Can Alliance Led by Egypt Hinder Ethiopia’s Quest for Sea Access?
For scholars in the field of political science and international relations, the international realm is basically the realm of balance of power, where states continuously struggle for much power and sustainable peace.
The influence states impose on one another may be exerted through bilateral persuasion, negotiating where third parties are available, pressing threats or the combination of those mechanisms.
After the the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed between the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali (PhD) and the Republic of Somaliland’s President Muse Bihi Abdi on January 1, 2024, we have been witnessing both converging and diverging positions on how this agreement could shape cooperation among countries residing in the region of the Horn of Africa.
Several scholars and concerned citizens have expressed outspokenly that the MoU between Ethiopia and Somaliland regarding sea access is a significant development in the region. The agreement likely addresses landlocked Ethiopia’s need for a reliable and efficient route to the sea to facilitate trade and boost economic growth.
On the other hand, Somaliland, as a coastal nation, can benefit from this arrangement through increased economic activity and the potential for infrastructural development. This MoU has the potential to deepen ties between the two nations and foster greater cooperation in areas such as trade, transportation, and investment. It is, however, essential to monitor how this agreement contributes to the regional dynamics in the Horn of Africa, as the Somali government has been seriously boycotting the agreement, seeking support from its counterparts.
In this particular piece, I don’t aspire to address the entire status quo of alliances initiated in the region following the MOU signed between Ethiopia and Somaliland, as my due emphasis is on analyzing Egypt’s intervention vis-à-vis Ethiopian stances on the one hand and Somalia’s fate on the other.
Towards this end, I address four questions: (1) Why has Egypt been orchestrating counter-alliances against Ethiopia? (2) Do international laws allow landlocked countries like Ethiopia to access coastlines? (3) Can Egypt lead a counter-alliance against Ethiopia and prohibit Ethiopia’s vision of access to the sea? (4) What would be Somalia’s fate other than politicizing this development for its sovereignty?
Leveraging current Ethiopia’s political factions for Egypt’s interests?
In this section, I attempted to answer the question: Why did the Egyptian Successive Regimes stand against Ethiopia’s National Interest at any cost so far?
States, according to the realpolitik doctrines, usually wait for suitable occasions so that they can grab the opportunities in order to favor themselves, as they merely stand for the realization of their respective national interests.
Letting aside other instances, the ongoing wars happening between Russia and Ukraine and Israel and Palestine have made it clear that not only the relations between those nations but also the power struggle among great powers have seriously been entangled with uncertainties.
Analytically speaking, the orchestration of the anti-Ethiopian alliance led by Egypt made it clear that the Egyptian government has been calculating the current domestic political faction in Ethiopia, especially the deterioration of relations between the government of the FDRE and the armed organizations residing in the two major regions, namely Oromia and Amhara, on the one hand, and the situations related to the TPLF in the Tigray region on the other hand.
Moreover, the status quo state between Ethiopia and Eritrea seems to have initiated Egypt to assume that this is the right time to revisit its roles based on diverging agendas among states in East Africa in general and the Horn region in particular.
Most importantly, as successive Egyptian regimes severely worry about Ethiopia’s deepened influence on the African cause, deep-rooted in Pan-African nationalism both continentally and globally, it is just the continuity of historical experiences now being orchestrated by president El-sisi’s regime.
However, deeply analysing Ethiopia’s experiences, such kind calculations appeared to be nonsense as Ethiopians stood up together against external interventions all the time in their history, irrespective of their internal factions. The history of the victories of the battles of Adwa and Karra Marra against the Italian and Somali invasions, respectively, demonstrates that Ethiopians, being severely divided internally, never allow external powers to intervene in their domestic affairs.
Recently, too, being under divisive domestic political factions, Ethiopians have realised their aspiration of building a huge dam, namely ‘the GERD’ on the Nile River, amid a series of political and economic orchestrations mostly led by Egypt so far
Do international laws allow landlocked countries like Ethiopia to access coastlines?
The instant answer to this question is yes. Although it is not straightforward enough, almost all international conventions consider that landlocked countries have rights and privileges to access coastlines based on the agreements made between or among states.
As there are about 44 landlocked states across the world, of which 16 are in Africa, Ethiopia is the most populous among all.
Including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and other prevailing laws, it was underlined that the rights of access to and from the sea for the landlocked countries are confirmed by the existence of freedom of transit through the territory of transit states by all means of transport.
This same UNCLOS convention also determines that the concerned states can realize these aspirations by entering into different agreement modalities, including bilateral, sub-regional, or regional ones.
In the mother document of Agenda 2063 prepared by AU, too, I remember the statement directly saying, “Utilizing the African natural resources for African shared prosperity has given priority.”
It is doubtless that Africa had enormous natural resources to realize its prosperity, including virgin and fertile farmlands, unutilized water, minerals, gas, oil resources, and so on.
However, because of the stagnant political stances existing so far among African states, the “my way or highway” attitude severely devastated Africa’s aspirations for Africa’s prosperity, peace, integration, and cooperation. The challenges Ethiopia has gone through to build its “Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD)” on the Nile River are the most crucial example among other similar hindrances happening to most African countries.
Taking all these conventions into consideration, any sensible person should ask these three questions to understand what Ethiopia is doing to realize its vision of access to sea so far. (1) Does Ethiopia have a right to access the sea? (2) Should Ethiopia deal with the Egyptian state to realize its interest in sea access? (3) Does it make sense for the Somalian government to choose the swaggering tactic of allying with Egypt rather than negotiating with Ethiopia? I have given due emphasis to these questions across the sections below
Egypt’s Counter-Movements Against Ethiopia: Change and Continuities
Critically analyzed, there is nothing new in Egypt’s current positions witnessed against Ethiopia’s visions to secure access to and from the Red Sea. It is part and parcel of Egypt’s government’s stances toward Ethiopia in particular and its ambitions to be a hegemonic power in general. What President El-sisi has been doing right now is what his predecessors used to do to Ethiopia so far.
While reading the book entitled “The River War,” written by the former British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, I have reaffirmed that the successive Egyptian government’s stances against Ethiopia don’t change with regimes, as they are deeply threatened by Ethiopia’s growth and the power Ethiopia could assume regionally, continentally, and globally. Churchill explicitly argued that the successive Egyptian ruling classes established one formidable narrative, usually referred to as “Egypt is the gift of the Nile River.”
Although this scenario has been challenged and almost changed following the successful construction of the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) so far, the Egyptian regimes would never like sharing the Nile water with anyone. Neither have they needed to witness Ethiopia’s development. That’s why, overtly or not, the Egyptian government, headed by President El-sisi, has been doing all it can to turn the remaining neighboring states against Ethiopia’s quest to access the Red Sea.
Churchill also wrote: “From 1819 to 1883, Egypt ruled the Sudan. Her rule was not kindly, wise, or profitable. Its aim was to exploit, not to improve the local population.” (Page 10)
However, Ethiopia’s continued stance towards safeguarding its national interests appeared to be clear and irreversible. Taking the disputes occurring on the utilization of the Nile River into consideration, Ethiopia’s need remains apparent to everyone that its goal is not deteriorating other nations ability to utilize Nile; its struggle is to make sure that all states gain their fair share.
On the other hand, despite the multiple efforts made against its national interests, Prime Minister Ahmed (PhD) repeatedly announced that Ethiopia doesn’t attempt to intervene in any country’s domestic issues, as its aspiration is to safeguard its national interests.
Taking these clear footprints into consideration, here, too, I would assert that Ethiopia’s peaceful measures to realize the right of access to the sea should also be seen in this framework. Ethiopia planned, launched, and finished its Great Renaissance Dam (GERD) amid a series of visible and invisible political and financial blockades, both from the Egyptian government and its allies. Ethiopia did so by sticking to the principles of peace, negotiation, and self-help.
Most Ethiopians continuously assert that we will absolutely realize our vision of access to the sea in a peaceful and win-win approach. This very aspiration of Ethiopia to access the sea doesn’t and never changes with regimes. Regimes come and go. However, this remains one of the fundamentals of our national interests.
As several other scholars in the field did argue and I myself have explicitly noted in my book entitled Ethiopia-Eritrea Relations since 1991: Wars, Stalemate, and Cooperation, “Despite a long history of interaction, the differing political, economic, and cultural systems present a challenge to greater coordination. This has been exacerbated by traditional definitions of Africa and the Middle East, in which the Red Sea has been used as a dividing line rather than a unifying geographic feature.” (Robe, 2022)
For any logical mind, I myself would reiterate that the Red Sea shouldn’t be a dividing line; it needs to be a unifying geographic feature!
For Ethiopian nationals, historically speaking, the anti-Ethiopian alliances led by successive Egyptian governments have instantly been labelled as the result of growing political antagonism as Ethiopia’s influence across the region is solid and thriving. This resembles the status quo of continuities existing between Ethiopia and Egypt in particular and the countries in the region in general.
For centuries, Ethiopia has been striving to access its fair share of the natural resources it shares across this volatile region of the Horn of Africa. However, because of some political and economic inefficiencies, Ethiopia has only remained ambitious so far.
Here, the change is that, as the regional presence of Ethiopia has substantially grown, the country has become assertive and able to influence, to the extent that we are now witnessing that it has provoked Egypt to mobilize anti-Ethiopian alliances. It is explicit that, if Egypt thinks that Ethiopia is still incapable of realizing the recent MoU signed with the Somaliland government, I would argue that it won’t get worried and might not officially declare anti-Ethiopian alliances to this extent.
Why should Somalia work on fruitful negotiations with Ethiopia and Somaliland rather than squabbling with external powers?
Since the very date of the signing of the MOU between Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed (PhD) and Somaliland’s President Muse Bihi, the Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and his government have been standing against the agreement both domestically and cooperating with their counterparts backing him.
As reported by World Africa online magazine, the Somalia president’s office explicitly notified the world that it would send a high-level delegation to Cairo (as it did days later) and asserted the delegation needed Cairo’s “unwavering” support for Somalia’s sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity. It is boldly noted that Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud visited Eritrea and Egypt instantly after the agreement between Ethiopia and Somaliland was made public.
However, as the interdependence between Ethiopia and Somalia is deeply rooted in a complex web of historical, political, economic, and social factors, it makes sense for Somalia to negotiate both with Somaliland and Ethiopia rather than swaggering with Egypt and other countries.
Geographically speaking, Ethiopia and Somalia share a long border, which facilitates trade, the movement of people, and cultural exchanges. This proximity means that developments in one country can significantly impact the other.
Both countries don’t share such close proximity with Egypt. So it is logical for both countries to fix their differences mainly through bilateral negotiations and, when necessary, invite third parties who could help them agree.
As Ethiopia looks for access to ports, conversely, Somalia seeks Ethiopia for goods and certain services. Given that Ethiopia has a larger, more diverse economy compared with Somalia, it is essential for both countries to work together rather than leaving vacuums for external interventions.
Ethiopia has played a significant role in supporting peace and security efforts in Somalia. As a neighboring country with historical ties to Somalia, Ethiopia has been actively involved in regional peace initiatives aimed at stabilizing Somalia and addressing the various challenges facing the country. Ethiopia has contributed troops to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), a peacekeeping mission mandated to support the Somali government in its efforts to combat insurgency and terrorism. Ethiopian forces have been instrumental in providing security, training Somali security forces, and conducting military operations against militant groups such as al-Shabaab.
In addition to its military support, Ethiopia has been engaged in diplomatic efforts to promote dialogue and reconciliation among various Somali political groups. Ethiopia has hosted peace talks and facilitated negotiations aimed at resolving political disputes and advancing the peace process in Somalia. Ethiopian officials have also played a role in supporting the Somali government in its state-building efforts, providing technical assistance and expertise in various areas such as capacity building, governance, and security sector reform.
Overall, Ethiopia’s presence in Somalia has been crucial in contributing to the maintenance of peace and security in the region. By actively participating in peacekeeping operations, providing military support, and promoting diplomatic efforts, Ethiopia has demonstrated its commitment to helping Somalia overcome its challenges and achieve lasting stability and development.
Had it not been for Ethiopia’s presence in Somalia, the very government in Mogadishu may even not have had the strength to ensure its survival against al-Shabaab and its alliances so far. Somalia’s government should be cautious regarding Ethiopia’s importance, not only for its domestic peace and stability but also for its role in regional cooperation. Warmongering rhetoric, which we have been witnessing across several media platforms, has no positive significance both for Somalia and the entire region
By Miessa Elema Robe, PhD
Miessa Elema Robe holds a PhD in Political Science and International Relations and is currently serving as head of the press secretariat at the Addis Abeba City Administration. He can be reached at miessaelemarobe@gmail.com
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