Month: March 2026

Somaliland: Children with Disabilities Still Face Barriers to Education

Rhima’s first step into school

Every morning, Rahima used to sit outside her home and listen. She listened to the laughter of children walking to school. She listened to their footsteps fading down the dusty road. And she imagined what it might feel like to walk beside them.

“I wished I could go with them,” she says quietly. But for years, school felt impossible.

When Rahima was nine years old, she was diagnosed with aggressive bone cancer. Her mother still remembers the moment clearly. “We did not know what tomorrow would look like,” she says. “We were very afraid.” The treatment saved Rahima’s life. But it came at a cost. Doctors had to amputate her right leg.

“I felt like my whole life had stopped,” Rahima recalls. After the surgery, she remained at home. Her parents worried she would face stigma from other children and the wider community. With limited income, they could not afford the support she needed to start school. As the years passed, Rahima watched other children leave for class each day while she stayed behind.

Opening doors for more children

Across Somaliland, many children with disabilities still face barriers to education.

Recent disability assessments conducted in twenty Education Cannot Wait (ECW)–supported schools identified 72 children with disabilities, many of whom had never accessed education due to stigma, limited support, or financial constraints. Through the ECW‑funded Multi‑Year Resilience Program (MYRP)—implemented by UNICEF in collaboration with the Ministry of Education and Science (MOES), Africa Educational Trust (AET) and local education partners—children with disabilities and out‑of‑school learners are being prioritized with scholarships and inclusive Accelerated Basic Education (ABE) pathways to restore their right to learn.

For families like Rahima’s, these changes are opening doors that once seemed permanently closed.

A future reimagined

Now settled into her learning journey, Rahima dreams of becoming a teacher.

“There are many girls like me still at home,” she says. “One day I want to help them learn too.”

Her story is a testament to the transformative power of inclusive education, made possible through the ECW‑funded MYRP, dedicated educators, and a community beginning to believe that every child deserves a place in school. For Rahima, the scholarship opened more than a school door. It gave her the chance to learn, to belong — and to dream again!

Impact beyond one child

The disability assessment in the ECW schools found significant numbers of children with:

  • Learning difficulties (32 cases)
  • Mobility impairment (13 cases)
  • Vision impairments (11 cases)
  • Hearing impairments (7 cases)
  • Behavioral challenges (7 cases)

These findings have strengthened inclusive practices, improved early identification of learning needs, and guided scholarship prioritisation to ensure children like Raxiima are not left behind.

Beyond the numbers, the assessments have also helped communities recognise that disability should not mean exclusion from education. By identifying barriers early and connecting families with schools and support programs, the ECW-supported initiative is helping more children with disabilities step into classrooms, rebuild confidence and begin their own learning journeys — just as Rahima has.

Somaliland’s Geopolitical Relevance Outpacing Its Institutional Preparedness

Somaliland’s geopolitical relevance is rising faster than its institutional preparedness
In an era of intensifying global competition along strategic maritime corridors, the Republic of Somaliland sits at a crossroads few policymakers can afford to ignore. Positioned along the Gulf of Aden, near the Bab el-Mandeb strait through which roughly around 12% of global trade passes, Somaliland occupies territory that is no longer peripheral to global strategy. It is central.
Yet Somaliland’s geopolitical relevance is rising faster than its institutional preparedness.
For over three decades, Somaliland has defied regional patterns. It has built a functioning political order, conducted competitive elections, and maintained relative internal stability without formal international recognition. These achievements are not accidental. They are the result of leadership.
From the early stewardship of Abdirahman Ahmed Ali (Tuur), who guided the fragile reassertion of sovereignty, to the state-building vision of Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal, Somaliland’s trajectory has been shaped by leaders capable of navigating crisis and compromise. Egal’s demobilization of militias and institutional consolidation remain foundational to Somaliland’s governance model.
This pattern of leadership continuity extended through Dahir Riyale Kahin, whose administration entrenched electoral legitimacy, and Ahmed Mohamed Mohamoud (Silanyo), whose economic diplomacy, particularly the Berbera Port agreement with DP World, signalled Somaliland’s entry into the geopolitical economy of the Red Sea corridor.
Under Muse Bihi Abdi, the state navigated rising internal political contestation and external pressure, while expanding its diplomatic outreach. Today, Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi (Iro) presides over a decisive phase, as Somaliland seeks to convert de facto statehood into formal international recognition, an aspiration first answered by the State of Israel in December 2025 after its PM announced a ‘full recognition’ of Somaliland’s sovereignty.
But here lies the paradox: as Somaliland’s strategic importance grows, the model that sustained its stability is becoming insufficient.
A Strategic Location in a Crowded Theatre
The Red Sea and Gulf of Aden are undergoing rapid geopolitical transformation. The region has become a theatre of overlapping interests:
  • ​Gulf states projecting economic and security influence
  • ​Global powers securing maritime routes and military access
  • ​Regional actors competing for ports, corridors, and alliances
Berbera Port, developed through the DP World concession, has emerged as a critical node in this competition. It offers an alternative logistics corridor to landlocked Ethiopia and a potential counterweight to congested or contested routes elsewhere in the region. But this opportunity comes with exposure.
Somaliland’s economy remains highly concentrated, dependent on Berbera port revenues, livestock exports, and remittances. Its lack of international recognition limits access to global financial systems, constraining its ability to scale infrastructure, diversify its economy, and absorb external shocks.
In short, Somaliland is strategically located, but structurally constrained.
The Leadership Constraint.
Historically, Somaliland has compensated for structural limitations through leadership. Its political stability has been personality-driven; anchored in individuals with legitimacy, experience, and consensus-building capacity.
Personality-Driven model is now reaching its limits
The emerging geopolitical environment demands a different type of leadership:
  • Leaders capable of navigating multi-alignment diplomacy without or with inadequate formal recognition.
  • Leaders able to negotiate complex economic partnerships without overexposure to external actors.
  • Leaders who can translate geopolitical opportunity into domestic development.
At present, Somaliland lacks a formalized system for producing such leadership. This creates a strategic vulnerability. Without a pipeline of capable leaders, Somaliland risks entering a period where geopolitical relevance outpaces governance capacity, a gap that external actors are quick to exploit.
Recognition Is Not a Strategy
Much of Somaliland’s external engagement has been framed around the pursuit of international recognition. While recognition remains a legitimate objective, it cannot substitute for internal capacity.
Recognition, even if achieved, will not resolve:
  1.  Economic concentration
  2. Institutional fragility
  3. Youth unemployment
  4. Women and minority groups’ representational equality
  5. Governance gaps
In fact, recognition without preparation could amplify these challenges by accelerating external engagement beyond the state’s ability to manage it. The more urgent priority is internal readiness.
Policy Imperatives in a Geopolitical Context
To navigate this new era, Somaliland must recalibrate its strategy along these axes:
Strategic Autonomy in Foreign Policy:
Somaliland must avoid overdependence on any single external partner. A diversified diplomatic approach: balancing Gulf, African, and Western engagements is essential to preserve autonomy.
Economic De-Risking:
Reducing reliance on Berbera Port revenues is critical. This requires investment in trade corridors, value-added exports, and emerging sectors such as digital services.
Leadership Institutionalization:
Political parties, civil society groups, and state institutions must collectively develop mechanisms for leadership cultivation. Governance cannot remain dependent on exceptional individuals.
Inclusive State-Building
The demographic reality where youth and women form the majority must be reflected in political representation. Exclusion is not only unjust; it is destabilizing.
Governance Before Recognition:
Somaliland’s comparative advantage has been its internal legitimacy. Preserving and deepening this must take precedence over external validation.
A Narrowing Window:
Somaliland’s current position is both an opportunity and a risk. Its stability makes it attractive. Its location makes it valuable. But without institutional depth, these same factors can render it vulnerable.
The next decade will not resemble the last. The geopolitical environment is less forgiving, more competitive, and far less tolerant of governance gaps.
Somaliland’s founding generation proved that leadership can create a state under conditions of collapse. The current generation faces a different test: whether it can transform that legacy into a system capable of sustaining the state under conditions of global competition.
Failure will not come as sudden collapse but as gradual erosion of autonomy, of policy space, and of strategic control. Success, however, would place Somaliland in a rare category not merely as a stable polity in a fragile region, but as a self-made state capable of navigating great power competition on its own terms. That is the real test ahead.
About the Author:
Salma Sheikh is a political analyst, a long time Somaliland recognition advocate, and Lead Advisor on Women Affairs at the House of Representatives of the Republic of Somaliland.

Dahabshiil iyo Telesom oo Batroolka Iran Iibsada

Dahabshiil iyo Telesom oo Batroolka Iran ka Iibsada Marakiibta Ciidanka Ilaalada Khumeyni oo Dawladda Mareykanku Xayiraad Saartey

Shirkadda Telesom, ee bixinta Adeega Internetka Somaliland gudaheeda ku keliyeysatey, ayaa dhawaan ka xidhay dadweynaha Reer Somaliland inay siyaartaan hoyga bogga loo yaqaan “Somaliland Chronicle” ee falanqeysa warar ku saabsan siyaasadda maamulka Qaranka Somaliland ee la xidhiidha dhinacyo kala duwan sida maareynta arrimaha dawladda, qandaraasyadda dawladda ee gacanta u gala maalqabeenka, iyo guud ahaan sida dhaqaalaha dalku u shaqeeyo ee saameyn weyn ku leh masiirka dalka iyo dadkaba.

Sidoo kale waxa uu boggu soo bandhigaa baadhitaano iyo dabagalo uu sameeyo oo salka ku haya xogo dhaba oo la xaqiijiyey jiritaankooda kuna saabsan dhacdooyin ka qabsoomay dalka oo ay hormood ka yihiin amba lug weyn ku leeyihiin xubno Golaha Wasiiradu amba Hogaanka Shirkada Waaweyn, oo sharciga dalka baalmarsan.

Bishan Maarso 10, 2026, ayuu boggu soo saaray qoraal si qoto dheer oo faahfaahsan uga hadlaya markab shidaal siday oo dekadda Berbera ku soo xidhay, una rarnaa labadda shirkadood ee kala ah : Shidaalka Geeska (Horn Petroleum) oo Kooxda Dahabshiil (Dahabshiil Group) leedahay iyo SomGas oo qayb ka ah shirkadda Hurmuud ee laga leeyahay dalka Somaliya.

Shidaalkan waxaa siday markab ku xidhan Ciidanka Ilaaladda Kacaanka Islamiga ee Iran loona yaqaan Qudus (CIKI-Q) sida ku sheegan maqaalka, isagoo ku soo xidhay dekedda Berbera bishii Feebarwari 2026 tiiyoo doonyaha dawladu gacansiiyeen xidhidhaankiisii.

Horn Petroleum iyo SomGas ayaa shidaalkaa labo qayb oo isleeg u kala qaatey, tiiyoo maamulka dekadda Berbera shixnadan shidaalka ah ku tilmaameen mida an hore loo arag baaxadeeda.

Isla markabkan ayaa bishii 9aad 17keedii ee 2025 isagoo ku xidhan deked Yeman ku taal oo Xuutiyiinta maamulaan loona yaqaan Ras Cisa ay Israa’il la beegsatey gantaal ka dhacay diyaarad daroon ah, isagoo gaas u sida Xuutiyiinta, mar ay qori caaraddii ku haysteen markabka iyo 27 qof oo saarnaa Xuutiyiintu, tiiyo mar dambe dadaal diblimaasiyadeed iyo dawladda Pakistan ku guuleysyeen soo daynta markabka iyo shaqaalihiisiiba.

Maraakiibka ayaa iska diiwaan geliya wadamo kale si ay mararka qaarkood u qariyaan cida leh si ay u khaldan macaamiisha, haddii xayiraadi saaran tahay ambaba rabaan in socdaalkooda badu u dhibyaraado.

Isla markabkan ayaa 5 bilood ka dib, tiiyoo magacii laga bedelay, calan kalena la saaray, loona sameeyey waraaqo ah in Ciraq laga leeyahay, ku soo xidhay dekedda Berbera lagana rogey shidaalkii uu siday tiiyoo loo qaybsadey sida kor ku xusan.

7 markab oo xayiraadi saaran tahay amba shake weyni dul hoganayo ayaa ku soo xidhay dekedda Berbera 30 kii cisho ee ku xigay dhacdadan iyada ah.

Saddex masuuliyiinta dekedda Berbera ayaa la xidhay maalmo yar ka dib markii markabkani ka ambabaxay dekedda, tiiyoon arrin aan la shaacin ilaa hadda wax dambi ahna lagu soo oogin masuuliyiintaas halka madaxdii shirkadaha shidaalka lahaana aan weli haba yaraatee wax ficil ah laga qaadin.

La macaamilka markabkan, warqadda ogolaansha ee la siiyey, iyo hawl fududenyta dekeddu u sameysey waxay ka hor imaneysaa qaraarkii madaxweynaha Maraykanku soo saaray tiiyoo Somaliland u keeni karta in la saaro cunaqabateyn xili la rabo in Aqoonsiga Somaliland laga iibiyo Maraykan iyo weliba Israa’iil oo aqoonsatey Somaliland in arrinkani shaki ku abuuro.

Agaasimaha Dekedda Berbera, Cabdi Diriye, oo madaxweynuhu magacaabo, ayaan ka soo jawaabin codsiyo loo diray oo arrintan khuseeya, qabanina dhawr telifoon oo loo diray, ka hor daabacaadda maqaalkan.

Suaasha imaneysaa waxaa weeye maxaa Telesom soo galiyey arrinkan ee ay xayirtay bogan soo bandhigay khiyaamadan qaranka halista ku ah. Telesom waa laan la mid ah shirkadda weyn Hurmuud fadhigeeduna yahay Muqdishu oo go’aamadda halkaas ayaa looga soo yeedhiyaa.

Djibouti at a Crossroads: The Presidential Transition Crisis Ahead of April 2026 Elections

Djibouti at a Crossroads: The Presidential Transition Crisis Ahead of April 2026 Elections

As Djibouti approaches its presidential elections, scheduled for April 2026, the contours of a complex political crisis are emerging within the ruling system. This crisis is rooted in chronic structural fragility, a tribal monopoly on power and deepening political uncertainty. The situation has been further exacerbated by President Ismail Omar Guelleh’s intention to amend the constitution to allow himself to run for a sixth term. Compounding this tension are growing divisions within the ruling elite over his possible successor.

These internal disagreements surfaced publicly in September following the resignation of Alexis Mohamed Gueldon, one of President Guelleh’s most prominent advisors and his official international spokesperson. Gueldon attributed his resignation to the country’s “democratic regression” and “nepotistic practices.” He also said that the president had “gone too far” – a clear reference to Guelleh’s intention to amend the constitution to remain in power.

Crisis of Power Transition in Djibouti

President Guelleh and his regime now face a twofold challenge. The first is constitutional; the 77-year-old president has exceeded the legal age limit for presidential candidacy (75). Despite his declining health, there are indications that he is seeking to replicate a previous amendment to the constitution to remove this limit. In an interview in May 2025, Guelleh left the door open to the possibility of running again – a move that has been met with internal resistance.

The second challenge concerns the identity of President Guelleh’s potential successor, an issue that could redefine the country’s political and social order. Guelleh’s options appear limited, and any move to designate a successor must be carefully calibrated to preserve regime cohesion and safeguard the influence of his family and clan, the Mamasan. In this context, the resignation of Gueldon, who belongs to the same clan, has fueled speculation that the president is grooming his stepson, Naguib Abdullah Kamil, who is affiliated with the Afar community, to succeed him.

Such a move risks intensifying ethnic polarization within the ruling coalition. The al-Issa tribe elite view Kamil as a threat to their historical dominance and privileges. This could prompt them to block his rise and prevent a transfer of leadership to the Afar, potentially through pressure to keep Guelleh at the top of the power pyramid or aligning with another candidate from within the clan, such as Gueldon, known for his extensive connections and political ambitions.

Consolidating Authoritarianism or a Potential Shift?

Given the current dynamics, three possible trajectories can be anticipated for the future of Djibouti’s ruling regime and the broader political landscape:

1. A Constitutional Amendment to Extend Guelleh’s Presidency

This scenario appears plausible, given President Guelleh’s extensive network of local, regional and international relationships, and his ability to navigate a political framework that enables him to balance and subordinate internal and external dynamics to his own objectives. Such a move would effectively extend the status quo and consolidate the regime’s de facto legitimacy and continuity, as well as preserve the interests of the elite without dismantling the tribal structure.

However, this path carries significant risks – including the erosion of the regime’s credibility, increased institutional fragility, growing public discontent and a strengthened opposition – which could ultimately destabilize the governance system in the medium term.

2. Engineering a Disciplined Transition of Power

This trajectory would require President Guelleh to recognize the need to lead an internal negotiated process to promote an agreed-upon successor. A likely successor could be his stepson, Kamil, who enjoys support from his influential mother and the Afar elite, or another figure from al-Issa/Mamasan clan. Such a managed transition could enhance the regime’s ability to reproduce itself while attracting regional and international endorsement, as it would offer a controlled and stable transfer of power. The key challenge, however, lies in forging internal consensus around the potential heir and reducing ethnic and factional rivalries within the ruling elite.

3. An Electoral Process Controlled by an Issa Candidate

The likelihood of this trajectory increases if al-Issa elite perceive a shift in power dynamics in favor of the Afar – particularly with the potential rise of Kamel. In response, they may push for elections, aiming to ensure victory for one of their prominent figures, thereby safeguarding their influence in the post-Guelleh era.

However this strategy risks deepening divisions and sparking elite-level confrontations, potentially drawing in the military and security forces – especially if the electoral process resembles previous ones marked by allegations of fraud and a lack of meaningful reforms to promote political inclusivity. Such conditions could lead to renewed opposition boycotts and further destabilize the political landscape.

Beyond Guelleh: Local and Regional Implications

Djibouti’s allies, with France at the forefront, are expected to play a leading role in facilitating a smooth transition of power

International and regional powers regard Djibouti as a strategic hub for expanding their influence in the wider region encompassing the Red Sea, East Africa, and the western Indian Ocean. These actors have long viewed President Guelleh and his regime as central to safeguarding their interests, relying on the political stability maintained throughout his tenure. As a result, they have often turned a blind eye to his authoritarian practices – such as fragmenting the local opposition and silencing dissent – which have enabled him to solidify his rule for over 25 years.

However, this stability appears tenuous and largely superficial. It does not stem from strong state institutions or effective governance, but rather from delicate tribal dynamics and the concentration of power in a few individuals who shape the country’s political landscape. With growing concerns surrounding succession and the ongoing discourse about the post-Guelleh era, there are genuine apprehensions of escalating tensions and conflict among Djibouti’s political and tribal elites. Such developments could undermine the governance system and weaken state institutions, pushing the small nation overlooking the Bab al-Mandab Strait into a period of turbulence, with significant implications for regional stability and the strategic interests of key regional and international players.

An uncontrolled succession crisis in Djibouti would have far-reaching consequences extending far beyond its domestic political sphere.  It would worsen regional instability and heighten geopolitical competition among the foreign powers maintaining military bases in the country. This would complicate their operational and strategic decision-making, potentially prompting a recalibration of their military strategies and presence. For example, the establishment of a Chinese military base in 2017 and Houthi attacks in the Red Sea have already weakened the US position in Djibouti. Restrictions imposed by Djibouti on US military activities have prompted Washington to explore alternative options, including expanding its presence in Kenya, making it its first non-NATO sub-Saharan African ally, as well as the growing US interest in Somaliland.

Conclusions

The months ahead will be pivotal in shaping the future of Djibouti. The choice between extending President Guelleh’s rule and initiating a political transition represents a delicate balancing act for the regime, which must demonstrate its ability to adapt to both domestic and external pressures for reform and democratic change. The decisions made by Djibouti’s leadership, particularly by Guelleh himself, could either pave the way for a new political era or maintain the status quo, with the risk of eventual regime collapse and national instability.

While international and regional partners prioritize sustainable stability and predictable transformation, external support for the ruling clan may no longer guarantee its endurance and political security. In this context, Djibouti’s allies –  especially France – are expected to play a leading role in diplomatic engagement and soft intervention. Their efforts may focus on  encouraging a peaceful transfer of power through internal consensus or a more transparent electoral process, rather than prolonging Guelleh’s grip on power