-Building
The demographic reality where youth and women form the majority must be reflected in political representation. Exclusion is not only unjust; it is destabilizing.
Governance Before Recognition:
Somaliland’s comparative advantage has been its internal legitimacy. Preserving and deepening this must take precedence over external validation.
A Narrowing Window:
Somaliland’s current position is both an opportunity and a risk. Its stability makes it attractive. Its location makes it valuable. But without institutional depth, these same factors can render it vulnerable.
The next decade will not resemble the last. The geopolitical environment is less forgiving, more competitive, and far less tolerant of governance gaps.
Somaliland’s founding generation proved that leadership can create a state under conditions of collapse. The current generation faces a different test: whether it can transform that legacy into a system capable of sustaining the state under conditions of global competition.
Failure will not come as sudden collapse but as gradual erosion of autonomy, of policy space, and of strategic control. Success, however, would place Somaliland in a rare category not merely as a stable polity in a fragile region, but as a self-made state capable of navigating great power competition on its own terms. That is the real test ahead.
About the Author:
Salma Sheikh is a political analyst, a long time Somaliland recognition advocate, and Lead Advisor on Women Affairs at the House of Representatives of the Republic of Somaliland.

Djibouti at a Crossroads: The Presidential Transition Crisis Ahead of April 2026 Elections

Djibouti at a Crossroads: The Presidential Transition Crisis Ahead of April 2026 Elections

As Djibouti approaches its presidential elections, scheduled for April 2026, the contours of a complex political crisis are emerging within the ruling system. This crisis is rooted in chronic structural fragility, a tribal monopoly on power and deepening political uncertainty. The situation has been further exacerbated by President Ismail Omar Guelleh’s intention to amend the constitution to allow himself to run for a sixth term. Compounding this tension are growing divisions within the ruling elite over his possible successor.

These internal disagreements surfaced publicly in September following the resignation of Alexis Mohamed Gueldon, one of President Guelleh’s most prominent advisors and his official international spokesperson. Gueldon attributed his resignation to the country’s “democratic regression” and “nepotistic practices.” He also said that the president had “gone too far” – a clear reference to Guelleh’s intention to amend the constitution to remain in power.

Crisis of Power Transition in Djibouti

President Guelleh and his regime now face a twofold challenge. The first is constitutional; the 77-year-old president has exceeded the legal age limit for presidential candidacy (75). Despite his declining health, there are indications that he is seeking to replicate a previous amendment to the constitution to remove this limit. In an interview in May 2025, Guelleh left the door open to the possibility of running again – a move that has been met with internal resistance.

The second challenge concerns the identity of President Guelleh’s potential successor, an issue that could redefine the country’s political and social order. Guelleh’s options appear limited, and any move to designate a successor must be carefully calibrated to preserve regime cohesion and safeguard the influence of his family and clan, the Mamasan. In this context, the resignation of Gueldon, who belongs to the same clan, has fueled speculation that the president is grooming his stepson, Naguib Abdullah Kamil, who is affiliated with the Afar community, to succeed him.

Such a move risks intensifying ethnic polarization within the ruling coalition. The al-Issa tribe elite view Kamil as a threat to their historical dominance and privileges. This could prompt them to block his rise and prevent a transfer of leadership to the Afar, potentially through pressure to keep Guelleh at the top of the power pyramid or aligning with another candidate from within the clan, such as Gueldon, known for his extensive connections and political ambitions.

Consolidating Authoritarianism or a Potential Shift?

Given the current dynamics, three possible trajectories can be anticipated for the future of Djibouti’s ruling regime and the broader political landscape:

1. A Constitutional Amendment to Extend Guelleh’s Presidency

This scenario appears plausible, given President Guelleh’s extensive network of local, regional and international relationships, and his ability to navigate a political framework that enables him to balance and subordinate internal and external dynamics to his own objectives. Such a move would effectively extend the status quo and consolidate the regime’s de facto legitimacy and continuity, as well as preserve the interests of the elite without dismantling the tribal structure.

However, this path carries significant risks – including the erosion of the regime’s credibility, increased institutional fragility, growing public discontent and a strengthened opposition – which could ultimately destabilize the governance system in the medium term.

2. Engineering a Disciplined Transition of Power

This trajectory would require President Guelleh to recognize the need to lead an internal negotiated process to promote an agreed-upon successor. A likely successor could be his stepson, Kamil, who enjoys support from his influential mother and the Afar elite, or another figure from al-Issa/Mamasan clan. Such a managed transition could enhance the regime’s ability to reproduce itself while attracting regional and international endorsement, as it would offer a controlled and stable transfer of power. The key challenge, however, lies in forging internal consensus around the potential heir and reducing ethnic and factional rivalries within the ruling elite.

3. An Electoral Process Controlled by an Issa Candidate

The likelihood of this trajectory increases if al-Issa elite perceive a shift in power dynamics in favor of the Afar – particularly with the potential rise of Kamel. In response, they may push for elections, aiming to ensure victory for one of their prominent figures, thereby safeguarding their influence in the post-Guelleh era.

However this strategy risks deepening divisions and sparking elite-level confrontations, potentially drawing in the military and security forces – especially if the electoral process resembles previous ones marked by allegations of fraud and a lack of meaningful reforms to promote political inclusivity. Such conditions could lead to renewed opposition boycotts and further destabilize the political landscape.

Beyond Guelleh: Local and Regional Implications

Djibouti’s allies, with France at the forefront, are expected to play a leading role in facilitating a smooth transition of power

International and regional powers regard Djibouti as a strategic hub for expanding their influence in the wider region encompassing the Red Sea, East Africa, and the western Indian Ocean. These actors have long viewed President Guelleh and his regime as central to safeguarding their interests, relying on the political stability maintained throughout his tenure. As a result, they have often turned a blind eye to his authoritarian practices – such as fragmenting the local opposition and silencing dissent – which have enabled him to solidify his rule for over 25 years.

However, this stability appears tenuous and largely superficial. It does not stem from strong state institutions or effective governance, but rather from delicate tribal dynamics and the concentration of power in a few individuals who shape the country’s political landscape. With growing concerns surrounding succession and the ongoing discourse about the post-Guelleh era, there are genuine apprehensions of escalating tensions and conflict among Djibouti’s political and tribal elites. Such developments could undermine the governance system and weaken state institutions, pushing the small nation overlooking the Bab al-Mandab Strait into a period of turbulence, with significant implications for regional stability and the strategic interests of key regional and international players.

An uncontrolled succession crisis in Djibouti would have far-reaching consequences extending far beyond its domestic political sphere.  It would worsen regional instability and heighten geopolitical competition among the foreign powers maintaining military bases in the country. This would complicate their operational and strategic decision-making, potentially prompting a recalibration of their military strategies and presence. For example, the establishment of a Chinese military base in 2017 and Houthi attacks in the Red Sea have already weakened the US position in Djibouti. Restrictions imposed by Djibouti on US military activities have prompted Washington to explore alternative options, including expanding its presence in Kenya, making it its first non-NATO sub-Saharan African ally, as well as the growing US interest in Somaliland.

Conclusions

The months ahead will be pivotal in shaping the future of Djibouti. The choice between extending President Guelleh’s rule and initiating a political transition represents a delicate balancing act for the regime, which must demonstrate its ability to adapt to both domestic and external pressures for reform and democratic change. The decisions made by Djibouti’s leadership, particularly by Guelleh himself, could either pave the way for a new political era or maintain the status quo, with the risk of eventual regime collapse and national instability.

While international and regional partners prioritize sustainable stability and predictable transformation, external support for the ruling clan may no longer guarantee its endurance and political security. In this context, Djibouti’s allies –  especially France – are expected to play a leading role in diplomatic engagement and soft intervention. Their efforts may focus on  encouraging a peaceful transfer of power through internal consensus or a more transparent electoral process, rather than prolonging Guelleh’s grip on power

A Coalition with Diverse Agendas Team up for Opposing Somaliland Recognition in the Name of Somali Unity

A Coalition with Diverse Agendas Team up for Opposing Somaliland Recognition in the Name of Somali Unity

In late 2025, Israel officially announced its recognition of Somaliland, a self-declared independent region in northern Somalia that has asserted its sovereignty since 1991 but remains largely unrecognized by the international community. The decision marks a notable realignment in diplomatic relations across the Horn of Africa and the broader Middle East. In response, a coalition of 21 Arab, Islamic, and African states issued a joint statement condemning Israel’s move. They described it as a “grave violation of international law and the United Nations Charter,” reaffirmed their commitment to Somalia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, and explicitly rejected any suggestion that the recognition could be linked to efforts to displace the Palestinian people.

The sustained and coordinated efforts of geopolitically influential powers—including Egypt, Turkey, Djibouti, and Somalia—alongside a broader alliance of Arab and Muslim states such as Jordan, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Pakistan, and the Maldives, to prevent Somaliland from obtaining international recognition, illustrate a highly complex and multidimensional geopolitical phenomenon. This opposition has intensified in parallel with Somaliland’s increasing external engagements, particularly pragmatic contacts with Israel and other non-Arab actors.

This article argues that the region’s overwhelming opposition to Somaliland’s recognition cannot credibly be interpreted as a principled or neutral position grounded in international law, Islamic solidarity, or genuine concern for Somalia’s unity. Rather, through systematic analytical deconstruction, it demonstrates that this opposition stems from a convergence of narrow national interests, deep-seated geopolitical anxieties, and defensive reactions to the potential restructuring of the existing regional order.

On the surface, this stance is articulated through legalistic rhetoric—invoking sovereignty, territorial integrity, and moral symbolism, especially in relation to the Palestinian cause. Yet in practice, a persistent and fundamental paradox emerges between states’ declared principles and their actual conduct. The gap between discourse and action reveals that strategic calculations, rather than normative commitments, drive much of the regional response to Somaliland’s bid for statehood

Somaliland in Arab Politics: ‘File’ rather than ‘cause’

Complexity and agency, as well as the historical specificity of Somaliland, are being systematically denied within the political institutions, diplomatic circles, and strategic cultures of most Arab and Islamic capitals. It is hardly ever activated as an independent object of international politics or as an acceptable instance of self-determination based on a separate colonial and post-colonial experience. Rather, it is diminished to a bureaucratic abstraction, a file that needs to be handled but not a cause that needs to be comprehended.

It is a reduction that works in two paradigms that are overlapping and expedient politically. The former views Somaliland as a strictly sovereign entity, which is subordinated to Somalia. Somaliland, under this framing, falls under the category of internal administrative or constitutional issues of the internationally recognized state of Somalia. This division offers a pre-made rationale of the categorical denial of recognition or substantive international action, which is normally expressed in slogans like the preservation of the territorial integrity and the protection of the sovereignty of the central state. More importantly, this stance puts the symbolic sacredness of inherited boundaries above the material political facts. It consciously puts aside the institutional history, electioneering, and social contract of Somaliland for the sake of maintaining a formal cartographic wholeness, which, more often than not, exists on a piece of paper.

The second paradigm perceives Somaliland as an instrumentalized variable in a more comprehensive regional and world power policy. Within this framework, Somaliland emerges as a chess piece, as well as in the Israeli-Iranian game, the growing Turkish strategic presence in Africa, and the geostrategic struggle of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the maritime arteries of the Red Sea. In this logic, Somaliland does not possess a political actor or even a political interest of its own. Instead, it is diminished to a tactical area to be exploited, limited, or neutralized as per the strategic decisions of foreign powers.

The two paradigms are united in their deliberate ignorance of facts on the ground. Somaliland has a relatively long history of a stable and functional government, a period of over thirty years. It has also created effective electoral institutions, which have been able to handle competitive and peaceful transfers of power; internal security, which is starkly opposed to the chronic instability that plagues southern Somalia; economic and commercial infrastructure, including the development and operation of the Berbera port; and the ability to find responsible ways of dealing with external actors, including Ethiopia and Taiwan. This has been accompanied by a steady claim of disinterest and adherence to international standards.

Even with these facts that can be verified, Somaliland remains to be described as a state that is an exception—something that is inconvenient that poses a danger to the psychological and political underpinnings of the post-colonial Arab regional order. The order places a heavy burden on the sanctification of inherited borders, even though these boundaries may be supported by the use of coercion or without the truly popular consent. Another tactic employed by the capitals of Somaliland in the form of persistent political and media pressure, even when there is no hostile action or strategic provocation on the part of Hargeisa, highlights the existence of a deep-seated kind of hypocrisy.

The selective invocation of legal and religious rhetoric is not a kind of policy prescription but rather an act of performance of regional power management. It shows a crisis of credibility, where the interest in Somali unity is rhetorically magnified and the welfare, rights, and political will of the population of Somaliland are systematically discriminated against. Therefore, the Somaliland problem goes beyond the scope of a local conflict. It is a critical prism in which the incoherence and instability of regional strategic thought are revealed, as well as the way in which the emergent political realities are pushed into the background of the endless reproduction of established power accounts.

Somaliland faces rejection over precedent, not reality

The action taken by the various players to oppose the recognition of Somaliland is fueled by fears that go way beyond Somaliland itself. It is fundamentally fear, which is not about the existence of Somaliland but about the meaning of its success. The rejection is not aimed at the empirical reality on the ground as much as it is aimed at the political, legal, and ethical precedent on which recognition would be created.

The action taken by the various players to oppose the recognition of Somaliland is fueled by fears that go way beyond Somaliland itself.”

This fear has been expressed in three factors that are interlinked. The former is internal political contagion. The international acceptance of Somaliland on the basis of sound governance, historical particularism, and popular consent over a long period would serve as an influential example for marginalized or peripheral states in other Arab and African states. Such areas of the Sahel as Southern Syria, Iraqi Kurdistan, Southern Yemen, and other ethnically or politically distinct regions might use the example of Somaliland to justify the claim to autonomy or independence. To other regimes that routinely repress such claims, this possibility is a massive legitimacy problem, which compels awkward inquiries about how selectively they exercise sovereignty and self-determination.

The second dimension is associated with the holiness of colonial boundaries. The case of Somaliland proves that the boundaries that were established by the European colonialists are not fixed and even natural. It demonstrates that political order, institutional effectiveness, and social cohesion can be developed without—and even against—those borders. This ideological and practical threat is a danger to centralized states that are based on inherited territorial structures as the basis of authority. The recognition of Somaliland might become a legal and political precedent to challenge disputed borders in other countries and create turmoil in regional and international politics.

The third dimension deals with the symbolic justification of the model of the centralized state, despite its obvious failure. The aggressive politics of Somali unity are not always protecting Somali citizens but instead the abstract entity of the central state. Any acceptance of Somaliland would shed an ugly light on the difference between an ineffective federal government that is unable to provide security and services to its citizens and a breakaway state that has achieved some degree of effectiveness. This contrast disputes the belief that centralized authority is inherently better or more stable and thus throws the stability of regimes that have based their legitimacy on similar arguments into doubt.

In this regard, the attack against Somaliland is essentially defensive. It is not motivated by the signs of destabilization in the region or legal inconsistency, but by the fact that the recognition of successful alternative models of governance might undermine established political systems and restructure the standards of legitimacy in the region.

Egypt: Nile, Suez, and Red Sea in geopolitics

Egypt is the most strategically articulate of the opponents of the recognition of Somaliland. Though the official discourse in Cairo is greatly centered around the issue of separatism and solidarity among the Arabs, its stand is deeply embedded in the national security issues that go far beyond Somalia.

At the core of the Egyptian position is the existential question of the Nile and the pending conflict with Ethiopia on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). The Egyptian policymakers are worried that a stronger relationship between Somaliland and Ethiopia, especially with the involvement of a third party like Israel, would give Addis Ababa strategic depth and alternative maritime access through Berbera. This would decrease the dependence of Ethiopia on the avenues that can be influenced by Egypt, and this will undermine the bargaining power of Cairo in negotiations over the Nile.

Egypt is the most strategically articulate of the opponents of the recognition of Somaliland.

Intimately connected is the issue of the Suez Canal and Red Sea maritime routes, which cause anxiety on the part of Egypt. The Bab el-Mandeb Strait is a strategic bottleneck of the world economy, and any independent actor that has relations with the opponents of Egypt in the region is viewed as a possible strategic complication. Although both nations have formal diplomatic ties and have wide-ranging security cooperation with Israel, Egypt is still conscious of new alliances that may upset its well-calculated regional equilibrium.

Here lies a very dramatic rhetorical contradiction as the Palestinian cause is invoked. On the one hand, Egypt is a state that positions its role as a supporter of Palestinian rights, but on the other hand, it has strong relationships with Israel. The Palestinian story is therefore a contagious tool of diplomatic mobilization and not a stable ethical guide. In Egypt, the opposition is also influenced by fears that the successful succession of the separate identity and self-rule of Somaliland will be heard by the marginalized regions in Egypt, and the centralized Nile Valley model of governance will be threatened.

Combined with the other positions of Egypt, it represents a strategic calculation of resource security, maritime dominance, and regional influence, which is disguised in terms of legal and moral principles.

Turkey: Safeguarding influence, not Somali unity

The Turkish attitude towards Somaliland can be seen in terms of a strategic investment, protection, and consolidation of regional influence, and not in terms of a normative language of sovereignty and unity that pervades official Turkish rhetoric. In the last ten years, Ankara has remodeled Somalia into one of the most noticeable arenas of its extra-regional foreign policy into a mix of humanitarian diplomacy, infrastructure development, military involvement, and political favor of power. In that context, the acknowledgement of Somaliland or even its increased internationalization is a structural dilemma to the vested leverage of Turkey.

There is a great material presence of Turkey in Somalia. It operates the international airport and port of Mogadishu, has its largest foreign military base in the latter, and controls security training courses of the Somali troops. These are supplemented by soft power programs on health, education, and development aid, which have created a lot of goodwill among the people. All these interactions make Turkey more than a collaborator of the Somali state but a key agent of power and entry. The preservation of the territorial integrity of Somalia, in its turn, is consonant with the interest of Ankara in the existence of a single political interlocutor with the help of which its influence can be wielded.

The contradiction of the current position of Turkey is well traced when judged by its relations with Israel. In spite of occasional rhetoric battles, Ankara still has complete diplomatic, trade, and security ties with Tel Aviv. However, it strongly resists any Somaliland-Israel interaction. Such a contradiction highlights the fact that the Turkish objection is not based on principle against Israel but on one that is against the development of other forms of diplomatic and economic routes that circumvent Turkish-dominated nodes of influence. Given a known or actively involved Somaliland, it would ease independent trade networks, security alliances, and diplomatic adoptions, which would reduce the strategic dominance of Turkey in the Horn of Africa.

The appeal to Somali unity, therefore, is rather a non-normative assertion or a legitimizing discourse of strategic entrenchment. The example of Somaliland controlling its own matters without relying on any outside help questions this story, showing how legal and humanitarian arguments are manipulatively harnessed to serve the interests of power instead of supporting the principles of self-determination or good governance in their overall formulation.

Djibouti: Berbera as economic threat disguised by false security claims

Djibouti’s opposition to Somaliland is perhaps the most transparently driven by direct material interests, even as it is publicly articulated in the language of regional security. Djibouti’s political economy is fundamentally anchored in its role as a maritime gateway for the Horn of Africa, particularly for landlocked Ethiopia. The emergence of Berbera as a modernized, competitive port directly threatens this economic model.

A fully operational Berbera port, supported by international investment and efficient management, has the potential to divert substantial trade flows away from Djibouti. This would undermine Djibouti’s monopoly over port services, reduce state revenues, and diminish its geopolitical leverage over Ethiopia. To obscure these economic motivations, Djibouti frames Berbera’s development as a security risk, warning of foreign military presence and regional destabilization. Such claims are difficult to sustain, given that Djibouti itself hosts multiple foreign military bases and has long positioned itself as a hub for international naval operations.

Beyond economics, there is a political contrast that Djibouti’s leadership finds deeply unsettling. Somaliland’s relative stability and participatory governance stand in sharp relief against Djibouti’s entrenched authoritarian system. The implicit demonstration that stability can coexist with decentralization and electoral competition undermines the narrative that centralized, personalized rule is a prerequisite for order. Djibouti’s opposition thus reflects not only economic self-preservation but also an anxiety about normative comparison. Ultimately, Djibouti’s resistance to Somaliland’s recognition is an effort to protect a fragile commercial and political monopoly. Security discourse serves as a strategic façade, lending legitimacy to what is fundamentally a defensive economic posture.

Federal Somalia: Political legitimacy over popular interest

The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) occupies a unique position in this constellation of opposition, as its resistance to Somaliland’s recognition is existential. The FGS grounds its position in the inviolability of territorial unity, presenting secession as a threat to national survival. However, this stance is less about the welfare of Somali citizens and more about preserving the political legitimacy of federal institutions headquartered in Mogadishu.

The Somali leadership’s selective application of principle is evident in its external engagements. While adopting an uncompromising posture against any Somaliland-Israel interaction, Mogadishu has itself explored engagement with Israel when such engagement aligned with immediate diplomatic or security interests. This reveals that the core issue is not Israel, but authority—specifically, who possesses the right to represent Somali territory internationally.
Recognition of Somaliland would fundamentally undermine the FGS’s claim to sovereignty over the former Somali Republic, a claim that underpins its access to international aid, security assistance, and diplomatic recognition. Such recognition could also embolden other federal member states to renegotiate their relationship with the center, accelerating centrifugal pressures within Somalia itself. In this sense, opposition to Somaliland is a strategy of regime survival rather than a coherent vision for peace or reconciliation.

The resulting tension is stark: symbolic unity is prioritized over pragmatic solutions that could stabilize the region and respect the political will of Somaliland’s population. This disconnect illustrates how international legitimacy can become detached from domestic effectiveness, producing policies that preserve form while sacrificing substance.

Other Arab States: Media pressure, double standards

The behavior of other Arab and Muslim states—including Jordan, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Pakistan, and the Maldives—reveals a consistent pattern of selective principle and narrative management. These states maintain normalized and often expanding relations with Israel, encompassing trade, security cooperation, and diplomatic exchange. Yet they apply a markedly different standard to Somaliland.

Their primary mechanism is media-driven pressure. State-aligned outlets amplify narratives portraying Somaliland’s external engagements as threats to regional stability, Arab solidarity, and the Palestinian cause. This occurs despite the absence of any material interaction between Somaliland and these states, and despite Somaliland posing no conceivable threat to their national interests.

This double standard serves several functions. It reinforces established hierarchies within the regional order, affirms the authority of larger states to define permissible diplomatic behavior, and distracts domestic audiences from the contradictions inherent in their own governments’ foreign policies. Somaliland becomes a symbolic target through which conformity to an approved narrative is enforced. Such practices underscore the instrumentalization of ethical and legal discourse. Principles are not abandoned but selectively applied in ways that preserve power asymmetries and marginalize smaller political entities.

Marginalizing Reality: Palestine as rhetorical tool

The Palestinian cause occupies a central position in Arab political discourse, often functioning as a moral touchstone for regional legitimacy. In the case of Somaliland, however, it is frequently deployed as a rhetorical weapon divorced from contextual relevance. Somaliland, which has no historical involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict, is nonetheless portrayed as a vector of normalization simply for pursuing diplomatic engagement.

This strategy has extended to the circulation of demonstrably false narratives, including allegations that Somaliland would facilitate the resettlement of Palestinians from Gaza. Such claims lack evidentiary basis and are contradicted by Somaliland’s own public positions. Their purpose is not informational accuracy but emotional mobilization, creating a moral pretext for opposition that obscures underlying strategic motives.

The instrumentalization of Palestine in this manner undermines the integrity of the cause itself. By transforming a legitimate struggle into a tool of political convenience, regional actors dilute its moral force and marginalize the lived realities of Palestinians. Somaliland becomes collateral in a symbolic conflict that serves external interests rather than advancing justice.

Red Sea, Houthi threat

The Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb strait constitute one of the world’s most critical geopolitical corridors, facilitating global energy flows and commercial shipping. Somaliland’s coastline and the port of Berbera place it at the center of this strategic geography. As a result, regional responses to Somaliland are shaped less by normative considerations than by zero-sum calculations of control and access.

Any enhancement of Somaliland’s maritime infrastructure or international partnerships is interpreted as a redistribution of influence. Established powers respond defensively, seeking to constrain Somaliland’s options rather than engage constructively. This reaction highlights a broader pattern in regional politics, where geography consistently outweighs humanitarian or legal considerations.

The double standard is again evident. States that actively cooperate with Israel in the Red Sea basin condemn Somaliland for pursuing similar engagements. The issue is not the nature of the partnership, but the challenge it poses to entrenched hierarchies of permission and control.

In the context of the Yemeni conflict, Somaliland has been rhetorically linked to the Houthi threat as a means of justifying its isolation. Claims that Somaliland-Israel relations would provoke Houthi attacks or destabilize shipping lanes lack empirical grounding. Somaliland has consistently affirmed its neutrality and has every incentive to promote maritime security.
The invocation of the Houthi threat functions as an externalized justification for policies rooted in control rather than security. It allows opposing states to frame Somaliland’s independent engagements as inherently dangerous while obscuring their own selective alliances and security arrangements.

Conclusion: The problem is not Somaliland, but what it represents

The regional opposition to Somaliland’s recognition reveals a consistent pattern of strategic contradiction. Legal principles, moral narratives, and religious symbolism are mobilized selectively to obscure narrow national interests and preserve entrenched power structures. The widespread normalization of relations with Israel by Somaliland’s critics exposes the hollowness of arguments framed around moral absolutism.

At its core, Somaliland represents an unsettling alternative: a small political entity that has achieved relative stability, participatory governance, and institutional functionality through internal consensus rather than external imposition. This reality challenges inherited assumptions about sovereignty, legitimacy, and the inevitability of centralized authority.

Somaliland thus functions as a living litmus test. It tests whether regional actors genuinely value principles such as self-determination, effective governance, and popular will, or whether they prioritize the preservation of familiar geostrategic arrangements. The intensity and coordination of opposition suggest a clear answer. The resistance is not to instability or illegality, but to the transformative implications of acknowledging a successful alternative model of political order.


Author: Gulaid Yusuf Idaan is a senior lecturer and researcher specializing in diplomacy, politics, and international relations in the Horn of Africa. He can be contacted at Idaan54@gmail.com

Unlocking America’s Leverage in the Strategic and Highly Contested Red Sea

Unlocking America’s Leverage in the Strategic and Highly Contested Red Sea

Mr. President,

Jan 4, 2025

I write on behalf of the Somaliland American Strategic Advisory Group to urge decisive U.S. action to re- recognize Somaliland and formalize a strategic partnership

Recent developments—including bipartisan congressional initiatives, the African Union’s 2005 fact finding conclusions, and Israel’s recognition of Somaliland—have created a narrow but consequential window to advance American interests in the strategic and highly contested Red Sea corridor and the Horn of Africa.

Bipartisan Congressional Momentum:
Congress has already taken substantive steps on Somaliland policy through bipartisan measures reflecting growing interest in formal ties and strategic cooperation. In the Senate, the Somaliland Partnership Act mandated reporting and feasibility studies and was introduced with bipartisan sponsorship. In the House, the Republic of Somaliland Independence Act (H.R. 3992) has been introduced and referred to committee, signaling additional support for reassessing U.S. policy. Together, these actions demonstrate cross party recognition that U.S. strategy in the Horn of Africa requires new tools and credible partners.

Legal and Historical Justification:
Somaliland became independent before Somalia and possesses more than a century of distinct political history and national identity—76 years under British Protectorate rule, 34 years of self-governance, and only a 30-year union with Somalia marked by violence. It was recognized by 35 nations upon independence in 1960. Its union with Somalia was voluntary and never ratified by a binding treaty. Somaliland’s 1991 withdrawal is supported by international legal principles, including the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the right to self-determination. (See: “The Case for the Independent Statehood of Somaliland,” American University International Law Review.) In a national referendum, over 89% of Somalilanders voted in favor of independence.

African Union Findings:
The African Union’s 2005 fact finding mission concluded that Somaliland’s political development and governance merited serious consideration, describing its statehood claim as “historically unique and self-justified.” The mission explicitly recommended engagement rather than isolation. This internal AU assessment undercuts claims that recognition would violate regional norms and provides a credible African basis for principled U.S. engagement.

Recent Diplomatic Shift:
Israel’s formal recognition of Somaliland in December 2025 marks the first instance of state level recognition and materially alters the diplomatic landscape. This development creates momentum for allied coordination and practical geopolitical cooperation while increasing the strategic value of timely U.S. leadership to shape outcomes.

Why Now and What to Do:
Somaliland offers secure logistics through the Berbera Port and Air Base, a stable democratic partner in a volatile region, and a geopolitical buffer against malign influence. Recognition and partnership with Somaliland—unlike with Somalia—do not entail open ended nation building. By recognizing Somaliland, the United States can secure a reliable ally, strengthen regional security, and advance long term national interests without the burden of failed aid programs or protracted military engagements. At the same time, the United States would gain basing access, defense cooperation opportunities, and commercial entry into Somaliland’s energy and mineral rich economy.

We recommend the following immediate steps: appoint a Special Envoy to initiate formal talks; direct the Departments of State and Defense to negotiate bilateral agreements on logistics, defense, and security initiatives; and coordinate with Congress to authorize targeted economic investment facilitation with appropriate oversight.

Mr. President, the convergence of congressional momentum, the African Union’s findings, and Israel’s recognition presents a strategic opening the United States should not cede. Acting now would secure U.S. access to a critical maritime chokepoint, expand economic opportunities for American firms, and strengthen a democratic partner in one of the world’s most strategically contested regions. We stand ready to brief your team and support an interagency process to implement these recommendations.

________________________________________

Respectfully,
IYussuf M. Issa
Somaliland Strategic Advisory Group
Ashburn, Virginia https://slsag.org

Somaliland Sovereignty Predates the Creation of Somali Republic and its Territorial Integrity

Somaliland Sovereignty Predates the Creation of Somali Republic and its Territorial Integrity.

What if the most repeated claims about Somaliland are wrong? What if the idea that its separation is a recent rebellion, that its people were always committed to pan-Somali unity, or that Israel’s move represents a sudden colonial intrusion collapses under even minimal historical scrutiny? And what if the real scandal is not Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, but how thoroughly the international system has ignored facts it once openly acknowledged?

Just a day after Christmas, on 26 December, a video call landed on the Somaliland president’s iPhone. On the other end was Benjamin Netanyahu, informing him of a decision that would detonate diplomatic outrage across Africa, the Middle East and the United Nations. Nothing about this moment was spontaneous. It was the endpoint of a long, calculated and largely clandestine process in which symbolism mattered far less than geography, intelligence and hard power.

To understand why this recognition matters, one has to begin with an inconvenient historical truth: Somaliland is not a breakaway region invented in 1991. It is a former British protectorate that became an independent state in June 1960, was recognized by more than thirty countries, and entered a voluntary union with the former Italian Somalia five days later. That union was political rather than organic, rushed rather than deliberative, and never subjected to a referendum in Somaliland itself. When it collapsed three decades later amid mass violence, Somaliland did not secede from a functioning state; it withdrew from a failed one and reclaimed a sovereignty it had already possessed.

This alone sits uncomfortably with the joint statement issued by Arab, Islamic and African states condemning Israel’s move as a violation of international law and an unprecedented assault on territorial integrity. The statement speaks as though Somaliland were a newly invented “region”, yet omits the fact that its statehood predates the Somali Republic itself. It invokes the sanctity of borders while ignoring that Somaliland has consistently defended colonial-era boundaries, whereas the Somali state openly rejected them through the doctrine of Greater Somalia. It warns of dangerous precedents while overlooking the dozens of cases in which self-determination has been selectively endorsed or denied depending on geopolitical convenience.

Declassified intelligence from the period before independence exposes how fragile the nationalist narrative always was. A 1948 CIA assessment of political organizations in British Somaliland noted that none were “purely political in character” and that they largely pursued “individual tribal or regional interests”. It estimated that only three or four per cent of the population belonged to any political party. Most explosively, it stated that the Somali Youth League, later mythologized as the voice of all Somalis, “does not have an appeal for the residents of British Somaliland”. This was not the verdict of a hostile power seeking to undermine unity, but an internal intelligence assessment written decades before Somaliland’s later rupture with Mogadishu.

The same document described early Somali nationalism as explicitly pan-Somali and dismissive of inherited borders, committed to uniting “all the inhabitants of the Somali countries”. That ideology would later become state doctrine in Mogadishu. Somaliland’s subsequent rejection of it was not a betrayal of some shared national soul; it was a continuation of a political culture that had always been cautious, localized and sceptical of ideological centralism. In this sense, Somaliland’s post-1991 governance — built around clan conferences, negotiated consent and decentralization — looks less like an anomaly and more like a return to form.

Israel’s role enters this story not as a sudden act of provocation, but as a long-term strategic calculation shaped by geography and threat perception. Somalia as a unified state never had meaningful relations with Israel. From the 1960s onward it aligned itself with pan-Arab causes, framed Israel as an imperial enemy, and became one of its most hostile critics in international forums. Somaliland, by contrast, was recognized by Israel in 1960 and quietly revisited that history after restoring its independence in 1991.

What followed, according to multiple Israeli and regional media reports, was years of discreet engagement managed largely outside formal diplomatic channels. Mossad is reported to have cultivated relationships with Somaliland’s leadership, laying political and security groundwork well before any public recognition. Israeli officials have openly thanked the agency’s leadership for its role. Key Somaliland leaders are said to have made several secret visits to Israel in 2025, meeting senior political, defense and intelligence figures. None of this was advertised, because recognition politics in Africa and the Arab world remain unforgiving.

The strategic logic is blunt. Somaliland sits on the Gulf of Aden, overlooking the Bab el-Mandeb strait through which a significant share of global trade passes. It lies within a few hundred kilometers of Houthi controled territory in Yemen, whose missiles and drones have reshaped security calculations across the Red Sea. From Berbera, Israel and its partners can monitor maritime traffic, detect launches, and project power at distances that radically alter response times. Israeli commentators have described the relationship as a force multiplier against the Houthis. Western security planners see similar advantages.

This also explains why the United Arab Emirates looms so large in the background. Long before Israel’s recognition, Abu Dhabi invested heavily in Berbera’s port and airport, reportedly turning them into advanced logistical and military facilities. The UAE’s absence from the joint condemnation statement was therefore less a mystery than a confirmation. Somaliland fits neatly into a wider Emirati strategy of controlling ports, trade routes and maritime choke-points from the Red Sea to the Horn of Africa, often operating beyond the authority of weak central governments.

China, too, factors into the equation. Its naval base in Djibouti and expanding presence along African trade routes have unsettled Western planners. Somaliland offers an alternative foothold in a region where influence is increasingly contested. From this perspective, Israel’s move is not only about countering the Houthis or extending the Abraham Accords, but about anchoring itself and its allies in a rapidly militarizing maritime corridor.

It is here that the most incendiary allegations emerge, particularly claims that Somaliland was discussed as a potential destination for Palestinians displaced from Gaza. These reports, widely circulated but officially denied, have inflamed regional reactions and colored interpretations of Israel’s motives. Whether such plans were speculative, exploratory or entirely fictitious, their very plausibility in public discourse speaks to how little Somaliland is treated as a political community in its own right, and how readily it is imagined as empty strategic space.

The backlash has been swift and severe. Fourteen UN Security Council members condemned Israel’s recognition; the African Union rejected it outright. Turkey warned of a strategy to fragment Islamic states. Somalia framed the move as an existential threat. Yet much of this outrage rests on selective memory. Somaliland is condemned for claiming self-determination, while states that suppress separatist movements within their own borders present themselves as guardians of international law. Israel is accused of expansionism, while Somalia’s own pursuit of Greater Somalia is quietly erased from the record.

None of this absolves Israel of opportunism, nor Somaliland of hard-nosed calculation. This was not an act of idealism. It was a transaction shaped by intelligence cooperation, shared threat perceptions and the cold logic of geography. It will intensify rivalries in the Horn of Africa, sharpen competition in the Red Sea, and test already fragile regional orders. It may also, paradoxically, force a long-overdue reckoning with Somaliland’s unresolved status.

The question now is whether the international community can continue to deny a political reality that intelligence agencies documented decades ago, that dozens of states once acknowledged, and that more than 39 years of effective self-rule have only reinforced. In the coming years, as the Horn of Africa becomes an ever more critical arena of global competition, that denial may prove more destabilizing than recognition itself.

by Nilantha Ilangamuwa is a founding editor of the Sri Lanka Guardian