The MoU That Stirring Political Turbulence in the Horn
The Horn is sharpened again. The entire village might be ablaze soon. The people living in the village are worried, for justified reasons. The neighbors, close and afar, are bewildered. The Horse of Nationalism is neighing for attention. And much more is happening. In the midst of all this, the international community appears to be busy somewhere else.
The politics of the Horn of Africa has always been unique in many ways and has its own unique logic of practice, resulting from its state formation and transformation processes, state-society relationship, transnational patronage, the primacy of regime security, the culture of destabilization of the neighbors and war by proxies, the quasi-open system and unceasing humanitarian crises, among others. The “Horn” should be taken literally when discussing the Horn affairs. This time, the Horn is very sharp and ready to spill blood.
For any keen observer, the gravity of the crisis could be gleaned from the pace with which Somalia reacted to the deal and the responses of the international community at large. For instance, it took less than 24 hours for the government of Somalia to show its outrage and lash out against Ethiopia. It rejected the deal with strong words possible, dubbed the move as an act of aggression, warned Ethiopia that it would fight if the MoU materializes, and vowed to defend its sovereignty at any cost.
Crucially, Somalia is ruthlessly escalating the matter. It has engaged in revamping bilateral diplomatic support and appealing to all Somali nationals to defend their land, and is beating the drums of war on a daily basis. There is a growing securitization of the issue from both sides. As it stands, alliances and re-alliances are unfolding in the region. Thus, the stakes are very high, with ramifications for regional peace and security.
The MoU, under international law and practice, is a quasi-legal document which, stricto sensu, is not legally binding. One of the parties may not acquire legal rights emanating from the MoU. Nor are third parties required to honor its terms and conditions. It has a quasi-legal status because its binding or otherwise nature is conditional. Pursuant to Art. 2(1)(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, “It is not the title or other appellation given to a diplomatic document that determines whether it is of a legally binding nature. Rather, it is the intent of the drafters to agree in written form governed by international law, irrespective of its designation, that determines the binding nature of the document.” Thus, the MoU is binding as long as both parties intend to create legal rights and subsequently, thereby pledge to uphold it in good faith. Besides, it may also help understand state practices in international law.
Beyond its legal relevance, however, the MoU carries a political commitment of a significant nature. It clearly shows that the parties are committed to collaborating on a specific set of issues, and there exists clear convergence of interests and propensity for further partnership. The MoU, therefore, symbolizes a preliminary agreement to undertake a legally binding treaty and hence, its significance goes beyond the technical considerations.
As to the content of the deal, apart from divergent interpretations and at times, conflicting press releases, we know little about the terms and conditions of the MoU for it has not been publicized. At the signing ceremony, PM Abiy declared that Ethiopia gained a port and access to the Red Sea, and on Twitter (now X) he called God as his witness. But on the same podium and at the same time, the President of Somaliland, Muse Bihi Abdi, unequivocally stated that Ethiopia agreed to be the first country to recognize Somaliland in exchange for a leased plot of land. Shortly after, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Somaliland issued a press release confirming the same fact. Alas, after two days, the Ethiopian government modified its previous statement awkwardly, in which it stated that the MoU enshrines that “the Ethiopian government to make an in-depth assessment towards taking a position regarding the efforts of Somaliland to gain recognition and in any case, recognition will be extended only upon receiving the land designated for the port and naval base…” While Ethiopia emphasized access to the sea, Somaliland capitalized on recognition.
The MoU and the flurry of press releases and clarifications created more confusion and raised more questions than it answered. Whatever the case, thus far, there is more misunderstanding than there is understanding!
After all, Somaliland has been and still remains to be a de facto state–having a relatively stable and functioning democracy– in one of the most turbulent regions of the world. Villa Somalia has lost effective control over Somaliland for more than three decades now. It has not, for all practical purposes, been able to effectively govern its sphere, which is a tall order by itself, much less administering Somaliland. Somalia is a fragile state, grappling with state reconstruction and nation-building projects. Leaving aside other matters, in its endeavor to fight terrorism the help of neighbors, particularly Ethiopia, is still much needed. It is pretty much expected that the government of Somalia would oppose Ethiopia´s gesture with the utmost sense of urgency
The issue is much deeper than it appears. I argue that the controversies surrounding the MoU are more political than legal. That is, it is neither the content nor the very fact of signing the MoU that sparked tensions as such. Because it is customary to engage in commercial activities with a de facto state such as Somaliland. Rather, the rationales for the outrage largely lie in Ethiopia´s attempt to recognize Somaliland. To begin with, virtually all the letters of condemnation from the international community revolve around and directed at the issue of state recognition. So far, there is not a single country that expressly supported Ethiopia´s move to recognize Somaliland.
All the same, Ethiopia could also invoke, as it did, the unilateral and discretionary nature of state recognition under international law. Insofar as an entity fulfills objective criteria for statehood, i.e., defined territory, permanent population, government and capacity to enter into relations with other states, it is up to each sovereign state to recognize (not to recognize) such an entity as a state. Since there is no diplomatic practice of collective recognition, one of the states has to make a first move. That is how many members of the United Nations came into existence, during the good(bad) old days.
Contrary to Somalia´s framing of the case, state recognition does not, ipso facto, constitute an act of aggression under international law. For one, an act of aggression commonly presupposes an illegal use of force by one state against another, aimed at territorial expansion. Second, it is the United Nations Security Council that has the ultimate authority to determine whether certain acts tantamount to aggression or not. In the presence case, however, both elements are absent or at least, it is premature to draw any conclusion.
As for Somalilanders, official recognition is what they have been desperately yearning for and if the MoU goes into effect, it will be a game-changer forever. There is one more thing. The signing of the MoU came into fruition just days after Somalia and Somaliland resumed a political dialogue under the rubric of Djibouti. It is possible that Ethiopia is exploiting the situation to enhance its leverage such that Eritrea, Djibouti and Somalia would offer a better deal and the international community might heed Ethiopia´s call. Similarly, Somaliland might have considered playing multiple cards to bolster its position vis-à-vis Somalia and regional players.
About Author:
Moges Zewdu Teshome is a doctoral candidate in Interdisciplinary International Studies at Vienna School of International Studies/ University of Vienna. Moreover, he is the host of a podcast known as የሀሳብ ገበታ-a Buffet of Ideas