Month: July 2026

Somaliland: UAE built the port. Diaspora writes the checks. Now Israel and Taiwan Want in

Somaliland: UAE built the port. Diaspora writes the checks. Now Israel and Taiwan want in.

Seven months on from recognition, the focus is pivoting from aid to hard investment. Here is what that actually looks like on the ground.

This is a bonus edition of Horn Horizons, part of the Global Power Shifts network, where I track Power, Ports, and Prosperity across the Horn and the Red Sea.

Somaliland is the closest thing the Horn has to a live experiment. A state recognized by only one country is trying to turn a Gulf-grade port and diaspora savings into a real economy. Israel and Taiwan test the edges, while the wider neighborhood watches what a single recognition unlocks.

The open question is whether any serious capital beyond the diaspora’s own actually shows up. To find out who’s buying, and where the pitch runs ahead of the plumbing beneath it, I sat down with Hana Kaise Abdi, founding partner of Bilow Capital , who guides foreign investors into Somaliland on the ground in Hargeisa.

Israel became the first and so far only country to recognize Somaliland in December last year, over objections from the African Union, the Arab League and, loudest of all, Mogadishu. A state recognized by just one country can’t borrow on international markets or draw on the development banks, so the capital that builds Somaliland arrives as investment, not debt, and most of it comes via the diaspora.

Remittances to Somalia as a whole, Somaliland included, run around $3 billion a year, much of it into land, property and businesses, and seven months on that hasn’t shifted. DP World is expanding its Berbera port terminal and the dismantling of USAID under the Trump administration has pushed donors to talk investment where they once focused on grants, but the buyer writing the checks is still overwhelmingly Somaliland’s own.

Hana wants to widen that pool. British-born, raised in Bristol by parents who fled the civil war, she moved to Hargeisa about seven years ago and co-founded Bilow Capital, which walks foreign investors through market research and due diligence, runs an accelerator, the Bilow Venture Lab, and since February has deployed a diaspora-backed fund, the Rise Fund, into startups that complete the cohort.

“The private sector’s the real route for sustainable development,” she tells me, a conviction that hardened as she watched the 2017 famine from the UK. She’s paid on the investment flow she describes, which is reason enough to hear her out and to read the numbers with that interest attached.

Recognition moved faster than the money

The harder assets moved earlier. DP World has run Berbera since 2017 and is building it toward a 2 million-container capacity, with a direct Jebel Ali service launched some eight months ago, and Hana treats the port as proof of concept — “a great symbol for what can be achieved if more foreign investors came in.”What the port mostly ships is the economy’s mainstay: live sheep and goats bound for Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, which made up about two-thirds of exports in 2024 and peak each year around Hajj time. Much of the investment case is a bet on diversifying away from that single artery.

The politics that dominate the headlines have, so far, left that balance sheet alone, which is the part that matters for anyone pricing exposure. Somalia’s annulment of its agreements with the UAE in January landed on federal Somalia and Abu Dhabi’s bases there, not on Berbera, and Hana reports no measurable effect on Somaliland itself. The 2024 memorandum meant to grant Ethiopia sea access for a step toward recognition is effectively frozen, and she doesn’t oversell it, calling Ethiopian investment interest “a matter of time” rather than a live pipeline.

Where she sees the newest interest is Taiwan, the Gulf, and Israel:

  • Taiwan: A natural counterpart — a self-governing island much of the world declines to call a country, for fear of provoking Beijing, yet trades with anyway. It moved earliest in hard assets, years before recognition was on the table: in 2021 Taiwan’s state oil company, CPC, took a 49% stake in a Somaliland exploration block, SL10B/13, operated by the British-Turkish firm Genel Energy, whose Toosan-1 prospect is estimated at up to 650 million barrels. Nothing’s out of the ground yet. The block’s still at the exploration stage, with no commercial well drilled, and Genel has been seeking a licence extension that would push a first drilling deadline toward 2027, even as its Taiwanese partner presses to move faster. Other Taiwanese firms are active in mining, fisheries, and agriculture.
  • The Gulf: Runs UAE-first, with Saudi money as the natural extension of that livestock trade.
  • Israel: The freshest and the least monetized. The areas she flags are agriculture and water (desalination and irrigation, where Israeli firms lead), technology, digital health, and health care, alongside a Red Sea security logic that’s really about the view it buys: Berbera sits across the water from Yemen, a vantage point on the Houthis and the Bab el-Mandeb chokepoint. “Very early days,” Hana said. That stretch of water’s stayed in the headlines, with the Iran-aligned Houthis recently attacking two Saudi oil tankers about 70 nautical miles southwest of Al Shuqaiq, near the strait.

The interview

Edited for length and clarity. The figures are hers unless attributed otherwise.

Q: Who’s actually putting money in?

Hana: The biggest chunk is the diaspora, without question. There’s remittance of roughly $3 billion, and while a lot of that’s consumption, a large amount goes into investment. There isn’t hard data I can point you to, but I’m diaspora, as is my whole extended family, and you can see it: a lot of the real estate is diaspora-owned, a lot of land, a lot of businesses.

Beyond that, there are two types of clients I work with. One is private-sector investors looking for market-rate returns, interested in fisheries, agriculture, mining, manufacturing, usually businesses from the Middle East or high-net-worth individuals. The other is development agencies trying to move away from the aid model into an investment model, who want to put money into things like the venture lab and the fund.

Her $3 billion figure’s worth a footnote. Remittances on that order are the standard estimate for Somalia as a whole, not Somaliland alone, and the investment share of it isn’t separately documented, a caveat she volunteers herself. Read it as direction, not measurement.

Q: What do your founders actually lack?

Hana: Capital, of course, is the first thing. But it goes beyond that. A lot of founders have brilliant ideas, and sometimes even the savings to start, but no procedures in place: financial management, operations, human resources, talent retention.

And formalization. One founder we worked with had a strong business and co-founders, but nothing was legalized or formalized, and it ended with him not being able to raise investment because of that. Moving from the informal to the formal economy is a huge missing link. Then working capital, because a lot of small businesses have no access to finance at all. And regulation, where the government hasn’t yet built an environment suited to small and medium businesses.

Q: Why the emphasis on women founders specifically?

Hana: There are a substantial number of female business owners, but they’re underrepresented and they don’t get the same opportunities. A lot of them don’t see themselves applying for something like an accelerator. They feel they might be excluded from it. So we push to bring the existing female founders through the cohorts, so they’re not left behind and get the same access to finance. It also gives them independence in their own lives and the ability to make a living themselves.

Q: For a non-diaspora investor, what about the legal framework? You’re, on paper, part of Somalia.

Hana: In practice, Somalia doesn’t regulate anything inside Somaliland, not the legal system, not the economy, definitely not the politics. Most investors just register their business here. If you go through the correct legal channels and the business or asset is in your name, and a dispute occurs with a partner on the ground, it’s very difficult to lose that case in the courts.

Some investors also choose to execute their contracts in the UAE or the UK. Either way it’s workable. The biggest misconception is how safe and how easy it actually is. As someone who’s traveled all over, Somaliland’s one of the safest places I’ve been

She’s talking about physical security, not investment risk, and there the UK Foreign Office is more cautious than she is; more on that below.

Her numbers, and the wider picture

Bilow doesn’t yet have an audited track record, and Hana’s candid that it’s early. In under a year, the venture lab has run two cohorts with about 46% female participation. Since launching the fund in February the firm has invested in 10 businesses, and seen more than 80% of participants qualify for investment after the program. One founder, she said, raised more than $200,000 in a single round, and others have opened second branches in Hargeisa or been approached directly by investors. The Rise Fund is structured as an open-ended, evergreen vehicle and began deploying immediately rather than waiting for a first close, which it hasn’t yet reached.

These are the firm’s own figures, from a party raising capital on the strength of them and with no independent registry to test them against, so read them as a founder’s self-report, not a verified return. What can be checked is the opportunity she points to, and the public record broadly supports her framing:

  • Fisheries: Her claim that the fisheries are barely exploited holds up: sector assessments put under 10% of stocks worked on a Gulf of Aden coast that ranks among East Africa’s richer fishing grounds.
  • Manufacturing: Her pitch rests on the country importing more than 90% of what it consumes, which she frames as room for import substitution rather than a solved problem.
  • Legal comfort: Real on paper, as Somaliland’s investment law grants foreign investors national treatment, a three-year tax holiday, and import-tax exemptions on equipment.

What the pitch leaves out

The formalization trap Hana cautions against is also the market’s central risk. When a viable business misses out simply because its founders never put proper contracts in place, the constraint isn’t a lack of ideas, but the fragile foundation beneath it. No accelerator program can substitute for commercial law, functional courts, or a regulator built to support small business. It’s the exact same gap a foreign investor inherits.

Recognition sits on the same ledger. Somaliland’s record of stability and peaceful transfers is real, and the safety case Hana makes is strong on its own terms, but the same non-recognition that shuts out sovereign debt also shuts out the political-risk insurance and development-finance guarantees that de-risk large projects, which is why what moves is still mostly diaspora equity and word of mouth. Her own workaround, registering locally but signing contracts under UAE or UK law, is a rational hedge and an admission of what the domestic framework can’t yet guarantee.

And she’s describing day-to-day Hargeisa, not the whole risk picture: the UK Foreign Office still advises against all but essential travel to Somaliland, and Houthi leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi declared in a televised address, days after recognition, that any Israeli presence in Somaliland would be treated as “a military target” (Times of Israel). A serious investor prices the corridor, not the city alone.

Somaliland’s story has moved faster than its balance sheet. Recognition, a Gulf-grade port, and the dismantling of USAID driven by Donald Trump and Elon Musk’s DOGE have made ‘investment, not aid’ the language everyone in Hargeisa now speaks, and Hana’s fluent in it because she’s been making that argument since before it was fashionable. But the buyers are still overwhelmingly the diaspora, because that’s most of what a largely unrecognized state has to work with, and Israeli recognition isn’t yet a financing system.

That’s also why the founders she works with keep being held back by the same unglamorous things: lack of paperwork, working capital, and basic regulation. The pitch works on paper, but the legal and regulatory rails beneath it remain fragile. I’d watch whether the aid-to-investment pivot converts into deployed private capital, and whether government policy catches up with the headlines by building the legal and banking infrastructure small businesses actually need.

The bottom line

So, who wants to invest in Somaliland? For now, the people who already believe in it.

  • The diaspora: Writes these checks because it’s personally invested in seeing Somaliland thrive, beyond the returns.
  • Israel: Has named its interests but not yet its money.
  • Taiwan: Has paid for an oil block it still has to drill.
  • The Gulf: Already the anchor customer, taking the live sheep and goats that remain the economy’s mainstay. For Abu Dhabi, Berbera is the template for doing business with an unrecognized state, feeding its wider ports strategy across Africa.
  • Ethiopia: Berbera offers the landlocked country sea access, a huge priority for Addis, and a way to diversify away from Djibouti, through which some 95% of its trade travels. DP World signed a 2021 memorandum of understanding with Addis to invest up to $1 billion in the Berbera-Ethiopia trade corridor, though where that agreement stands today is an open question.

The next twelve months will show which of those turns into deployed capital.

Between Maritime Access and Recognition: Geopolitical Implications of Rapprochement Between Ethiopia and Somaliland

Between Maritime Access and Recognition: Geopolitical Implications of Rapprochement Between Ethiopia and Somaliland

Recent statements by Somaliland’s foreign minister, Abdirahman Dahir Adam, also known as “Bakal” — affirming Ethiopia’s right to sea access and Hargeisa’s readiness to discuss this issue with the Ethiopian government — have reignited debate over Ethiopia-Somaliland relations. These remarks carry particular weight in the context of shifting power dynamics around the Red Sea, where intensifying global competition over maritime routes underscores the growing strategic importance of ports and logistical infrastructure. At the heart of this debate lies a structural geopolitical dilemma: Ethiopia’s landlocked geography on one side, and Somaliland’s uncertain status within the regional order on the other. The challenge extends beyond bilateral ties between Hargeisa and Addis Ababa, encompassing questions of sovereignty, recognition, and the balance of power in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea region.

The interview given by Somaliland’s foreign minister to the Ethiopian newspaper The Reporter on June 6, 2026, conveyed several key messages that reveal the implications and motives behind the revival of this maritime cooperation issue, the future of relations between Somaliland and Ethiopia, and the ongoing transformations in the Horn of Africa:

First, the statements emphasized the flexibility of the new administration in Hargeisa and its openness toward its Ethiopian neighbor. They suggest that Somaliland may not necessarily require formal Ethiopian recognition at this stage, but rather seeks to strengthen its partnerships with Addis Ababa and other regional and international actors. This approach is intended to bolster Somaliland’s de facto legitimacy and improve its negotiating position with Mogadishu, even in the absence of legal recognition. Despite growing expectations among Somaliland’s leadership and elite that friendly countries like Ethiopia and Kenya might follow Israel’s lead in recognizing Somaliland, Bakal clarified that his government respects Ethiopia’s policy and would never push Addis Ababa toward recognition. He expressed confidence, however, that Ethiopia will eventually view Somaliland as “a reliable and stable partner that it will eventually recognize.” This reflects a growing awareness in Hargeisa that the real value lies not only in potential recognition, but in positioning Somaliland as an indispensable partner in regional arrangements concerning ports, trade, and logistical corridors.

Second, the interview paved the way for a new negotiating track. When the Somaliland minister was asked how far his country’s new administration had changed its policy toward neighboring Ethiopia, which he described as Somaliland’s closest and most important ally in the Horn of Africa, and whether the administration wished to revive the controversial memorandum of understanding with Ethiopia, he did not provide a direct answer. Instead, he shifted the discussion away from the memorandum itself, which he said was “not the only thing” possible in the course of cooperation between the two sides, and emphasized the broader idea that Hargeisa understood Ethiopia’s maritime needs and was prepared to discuss them. He also noted that Ethiopia could make greater use of the port of Berbera, which, according to him, has not yet happened. This formulation does not necessarily indicate a formal return to the memorandum of understanding. Rather, it reflects an attempt to reproduce the strategic logic on which the memorandum was based, with a view to reintroducing it within a new negotiating framework that is less politically costly and more diplomatically acceptable. In other words, Hargeisa may be seeking to separate the strategic project from the legal and political framework that has raised regional and international objections, by presenting maritime cooperation with Ethiopia as a long-term economic and logistical project rather than a geopolitical maneuver conditional on recognition or one that infringes on questions of sovereignty.

Third, Hargeisa is seeking to capitalize on regional transformations that enhance Somaliland’s geostrategic value. This is especially true of developments related to the war with Iran and its proxies, and their repercussions for Red Sea security and global supply chains. These developments have led to a reassessment of the strategic importance of ports and vital coastal sites in the Horn of Africa, including the port of Berbera. The port is becoming increasingly attractive, especially for Ethiopia, as one of the potential alternatives for reducing its dependence on Djibouti. It is also gaining relevance as part of the broader restructuring of regional transport and trade networks, as well as emerging maritime security arrangements.

The chances of reviving the maritime access issue and reaching new arrangements between Ethiopia and Somaliland have increased

The prospects for reviving maritime cooperation and reaching new arrangements between Ethiopia and Somaliland appear stronger than before. Despite the uncertainty created by the “Ankara Declaration” signed between Ethiopia and Somalia in late 2024, several drivers continue to support — and even reinforce — the potential for a deeper partnership.

First, Internal Pressures: Domestic circumstances in both countries create incentives to break the deadlock, opening space for development and joint growth. Both governments increasingly recognize the feasibility of partnership, given the convergence of economic and strategic interests.

Second, Somaliland’s Growing Assertiveness: Somaliland’s recent success in consolidating power has emboldened Hargeisa to challenge Mogadishu more directly, strengthening its confidence in pursuing independent arrangements.

Third, Port Negotiations: Statements by Somaliland’s foreign minister did not rule out the possibility of granting Ethiopia a sovereign seaport. Rather, they suggested a willingness to negotiate better terms or wait for more favorable timing, signaling flexibility rather than outright rejection.

Fourth, Somalia’s Instability: The deteriorating situation in Somalia — marked by the federal government’s crisis of legitimacy and accumulated failures to establish a stable governance model in the south — creates further openings for Somaliland to advance alternative arrangements.

Fifth, Regional and International Context: Potential regional supporters for this type of arrangement, combined with growing international concern over Red Sea security and global supply chains, may help create an enabling environment for expanding logistical cooperation. While comprehensive political agreements remain unlikely in the near term, these dynamics could sustain incremental progress in maritime collaboration.

On the other hand, this path faces significant structural and political obstacles. Foremost among them is the legal status of Somaliland, which remains unrecognized internationally, and the firm position of Mogadishu, which enjoys broad support from the African Union and most international partners. In addition, the Ankara Declaration has created a new political reality that may make any Ethiopian return to unilateral arrangements with Hargeisa more politically and diplomatically costly. Such a move could be interpreted as a retreat from Ethiopia’s efforts to maintain calm with Somalia, especially given Addis Ababa’s ambitious demands — including a military base — and its declining reliance on Somalia, which is unable to offer a credible alternative for port access.

Beyond these bilateral challenges, the fragile balance of power in the Red Sea, overlapping interests of regional actors, and the sensitivity of port-related issues add further complications. The volatility of the regional security environment undermines the prospects for sovereign agreements and weakens the ability of both parties to commit to long-term arrangements that require durable political and security stability.

The resurgence of Ethiopia-Somaliland maritime cooperation reflects broader regional transformations. The revival of the idea of granting Ethiopia maritime access through Somaliland goes beyond economic and logistical considerations. It constitutes a critical test of sovereignty, recognition, and influence in the Horn of Africa, with far-reaching implications for relations between Mogadishu and Hargeisa, broader geopolitical balances in the region, and the interests of external powers.

1. Implications for Mogadishu-Hargeisa Relations 

For Mogadishu and Hargeisa, the issue is not merely about port facilities for Ethiopia — it sets a political precedent that directly touches on sovereignty and legitimacy. Any maritime arrangement between Ethiopia and Somaliland would deepen the divide between Somalia and Somaliland, exacerbating long-standing disputes, particularly against the backdrop of Somaliland’s normalization of relations with Israel.

While Somalia’s federal government asserts its full and exclusive authority over all Somali territory, including Hargeisa and Berbera, and threatens to use force to reintegrate Somaliland into the Somali federal state, the most dangerous aspect may not be the Somali response itself. Rather, it lies in the interplay of internal and external factors that continue to deepen the rift between the ruling elites in the south and north. The Somaliland issue is no longer merely an internal political matter that can be resolved through dialogue or gradual containment. It has become a distinct reality intertwined with regional and international calculations and interests that extend beyond the control of Somali and Somaliland leaders.

2. Implications for Regional Balances

The Ethiopia-Somaliland partnership exemplifies the intensifying geopolitical competition in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. In recent years, the region has undergone profound transformations, with the focus shifting from security issues, border disputes, and counterterrorism to ports, sea lanes, and logistics infrastructure.

Strengthening cooperation with Ethiopia would mark a qualitative leap for Somaliland, expanding its network of foreign relations and strengthening its position at the heart of the regional and geopolitical equation. It would also place Hargeisa on a clearer path toward broader international engagement as a de facto independent actor. In return, it would significantly advance Ethiopia’s strategic project to build maritime influence, including securing a permanent port and military base on the Red Sea coast. Such a development could redefine Ethiopia’s regional role and reshape the balance of power and maritime security equations in this vital corridor and the wider region.

The Future of the Ethiopia-Somaliland Partnership

Available evidence suggests that the partnership between Addis Ababa and Hargeisa will be shaped not only by internal dynamics and political will, but also by evolving regional balances across the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa. Expectations regarding maritime access and political recognition fluctuate between three possible scenarios.

Scenario 1:The Expansion of Functional Cooperation

This scenario builds on the existing trajectory of gradual cooperation, focusing on economic rather than political dimensions. It could involve greater use of the Port of Berbera, development of trade routes and infrastructure, and the creation of special economic zones. Crucially, it avoids sensitive political or sovereign arrangements that could be interpreted as implicit recognition of Somaliland or affecting its current legal status.

Grounded in pragmatism, this path allows both sides to achieve economic gains while minimizing political risks. It provides a practical and predictable framework with fewer risks, including those perceived by Somalilanders, southern Somali unionists, and their regional allies. This approach also aligns with the Ankara Declaration and with the preference of many international partners to promote economic integration while preserving the existing legal framework. It is therefore the most realistic and achievable scenario in the short and medium term, and it could evolve gradually through cumulative implementation steps rather than through a comprehensive political agreement.

Scenario 2: Negotiating a New Formula That Could Lead to Ethiopian Recognition of Somaliland

This scenario assumes that the governments of Abiy Ahmed and Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi, better known as “Irro”, will engage in serious discussions that could lead to reviving or improving the previous memorandum of understanding. This could result in a more comprehensive agreement granting Ethiopia long-term maritime privileges in exchange for political and economic gains for Somaliland. These gains could include formal recognition or steps that approach it in practice.

This scenario reflects Ethiopia’s growing maritime ambitions and Somaliland’s increasing confidence in its ability to expand its foreign policy options. However, its realization remains dependent on changes in the regional and international environment. First, Ethiopia would need to be convinced that the strategic gains outweigh the potential costs of deviating from the understandings established by the Ankara Declaration. This makes the scenario possible, though less likely, in the foreseeable future.

Scenario 3: Strategic Stagnation

In this scenario, political and diplomatic constraints prevent a breakthrough on the maritime access issue, leaving relations between the two parties uncertain. This scenario could gain strength if renewed momentum emerges in the reconciliation process between Ethiopia and Somalia. It could also become more likely if leadership priorities or political calculations change in Addis Ababa, Hargeisa, or Mogadishu. Additionally, Mogadishu’s ability to mobilize regional and international pressure could increase, leading to the containment or obstruction of any arrangements to which it is not a party. This would, in turn, reduce opportunities for maritime cooperation between Ethiopia and Somaliland.

However, such a stalemate would not address the root causes of the problem, including Ethiopia’s geographical constraints, Somaliland’s limited legal status, and increasing regional competition over sea lanes. These factors make this scenario less sustainable in the medium and long term.

Conclusions

Recent developments in relations between Ethiopia and Somaliland reveal that the issue of Ethiopian maritime access is re-emerging within new regional dynamics. Despite the constraints imposed by the Ankara Declaration and the sensitivity of the Somali sovereignty question, the motives driving both parties have become more urgent.

However, the future of this path will likely depend on the parties’ ability to reconcile the imperatives of economic geography with the requirements of political legitimacy. This makes the gradual expansion of functional economic and logistical cooperation the most likely scenario in the foreseeable future.

By contrast, the scenario of reviving the memorandum of understanding in a modified form that includes official recognition or sovereign arrangements remains contingent on deeper regional and international transformations, as well as shifting calculations among key actors. This makes the maritime access issue itself a central determinant of regional stability and a pivotal factor in reshaping the geopolitical order in the Horn of Africa in the coming years.

Source: Emirates Policy Center

Why Rahm Emanuel Misjudged Netanyahu’s Somaliland Strategy

Why Rahm Emanuel Misjudged Netanyahu’s Somaliland Strategy

Recognizing the independent republic is the opening move to anchor Israel as an indispensable security power in the region.

On a recent visit to Israel, former Obama administration Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel mocked Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s Somaliland strategy, arguing that Israel had “lost Europe” and “lost America,” and was left with only the small republic in the Horn of Africa.

He badly misread Netanyahu’s strategic calculus. Israel’s recognition of Somaliland is Israel’s most strategically consequential foreign-policy move in years. Far from diminishing its Western alignment, this opening gambit positions Israel as the indispensable security guarantor of the world’s most critical maritime corridors, exponentially increasing its value to both the United States and Europe.

Israel’s recognition of Somaliland roots the Jewish state firmly in its own region—the Middle East and the Red Sea—where its future will actually be decided, not in Washington or Europe. By expanding its partnership with Eritrea and deepening ties with Ethiopia, Somaliland and Sudan, Israel will become the ultimate security guarantor of the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea and the southwestern Indian Ocean.

Partnering with Horn of Africa nations allows Israel to deploy its advanced technology and agriculture to lift hundreds of millions out of poverty, cementing it as an undeniable force for good.

In doing so, Israel will make itself indispensable to the security and economy of Europe, America and the Gulf states threatened by Iran. The West supports Israel not out of sentiment, but because it is indispensable to security and economic interests. During the Cold War, Israel contained Soviet influence and hostile Arab states; today, its strategic role in counterterrorism remains unmatched.

However, Israel was strongest when it had alliances with regional actors, such as Iran, Turkey and an Ethiopia that controlled Eritrea and the Red Sea. Today, Iran and Turkey are enemies, while a struggling Ethiopia is choked off from the sea, denied access to Eritrean ports by Eritrean dictator Isaias Afwerki. This tyrant now aligns with Iran, opposes Israel, fuels Sudan’s Muslim Brotherhood, tried to block Somaliland’s independence, and actively backs the Houthis and Al-Shabaab to destabilize the region.

Today, Israel counts the Gulf states, particularly the United Arab Emirates, as allies, while Saudi Arabia navigates the volatile landscape left by America’s regional retreat. If Israel steps up to secure the region, Saudi Arabia will inevitably fall into alignment once Israel proves it is the only reliable security provider in the Red Sea.

Israel’s traditional Arab adversaries—Iraq, Syria, Libya and Yemen—have collapsed, only to be replaced by a far more volatile threat: radical non-state Islamist actors like Hezbollah and the Houthis, alongside the imminent rise of Iran-backed forces in Sudan. Meanwhile, severe economic crises render Israel’s cold peace with Egypt and Jordan entirely unpredictable.

Partnering with Horn of Africa nations allows Israel to deploy its advanced technology and agriculture to lift hundreds of millions out of poverty, cementing it as an undeniable force for good.

Israel must forge a new security apparatus tailored to its own survival while making itself indispensable to the United States and Europe. This requires crushing the Houthis, restoring Yemen’s legitimate government and containing Iran-backed Islamist threats in Sudan as well as the Eritrean regime. Ultimately, the United States and Europe need a reliable Israeli security guarantee in the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf to safeguard their own economic and existential interests.

It is within this new strategic framework that Somaliland becomes vital. Recognizing Somaliland is not only a moral imperative for Israel—aligning with Jewish values of backing liberty and self-determination—but also a cornerstone of Israel’s future security architecture. This grand strategy requires Israel to fill the security vacuum across the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea and the southwestern Indian Ocean in partnership with regional powers, and Somaliland is the beginning of that vision.

Israel already aligns with Ethiopia and Somaliland; Eritrea is the missing piece of the puzzle. Sudan lies within Eritrea’s strategic geography, and its ground forces possess the military capacity to crush the Houthis. With an aging dictator making political change inevitable, a powerful coalition is within reach. By combining Israel’s air superiority and defensive tech, Gulf financial power and the proven ground forces of Eritrea and Ethiopia, only a strong naval force to pacify Yemen and Sudan, contain Iran and permanently secure the Red Sea is required.

The Tigrinya people, the overwhelming majority who live in Eritrea, share a common destiny with Israel and the Jewish people. Just as the Jews have no homeland but Israel, they have no homeland but their own. Neither Eritrea nor Israel is a member of the Arab League or the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). Although the Tigrinya and the Jews are the overwhelming majorities in their respective countries, they remain tiny minorities in the wider region, surrounded by half a billion Arabs and Muslims.

Eritrea holds a strategic location at Bab el-Mandab in the Red Sea, ground military capability, historical perspective and the strategic patience to play the long game thanks to the Tigrinya nation’s homogeneity and nationalism. Eritrea stands as the region’s most stable state, yet its dictator weaponizes that stability to fuel regional chaos. A partnership with Israel would leverage the Tigrinya’s cheap labor and abundant resources alongside Israel’s know-how to produce high-quality ammunition and drones more cheaply than Iran and Turkey.

Their survival and future are permanently bound together. Today, China and the imperialist leaders of Iran and Turkey use proxies to threaten the Tigrinya’s historical role as the ultimate security guarantor of the Red Sea. That role must be reclaimed to remain vital to the security of Israel, the United States and Western allies, leveraging technology, investment and markets to overcome our existential crises at home: abject poverty and environmental devastation.

Rahm Emanuel thus missed a core truth: Israel’s survival depends on mastering its own backyard, not relying on Western capitals. Somaliland is just the start.

The final, essential piece of this Red Sea architecture is Eritrea, anchored by a Tigrinya majority bound to the Jewish people through the ancient Orit faith, and united against the shared security threat from Iran and its Islamist proxies.

Habtom Ghebrezghiabher , Ph.D., from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, is an expert on geopolitical and security dynamics in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea region.

Turkey’s Strategic Blunder on Somaliland

Turkey’s Strategic Blunder on Somaliland

For years, Turkey has systematically obstructed Somaliland’s pursuit of international recognition while portraying itself as an impartial mediator in the Horn of Africa. This policy exposes a glaring double standard. Ankara fiercely defends and militarily protects the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, yet condemns Somaliland’s quest to restore the sovereignty it voluntarily surrendered in 1960. Turkey cannot credibly champion self-determination in Cyprus while denying Somalilanders the same right.

The comparison overwhelmingly favors Somaliland. The people of Somaliland are indigenous to their homeland. British Somaliland gained internationally recognized independence on 26 June 1960 before voluntarily entering a union with the former Italian Somalia five days later to form the Somali Republic. Following the collapse of that failed union in 1991 and after suffering the internationally documented genocide committed by Siad Barre’s regime, Somaliland reasserted the sovereignty it had previously possessed. Many Somalilanders therefore view their case not as secession but as the dissolution of a failed political union and, morally and legally, as one strengthened by the principle of remedial self-determination.

Northern Cyprus presents a very different case. It emerged following Turkey’s 1974 military intervention and survives through Ankara’s political, military, and economic support. Unlike Somalilanders, who are indigenous to their homeland, the Turkish community in Northern Cyprus traces its presence to settlement during the Ottoman Empire’s rule over the island.. Yet Turkey insists the world should recognize Northern Cyprus while simultaneously campaigning against Somaliland. Such a position is not based on principle; it is based on strategic convenience.

Turkey’s opposition has been deliberate. Former Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu publicly acknowledged challenging then British Foreign Secretary William Hague over discussions concerning Somaliland’s recognition, arguing that recognition of Somaliland would require recognition of Northern Cyprus. Davutoğlu further stated that he contacted the late Somaliland President Ahmed Mohamed Mohamoud (Silanyo) and encouraged negotiations with Somalia. From Somaliland’s perspective, these talks served one overriding purpose: delaying recognition by creating the illusion that Somaliland’s political future remained negotiable.

Turkey has also repeatedly argued that Somaliland and Somalia belong together because they share the same language, religion, ethnicity, and culture. This argument collapses under even minimal scrutiny. More than twenty Arab states share Arabic language, Islam, and similar cultural traditions, yet each is an independent sovereign state. Conversely, countries such as Kenya, India, Switzerland, and Canada are multilingual and multiethnic yet remain stable sovereign states. Shared identity neither guarantees successful statehood nor obliges separate peoples to remain in a political union against their will.

The decisive issue is not ethnicity but political consent. Most Somalilanders reject reunification because their historical experience convinced them that their security, liberty, and political future are best protected through separate statehood. Respecting that democratic choice—not romantic notions of pan-Somali nationalism—is the foundation of lasting peace.

Turkey repeated the same strategic mistake when it mediated between Ethiopia and Somalia following the Ethiopia-Somaliland Memorandum of Understanding. Instead of acknowledging Somaliland as a direct stakeholder, Ankara once again sought to preserve Mogadishu’s position and undermine an agreement that could have advanced Somaliland’s international standing. Rather than acting as an honest broker, Turkey appeared determined to prevent any diplomatic breakthrough benefiting Somaliland.

Ankara fundamentally misread the strategic landscape. Had Turkey maintained neutrality, it could have preserved influence in both Hargeisa and Mogadishu. Instead, it openly aligned itself with Somalia’s position and transformed Somaliland from a potential partner into a strategic adversary.

The consequences are now becoming evident. Having repeatedly found the door to recognition blocked by Turkey, Somaliland has increasingly sought partnerships beyond Ankara’s sphere of influence. Among those partners is Israel—Turkey’s principal strategic competitor in the Eastern Mediterranean and an increasingly influential actor in the Red Sea region. Supporters of Somaliland’s diplomatic strategy argue that Israel’s recognition of Somaliland as a sovereign state marks a turning point that Turkey’s own policies helped bring about. Whether viewed through diplomacy or geopolitics, Ankara’s obstruction has accelerated the very realignment it sought to prevent.

Turkey relied on the same strategy repeatedly—blocking recognition through mediation and preserving the status quo. Somaliland adapted. Instead of abandoning its aspirations, it diversified its alliances and sought partners beyond Turkey’s reach. This shows that Turkey has naively underestimated Somaliland’s resolve.

In the end, Turkey’s Somaliland policy has become a textbook case of strategic failure. By placing Somalia’s interests above its own long-term geopolitical interests, Ankara surrendered the opportunity to maintain influence across both sides of the Somali Peninsula. It has instead created space for Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Greece, and Cyprus to deepen their engagement with Somaliland.

History often punishes states that mistake obstruction for strategy. In attempting to deny Somaliland international recognition, Turkey has weakened its own strategic position in the Horn of Africa while pushing Somaliland toward Turkey’s regional rivals. That is not a diplomatic success—it is a self-inflicted geopolitical defeat.

About the Author
The author is a PhD candidate in Peace and Development Studies. He also teaches Public Policy and Ethics in Government at the Civil Service Institute in Hargeisa, Somaliland, and is an active political commentator on local, regional, and international affairs. He can be reached at abhussein1988@gmail.com