Tag: Hargeisa

Somaliland: UAE built the port. Diaspora writes the checks. Now Israel and Taiwan Want in

Somaliland: UAE built the port. Diaspora writes the checks. Now Israel and Taiwan want in.

Seven months on from recognition, the focus is pivoting from aid to hard investment. Here is what that actually looks like on the ground.

This is a bonus edition of Horn Horizons, part of the Global Power Shifts network, where I track Power, Ports, and Prosperity across the Horn and the Red Sea.

Somaliland is the closest thing the Horn has to a live experiment. A state recognized by only one country is trying to turn a Gulf-grade port and diaspora savings into a real economy. Israel and Taiwan test the edges, while the wider neighborhood watches what a single recognition unlocks.

The open question is whether any serious capital beyond the diaspora’s own actually shows up. To find out who’s buying, and where the pitch runs ahead of the plumbing beneath it, I sat down with Hana Kaise Abdi, founding partner of Bilow Capital , who guides foreign investors into Somaliland on the ground in Hargeisa.

Israel became the first and so far only country to recognize Somaliland in December last year, over objections from the African Union, the Arab League and, loudest of all, Mogadishu. A state recognized by just one country can’t borrow on international markets or draw on the development banks, so the capital that builds Somaliland arrives as investment, not debt, and most of it comes via the diaspora.

Remittances to Somalia as a whole, Somaliland included, run around $3 billion a year, much of it into land, property and businesses, and seven months on that hasn’t shifted. DP World is expanding its Berbera port terminal and the dismantling of USAID under the Trump administration has pushed donors to talk investment where they once focused on grants, but the buyer writing the checks is still overwhelmingly Somaliland’s own.

Hana wants to widen that pool. British-born, raised in Bristol by parents who fled the civil war, she moved to Hargeisa about seven years ago and co-founded Bilow Capital, which walks foreign investors through market research and due diligence, runs an accelerator, the Bilow Venture Lab, and since February has deployed a diaspora-backed fund, the Rise Fund, into startups that complete the cohort.

“The private sector’s the real route for sustainable development,” she tells me, a conviction that hardened as she watched the 2017 famine from the UK. She’s paid on the investment flow she describes, which is reason enough to hear her out and to read the numbers with that interest attached.

Recognition moved faster than the money

The harder assets moved earlier. DP World has run Berbera since 2017 and is building it toward a 2 million-container capacity, with a direct Jebel Ali service launched some eight months ago, and Hana treats the port as proof of concept — “a great symbol for what can be achieved if more foreign investors came in.”What the port mostly ships is the economy’s mainstay: live sheep and goats bound for Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, which made up about two-thirds of exports in 2024 and peak each year around Hajj time. Much of the investment case is a bet on diversifying away from that single artery.

The politics that dominate the headlines have, so far, left that balance sheet alone, which is the part that matters for anyone pricing exposure. Somalia’s annulment of its agreements with the UAE in January landed on federal Somalia and Abu Dhabi’s bases there, not on Berbera, and Hana reports no measurable effect on Somaliland itself. The 2024 memorandum meant to grant Ethiopia sea access for a step toward recognition is effectively frozen, and she doesn’t oversell it, calling Ethiopian investment interest “a matter of time” rather than a live pipeline.

Where she sees the newest interest is Taiwan, the Gulf, and Israel:

  • Taiwan: A natural counterpart — a self-governing island much of the world declines to call a country, for fear of provoking Beijing, yet trades with anyway. It moved earliest in hard assets, years before recognition was on the table: in 2021 Taiwan’s state oil company, CPC, took a 49% stake in a Somaliland exploration block, SL10B/13, operated by the British-Turkish firm Genel Energy, whose Toosan-1 prospect is estimated at up to 650 million barrels. Nothing’s out of the ground yet. The block’s still at the exploration stage, with no commercial well drilled, and Genel has been seeking a licence extension that would push a first drilling deadline toward 2027, even as its Taiwanese partner presses to move faster. Other Taiwanese firms are active in mining, fisheries, and agriculture.
  • The Gulf: Runs UAE-first, with Saudi money as the natural extension of that livestock trade.
  • Israel: The freshest and the least monetized. The areas she flags are agriculture and water (desalination and irrigation, where Israeli firms lead), technology, digital health, and health care, alongside a Red Sea security logic that’s really about the view it buys: Berbera sits across the water from Yemen, a vantage point on the Houthis and the Bab el-Mandeb chokepoint. “Very early days,” Hana said. That stretch of water’s stayed in the headlines, with the Iran-aligned Houthis recently attacking two Saudi oil tankers about 70 nautical miles southwest of Al Shuqaiq, near the strait.

The interview

Edited for length and clarity. The figures are hers unless attributed otherwise.

Q: Who’s actually putting money in?

Hana: The biggest chunk is the diaspora, without question. There’s remittance of roughly $3 billion, and while a lot of that’s consumption, a large amount goes into investment. There isn’t hard data I can point you to, but I’m diaspora, as is my whole extended family, and you can see it: a lot of the real estate is diaspora-owned, a lot of land, a lot of businesses.

Beyond that, there are two types of clients I work with. One is private-sector investors looking for market-rate returns, interested in fisheries, agriculture, mining, manufacturing, usually businesses from the Middle East or high-net-worth individuals. The other is development agencies trying to move away from the aid model into an investment model, who want to put money into things like the venture lab and the fund.

Her $3 billion figure’s worth a footnote. Remittances on that order are the standard estimate for Somalia as a whole, not Somaliland alone, and the investment share of it isn’t separately documented, a caveat she volunteers herself. Read it as direction, not measurement.

Q: What do your founders actually lack?

Hana: Capital, of course, is the first thing. But it goes beyond that. A lot of founders have brilliant ideas, and sometimes even the savings to start, but no procedures in place: financial management, operations, human resources, talent retention.

And formalization. One founder we worked with had a strong business and co-founders, but nothing was legalized or formalized, and it ended with him not being able to raise investment because of that. Moving from the informal to the formal economy is a huge missing link. Then working capital, because a lot of small businesses have no access to finance at all. And regulation, where the government hasn’t yet built an environment suited to small and medium businesses.

Q: Why the emphasis on women founders specifically?

Hana: There are a substantial number of female business owners, but they’re underrepresented and they don’t get the same opportunities. A lot of them don’t see themselves applying for something like an accelerator. They feel they might be excluded from it. So we push to bring the existing female founders through the cohorts, so they’re not left behind and get the same access to finance. It also gives them independence in their own lives and the ability to make a living themselves.

Q: For a non-diaspora investor, what about the legal framework? You’re, on paper, part of Somalia.

Hana: In practice, Somalia doesn’t regulate anything inside Somaliland, not the legal system, not the economy, definitely not the politics. Most investors just register their business here. If you go through the correct legal channels and the business or asset is in your name, and a dispute occurs with a partner on the ground, it’s very difficult to lose that case in the courts.

Some investors also choose to execute their contracts in the UAE or the UK. Either way it’s workable. The biggest misconception is how safe and how easy it actually is. As someone who’s traveled all over, Somaliland’s one of the safest places I’ve been

She’s talking about physical security, not investment risk, and there the UK Foreign Office is more cautious than she is; more on that below.

Her numbers, and the wider picture

Bilow doesn’t yet have an audited track record, and Hana’s candid that it’s early. In under a year, the venture lab has run two cohorts with about 46% female participation. Since launching the fund in February the firm has invested in 10 businesses, and seen more than 80% of participants qualify for investment after the program. One founder, she said, raised more than $200,000 in a single round, and others have opened second branches in Hargeisa or been approached directly by investors. The Rise Fund is structured as an open-ended, evergreen vehicle and began deploying immediately rather than waiting for a first close, which it hasn’t yet reached.

These are the firm’s own figures, from a party raising capital on the strength of them and with no independent registry to test them against, so read them as a founder’s self-report, not a verified return. What can be checked is the opportunity she points to, and the public record broadly supports her framing:

  • Fisheries: Her claim that the fisheries are barely exploited holds up: sector assessments put under 10% of stocks worked on a Gulf of Aden coast that ranks among East Africa’s richer fishing grounds.
  • Manufacturing: Her pitch rests on the country importing more than 90% of what it consumes, which she frames as room for import substitution rather than a solved problem.
  • Legal comfort: Real on paper, as Somaliland’s investment law grants foreign investors national treatment, a three-year tax holiday, and import-tax exemptions on equipment.

What the pitch leaves out

The formalization trap Hana cautions against is also the market’s central risk. When a viable business misses out simply because its founders never put proper contracts in place, the constraint isn’t a lack of ideas, but the fragile foundation beneath it. No accelerator program can substitute for commercial law, functional courts, or a regulator built to support small business. It’s the exact same gap a foreign investor inherits.

Recognition sits on the same ledger. Somaliland’s record of stability and peaceful transfers is real, and the safety case Hana makes is strong on its own terms, but the same non-recognition that shuts out sovereign debt also shuts out the political-risk insurance and development-finance guarantees that de-risk large projects, which is why what moves is still mostly diaspora equity and word of mouth. Her own workaround, registering locally but signing contracts under UAE or UK law, is a rational hedge and an admission of what the domestic framework can’t yet guarantee.

And she’s describing day-to-day Hargeisa, not the whole risk picture: the UK Foreign Office still advises against all but essential travel to Somaliland, and Houthi leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi declared in a televised address, days after recognition, that any Israeli presence in Somaliland would be treated as “a military target” (Times of Israel). A serious investor prices the corridor, not the city alone.

Somaliland’s story has moved faster than its balance sheet. Recognition, a Gulf-grade port, and the dismantling of USAID driven by Donald Trump and Elon Musk’s DOGE have made ‘investment, not aid’ the language everyone in Hargeisa now speaks, and Hana’s fluent in it because she’s been making that argument since before it was fashionable. But the buyers are still overwhelmingly the diaspora, because that’s most of what a largely unrecognized state has to work with, and Israeli recognition isn’t yet a financing system.

That’s also why the founders she works with keep being held back by the same unglamorous things: lack of paperwork, working capital, and basic regulation. The pitch works on paper, but the legal and regulatory rails beneath it remain fragile. I’d watch whether the aid-to-investment pivot converts into deployed private capital, and whether government policy catches up with the headlines by building the legal and banking infrastructure small businesses actually need.

The bottom line

So, who wants to invest in Somaliland? For now, the people who already believe in it.

  • The diaspora: Writes these checks because it’s personally invested in seeing Somaliland thrive, beyond the returns.
  • Israel: Has named its interests but not yet its money.
  • Taiwan: Has paid for an oil block it still has to drill.
  • The Gulf: Already the anchor customer, taking the live sheep and goats that remain the economy’s mainstay. For Abu Dhabi, Berbera is the template for doing business with an unrecognized state, feeding its wider ports strategy across Africa.
  • Ethiopia: Berbera offers the landlocked country sea access, a huge priority for Addis, and a way to diversify away from Djibouti, through which some 95% of its trade travels. DP World signed a 2021 memorandum of understanding with Addis to invest up to $1 billion in the Berbera-Ethiopia trade corridor, though where that agreement stands today is an open question.

The next twelve months will show which of those turns into deployed capital.

Between Maritime Access and Recognition: Geopolitical Implications of Rapprochement Between Ethiopia and Somaliland

Between Maritime Access and Recognition: Geopolitical Implications of Rapprochement Between Ethiopia and Somaliland

Recent statements by Somaliland’s foreign minister, Abdirahman Dahir Adam, also known as “Bakal” — affirming Ethiopia’s right to sea access and Hargeisa’s readiness to discuss this issue with the Ethiopian government — have reignited debate over Ethiopia-Somaliland relations. These remarks carry particular weight in the context of shifting power dynamics around the Red Sea, where intensifying global competition over maritime routes underscores the growing strategic importance of ports and logistical infrastructure. At the heart of this debate lies a structural geopolitical dilemma: Ethiopia’s landlocked geography on one side, and Somaliland’s uncertain status within the regional order on the other. The challenge extends beyond bilateral ties between Hargeisa and Addis Ababa, encompassing questions of sovereignty, recognition, and the balance of power in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea region.

The interview given by Somaliland’s foreign minister to the Ethiopian newspaper The Reporter on June 6, 2026, conveyed several key messages that reveal the implications and motives behind the revival of this maritime cooperation issue, the future of relations between Somaliland and Ethiopia, and the ongoing transformations in the Horn of Africa:

First, the statements emphasized the flexibility of the new administration in Hargeisa and its openness toward its Ethiopian neighbor. They suggest that Somaliland may not necessarily require formal Ethiopian recognition at this stage, but rather seeks to strengthen its partnerships with Addis Ababa and other regional and international actors. This approach is intended to bolster Somaliland’s de facto legitimacy and improve its negotiating position with Mogadishu, even in the absence of legal recognition. Despite growing expectations among Somaliland’s leadership and elite that friendly countries like Ethiopia and Kenya might follow Israel’s lead in recognizing Somaliland, Bakal clarified that his government respects Ethiopia’s policy and would never push Addis Ababa toward recognition. He expressed confidence, however, that Ethiopia will eventually view Somaliland as “a reliable and stable partner that it will eventually recognize.” This reflects a growing awareness in Hargeisa that the real value lies not only in potential recognition, but in positioning Somaliland as an indispensable partner in regional arrangements concerning ports, trade, and logistical corridors.

Second, the interview paved the way for a new negotiating track. When the Somaliland minister was asked how far his country’s new administration had changed its policy toward neighboring Ethiopia, which he described as Somaliland’s closest and most important ally in the Horn of Africa, and whether the administration wished to revive the controversial memorandum of understanding with Ethiopia, he did not provide a direct answer. Instead, he shifted the discussion away from the memorandum itself, which he said was “not the only thing” possible in the course of cooperation between the two sides, and emphasized the broader idea that Hargeisa understood Ethiopia’s maritime needs and was prepared to discuss them. He also noted that Ethiopia could make greater use of the port of Berbera, which, according to him, has not yet happened. This formulation does not necessarily indicate a formal return to the memorandum of understanding. Rather, it reflects an attempt to reproduce the strategic logic on which the memorandum was based, with a view to reintroducing it within a new negotiating framework that is less politically costly and more diplomatically acceptable. In other words, Hargeisa may be seeking to separate the strategic project from the legal and political framework that has raised regional and international objections, by presenting maritime cooperation with Ethiopia as a long-term economic and logistical project rather than a geopolitical maneuver conditional on recognition or one that infringes on questions of sovereignty.

Third, Hargeisa is seeking to capitalize on regional transformations that enhance Somaliland’s geostrategic value. This is especially true of developments related to the war with Iran and its proxies, and their repercussions for Red Sea security and global supply chains. These developments have led to a reassessment of the strategic importance of ports and vital coastal sites in the Horn of Africa, including the port of Berbera. The port is becoming increasingly attractive, especially for Ethiopia, as one of the potential alternatives for reducing its dependence on Djibouti. It is also gaining relevance as part of the broader restructuring of regional transport and trade networks, as well as emerging maritime security arrangements.

The chances of reviving the maritime access issue and reaching new arrangements between Ethiopia and Somaliland have increased

The prospects for reviving maritime cooperation and reaching new arrangements between Ethiopia and Somaliland appear stronger than before. Despite the uncertainty created by the “Ankara Declaration” signed between Ethiopia and Somalia in late 2024, several drivers continue to support — and even reinforce — the potential for a deeper partnership.

First, Internal Pressures: Domestic circumstances in both countries create incentives to break the deadlock, opening space for development and joint growth. Both governments increasingly recognize the feasibility of partnership, given the convergence of economic and strategic interests.

Second, Somaliland’s Growing Assertiveness: Somaliland’s recent success in consolidating power has emboldened Hargeisa to challenge Mogadishu more directly, strengthening its confidence in pursuing independent arrangements.

Third, Port Negotiations: Statements by Somaliland’s foreign minister did not rule out the possibility of granting Ethiopia a sovereign seaport. Rather, they suggested a willingness to negotiate better terms or wait for more favorable timing, signaling flexibility rather than outright rejection.

Fourth, Somalia’s Instability: The deteriorating situation in Somalia — marked by the federal government’s crisis of legitimacy and accumulated failures to establish a stable governance model in the south — creates further openings for Somaliland to advance alternative arrangements.

Fifth, Regional and International Context: Potential regional supporters for this type of arrangement, combined with growing international concern over Red Sea security and global supply chains, may help create an enabling environment for expanding logistical cooperation. While comprehensive political agreements remain unlikely in the near term, these dynamics could sustain incremental progress in maritime collaboration.

On the other hand, this path faces significant structural and political obstacles. Foremost among them is the legal status of Somaliland, which remains unrecognized internationally, and the firm position of Mogadishu, which enjoys broad support from the African Union and most international partners. In addition, the Ankara Declaration has created a new political reality that may make any Ethiopian return to unilateral arrangements with Hargeisa more politically and diplomatically costly. Such a move could be interpreted as a retreat from Ethiopia’s efforts to maintain calm with Somalia, especially given Addis Ababa’s ambitious demands — including a military base — and its declining reliance on Somalia, which is unable to offer a credible alternative for port access.

Beyond these bilateral challenges, the fragile balance of power in the Red Sea, overlapping interests of regional actors, and the sensitivity of port-related issues add further complications. The volatility of the regional security environment undermines the prospects for sovereign agreements and weakens the ability of both parties to commit to long-term arrangements that require durable political and security stability.

The resurgence of Ethiopia-Somaliland maritime cooperation reflects broader regional transformations. The revival of the idea of granting Ethiopia maritime access through Somaliland goes beyond economic and logistical considerations. It constitutes a critical test of sovereignty, recognition, and influence in the Horn of Africa, with far-reaching implications for relations between Mogadishu and Hargeisa, broader geopolitical balances in the region, and the interests of external powers.

1. Implications for Mogadishu-Hargeisa Relations 

For Mogadishu and Hargeisa, the issue is not merely about port facilities for Ethiopia — it sets a political precedent that directly touches on sovereignty and legitimacy. Any maritime arrangement between Ethiopia and Somaliland would deepen the divide between Somalia and Somaliland, exacerbating long-standing disputes, particularly against the backdrop of Somaliland’s normalization of relations with Israel.

While Somalia’s federal government asserts its full and exclusive authority over all Somali territory, including Hargeisa and Berbera, and threatens to use force to reintegrate Somaliland into the Somali federal state, the most dangerous aspect may not be the Somali response itself. Rather, it lies in the interplay of internal and external factors that continue to deepen the rift between the ruling elites in the south and north. The Somaliland issue is no longer merely an internal political matter that can be resolved through dialogue or gradual containment. It has become a distinct reality intertwined with regional and international calculations and interests that extend beyond the control of Somali and Somaliland leaders.

2. Implications for Regional Balances

The Ethiopia-Somaliland partnership exemplifies the intensifying geopolitical competition in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. In recent years, the region has undergone profound transformations, with the focus shifting from security issues, border disputes, and counterterrorism to ports, sea lanes, and logistics infrastructure.

Strengthening cooperation with Ethiopia would mark a qualitative leap for Somaliland, expanding its network of foreign relations and strengthening its position at the heart of the regional and geopolitical equation. It would also place Hargeisa on a clearer path toward broader international engagement as a de facto independent actor. In return, it would significantly advance Ethiopia’s strategic project to build maritime influence, including securing a permanent port and military base on the Red Sea coast. Such a development could redefine Ethiopia’s regional role and reshape the balance of power and maritime security equations in this vital corridor and the wider region.

The Future of the Ethiopia-Somaliland Partnership

Available evidence suggests that the partnership between Addis Ababa and Hargeisa will be shaped not only by internal dynamics and political will, but also by evolving regional balances across the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa. Expectations regarding maritime access and political recognition fluctuate between three possible scenarios.

Scenario 1:The Expansion of Functional Cooperation

This scenario builds on the existing trajectory of gradual cooperation, focusing on economic rather than political dimensions. It could involve greater use of the Port of Berbera, development of trade routes and infrastructure, and the creation of special economic zones. Crucially, it avoids sensitive political or sovereign arrangements that could be interpreted as implicit recognition of Somaliland or affecting its current legal status.

Grounded in pragmatism, this path allows both sides to achieve economic gains while minimizing political risks. It provides a practical and predictable framework with fewer risks, including those perceived by Somalilanders, southern Somali unionists, and their regional allies. This approach also aligns with the Ankara Declaration and with the preference of many international partners to promote economic integration while preserving the existing legal framework. It is therefore the most realistic and achievable scenario in the short and medium term, and it could evolve gradually through cumulative implementation steps rather than through a comprehensive political agreement.

Scenario 2: Negotiating a New Formula That Could Lead to Ethiopian Recognition of Somaliland

This scenario assumes that the governments of Abiy Ahmed and Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi, better known as “Irro”, will engage in serious discussions that could lead to reviving or improving the previous memorandum of understanding. This could result in a more comprehensive agreement granting Ethiopia long-term maritime privileges in exchange for political and economic gains for Somaliland. These gains could include formal recognition or steps that approach it in practice.

This scenario reflects Ethiopia’s growing maritime ambitions and Somaliland’s increasing confidence in its ability to expand its foreign policy options. However, its realization remains dependent on changes in the regional and international environment. First, Ethiopia would need to be convinced that the strategic gains outweigh the potential costs of deviating from the understandings established by the Ankara Declaration. This makes the scenario possible, though less likely, in the foreseeable future.

Scenario 3: Strategic Stagnation

In this scenario, political and diplomatic constraints prevent a breakthrough on the maritime access issue, leaving relations between the two parties uncertain. This scenario could gain strength if renewed momentum emerges in the reconciliation process between Ethiopia and Somalia. It could also become more likely if leadership priorities or political calculations change in Addis Ababa, Hargeisa, or Mogadishu. Additionally, Mogadishu’s ability to mobilize regional and international pressure could increase, leading to the containment or obstruction of any arrangements to which it is not a party. This would, in turn, reduce opportunities for maritime cooperation between Ethiopia and Somaliland.

However, such a stalemate would not address the root causes of the problem, including Ethiopia’s geographical constraints, Somaliland’s limited legal status, and increasing regional competition over sea lanes. These factors make this scenario less sustainable in the medium and long term.

Conclusions

Recent developments in relations between Ethiopia and Somaliland reveal that the issue of Ethiopian maritime access is re-emerging within new regional dynamics. Despite the constraints imposed by the Ankara Declaration and the sensitivity of the Somali sovereignty question, the motives driving both parties have become more urgent.

However, the future of this path will likely depend on the parties’ ability to reconcile the imperatives of economic geography with the requirements of political legitimacy. This makes the gradual expansion of functional economic and logistical cooperation the most likely scenario in the foreseeable future.

By contrast, the scenario of reviving the memorandum of understanding in a modified form that includes official recognition or sovereign arrangements remains contingent on deeper regional and international transformations, as well as shifting calculations among key actors. This makes the maritime access issue itself a central determinant of regional stability and a pivotal factor in reshaping the geopolitical order in the Horn of Africa in the coming years.

Source: Emirates Policy Center

President Irro of Somaliland is in Israel on a State Visit

President Irro of Somaliland is in Israel on a State Visit

On Sunday, June 14, 2026, Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi arrived in Jerusalem, making it the first time a leader from the Somaliland Republic in the Horn of Africa had visited Israel on an official visit. Since Israel became the first UN member state to formally recognize Somaliland’s sovereignty in December of last year, the bilateral relationship has drastically changed, and this visit marks a significant turning point.

The official opening of the Somaliland Embassy, an important symbolic event, is at the core of Jerusalem’s diplomatic agenda. Israeli President Isaac Herzog welcomed President Abdullahi to the President’s Residence and spoke to him in Somali and English.

Upon his arrival, President Abdullahi declared, “The people of Somaliland have built a peaceful, democratic, and resilient nation for 35 years.” “Do you see us?” we asked the world. Israel was the first to respond.

The visit comes after Israel became the first member of the UN to formally recognize the Republic of Somaliland in December 2025. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made this decision “in the spirit of the Abraham Accords,” and it was supported by pledges of broad collaboration in the fields of energy technology, agriculture, health, and water management.

The visit takes place in the context of growing regional security concerns, in addition to the diplomatic ceremony. The Red Sea, a vital conduit for international trade, is cited by analysts as the main force for the growing alliance. According to recent reports, Israel has expanded its intelligence presence in the area, and talks on the strategic value of the Berbera International Airport are still going on.

The engagement’s cornerstone continues to be security cooperation. The present team is anticipated to complete framework agreements on maritime security and information sharing, and reports suggest that Somaliland officials and presidential guard units have received training in Israel. Regional observers see these changes as an attempt to offset challenges, such as the actions of Houthi rebels operating along the Bab al-Mandab Strait.

There has been debate around the growing relationships. Israel’s recognition of Somaliland has been repeatedly denounced by the Federal Government of Somalia as an infringement on its geographical integrity and sovereignty. Concern has also been voiced by regional nations, with China expressing unease about the possibility of an Israeli presence close to its maritime trading routes.

A visit to Yad Vashem, the World Holocaust Remembrance Center, and a number of high-level talks with Israel’s defense, finance, and economy ministries are part of President Abdullahi’s program, which runs through Thursday.

Hargeisa nevertheless faces the difficulty of converting this diplomatic victory into real infrastructure and economic benefits. Jerusalem views the visit as a strategic outreach effort to broaden its regional partnerships. The international world is still concerned about how this unique collaboration would affect the precarious balance of power in the Horn of Africa as the Somaliland Embassy is ready to open.

Somaliland and Israel – Considerations for Recognition and Cooperation

Somaliland and Israel – Considerations for Recognition and Cooperation

In the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea – a space whose security-strategic importance to Israel has been prominent again in the past two years – Somaliland, an independent and pro-Western country, is established, which is not recognized by the international community. Its ultimate goal is to gain international recognition and establish alliances with countries that will help it against its enemy: the Somali government of Mogadishu. In recent years, she has been establishing close ties with the UAE and Taiwan. The rise of the Trump administration and the presence of senior Republican officials who support recognition of it are given hopes to the leaders of Somaliland, and against this background its efforts to gain recognition have been increased, including against Israel. This article examines the issue of relations with Somaliland for Israel, while presenting the supportive and inhibiting Israeli recognition of it.

Somaliland – over thirty years of independence and stability

Somaliland spans the northwestern part of what the international community recognizes as a wholesale. Somaliland was independent for five days in 1960 before joining the Union with Somalia, and was reborn as an independent state in 1991 from the brutal and long-term Somali Civil War that has been taking place since the late 1980s. Somaliland is based on a unique and separate identity that has been formed in the last hundred years: the territory was under British colonial rule (unlike the rest of Somalia, which was under Italian rule); its people have extensive ties with southern Yemenite over the other side of the Gulf of Aden where it borders; and most of its population is among the members of the Isak clan – unlike the rest of the Somalia inhabited by other clans. The Isak suffered from discrimination and violence—and even claim to have genocide—from the clans that ruled Somalia-Mogadishu, especially in the 80’s.

Since its actual independence in 1991, Somaliland has been an antithesis for taking place in Somalia: its security situation is benign, its internal arena is stable, has no significant jihadist activity, and although there are border disputes at its ends (especially in the districts where other clans live), they are specific and polluted. Since the 2000s, Somaliland has been conducting a stable and proper multi-party democratic system, with a permanent election, the last of which took place in 2024 and announced a peaceful and orderly change of government. All the significant political forces operating in it are pro-Western and suspicious of Islamist forces or China and Russia. Although they are divided on the methods of action, they all see international recognition as a supreme goal.

The fact that Somalia-Mogadishu’s problems are concentrated in the south helps the survival of Somaliland, which is far from the battlegrounds between the various clans and the powerful government of Mugheyshu and the powerful Al-Shabaab organization. In addition, Somaliland borders on relatively friendly and stable governments: Ethiopia, Puntland (an independent state actually member of the Somalia Federation), and Djibouti. With them, Somaliland had peaceful and improved relations: In 2024, Somaliland signed a strategic understanding agreement with Ethiopia, which was supposed to give the unaccessible Ethiopia to the sea a foothold in the strategic port, Barbara, insinuating future recognition of her independence (this agreement was effectively frozen, but not canceled, under Turkish-Somali pressure). Somaliland’s ties with Djibouti are also improving, and in October 2025 she signed a “Nairubi Agreement” with Puntland for security and commercial cooperation.

In recent years, Somaliland has also developed its ties with other pro-Western countries. Taiwan and the UAE are its two most strategic partners: Taiwan – the chip manufacturing giant – is investing in the development of the country’s rare metal and mineral mines, and the UAE has invested a fortune in the development of the port of Barbara. As far as the UAE is concerned, Somaliland is a strategic stronghold in the Horn of Africa alongside the other Maozia in the region – on the Yemenite island of Socotura, in Puntland, and Darfur.

Even with the United States, Somliland has reasons for cautious optimism. American delegations—including from the Pentagon—have visited the country, which markets itself as a potential strategic base for the United States in the region. President Trump said the United States is considering recognizing it, and the U.S. Congress is interested in ordering the State Department to re-examine ties with Somaliland to improve them and upgrade them. As an intermediate stage, U.S. lawmakers aim for the State Department to start separating Somalia from Somalia and Somaliland in the context of travel warnings. Republican officials, such as Senator Ted Cruz of Texas, frequently express themselves in their support for recognizing Somaliland’s independence. However, the Americans have heavy considerations that are urgent to avoid recognition, along with delays in appointments and policy formulation for Africa and the Red Sea.

Against this background, Somaliland is conducting a lobbying campaign to promote the issue of recognition. In May 2025, the Somalilan President appealed to the UN members to recognize it as an independent state. During October 2025, the media in Somaliland reported that more than 20 countries, including Israel, are approaching the decision to recognize it. Somaliland is also more correct to adopt additional sovereign features: in November 2025, it declared full control of its airspace (by disconnecting it from the symbolic sovereignty of Somalia), demanding that it be authorized by a direct permit from its authorities to move in the sky, and announced that it would not recognize visas received from the Government of Mogadishu.

International recognition by other countries is therefore the primary target for the various Somliland governments (it remains one even after the exchange of government in democratic elections). International recognition will determine the existence of Somaliland and grant it protection, at least it hopes, from a scenario in which Somalia is reinforced (one or with its allies) will be able to act in the future international legitimacy to re-apply its authority to the territory. Alongside international recognition, Somaliland strives to acquire reliable and powerful allies. The danger from the government of Mogadishu is now still imaginary, but Somaliland has more tangible concerns than other security threats, from the Houthim, through the spread of global jihad (which is currently active in neighboring Pontland), to separatism in the periphery of the territory and even subversive activity that has evidence on the ground by China and Turkey.

Importance of Somaliland to the West and Israel

The importance of Somaliland lies in its geostrategic location and correctness – especially as a stable, moderate and reliable country in a volatile region – to cooperate in a comprehensive and broad manner with Western countries. The location of Somaliland at the entrance to the Gulf of Eden – opposite southern Yemen – connecting the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean, gives it a geo-strategic uniqueness. This is the historical reason that the British Empire took over in the late 19th century, and that the United States during the Reagan administration established a military base in the 1980s, in the midst of the Cold War.

Today, the distance between the waters and territory of Somaliland and the Houthi control areas in Yemen, the port of Hadida, for example, is about 300 to 500 km. The fact that in recent years the Gulf states, the United States and Israel – each in turn – have fought the Houthis without a decision, gives the location of Somaliland and the potential ability to operate from its territory, considerable global importance, within a possible equality voucher. Somaliland has a potential to be a frontal base for a variety of missions: intelligence surveillance against the Houthis and their empowerment efforts; providing logistics to the legitimate Yemeni government in its war against the Houthis; and a base for direct operational activity against the Houthi – offensive and to thwart Houthi attacks at sea or by means of drones. The necessary parallel to Israel’s steadfast alliance with Azerbaijan, which has significantly upgraded the strategic and operational Israeli ability to deal with the Iranian threat. It is possible that Somaliland is the equivalent brick for Israel in the face of the Houchi threat.

Alongside the valuable location of Somaliland, it is equally important that its government is interested in cooperating broadly with pro-Western countries. It’s a combination of willingness and ability. Eritrea is located in an even closer location to actions against the Houthis, but police are anti-Western and friendly to Iran. Djibouti, who has the strategic location, maintains actual neutrality in conflicts. Ethiopia lacks access to the sea and relations between police and the United States are ambivalent. Somaliland therefore offers a unique combination of geo-strategic location and a willingness to agree to widespread cooperation with pro-Western countries. Its ties with the UAE – that much of the logic that guides them from a utterance point of view was the war in the Hothis – are evidence of this. Messages coming out of Somaliland indicate that the state is also willing to have broad security relations with the United States, including hosting an American base, and even with Israel.

Regarding Israel, the positive attitude of the Somaliland government is evident, even in the midst of the war in the past two years, and it is likely that there are already unofficial ties between senior officials in both countries. Somaliland has sent messages in recent months that it is ready to cooperate with pro-Israel initiatives, including the expansion of the Abraham Agreements. The public discourse in the country tends to be pro-Israel, although there are also critical voices, especially in light of the war and reports from the Gaza Strip, as well as in light of the existence of Salafi movements (non-violent) in the country.

Considerations for and against recognition of Somliland

For Somaliland, the most coveted prize is American recognition, with which, they estimate, will come recognition from many other countries close to Washington. She therefore invests effort in front of the White House and Congress. Somaliland positions itself as an antagonist for China who is willing to go as a long way to realize American interests in the strategic space of the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. In the face of the Americans, Somaliland also emphasizes its democratic and free character and hostility to radical Islamist ideologies. In conversations with American officials and media messages, she clarifies her immediate readiness for entering the Abraham Agreements. Her desire to gain recognition was so great that the Somaliland government did not even publicly reject the discourse that took place a few months ago about plans to encourage the immigration of Gazans into its territory, despite the great unpopularity that the idea has sparked in its population.

However, despite the friendliness of Washington and the strategies of Somaliland’s location, the United States still seems to be hesitant about the question of official recognition, and it has serious reasons for this.

First, on a fundamental level, U.S. policy on the Somali issue has been consistent in recent decades: recognition of the idea of “one Sommalia.” The United States has sought to strengthen the Mogadishu government, especially in light of its difficult war against Al-Shabaab over the past two decades. For the United States, Somalia-Mogadishu is an ally, also weak and failing. The United States also provides it with military assistance in the attacks against global jihadist elements. Recognition of Somliland will see as an American betrayal, which could lead to the wave of the blast in the shaky Somalia (for example, by officially withdrawing from Fontland and Jubald – both of which are still a symbolic commitment to Mogadishu’s authority – or the strengthening of Al-Shabab). This consideration should be added to international practice – an aspiration not to recognize the changes in unilateral borders or in quitting countries, with the understanding that this is a possible opening of the Pandora’s box and an appeal of existing borders in the rest of the world, especially in the Middle East and Africa.

Although this is a weighty consideration for Status-Quo-like U.S. administrations, the Trump administration may be able to violate the tradition of adherence to the idea of “one Somalia” or the reluctance to recognize quitting countries. However, there is a consideration that probably plays a more significant role for Washington at the present time: the support of most Arab countries including Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Egypt, as well as Turkey in this idea. The Arab League countries, except the UAE, are declaratively supporting the unity of Somalia and strongly opposed the recognition of Somaliland. For Turkey, Somalia-Mogdeishu is a major ally in the Red Sea region, bordering on the status of a protectorate. These powerful countries, which are mined ear in Washington, express their aversion to the possibility of recognition of Somliland.

Although their impact on Washington is much less, the African Union countries are also inclined to deeply disapprove of any official recognition of quitting countries, fearing the domino effect in the rest of Africa.

Compared to the considerations of the United States, Israel has additional considerations: Although the Qatari and Turkish attitudes against recognition of Somliland are not significant (and vice versa), it is possible that the Egyptian position, and perhaps also Chinese, is more significant. On the other hand, Israel’s proximity to the UAE reinforces the pro-Somalland consideration. However, traditionally, Israel is hesitant to recognize quitting countries, partly for fear of precedents or a boomerang effect on the issue of recognition of a Palestinian state, although this consideration seems to be less relevant at the present time, due to the actual, almost sweeping recognition that the Palestinian “state” has won in recent years.

A more significant consideration for Israel, which is supposed to arouse caution and deep thought before official recognition of Somaliland, is actually a pragmatic aspect. Israeli recognition of Somaliland, which is not accompanied by American recognition, may cause a negative effect that will harm both Israel and Somaliland. While an Israeli-Somalian agreement may appear to be reinforcement of Israel’s status in the region, at the same time causing a strong counter-reaction in the Muslim world, which in turn may place Somaliland at the focus of regional criticism and, consequently, lead to a reluctance to expand public or substantive cooperation with Israel. Israeli recognition, ironically, may actually contain efforts to expand the Abraham Accords with other Muslim countries.

Under the threshold of consciousness, at least for now

Israel is required for allies in the Red Sea area, in part to prepare for the next campaign against the Houthis. Somaliland is an ideal candidate for this cooperation, who will be able to grant Israel as a matter of action near the scene of operations. But in addition to security cooperation, relations with Somaliland also have important economic-conscious potential for Israeli national security, due to the minerals in its territory and the desire to establish relations with Muslim populations in the region. Therefore, Israel must work to expand cooperation with this entity, ideal while cooperating with the UAE and the United States.

However, Israel has serious reasons for avoiding the first country to recognize Somaliland, which is primarily an understanding that such recognition may actually act against promoting intimate relations between Israel and Somaliland due to regional responses and dynamics. As long as the United States (or at least the UAE) does not recognize Somaliland as an independent state, Israel must not act alone on this official level.

The recommendation is therefore to promote the intimate relationship with Somaliland “under the threshold of consciousness.” Israel and its allies in Washington can help Somliland in persuasion attempts with the Trump administration, but the United States must take the first public step to recognition. At the same time, the two countries can promote – even before official recognition – security and economic partnerships, the establishment of interest offices (as many other countries with Somaliland do), and even symbolic measures such as recognition of the Somaliland passports.

These are steps that will prevent the possible risks involved in official recognition, while at the same time helping both parties to advance their fundamental interests. Israeli security and economic presence in Somliland does not necessarily require official recognition, and on the other hand, Somaliland may also be preferable to intimate and quiet relations with Israel over high-profile precedent-setting declarations. Somaliland can benefit many of these ties with Israel, especially in light of the security challenges that the country may encounter in the challenging neighborhood of the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa. For Israel, Somliland may be a “vigilance breaker” in the struggle against the Houthis.

** The author wishes to thank the staff of the Institute for National Security Studies for fruitful discourse on the issue, including as part of a guest lecture given by the author at the Institute on September 30, 2025; Dr. Rashid Abdi, head of research at the Sahan Institute in Kenya, for discourse and sharing of knowledge; and the Israel-Africa Relations Institute for support and encouragement.

The opinions expressed in the publications of the Institute for National Security Studies are those of the authors only.

New Maritime Gateway: UAE to Somaliland

New Maritime Gateway: UAE to Somaliland

DP World has unveiled a new strategic shipping route linking Jebel Ali Port in the UAE to Berbera Port in Somaliland

Operating every nine days, the service strengthens DP World’s global network and enhances Berbera position as a key logistics hub and maritime gateway in East Africa.

The Jebel Ali–Berbera route improves trade connectivity between the Gulf and East Africa, providing a faster maritime link to Somaliland. Scheduled stops at Aden and Djibouti further expand access to vital port cities, enabling smoother connections to markets across the Horn of Africa.

From Berbera, cargo can reach inland destinations, including Ethiopia, offering an alternative to the traditional Djibouti Port-dependent overland routes. The service also promises more predictable transit times while mitigating risks from regional bottlenecks.

Berbera Port features a 1,050-metre quay with a 400-metre section capable of handling Triple E vessels, extensive bulk and break-bulk facilities, and an annual livestock handling capacity of around four million heads.

Ganesh Raj, group chief operating officer, Marine Services at DP World, said, “The Jebel Ali to Berbera service further complements our investment drive into Africa. Building on the significant infrastructure we have developed across the continent, the service enhances connectivity for our customers as we continue to boost trade links between the Middle East and East Africa.”

“In doing so, we are supporting the growth of resilient, sustainable corridors that unlock prosperity for our partners, customers and the communities we serve,” he added.

Berbera is home to the region’s most modern container terminal and the Berbera Special Economic Zone (BSEZ), designed to attract foreign investment and support long-term industrial growth.

DP World holds a 58.5% stake in the Berbera container and general cargo terminal, providing deep-water access to major East–West shipping lanes. The nearby Berbera Economic Zone further accelerates local industrialisation, while the port handles over 4.1 million heads of livestock annually, generating trade worth more than US$1bn.

Community initiatives, including training the region’s first “Solar Mamas” as solar-energy technicians, illustrate how trade infrastructure can deliver economic and social benefits.

Supachai Wattanaveerachai, CEO, DP World Horn of Africa, commented, “The launch of this new corridor is a milestone in our ambition to build faster, safer, and more reliable trade routes. It reflects our commitment to creating meaningful economic benefits for businesses and communities in the region.”

“Our work in Berbera is already stimulating trade and industry, while supporting wider community development. Looking ahead, this service will strengthen Berbera role as a gateway for East Africa’s future growth and prosperity,” he added.

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Somaliland Child Education: An Emerging Model in the Horn of Africa

Somaliland Child Education: An Emerging Model in the Horn of Africa

Somaliland covers an area of 137,600 kilometers and shares a broader with Ethiopia, Djibouti and Somalia. Hargeisa is the political and commercial capital of Somaliland. School education system of Somaliland is playing a vital role for the cognitive, social and emotional growth of children and is responsible for the overall well being of children. In Somaliland, for the first two to three years of a child’s life, early childhood education is integrated into formal schools and private Quranic schools. Primary school lasts eight years, divided into elementary and intermediate cycles. Continue reading “Somaliland Child Education: An Emerging Model in the Horn of Africa”

Insiders and Insurgents: The Joint Venture of Al-shabab & Somali Government

Insiders and Insurgents: The Joint Venture of Al-shabab & Somali Government

At the heart of the Horn of Africa is a chilling story—one that combines corruption, terror, and insurgency into a deadly cycle. Somalia, forever plagued by political instability and extremism, is now in the hot seat for its suspected harboring of an unholy trinity: a low-key, transactional relationship between branches of its government and the Al-Qaeda-linked militant group Al-Shabaab. This is less a story of betrayal but more an expose on how terror had become a cross-ventured business. Continue reading “Insiders and Insurgents: The Joint Venture of Al-shabab & Somali Government”

Somalia Observes as the UAE Deepens Its Military Ties with Somaliland

Somalia Observes as the U.A.E. Deepens Its Military Ties with Somaliland

As the Gulf state increases its power in the Horn of Africa, the United Arab Emirates -UAE – and Somaliland are strengthening their military and security collaboration. This development may further exacerbate tensions between Abu Dhabi and the federal government of Somalia. Continue reading “Somalia Observes as the UAE Deepens Its Military Ties with Somaliland”

Camel Milk Prevents Developing Heart Disease and Microbial Infection

Camel Milk Prevents Developing Heart Disease and Microbial Infection

Camel milk may be a better alternative to traditional dairy from cows due to its antimicrobial and antiallergenic properties, a new study says.

Researchers at the Edith Cowan University in Australia say camel milk has more naturally occurring active short protein molecules compared to cow milk.

Although scientists have known that camel milk can be less allergenic compared to bovine milk, the new study, published in Food Chemistry, confirms that it also has a higher potential to yield molecules with antimicrobial and anti-hypertensive properties.

These active compounds can selectively inhibit certain pathogens, researchers say.

As a result, camel milk creates a healthy gut environment and likely helps decrease the risk of developing heart disease in future.

A camel in the outskirts of the city of Hargeisa, Somaliland

The individual potency of these active molecules in camel milk needs further testing, however.

The study also confirms previous findings that camel milk lacks the major cow milk allergen β-lactoglobulin and, thus, provides dairy users who have a β-Lg allergy a viable alternative to cow milk. “The unique study of allergenic protein characterization in camel and cow milk suggested camel milk’s potential to be less allergenic due to the absence of β-Lg,” the study notes.

The level of lactose in camel milk is also lower than in cow milk

Cow milk generally contains around 85-87 per cent water, 3.8-5.5 per cent fat, 2.9-3.5 per cent protein, and 4.6 per cent lactose. Camel milk has slightly more water at 87-90 per cent, a protein content that varies from 2.15 to 4.90 per cent, 1.2 to 4.5 per cent fat, and 3.5-4.5 per cent lactose.

The researchers say the latest findings could lead to the development of “nutrient-enriched” dairy products.

Currently, 81 per cent of the milk consumed worldwide comes from cows. Camels are the fifth largest source behind buffaloes, goats and sheep. Camels account for only about 0.4 per cent of the global milk production, concentrated mostly in arid parts of the world like the Middle East.

Ali Abdi Elmi holds a cup filled with camel milk on the outskirts of the city of Hargeisa in Somaliland

However, some semiarid regions such as Australia, which have an existing camel population, can increase production as well as consumption. These areas, which can be challenging for traditional cattle farming, are “perfect for camels”, researchers say.

Somaliland Government Rejected Mogadishu’s Fragile Authority Assertion Over Upcoming Elections in Somaliland

Somaliland Government Rejected Mogadishu’s Fragile Authority Assertion Over Upcoming Elections in Somaliland

Hargeisa, Somaliland, October 04th, 2024 – The Government of the Republic of Somaliland strongly condemns the recent comments made by the Mogadishu administration at the United Nations regarding Somaliland’s upcoming presidential and political party elections. These remarks are baseless and reflect a continued attempt by an illegitimate administration to undermine the democratic rights and sovereignty of the people of Somaliland.

The administration in Mogadishu, which controls a fraction of its territory and is plagued by insecurity, with much of its land dominated by Al-Shabaab militants, has no legitimacy or authority to speak on the internal affairs of Somaliland. The so-called government in Mogadishu has failed time and again to hold any credible, transparent, or inclusive electoral process. It is laughable for such a regime—where no citizen participation or one-person-one-vote elections have occurred for decades—to comment on Somaliland’s well-established democratic system.

Somaliland, a nation with a proud tradition of democracy, will once again demonstrate its commitment to its people’s right to self-determination. The Somaliland people will elect their president and new political parties through free and fair elections in November 13 2024. The Mogadishu regime has no role to play in this process and no say over Somaliland’s future.

We urge the Mogadishu administration to focus on its own internal crises, restore security, and ensure the basic governance of its own territory rather than issuing statements on matters outside of its control. The Republic of Somaliland will continue on its path of democracy, stability, and development, and we will not allow any external interference to distract us from that goal.